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Abstract 
 
Land tenure is high on the international development agenda. A key notion in these 
policy debates is tenure security, which is portrayed crucial for economic growth, 
poverty reduction, social cohesion and governance. A gap exists, however, between 
conceptions of tenure security in critical development literature and its practice within 
land policies.  
 
With this research, I demonstrate the complexities of the notion and the ambiguities of 
policies established around it. Taking the example of Malagasy land policy process, I 
ask how tenure security has been conceived, practiced and maintained. I ‘study through’ 
the policy process (Wedel and Feldman 2005), relying on concepts of policy narratives 
(Roe 1991), assemblages (Li 2007) and power (Gaventa 2006). I adopt qualitative, 
temporal and nested research approaches. I combine research from global, national and 
local levels, drawing on observations, semi-structured interviews and document 
analysis, attending to the stories of social actors linked to the policy. 
 
The Malagasy land policy was structured around the conceptions and practices of 
recognition and registration of legitimate tenure rights by decentralised authorities. The 
policy has, however, faced institutional, operational and social challenges. By 
questioning the state authority and control over land, it has also become an arena for 
power plays. Hence, the policy has generated unintended consequences in terms of 
tenure security and failed to win widespread support. The research findings highlight the 
importance of considering tenure security in land policy from multiple perspectives 
throughout the process and by attending to its inherently political nature. I conclude that 
tenure security is an institutional matter influenced by authority, political, social, 
cultural, and power relations between actors at different levels. Consequently, policies 
should go beyond the blueprint solutions of recognition and registration of tenure rights.  
 
 
Key words: Land, tenure security, policy process, policy narratives, assemblage, power, 
Madagascar 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
It [land] is of great value because it ensures our survival, it is the source of food for 
farmers, and a landless farmer is no longer a farmer. But the land has an importance. 
Thanks to it we can ensure contributions and obligations, and all the things we need 
on the religious, official and family side. 
A farmer in a focus group discussion, 02.06.2016 
 
Malagasy farmers describe land as life. Indeed, people’s activities, livelihoods, 
identities, histories and culture are entwined with land (Palmer et al. 2009; Lund 2011; 
Hall 2013; Li 2014). It can be used ‘to produce the material conditions of survival and 
enrichment, but also to gain control over others, and to define personal and social 
identities’ (Shipton and Goheen 1992, p.307). What makes land special is that it has 
different meanings for different people (Li 2014). Even though it is an immovable 
resource located in a given space (Hall 2013), it can be assembled as a national or global 
resource through discourses and the use of a variety of inscription devices (for instance 
maps, grids, surveys, graphs, images) (Li 2014). These multiple characteristics entail that 
diverse interests are linked to land. They make land inherently political, placing it ‘at the 
centre of philosophical and technical debates about how to secure “the right disposition 
of things”’ (Li 2014, p.12). These debates determine which land uses and rights are 
legitimised, which are excluded, and how (see Shipton and Goheen 1992; Li 2014).  
 
The debates on which I focus in this research are those that revolve around the notion of 
security of tenure of land. In fact, tenure security is often placed as an overarching 
objective in land policies and portrayed as a condition for economic and social 
development. I am then interested in analysing how tenure security has been conceived 
in these debates, operationalised on the ground and maintained as an objective in policies 
and development interventions through the interaction between a range of actors. I take 
as an example the development and implementation of the Malagasy land policy, which 
has been strongly articulated around the notion of tenure security. These investigations 
lead me to show the multidimensional nature of tenure security and the dynamisms of 
land policy processes. I demonstrate how tenure security is fundamentally a political 
question. 
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In this introduction, I set the scene and rationale for the research. I start by discussing 
the various definitions of tenure security that leave space for actors to conceive and 
operationalise it. I continue by explaining the overall land policy contexts in which 
tenure security is portrayed as a key objective and setting the scene for the Malagasy 
land policy. I then present the key questions, approaches and aims of the research. 
Finally, I outline the structure of the thesis. 
 
 
1.1. Various definitions of tenure security  
 
A useful starting point for disentangling the notion of tenure security is through the 
definition of land tenure, which can be described as ‘the relationship, whether legally or 
customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land’ (FAO 
2002, p.7).1 Land can be seen as property2 on which claims of access, use and benefit 
are made by people and enforced through custom, convention or law by the society or 
state (MacPherson 1978). These tenure and property relations constitute systems that 
‘determine who can use what resources for how long, and under what conditions’ (FAO 
2002, p.7). These relations between people are above all political (MacPherson 1978), 
meaning that tenure rights are ‘frequently re-negotiated, and the terms of those 
negotiations are widely diverse across time and space’ (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006, 
p.11). Security, then, becomes a question of ‘the certainty that a person’s rights to land 
will be recognised by others and protected in cases of specific challenges’ (FAO 2002, 
p.18). What is important in these generic definitions is that they highlight social relations 
and institutions, tenure rights, and the recognition and protection of rights. These 
elements are furthermore present in other conceptions.  
 
                                                 
1 Part of this research relies on francophone literature and has been conducted in French. I translate the 
French word foncier as ‘land tenure’. In fact, foncier can be understood as both relations between people 
and land (Rochegude 2005) and as a social relation through which a society defines rights to land, 
distributes land rights between actors and guarantees and administers land rights (Comité technique 
“foncier et développement” 2009). Shipton and Goheen (1992) note the challenges in translating 
terminologies between languages as follows: ‘The French umbrella term le foncier, for instance, stretches 
only awkwardly into its nearest English equivalents, perhaps 'land-holding' or 'tenure' or 'rights in land', 
and these leave out the land's products, to which the term can also refer.’ (p.314) Therefore, the French 
word foncier is broader than ‘land tenure’. 
2 In this research, I consider property and tenure relations/rights to be equivalent. While I have made the 
choice to talk about tenure, I refer to the word property when it has been used by the cited authors. 
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The relational and institutional lens is central to a definition proposed by Lavigne 
Delville (2010 and 2017b), who sees tenure security as a product of authorities and 
institutions that validate, guarantee and confirm socially legitimate tenure rights. What 
is interesting here is that the purpose of institutions, as long-lasting rules and agreements, 
is hence to ‘reduce uncertainty about how to act in diverse situations’ (Leftwich 2004, 
p.10). They should procure a feeling of security for tenure right-holders. Simbizi et al. 
(2014) equally focus on the relational aspects, conceiving tenure security as a feature of 
tenure systems that are constituted of elements (people, social and public institutions, 
continuum of land rights and land information) and interaction between these.  
 
The debate on security has furthermore raised questions on the nature of tenure rights to 
be protected. Indeed, tenure security has been linked to the notion of a bundle of rights 
that Schlager and Ostrom (1992) conceived as access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion and alienation. For instance, Migot-Adholla and Bruce (1994) argue that, to 
have tenure security, the holder of a parcel should be able to use, manage and transfer it 
as well as benefit from its produce without disturbance and in a continuous manner. 
Tenure security would thus have three components: breadth, duration and assurance 
(Place et al. 1994). Here, breadth refers to the different aspects of the bundle of rights, 
duration to the timeframe during which people can benefit from these rights and 
assurance to the absence of hindrance (Place et al. 1994). Nevertheless, scholars 
considering tenure security from its institutional perspective have challenged the 
definitions based on the bundle of rights. Lavigne Delville (2010) argues that they define 
constituents of private property rather than tenure security. Sjaastad and Bromley (2000) 
also prefer focusing only on assurance, as for them breadth defines the size of the bundle 
and duration the substance of the rights without having explicit links with security. 
Indeed, what is needed is certainty of being able to exercise given rights during a set 
timeframe (Lavigne Delville 2017b), but the constituents of these rights and the 
preferred timeframe depends on each person.  
 
The lenses of recognition and protection of rights have often meant that scholars and 
practitioners consider tenure security through legal and administrative practices that are 
supposed to bring clarity over rights and prevent tenure disputes from arising (Palmer 
1998). Gelder (2010), for instance, has introduced a tri-partite view where a legal 
construction of tenure security is placed between perception and de-facto situation on 
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the ground. Simbizi et al. (2014) emphasise legal aspects by talking about the 
enforcement of rights in a continuum of rights approach (see also UN-Habitat and GLTN 
2008; Barry and Augustinus 2016) and introduce administrative dimensions by referring 
to the management of land information. Indeed, tenure security is associated with the 
operation and governance of land administration, stressing the importance of registering, 
managing and up-dating information on tenure rights (Palmer 1998).  
 
Against this background, I find that tenure security thus relates to a sense of comfort that 
what one has is recognised and protected by authorities and institutions and will not be 
taken away when one needs it. It is, above all, a subjective notion linked to the assurance 
of holding something legitimately and not an objectively measurable notion as breadth 
and duration would suggest (see Migot-Adholla and Bruce 1994; Place et al. 1994). 
Scholars nevertheless do recognise this subjective dimension, linking it to the perception 
of people (e.g. Migot-Adholla and Bruce 1994; Place et al. 1994; Sjaastad and Bromley 
2000; FAO 2002; Broegaard 2005; Bouquet 2009; Gelder 2010; Simbizi et al. 2014). 
However, there is a difference between the perception of losing one’s rights and the 
likelihood of it happening (Sjaastad and Bromley 2000). In other words, ‘what resides 
in the mind of the perceiver is something different than the facts on the ground’ (Gelder 
2010, p.452).  
 
This overview demonstrates that there is no unilateral conception of tenure security. To 
understand its multidimensional nature, the relational and institutional definitions invite 
further investigation of the authority, social and cultural characteristics of tenure 
relations that influence the sources and conditions of tenure (in)security. The legal and 
administrative views suggest analysing practices for securing tenure. Attention to 
people’s perceptions calls for a grasp of the subjective nature of tenure security and 
people’s interests linked to it. I follow these lines of thought in the literature review 
(Chapter 2) and overall research, adding a consideration of power plays and everyday 
politics that I find to be inherent to land tenure relations.  
 
Finally, these multiple definitions leave space for conceiving tenure security, designing 
actions to secure tenure and debating its possible benefits in the context of land policies 
and development interventions. Gelder (2010) observes that this ‘indiscriminate use of 
the different elements of tenure security and the confusion it generates easily leads to 
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detrimental consequences for theory building and policy making’ (p. 452). Indeed, this 
opacity is not without risks, considering that tenure security has become a key objective 
for public policies. 
 
 
1.2. Tenure security as an object for policies 
 
Land tenure questions are high on the international development agenda. This can be 
attributed to the revival of debates on land reform, policies and governance (see Sikor 
and Müller 2009; Borras and Franco 2010). Land reforms revolve around three models: 
i) redistribution, conducted either through expropriation or market mechanisms; ii) 
‘post-totalitarian land distribution’; and iii) land registration and titling (Sikor and 
Müller 2009, p.1309). It is the third form of land registration and titling as well as the 
interconnected legal and administrative measures that have been most closely linked to 
tenure security (see Dickermann et al. 1989). In terms of land policies and governance, 
Borras and Franco (2010) attribute the revival of land on the international agenda to the 
2006 International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD); 
the establishment of the United Nations (UN) Commission on Legal Empowerment of 
the Poor; the development of guidelines on land governance by the European Union 
(EU); the report of the World Bank on land policies in 2003 (see Deininger 2003; Bruce 
and Migot-Adholla 1994; Byamugisha 2013); and the engagement of civil society 
organisations in campaigns for agrarian reform. These have since been followed by the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests in the Context of National Food Security coordinated by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and endorsed by the Committee 
on World Food Security (CFS) in 2012; the African Land Policy Initiative (LPI) of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Development 
Bank (AfDB) and the African Union Commission (AUC); and the Land Governance 
Assessment Framework (LGAF) exercise set up by the World Bank. The Voluntary 
Guidelines in particular are considered the first international soft law instrument on land 
tenure (Munro-Faure and Palmer 2012) and the most concrete element of global land 
governance (Margulis et al. 2013). 
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In these public debates, tenure security is portrayed as crucial for economic growth, 
poverty reduction, social cohesion and governance (Palmer 1998; Byamugisha 2013). 
For instance, tenure security, when achieved through clear and enforced rights, is 
considered to create incentives for investment (e.g. in agriculture), provide access to 
credit, facilitate transfers of land and revive informal assets, thus raising people out of 
poverty (Place et al. 1994; Rose 1994; De Soto 2000; Deininger 2003; Colin et al. 2009; 
Lavigne Delville 2010; Arnot et al. 2011; Pedersen 2016). Moreover, tenure security is 
associated with social integration and citizenship when people’s assets are protected, 
and rights recognised by legal systems (Lavigne Delville 2010; Hall 2013) or when 
tenure systems are governed according to common social norms (Rose 1994). More 
recently, tenure rights and security have been linked to participation in decision-making 
by empowering and providing people, especially women, with a stronger voice in 
development processes (Deininger 2003; Hall 2013) or protecting them against 
dispossession (Byamugisha 2013).  
 
These debates have also led to proposals for action. The Voluntary Guidelines, in 
particular, call for the recognition, respect, safeguard, promotion and facilitation of all 
legitimate tenure rights and for the provision of access to justice to handle any 
infringements (FAO and CFS 2012). They set reference points and standards of best 
practice to which states and other actors can refer when developing their own strategies, 
policies, legislation, programmes and activities (Munro-Faure and Palmer 2012). The 
successes of these policies and development interventions are then increasingly 
measured against notions of tenure security. As an example, some of the indicators of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the UN include references to tenure 
security where they measure rights to land and property (indicators 1.4.2. and 5.a.1.).3 
 
                                                 
3 Target 1.4.: ‘By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have 
equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land 
and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial 
services, including microfinance.’ The target is measured against indicator 1.4.2.: ‘Proportion of total 
adult population with secure tenure rights to land, with legally recognized documentation and who 
perceive their rights to land as secure, by sex and by type of tenure.’ 
Target 5.a.: ‘Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to 
ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural 
resources, in accordance with national laws.’ The target is measured against indicator 5.a.1.: ‘(a) 
Proportion of total agricultural population with ownership or secure rights over agricultural land, by sex; 
(b) share of women among owners or rights-bearers of agricultural land, by type of tenure.’ 
https://landportal.org/book/sdgs  
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Since the mid-2000s, tenure security has received additional attention with increased 
interest in and commodification of land and natural resources that have in turn been 
driven by concerns over food security, conservation of the environment and economic 
development. The interest in land has raised fears about the dispossession of people, 
states expropriating land from farmers, and new patterns of access and control over land 
(e.g. Cotula et al. 2009; Alden Wily 2011; Cotula and Vermeulen 2011; De Schutter 
2011; Peluso and Lund 2011; White et al. 2012; Fairhead et al. 2012; Burnod et al. 2013; 
Burnod and Andriamanalina 2017). Hence, calls have been made for securing the tenure 
rights of local people and ensuring their livelihood opportunities (e.g. De Schutter 2011). 
This has led some actors to call for mapping of tenure rights (De Schutter 2011) or the 
decentralisation of land administration and the registration of land rights as a timely 
response (Byamugisha 2013). In the latter, systems should be simple, basic and 
sustainable (Enemark et al. 2014). Enemark et al. (2014) even boldly state that there is 
‘a security of tenure vacuum’ because an estimated 75 percent of the world’s population 
are out of the reach of statutory administration and thus ‘remain trapped in poverty’ 
(p.34). The varied calls for tenure security do not, however, target only rural people: this 
has also been highlighted as an issue for investors whose rights governments and local 
authorities should guarantee (Cotula 2016; Pedersen and Buur 2016). 
 
These examples demonstrate that tenure security is cast as an objective for wider 
economic and social development, a concern of its own and a motivation for action. A 
myriad of social actors and institutions are involved in policy debates and practices at 
various levels. These include intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), international 
financial institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society 
organisations (CSOs), social movements, local communities and the private sector that 
all operate alongside states (Camprese and Borrini 2011; Hall 2013; Margulis et al. 2013; 
Arial 2014). All these actors have their own ideas of tenure security and strategies for 
securing tenure where they combine references from global conceptions, national 
programmes and local experiences. This complexity makes policies focused on tenure 
security interesting objects for analysis.  
 
 
 
 
21 
 
1.3. Land policy of Madagascar  
 
These debates and trends on tenure security can also be seen in Madagascar, where a 
land policy was enacted in 2005 and consolidated in 2015. The purpose of the 2005 
policy was to improve the conditions for investment, agricultural production, 
environmental management, decentralisation and social cohesion (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2005a). The 2015 policy strengthened these development objectives, 
simply seeing land as ‘a basis for development’ (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a).  
 
The land policy emphasised tenure security to achieve the stated development 
objectives. Its 2005 version aimed to ‘respond to a massive demand for securing tenure 
[…] through the formalisation of non-written tenure rights and through the safeguard 
and regularisation of written tenure rights’ (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a). The 
2015 version is along the same lines, considering the securing of the diversity of rights 
as a solution for development (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a). Hence, the Malagasy 
land policy is part of land reforms centred on registration and titling (Dickermann et al. 
1989; Sikor and Müller 2009). One of its key principles, on which I focus in this 
research, has been to recognise rights to land based on its current appropriation and use 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a). This recognition is done by local commissions and 
has led to the issuing of certificates and up-dating of land occupancy status maps 
(PLOFs). The process is coordinated by local land offices opened in rural municipalities. 
 
The policy development and implementation has brought together a number of actors, 
ranging from donors, international and national experts, administrators, investors, civil 
society representatives to municipal actors. Farmers, who can apply for certificates, are 
considered the final beneficiaries. The policy thus placed their security of tenure in the 
foreground and questioned former state control of land. This has not happened without 
contestation due to the divergent interests of actors in terms of tenure security and 
development. In the land policy itself, there is tension between agricultural investment 
objectives and securing tenure for small-scale farmers. These divergent interests have 
then contributed to the ‘complexity, ambiguity and messiness’ of the policy process 
(Wedel and Feldman 2005, p.2), which investigation is at the centre of this research. 
This complexity can moreover be explained through the inherently political nature of 
land tenure and the power dynamics linked to public policies.  
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1.4. Research objectives and questions 
 
My motivation to analyse tenure security through a policy process stems from my 
previous professional experience acquired in the land tenure team of FAO from 2008 to 
2013. I was closely engaged in the development and implementation of the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure. An overarching theme in these 
policy debates was tenure security. These experiences motivated me to examine further 
the notion and to analyse a policy process between global, national and local influences. 
I chose Madagascar as an example due to its preponderance in global debates and 
because of my previous exposure to the country through my Masters degree in 
geography from the University of Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris 1.   
 
With this motivation in mind, the key research question asks: How has tenure security 
been conceived, practiced and maintained in land policy development and 
implementation processes in Madagascar? This question requires disentangling how 
key policy ideas are conceived, operationalised and translated in practice, and exploring 
the dynamisms of land policy processes.  
 
Through these examinations, I show the multidimensionality of the notion of tenure 
security. My argument is that seeing tenure security solely through one lens (for instance 
that of securing tenure through land registration) hides some of its more dynamic aspects 
related to authority, institutional, political, social and cultural relations, and to 
interaction between actors of local, national and global levels.4 Through these analyses, 
I also untangle the politics behind policy processes. My stance is that these processes 
are significantly impacted by everyday politics especially when one deals with an object 
such as land. These politics then impact the sources of tenure (in)security as well as 
influence prescriptions for securing tenure. I conclude that the combined focus on the 
multidimensionality of tenure security and the politics of policy processes can reveal 
hidden dynamisms that enhance existing and/or create new sources of tenure insecurity 
and that explain some of the failures of policies. 
 
                                                 
4 See Borras and Franco (2010) on similar criticisms of treating land governance and policies as matters 
of efficient functioning of administration that end up ignoring questions of political power recognition of 
rights, access to land, political economy and political change. 
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In order to explore the main research question, I ‘study through’ the Malagasy land 
policy process, attending to its framings, dominant ideas, practices, inclusion and 
exclusion of actors, power dynamisms, and results (see Keeley and Scoones 2003; 
Wedel and Feldman 2005). This is done at temporal and multilevel perspectives 
analysing interaction between actors at global, national and local levels, from the 
elaboration of the policy in 2005 to its consolidation in 2015 (see Keeley and Scoones 
2003). I employ three main ideas to conceptually structure the work. First, I use the 
concept of policy narratives to observe how actors conceive tenure security and elaborate 
practices around it. Secondly, I employ the concept of assemblage to analyse how actors 
with divergent interests end up gathering around these policy narratives and practices as 
well as maintaining them in time and space. Thirdly, I rely on the concept of power to 
examine the dynamic interaction between actors in the policy process. 
  
The research is qualitative, building on observations, event-ethnography, semi-
structured interviews and document analysis. It is multidisciplinary, drawing from 
geography, political ecology, social anthropology and political science. I apply a nested 
research design bringing together the analysis of global, national and local levels. The 
global analysis concentrates on the intervention of international actors in the Malagasy 
land policy process and the links between the policy and international frameworks. The 
national examination looks at the conceptions of tenure security and power dynamisms 
in the development and implementation of land policy in Madagascar. The local study 
focuses on tenure security as everyday experience, the implementation of the policy and 
the enrolment of farmers in the process in one rural municipality. In data analysis, I pay 
attention to narratives in terms of what actors say, how, when and in which contexts 
(Riessman 1993; Gibbs 2007; Gubrium and Holstein 2009). The object is to give voice 
to the interviewed actors i.e. letting them tell the story of the policy process and tenure 
security. This finally entails that I take an interpretative stance towards the data.  
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1.5. Structure of the thesis 
 
I have organised this thesis into nine chapters. This introduction is followed by a 
literature review on tenure security, overview of the key research questions and setting 
of the conceptual foundations of the research (Chapter 2). I then explain the research 
design, implementation and methodology (Chapter 3) before providing a contextual 
background to the Malagasy land policy (Chapter 4), which facilitates the reading of the 
empirical chapters.   
 
Chapters 5 to 8 ‘study through’ the Malagasy land policy process, bringing forward 
empirical research findings. In Chapter 5, I analyse the conceptions actors have of tenure 
security in the 2005 and 2015 land policies and discuss how these have constituted a 
dominant policy narrative. In Chapter 6, I investigate the practices of securing tenure 
through which the policy, in the form of its dominant narrative, has been institutionally 
operationalised and translated on the ground. In Chapter 7, I focus on the local setting, 
taking the rural municipality of Ankazomiriotra as an example. This involves analysing 
farmers’ conceptions of tenure security and practices of securing tenure, and their 
subscription to the dominant policy narrative. In Chapter 8, I examine more in detail the 
assemblages of actors and power dynamisms that have emerged around the dominant 
policy narrative at the national level.   
 
Finally, the Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. I synthesise the salient thematic points and 
discuss the theoretical, methodological and policy contributions of the research. 
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2. Theoretical foundations  
 
 
I underlined in the introduction the various definitions of tenure security. The notion has 
been looked from the perspectives of social and institutional relations, the nature of 
tenure rights, actions to secure tenure and subjective perceptions of people. I also 
discussed how tenure security has become a buzz-word guiding the development and 
implementation of land policies. A range of social actors and institutions call for the 
importance of tenure security and are engaged in securing tenure, but with varied entry 
points, approaches and intentions. These global, national and local actors meet in the 
context of land policies.  
 
In this chapter, I focus on three strands of literature to deepen the understanding of tenure 
security. I make a distinction between i) the sources and conditions for tenure 
(in)security that are linked to the politics of land; ii) the practices of securing tenure that 
rely on legal, administrative and technological solutions; and iii) the interaction between 
actors and institutions in a wider political context. I start by exploring the conditions for 
tenure security that I argue are influenced by authority, institutional, political, social and 
cultural relations. I continue by analysing literature that discusses state-led, 
decentralised and customary practices for securing tenure and the commonalities 
between them. I follow up by considering the connections between global, national and 
local actors intervening in the context of land policies and development interventions. 
This outlook is needed as a basis for further exploring the considerations of tenure 
security in and the politics of the Malagasy land policy process. I leave aside the direct 
considerations of the nature of tenure rights, perceptions of tenure security and outcomes 
achieved through tenure security, as these are either context-specific or irrelevant to this 
research. To explore the notion of tenure security, I draw on a literature on political 
ecology, social anthropology and political science with a thematic focus on land tenure, 
natural resource management and rural development in sub-Saharan Africa. This body 
of literature is apt for pointing out the multidimensional and political side of land tenure 
security. 
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The literature review leads me to outline the research gaps and core questions. I then 
discuss the disciplinary foundations of the research and finish by introducing the 
concepts constituting the theoretical backbone of the research. Overall, the research 
analyses how key policy ideas such as tenure security are conceived and translated into 
practice, and how actors interact around these ideas. The research entails disentangling 
the mechanisms that shape the considerations of tenure security and the dynamisms of 
the Malagasy land policy process by drawing from the concepts of policy narratives, 
assemblages and power. My main argument is that tenure security should be considered 
from a multidimensional perspective throughout the policy process in order not to 
enhance existing or create new sources of insecurity.  
 
 
2.1. Sources and conditions for tenure (in)security 
 
A first strand of literature reveals what I call the sources of and conditions for tenure 
(in)security. I take inspiration from Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) who consider 
property regimes from multifunctional perspectives where they ‘cannot easily be 
captured in one-dimensional political, economic or legal models’ (p.2). Rather, the 
authors relate property to the political organisation of societies, sources of political 
power, the continuity of social groups, identities of individuals and groups, and religious 
meanings (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006). This leads me to consider tenure security in 
respect to authority between people and institutions, wider social changes and state 
politics, social dynamisms between individuals, families and groups, identities and 
cultural belonging.  
 
2.1.1. Authority and institutional relations  
 
Definitions of the concept of property allow the recognition and enforcement of rights 
by social actors and institutions to emerge as conditions for tenure security. For instance, 
for MacPherson (1978) property is a claim to use or benefit from something that can be 
a right to a common resource or an individual right to a private thing. These claims need 
to be justified and enforced to be considered property rights (MacPherson 1978). Lund 
(2011) agrees, noting that what makes property rights different is their recognition by 
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other social actors. These can be politico-legal-social institutions such as communities, 
state structures or coercive organisations (e.g. mafia) (Palmer 1998) that enforce rights 
based on custom, convention, law, economic or political influence, and threat of force 
or violence (MacPherson 1978; Shipton and Goheen 1992). 
 
Through the act of recognising and enforcing property rights and setting the rules of 
tenure, the institutions themselves gain authority in the eyes of the wider society (Sikor 
and Lund 2009). This can equally apply to people whose rights have been recognised 
and protected compared to those whose rights have not. The social actors and institutions 
can furthermore use this legitimacy to exercise control over natural resources and 
people, and structure spaces through processes scholars call territorialisation (Sikor and 
Lund 2009; see also Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). Gradually land becomes a political 
asset – a ‘territory to be controlled both for its economic value and as a source of leverage 
over other people’ (Berry 2009, p.24). This legitimate control exercised over land can 
furthermore provide political power for the commanding authorities (Benda-Beckmann 
et al. 2006) and constitute state power (Lund 2016).  
 
A number of institutions recognising and guaranteeing tenure rights can exist in parallel 
(e.g. statutory and customary institutions). This institutional plurality might be affected 
by ‘contradictions and insecurity regarding whose rights count, whose will be supported 
in the event of contest, and which decision-making structures are paramount' (Toulmin 
2008, p.13). Some people might gain legally undeniable and state-enforced rights on 
land that have, however, been legitimately occupied by others under customary tenure 
systems, making it difficult to decide on which basis rights should be recognised 
(Lavigne Delville 2010). In such a situation, people might be encouraged to seek 
recognition and enforcement of rights from multiple authorities, on the assumption that 
the plurality of sources guarantees stronger rights (Broegaard 2009). Broegaard (2009) 
notes, however, that this can lead to some actors ‘shopping around’ to find the most 
favourable guarantee. In a much-cited example from Indonesia, Benda-Beckmann 
(1981) describes how parties of tenure conflicts relied on institutions with which they 
would have the most favourable outcomes (‘forum shopping’), but also the institutions 
manipulated disputes for their political ends or silenced disputes affecting their interests 
(‘shopping forums’). The practice of ‘forum shopping’ can furthermore create 
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inequalities between people, as some have access to institutions with authority, while 
others don’t.  
 
This institutional plurality is recurrent in sub-Saharan Africa, where there is tension 
between statutory state policies and laws, and customary ones managed locally, with 
varying degrees of state recognition. While the plurality exists in practice, some studies 
find it conceptually superficial because customary tenure systems have been strongly 
modelled by the interpretations and actions of colonial and post-colonial states (Berry 
1997 and 2002; Peters 2004; Boone 2014). First, colonial and post-colonial powers have 
interpreted customary tenure systems by relying on European legal conceptions and 
language of rights, labelling them “communal tenure” as part of “customary law” 
(Whitehead and Tsikata 2003; Peters 2004; Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006). Second, 
customary tenure systems have been linked to wider state politics, for instance by 
placing chiefs and communities under central authority to mobilise the electorate and 
control land conflicts (Boone 2014). This observation has led Boone (2014) to challenge 
conceptions of state presence in rural sub-Saharan Africa as weak.  
 
2.1.2. Societal evolutions and state politics 
 
Societal evolutions and wider state politics linked, for instance, to the imperatives of 
global agreements, agricultural policies, environmental protection and changes in 
government can also influence the legitimacy and meaning of institutions guaranteeing 
tenure rights (MacPherson 1978; FAO 2002). Indeed, changes in the wider fabric of 
society might destabilise the position of a once-legitimate institution (Sikor and Lund 
2009, p.19) and fluctuations in state policies influence concepts of legality and security 
(Bouquet 2009). Institutional competition, in particular, can emerge when land becomes 
an asset and its control becomes a source of political power (Toulmin 2008; Sikor and 
Lund 2009; Lund 2011; Boone 2014). Such competition can weaken pre-existing tenure 
rights (Boone 2014). 
 
Such political changes may then entail that a tenure right recognised today might not be 
recognised tomorrow as the governing principles and rules of institutions evolve and 
fluctuate:  
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the right moment for pressing a particular claim depends on the contemporary 
political constellation of institutions that can recognize claims as valid. What 
constitutes a good claim at one moment may be less viable at another and may not 
resonate with what is generally or politically accepted.  
Sikor and Lund (2009, p.7) 
This explains, for instance, changes in the recognition of customary tenure rights in sub-
Saharan Africa where, under some political systems these rights are considered legally 
valid and under others not. Similarly, a right recognised by one actor or institution (e.g. 
customary authorities) might not be recognised by another one (e.g. statutory land 
administration).  
 
Societal evolutions and state politics can also lead to institutions losing their authority 
to validate rights. Sikor and Lund (2009) observe that ‘just as many people struggle to 
turn access claims into legitimate property, many are stripped of property rights to their 
possessions when the institutions that guaranteed them are weakened’ (p.19). In the light 
of these issues, a person seeking recognition of his/her claims should choose an 
institution that is legitimate and with a solid political, institutional and social position in 
time and space (Benjaminsen et al. 2008). This means that acquiring a position where 
rights are secured is not absolute (Boone 2014).   
 
These studies underscore the importance of analysing the relations people have in regard 
to institutions guaranteeing their rights, examining the social and legal legitimacy of 
these institutions, and investigating the changes in the position of these institutions in 
relation to societal and political change. I will contribute to this knowledge through the 
examination of the Malagasy land policy process. The objective is to show how the land 
policy has changed (or not) authority and institutional relations, as well as how it has 
altered the legitimacy of some institutions. I also explore the impacts that these 
variations have had on tenure security.  
 
2.1.3. Social dynamisms  
 
In addition to being an institutional matter, tenure security is furthermore connected to 
social dynamisms that entail interaction between people, households and communities. 
Indeed, tenure security can be sought via interpersonal links (Goodwin 2013) and 
connected to broader social entities (Shipton and Goheen 1992). Observing tenure 
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relations in Ghana, Berry (1997) finds that tenure security is about processes of 
negotiation. She argues that the position of individuals in families, communities and 
society at large define the security of rights. Using an example from Zimbabwe, 
Fortmann (1995) argues that property rights are constantly renegotiated in a dynamic 
process of telling stories and building discursive strategies to defend one’s position. For 
both Berry (1997) and Fortmann (1995), the audience and witnesses of narratives are 
important in legitimising and protecting tenure rights. These concepts join Rose’s (1994) 
definition of property as something held together by common beliefs, understandings 
and culture. For her, narratives are ways to persuade people of the common good of 
property regimes, thus ensuring that they are adhered to. A sense of security is 
constructed within and between communities in dynamic processes of negotiation (Rose 
1994). 
 
While Peters (2004 and 2009) recognises that narratives and stories are used to justify 
tenure and that negotiations do take place, she questions the extent to which the ability 
to negotiate one’s position is influenced by questions of class, race and gender, and 
conditioned by processes of division and exclusion within social groups. Case studies 
also relate tenure insecurity to inequalities in social position, wealth and power 
(Broegaard 2005; Ghebru and Lambrecht 2017). From these perspectives, insecurity is 
linked to power plays inside tenure systems that are not necessarily established around 
common consensual rules (Sjaastad and Cousins 2008). For instance, women might face 
impediments in customary tenure systems (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). Some scholars 
argue in favour of allocating separate individual or group rights to women that are 
guaranteed by statutory systems (Agarwal 2003), while others underscore that regardless 
of these, women’s rights continue to be mediated by social relations within broader 
contexts of marriage, household, kinship, custom and authority (see Jackson 2003, 
Whitehead and Tsikata 2003, Rao 2017). Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux (2004) illustrate 
this in relation to Western Madagascar, where village elders retain power over women 
and young people, taking decisions on common issues behind closed doors, even when 
apparently open and participatory discussions had been held earlier on.  
 
From the point of view of this research, it is important to note that the power plays might 
be intensified by social changes, during the introduction of new authorities and when 
land is increasingly conceived as private property. Platteau (1996) observes that the 
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evolution towards formal private property can disturb social stability and create 
injustices (e.g. towards women) by empowering the already wealthy and powerful 
segments of society. Overall, he finds that the processes of registration of rights are 
vulnerable to manipulations and abuses of power creating new sources of tenure 
insecurity, especially for less influential right-holders (Platteau 1996). For instance, 
there is a risk that local leaders gain power by progressively starting to control land for 
which local people sought recognition after them (Benjaminsen et al. 2008) or by 
capturing land thanks to the possession of information and resources that allow them to 
act strategically (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997). Also, in the contexts of privatisation of 
rights and economic development, women might face disadvantages in buying land 
(Whitehead and Tsikata 2003) and are seen as dependents if patriarchal norms have 
revived (Rao 2017). It might be that men resist political and legal changes because they 
are concerned at losing their authority and respect (Leeuwen 2017).  
 
These observations suggest that scholars should attend to social struggles and 
contentious relations in the examination of tenure security. They invite us to consider 
the potential winners and losers in tenure activities (Peters 2009) and note changes in 
the allegiance of people to different groups when resources become scarcer (Shipton and 
Goheen 1992). Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that the more powerful 
can also be subject to tenure insecurity if they are outsiders to the community and/or 
outside the dominant group controlling land allocation (Platteau 1996; Boone 2014). I 
explore this next.  
 
2.1.4. Belonging and citizenship  
 
Tenure security can also be analysed in relation to the sense of belonging of people to a 
certain community and in relation to the notion of citizenship. Lund (2011) finds that by 
establishing relations with an institution of public authority – be it a national or local 
one – people gain membership of and status within a certain community. This sense of 
belonging is essential, as the institutions allocate and define the rights of people, which 
in turn allows a sense of citizenship to emerge (Lund 2011). Belonging and citizenship 
can then be used to claim access to resources and to secure property, but the relation also 
works in the other sense, where property can strengthen claims of belonging and 
citizenship (Lund 2011).   
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People can claim belonging in terms of their past, origins and ancestry (Berry 2009). In 
Madagascar, for instance, land is linked to ancestors and ‘there exists a deep-rooted 
belief in the absolute land rights of the first cultivator of a land and his descendants’ 
(Evers 2013, p.127). Belonging to a village community is thus expressed as being 
descended from the founders of the village, possessing land and having a family tomb 
in the village (Omrane 2008) as a sign of family authenticity (Evers 2013). This sense 
of belonging furthermore guarantees security (Boué 2013).  
 
When referring to belonging as a source of security, differences are quickly drawn 
between “us” and “them”. These nuances have been central in tenure disputes across 
sub-Saharan Africa opposing, for instance, autochthones (us) and migrants (them) 
(Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux 2004; Boone 2014). In reference to Madagascar, Evers et 
al. (2011) observe that ‘groups often claim autochthonous status using the rhetoric that 
their ancestors are buried on their family lands’ (p.111). Ancestral linkage and tombs as 
concrete symbols can then be used as arguments to claim land in situations of 
competition (Evers 2013). These oppositions can be furthermore constructed and 
reinforced by state policies and legislation on access to land and directed in favour of or 
against groups based on ethnic and indigenous divisions. Chauveau (2009) notes that 
such state intervention took place with the 1998 land law in Côte d’Ivoire, which made 
a distinction between ‘customary rights in conformity with tradition’ (allocated to 
autochthones) and ‘customary rights of third parties’ (non-autochthones, but citizens of 
Côte d’Ivoire).   
 
As with questions of authority and social struggles, the positions of belonging and 
citizenship are constantly negotiated (Lund 2011). Indeed, conflicts over the meaning of 
belonging and citizenship have emerged with the value of land increasing and 
competition over land and authority becoming more common (Peters 2004; Berry 2009). 
Again, these conflicts might have been triggered by the evolution towards private 
property and registration of tenure rights. Peters (2004) argues that in such cases, the 
sense of belonging to a place has become a feeling of property belonging to someone. 
This in turn contributes to excluding people from land, such as those whose rights are 
considered secondary. Therefore, rather than enhancing security, these programmes 
might have created fear of dispossession and revived custom as a basis for legitimising 
rights (Berry 2009). The reference to custom might furthermore create or enhance 
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existing inequalities in terms of citizenship and in turn impact tenure rights. Lund (2011) 
notes that women, for instance, might have fewer citizenship rights and thus enjoy 
weaker rights to property than men. Therefore, when bound together, ‘property and 
citizenship are central gate-keeping functions of any state; they engage the questions of 
who can have rights, and what rights can they have’ (Lund 2011, p.75). 
 
 
In this research, I consider tenure security to be influenced by authority, institutional, 
political, social and cultural relations between people, which are characterised by 
politics and power plays. I find that conceiving tenure security from these dynamic 
perspectives is important, especially when practices of securing tenure tend to centre 
around legal, administrative and technological solutions. For these practices of securing 
tenure, the dynamic relations between social actors and institutions, as well as the 
everyday politics of land tenure, have been side concerns. I discuss these practices in the 
next section. 
 
 
2.2. Approaches for securing tenure 
 
A second strand of literature has debated approaches and concrete practices for securing 
tenure by different social actors and institutions. Dominant approaches have favoured 
state-centred activities, while counter-proposals have considered customary authorities 
and decentralised institutions as best-suited for managing, governing and securing tenure 
rights, and additional ideas have tried to bridge the gap between them. What is common 
to all three is a quest for registering rights, gaining clarity over rights and governing 
processes as means for securing tenure (Bruce et al. 1994; Pélissier 1995; Toulmin 2008; 
Benjaminssen et al. 2008 etc.). These approaches could also be seen through three 
paradigms: i) orthodox, leading to border delimitation and property titles; ii) substitution 
that concentrates on the creation of alternative processes such as certification; and iii) 
adaptation that calls for a gradual approach considering customary rights and cultural 
representations (Colin et al. 2009; Rochegude 2011b). The extent to which the legal, 
administrative and technological practices are undertaken; the moment when and the 
context where these are relevant; the parties being recognised; and the tools and 
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technologies being used are still being debated. The evolution of these debates is 
explored here.  
 
2.2.1. (State-led) registration of tenure rights 
 
The dominant approaches centre around state-led reforms of land registration. States 
have traditionally been key actors in modelling and administering tenure systems as well 
as making them legible for development purposes (Scott 1998; Hall 2013). In sub-
Saharan Africa, states often hold all rights to land on which they have allocated private 
property rights through registration that is consisted of legal recording and cadastral 
mapping (Colin et al. 2009). The registration of land has been part of states’ 
modernisation efforts (Benjaminssen et al. 2008), leading to the transformation of legal 
systems, administrative structures and tenure relations (Hall 2013). It is thus an aspect 
of land reform and strongly linked to tenure security in dominant policy narratives (see 
Dickerman et al. 1989; Sikor and Müller 2009; Hall 2013; Pedersen 2016).  
 
These approaches consider that the registration of land is necessary to gain clear and 
secure rights through which the potential of private property can be realised (Rose 1994). 
Rose (1994) describes this line of thinking as follows: ‘if we want to reach that result of 
collective well-being […] we need to have clear and secure property rights; the more 
valuable the resources at stake, the clearer and more secure the property rights should 
be’ (p.3). Indeed, clear private property rights are considered to increase investment and 
productivity, activate land markets and open access to credit for the rural poor (Colin et 
al. 2009; Lavigne Delville 2010; De Schutter 2011).5  
 
The quest for the registration of land as a means for securing tenure dominated the 
approaches of colonial and post-colonial authorities until 1990 (Benjaminssen et al. 
2008). Its more recent resurgence is credited to De Soto (2000), according to whom 
private property rights, formalised by titles, would revive informal assets of people and 
raise them out of poverty. De Soto’s ideas are rooted in neoliberalism and linked to the 
legal empowerment of the poor. According to Harvey (2005), neoliberalism sees unclear 
property rights ‘as one of the greatest of all institutional barriers to economic 
                                                 
5 These approaches are called orthodox (Colin et al. 2009, Lavigne Delville 2010) or neo-utilitarian (Rose 
1994). 
35 
 
development and the improvement of human welfare’ (p. 65). These dominant 
approaches have nevertheless been criticised. Scholars started to question state-led land 
registration approaches in the 1980s and a new wave of criticism emerged as a response 
to De Soto’s book.6 In general, scholars found that state-led reforms had failed to find 
support and adapt to local tenure systems and authority relations (Sikor and Müller 
2009). Case studies have shown how registration projects introduced new sources of 
conflict, ‘modernised’ existing tenure insecurities and social inequalities, accentuated 
wealth differences, ignored secondary rights to land and in some cases reinforced state 
control over access to land (Jansen and Roques 1998; Benjaminssen et al. 2008; Toulmin 
2008; Colin et al. 2009). The conceptual equivalences between registration and security 
of tenure, between registration and economic development, and between security of 
tenure, investment, credit and markets have also been questioned (Roe 1991; Sjaastad 
and Bromley 1997; Bromley 2008; Colin et al. 2009). For instance, Sjaastad and 
Bromley (1997) consider that the relation of tenure security to investment is reversed 
where investment in land (e.g. through improvements made to a parcel) can be a way 
for a farmer to show his/her commitment, to make a case in a context of litigation, and 
thus to improve tenure security. Furthermore, concerns have been raised about 
governance in contexts where states and legal frameworks are weak, costs of registration 
high, technical solutions complex and updating of records challenging (Benjaminssen et 
al. 2008; Toulmin 2008; Colin et al. 2009). Bromley (2008) notes ‘what arrogance is 
required to presume that titles will fix, rather than undermine, long-standing 
fundamental social and economic relations’ (p.26).  
 
Despite the criticism and the extent of case studies on possible side effects, land 
registration endeavours and De Soto’s ideas have gained popularity in the overall context 
of external pressure over land and with the emergence of green economy thinking, 
investment in agriculture and market-based approaches to environmental management. 
This recent resurgence is also visible in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, some 
professionals see agricultural investments as an outright opportunity to promote the 
registration of land rights for the purpose of poverty reduction (Byamugisha 2013). 
Chouquer (2011) suggests that if land was subdivided into clearly defined properties and 
                                                 
6 Critical views of registration have been presented in a special issue of the Land Use Policy (2008) that 
challenges De Soto’s approaches and records experiences on registration. In francophone circles, a book 
on registration was edited by Colin et al. in 2009.  
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legally guaranteed, it would be more complicated to allocate to investors and thus protect 
the rights of farmers. Indeed, investors would be obliged to negotiate with a wider 
audience of farmers in opposition to a single state authority, and by doing so would 
become more aware of the geographical and social realities on the ground. Securing 
tenure through legally-recognised private property could thus constitute a local counter-
power. (Chouquer 2011) Nonetheless, whether conducted to reduce poverty or as a 
means of protecting rights, some scholars have cautioned against the most recent 
registration programmes and the risk of them becoming yet another means for outside 
actors to gain power at the expense of tenure rights of local people and their autonomy 
of managing land (German et al. 2017). 
 
The difference now is that professionals promote cost-efficient ways for registering 
rights and modernising land administration systems (see Lemmen 2010; Byamugisha 
2013). Some people promote ‘pro-poor’ or ‘fit-for-purpose’ solutions where the 
registration of rights is based on simple, low-cost administrative activities adapted to 
local contexts (Zevenbergen et al. 2013; Enemark et al. 2014). These solutions use the 
latest technological tools such as satellite images, hand-held Global Positioning System 
(GPS) devices, smartphones, drones etc. They seek to involve both land administration 
professionals (for instance surveyors) and local communities (see Lemmen 2010; 
Enemark et al. 2014) and may become more elaborate with time (Zevenbergen et al. 
2013; Enemark et al. 2014).  
 
These ‘pro-poor’ solutions are furthermore linked to an approach of a continuum of 
rights. It considers that tenure rights evolve from informal to formal with different sets 
of rights, responsibilities and degrees of security being involved (UN-Habitat and GLTN 
2008; Barry and Augustinus 2016). The idea is that ‘improving tenure security using a 
progression of different tenure types (…) until land holders acquire a form that best suits 
their needs in the long term is more likely to succeed than a grand, sweeping titling 
programme’ (Barry and Augustinus 2016, p.xiv). While these solutions and approaches 
aim to be flexible and adapted to local contexts, rather than involving states as the main 
actors, they still entail registration of land and consider tenure security to be a legal and 
administrative matter.  
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2.2.2. Recognition of customary rights tenure rights, and decentralised and 
community-based approaches 
 
From the 1990s onwards, solutions for securing rights were also sought via legal 
recognition of customary rights and systems, as well as via community-based and 
decentralised approaches (Benjaminssen et al. 2008; Colin et al. 2009; Knight 2010; 
Rochegude 2011b). To justify the legitimacy of customary tenure systems, scholars and 
activists underscored their flexibility and broke down conceptions according to which 
they would hinder, for instance, the modernisation of agriculture (Peters 2004). The 
objective was to reconcile the legality and legitimacy of rights by giving more space to 
recognise those that are locally legitimate (Rochegude 2011b). In addition to recognising 
and registering customary tenure rights legally, states started to devolve land governance 
and management responsibilities to local institutions.  
 
A distinction can be made between community-based and decentralised approaches 
(Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux 2004). In the first, communities are either customary or 
assembled for a certain purpose. The allocation of responsibilities relies on the 
assumption that a ‘property does not have to be individually owned to be efficient; 
instead, communities can govern common property on the basis of common norms' 
(Rose 1994, p.5). Local populations are considered best placed to manage natural 
resources (Bertrand 1998). In francophone Africa, approaches in this sense have varied 
from gestion des terroirs (Blanc-Pamard 2002) and mediation patrimoniale (Babin and 
Bertrand 1998; Karsenty 1998)7 to plans fonciers ruraux (local land use plans) (Lavigne 
Delville 2009; Rochegude 2011b). Yet, in some cases, states retain control over land 
instead of allocating all responsibilities to communities (Sikor and Müller 2009). In the 
second, land administration responsibilities have been decentralised to local 
governments that register rights at individual, households or village levels (see 
Deininger et al. 2008 on Ethiopia; Teyssier et al. 2009 on Madagascar; Pedersen 2016 
on Tanzania; Leeuwen 2017 on Uganda). These actions often take place within the 
broader government policies to decentralise public administration (Byamugisha 2013). 
                                                 
7 An example of this is the law Gelose (Gestion locale sécurisée des ressources naturelles renouvelables 
– secured local management of renewable natural resources) in Madagascar, under which legal and 
institutional arrangements transfer management of natural resources (e.g. forests) to local communities, 
based on negotiations between local communities, local state authorities (municipalities) and central state 
(Babin and Bertrand 1998; Weber 1998 and 2000). 
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Sometimes the decentralised forms of registration follow local norms where people had 
written down transactions and exchanged documents to prove ownership and manage 
tenure relations (Lavigne Delville and Mathieu 1999; Teyssier et al. 2006; Toulmin 
2008; Teyssier et al. 2009). These documents are called petits papiers in Madagascar. 
Nevertheless, decentralised actions are not uniformly implemented. As noted by Ribot 
et al. (2006) ‘while some elements within the state pursue decentralization policies, 
others find their interests better served by resistance to decentralization’ (p.1881). This 
suggests that some segments of the state have an interest in retaining control over land 
rather than devolving it. 
 
2.2.3. Adapting approaches to the sources of tenure (in)security 
 
The above review demonstrates how state-led and customary, community-based or 
decentralised approaches have been in opposition to each other. Yet, Sikor and Müller 
(2009) remind us that they are related to each other and should not be seen in binary 
opposition. Indeed, scholars started to bridge this gap by observing the progressive 
evolution of customary tenure systems towards a greater individualisation with 
population growth, development of markets and commercialisation of agriculture (Bruce 
et al. 1994; Platteau 1996; Lavigne Delville 2010). This made Bruce et al. (1994) call 
for a new paradigm called adaptation, in which legal and administrative frameworks 
support the evolutionary change in customary law, recognize the customary forms of 
tenure and clarify the legal status of these various systems. Legal recording and cadastral 
surveys could be done cost-effectively at the most suitable moment (Bruce et al. 1994), 
when customary institutions are not able to secure tenure or are absent (Platteau 1996, 
Fitzpatrick 2005; Colin et al. 2009) or should be justified by frequent conflict over, and 
potential high value of, land (Colin et al. 2009). 
 
Fitzpatrick (2005) developed these ideas further, proposing that the solutions for 
securing tenure could be adapted to sources of (in)security: when tenure security is not 
endangered there is no particular need for state intervention; when encroachment by 
outsiders takes place the demarcation of group boundaries could be considered; when 
communities increasingly deal with outsiders there is a requirement to develop proper 
agreements; and when tenure insecurity persists inside groups, state enforcement of 
individual rights could be considered. Hence, while local recognition can suffice when 
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there is no external pressure over land, state recognition becomes important when the 
outside value of and interest in land increases (Toulmin 2008).  
 
These proposals, however, don’t fully consider the authority, institutional, social and 
cultural relations elaborated in section 2.1. To address these gaps, Sikor and Müller 
(2009) underline that reforms need to be ‘responsive to the variety of property 
arrangements on the ground’ and recognise the multiple sources of authority that 
sanction rights to land (p.1312). Rochegude (2005) invites us to go beyond ideas of 
registration recognising the rights to act on something (droit d’agir) and attending to 
social processes through which tenure relations are dealt with. Sjaastad and Cousins 
(2008) propose a shift of attention towards the ‘institutional arenas in which negotiations 
take place and power relations assert themselves’ (p.7). Moreover, Bouquet (2009) 
argues in favour of exploring the nature and implications of institutional pluralism in 
securing tenure rights and assessing tenure security from the perspective of up-stream 
actions (policies, discourses, motivations) and down-stream mechanisms 
(administrative processes of registration, titling etc.). Finally, she calls for the 
consideration of the histories of places and the temporalities of tenure security (Bouquet 
2009). These more politically, socially and culturally sensible ideas inform my analysis 
of the Malagasy land policy. 
 
2.2.4. Common features  
 
The three approaches discussed above all entail a certain degree of legal recognition, 
recording of rights and mapping or surveying of land. As a result, titles/certificates and 
maps are produced with the purpose of clarifying who holds what and where. These are 
not, however, neutral devices and can be used for purposes other than securing tenure. 
Also, the registration of rights requires setting up a system to administer the relevant 
records and governing these processes to ensure tenure security. Indeed, the records and 
maps can serve diverse interests and their production involves a range of people and 
institutions with different powers. In critical development literature, authors talk about 
‘inscription devices’ (e.g. titles, maps, satellite images) used by states to assemble land 
as an investable resource (Li 2014), to manage environments and to ease state 
functioning (Scott 1998). Scott (1998) suggests that with titles, customary practices are 
reduced to a transferrable title, and with cadastral mapping agrarian systems are 
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simplified into homogenous representations of parcels. When the information on the 
owner (title) is linked with the location on the map (cadastre), states can levy tax, 
meaning that land information becomes an inherent part of state construction (Scott 
1998). This links to earlier discussions in section 2.1 on how the control of land is 
constitutive of political and state power (Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; Lund 2016). 
While Scott (1998) and Li (2014) provide descriptive and prescriptive powers to titles 
and maps, Fogelman and Basset (2017) invite scholars to pay more attention to the 
procedural side of map-making that involves a range of actors with their own interests. 
For them, the influence that each actor has on the process of map-making give the maps 
their power (Fogelman and Basset 2017).  
 
Neither the recording of rights nor the mapping of land are reserved for state actors. 
CSOs and local communities have undertaken ‘counter-mapping’ to ‘bolster the 
legitimacy of “customary” claims to resources’ (Peluso 2005, p.273), applying the same 
techniques of cartography and modes of representation of space (linear boundaries and 
territories) previously used by states (Walker and Peters 2001; Peluso 2005). However, 
‘counter-mapping’ comes with risks. First, technologies that remain out of reach of 
communities are used, requiring the dependence on outside actors (Peluso 2005). 
Second, competing and overlapping maps and surveys are easily created, complicating 
the understanding of local realities and open spaces for locally-illegitimate claims to be 
made by more powerful actors (Neville and Dauvergne 2012). Third, there is a risk of 
freezing dynamic social tenure relations, obscuring seasonal and rotational land uses 
(e.g. pastoralism), and questioning de facto access to land (Walker and Peters 2001; 
Peluso 2005).  
 
It is important to note in relation to Madagascar that the recording of rights and mapping 
of land, at whatever level, requires setting up a system to administer, conserve and up-
date the relevant records. The operation of such a system, as well as the guarantee of the 
symmetry and availability of information, are furthermore constitutive of legal and 
administrative tenure security (Simbizi et al. 2014). As explained by Rochegude (2005), 
securing tenure in these circumstances would require users to rely on the land 
administration system, and the system itself needs to monitor the administrative 
processes and manage data. In policy debates, attention has started to be paid to the 
governance of processes beyond the simple administration of rights. Palmer et al. (2009) 
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define land governance as ‘the rules, processes and structures through which decisions 
are made about the access to land and its use, the manner in which the decisions are 
implemented and enforced, and the way that competing interests in land are managed’ 
(p.9). Problems of governance are considered to subsist both in statutory and customary 
systems and emerge especially when the value of land increases and new powers over 
land are acquired (see Ubink and Quan 2008; Palmer et al. 2009; Hodgson and Schroeder 
2002). This recent focus on governance thus brings the operational debate closer to the 
everyday politics of tenure relations and its impacts on tenure security as explored in 
section 2.1.  
 
 
The literature in this section is based on a critical outlook of the dominant, counter and 
alternative approaches that exist on the registration of land and their links to tenure 
security. Understanding these is important to be able to situate the Malagasy land policy 
in context. Also, the approaches and practices adopted influence the way in which the 
authority, institutional, political, social and cultural relations affecting tenure security 
are considered. They also indicate probable sources of tenure (in)security that might 
emerge with the implementation of policies.  
 
 
2.3. Dynamic interaction between actors at global, national and local 
levels  
 
In the two previous sections, I showcased how the conditions for tenure security are 
influenced by authority; institutional, social and cultural relations; and how legal, 
administrative and technological solutions to the problem of securing tenure have been 
sought. A constant element is the interaction between social actors and institutions. 
Tenure relations are played out inside families, between neighbours, among and between 
communities, and inside decentralised and state jurisdictions.  
 
In this section, I analyse a third strand of literature focusing on the connections between 
social actors and institutions in the context of policies and development interventions. 
These actors are situated at different levels. I consider tenure security as an element in a 
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development interplay where, alongside states, a range of global, national and local 
actors have gained authority and sometimes state-like characteristics, started to negotiate 
interests on land, and influenced the configurations of local spaces. On a meta-level, we 
can therefore question whether the appearance of new actors is a counterbalance to state 
powers bringing in diversity and representing more local views and knowledge (Scott 
1998) or a demonstration of the disengagement of states where a range of civil society 
actors fill in the gap states have left (Harvey 2005). We can also analyse changes in local 
power relations (see e.g. Olivier de Sardan 1995), examine the margin of action left for 
local actors, whether through democratic processes, contestation or resistance (Li 2014) 
and research the relationships between actors of all levels (Pedersen 2016). I look at 
these issues and their influence on tenure security next. 
 
2.3.1. Multiplication of actors and competition over authority at the local level 
 
The policies and development interventions, whether state-led, decentralised or 
community-based, open rural spaces for the engagement of new institutions, social 
actors and intermediaries (Bierschenk et al. 2000; Fauroux 2002b). These can be existing 
local organisations and authorities gaining responsibilities, agents through which 
development institutions attempt to implement projects, and intermediaries or brokers 
that work between projects and local people (Olivier de Sardan 1995; Bierschenk et al. 
2000; Mosse 2005; Andriamahefazafy et al. 2007). 
 
The community-based and decentralised approaches tend to generate competition 
between central state and local institutions. Indeed, opportunities are offered for the local 
decentralised and non-state institutions to establish, consolidate and reconfigure their 
authority over land and redefine rules of tenure (Leeuwen 2017). In this process, they 
can become state-like institutions not only questioning state power but also changing 
people’s ideas about the state (ibid.).  
 
At the local level, a number of individuals interact at the interface between the policy-
making levels, development projects and end beneficiaries. First, Olivier de Sardan 
(1995) identifies development agents directly engaged in project activities, playing a 
double role of awareness-raising (promoting both policy ideas and technical knowledge) 
and mediation (merging policy ideas and technical knowledge with local concepts to 
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find the best possible outcomes for their projects). This double role requires an ability 
to speak ‘different languages’ (e.g. the policy/project jargon and the local language) in 
order to translate the divergent ways of seeing things, but also a capacity to manage 
power dynamisms between actors at various levels (Olivier de Sardan 1995). Second, 
Olivier de Sardan (1995), Bierschenk et al. (2000) and Mosse (2005) talk about brokers, 
such as local actors (e.g. leading farmers) representing people and translating their 
demands in different institutional languages, seeking financial and operational support. 
They can also attract local interest in projects and gain approval for project activities 
from local authorities (Bierschenk et al. 2000), thus reinforcing their own position in 
local society (Olivier de Sardan 1995). This can generate rivalries with authorities and 
customary leaders and thus fragment the constituencies of local powers (Bierschenk et 
al. 2000; Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux 2004; Bennett et al. 2013). 
 
Clearly, these actors shape the authority and institutional relations discussed in section 
2.1 and impact the conditions for tenure security. They also play a role in bringing the 
practices of securing tenure to local spaces, as seen in section 2.2. Furthermore, they can 
participate in communicating local experiences in securing tenure to national and global 
levels where these insights inform the elaboration of policies and the development of 
guidelines. Indeed, these actors can be linked to wider global dynamisms, explored next. 
 
2.3.2. Transnational character of land 
 
In the contemporary development scene and when external interests in land emerge, 
tenure security is not only a question of power relations inside and between households, 
communities and states, but has a transnational dimension as well (Peluso 1993: Peters 
2004; Chouquer 2011; Hall 2013; Boone 2014). The transnational character of land can 
be seen in state efforts to control land across their borders, transnational actors 
influencing land governance and policies, and states and corporations seeking to control 
specific pieces of land (Hall 2013). Land can be assembled as a global resource (Li 2014) 
and some legal forms of its appropriation transferred to global levels (Chouquer 2011).  
 
These transnational dynamisms are susceptible to changes in tenure relations where land 
and its use are fixed in a given space, but their governance and management debated 
elsewhere (Chouquer 2011; Hall 2013). This also entails that the control and authority 
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over land are de-territorialised (Margulis et al. 2013). Peluso and Lund (2011) talk about 
‘new frontiers of land control’ that challenge past authorities, produce new conditions 
for resource rights, and shift de jure and de facto control of land. In these contexts, 
disputes over the control and authority over land are equally exercised by an increasing 
number of parties going beyond single property boundaries, taking place at a vast 
distance from the land under discussion (Margulis et al. 2013). They become 
contestations over the norms, rules, discourses and institutions of the production regimes 
(ibid.).     
 
These mechanisms persist today, especially in relation to agricultural investments and 
‘green grabbing’ that can in some cases ‘involve the wholesale alienation of land, and 
in others the restructuring of rules and authority in the access, use and management of 
resources’ (Fairhead et al. 2012, p.237). Madagascar is a prime example of a country 
where these dynamisms play out. It has attracted global attention due to its biodiversity, 
endemic species and environmental challenges (Duffy 2006; Blanc-Pamard et al. 2012) 
as well as a perceived availability of land where only 1.5 percent of all agricultural is 
under permanent crops, 8.5 percent of agricultural land is arable and the remaining 90 
percent meadows and pastures (FAO STAT 2016). 
 
The Malagasy conservation sector has become a playing field for IGOs, donors, 
technical operators, global NGOs, newly-created government agencies and development 
workers (Horning 2008) that have adopted state-like characteristics (Corson 2016). In 
such situation, the state plays a role of a nodal point in a wider multi-centric network 
and is described as a ‘stakeholder’, ‘participant’ or ‘partner’ among other actors (Duffy 
2006). This has entailed an end to the state monopoly and public action over the control 
and management of natural resources (Blanc-Pamard et al. 2012). Rather, external 
organisations have decided ‘what the Malagasy environmental problem is’ and defined 
‘the best way to tackle the problem’ (Duffy 2006, p.738). 
 
In the agricultural sector, the presence of external investors has raised global concerns 
of states expropriating land from farmers by relying on or going against existing legal 
frameworks and then passing this land to investors (De Schutter 2011; Rochegude 
2011a; White et al. 2012; Broegaard et al. 2016; Burnod and Andriamanalina 2017). In 
Madagascar, the legal prerequisites of the 2005 land policy should protect land 
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appropriated by farmers and enable them to directly negotiate with investors, rather than 
the investors passing through the state (Rochegude 2011a) or relying on local and state 
authorities to secure their access to land (Evers 2011; Burnod et al. 2013). Yet, this local 
‘autonomy’ has remained theoretical (Rochegude 2011a; Chouquer 2011). This is 
demonstrated through the cases of the South Korean Company Daewoo and the Indian 
Company Varun International, to whom President Ravalomanana promised respectively 
1.3 million hectares (Daewoo) and 200,000 hectares (Varun) of arable land (Teyssier et 
al. 2010; Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011; Burnod et al. 2013).  
 
These and other agricultural investments projects have nevertheless struggled to sustain 
themselves in Madagascar. Some scholars attribute these challenges to the overall 
investment environment (Andriamanalina 2014a). Some case studies demonstrate that 
transnational activism has contributed to the withdrawal of planned investment projects 
since 2009 (Gingembre 2015). Other authors argue, however, that it has been about 
internal power plays for instance, in the Daewoo and Varun cases, against President 
Ravalomanana, rather than ideological opposition to large-scale agricultural investment 
(Wolford et al. 2013) or contestations over the rules and norms of land governance 
(Margulis et al. 2013). In fact, the parallel political uprising used the selling of ancestral 
lands as an argument against President Ravalomanana (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 
2011) and the fall of his government generated international attention to the Daewoo 
and Varun cases, which could have passed unnoticed otherwise (Andrianirina-
Ratsialonana et al. 2011; Wolford et al. 2013). 
 
2.3.3. States seeking to control land 
 
The above examples underline how land and natural resources have attracted attention 
beyond the local and national levels. However, states remain key players trying to regain 
control over land and sometimes using transnational influence for their own benefit. In 
1993, Peluso showed how states used the global objectives of conservation to enhance 
their control over land and resources, at the expense of local resource users. Wolford et 
al. (2013) highlight that states are indeed active in negotiating agricultural investment 
deals and associating themselves with a range of actors. Pedersen (2016) notes that some 
states might regret previous decentralised policies that gave control of land to local 
governments, trying to take it back now that land has become a global good. However, 
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states are not uniform structures: competition, policy discordances and power plays exist 
inside them (Wolford et al. 2013). Some segments of the state might be working in 
favour of pro-poor land policies, building allies within the wider society to implement 
changes (Borras and Franco 2010). Other segments might instead have conflicting 
interests, for instance, claiming back authority over the access to land (Borras and 
Franco 2010; Burnod and Andriamanalina 2017).  
 
These observations are relevant to Madagascar and followed throughout the research. In 
fact, the 2005 land policy ended state control over all land by legally recognising local 
appropriations and uses. Regardless of this policy, the central state tends to consider land 
as its own and something it can freely control and allocate to investors (Chouquer 2011). 
The endeavours of the central state are backed up by the investment law of 2007 that 
foresees a facilitation role for the state in private sector-driven development 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2008). This showcases the tension between policies 
seeking to enhance tenure security of local people through registration of land, and 
policies and behaviour of the central state favouring investment to satisfy its neoliberal 
development objectives (Pedersen and Buur 2016).   
 
 
The literature relevant to this section considers the complex net of interests and 
interactions that exist at and between global, national and local levels. The underlying 
interests of actors can explain some of their adopted strategies and expose the dynamics 
around the Malagasy land policy. I contribute to this literature by examining the 
influence of these interests and interactions on tenure security, and on the authority 
actors and institutions hold over land.  
 
 
2.4. Research gaps and questions  
 
The above literature review explored the multidimensional nature of tenure security. I 
first discussed tenure security in relation to authority and institutional relations, societal 
evolutions and state politics, social dynamisms, and belonging and citizenship. 
Underscoring these aspects is important when the usual practices for securing tenure 
revolve around legal, administrative and technological solutions that undermine the 
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dynamic sources of and conditions for tenure (in)security. Through the second strand of 
literature on securing tenure, I demonstrated that a dominant approach is centred around 
the registration and mapping of tenure rights by central states, while counter-proposals 
encourage decentralised and community-based approaches. Additional ideas have tried 
to bridge the gap and propose to register customary rights when the needs and moments 
are appropriate. Yet, these debates on practices of securing tenure have rarely created a 
link between the examination of the sources of and conditions for tenure (in)security. 
Furthermore, little attention has been paid to tenure security at the interface of global, 
national and local levels. To explore these, I focused on a third strand of literature 
looking at the intervention of social actors in the context of public policies and 
development interventions. These actors can be representatives of governments and state 
institutions, global and national NGOs, private players or intermediaries of different 
sorts. They have their own conceptions of tenure security and practices for securing 
tenure. Furthermore, power dynamics between the actors are liable to influence the 
conditions for tenure security, and the development and implementation of public 
policies.  
 
In this research, I bring these three strands of literature together. This enables my thesis 
to respond to research gaps by linking conceptions of tenure (in)security to practices of 
securing tenure, and by highlighting the interaction between social actors located at 
global, national and local levels. Such connections pay attention to power plays and 
everyday politics that I consider intrinsic constituents of tenure relations. The objective 
is to shed light on the conception of key policy ideas, to examine their translation into 
practice and to unravel the dynamics of policy processes. Such investigation reveals 
factors and mechanisms that shape the considerations of tenure security in a policy 
process such as that of the Malagasy land policy. 
 
The main research question asks: How has tenure security been conceived, practiced 
and maintained in land policy development and implementation processes in 
Madagascar? This overall question is divided into three sub-questions: 
Q1: How different actors conceptualise tenure security?  
Q2: What practices of securing tenure have different actors adopted? 
Q3: What interactions exist between actors and around which interests?   
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These research questions entail ‘studying through’ the policy process from its ideas, 
prescriptions and programmes to those impacted by them (Wedel and Feldman 2005, 
p.2). I follow the example of Keeley and Scoones (2003) who invite us to analyse 
policies in terms of their framings, dominant ideas, practices, inclusion and exclusion of 
actors, and power dynamics. By relying on a conceptual framework of policy narratives, 
assemblage and power, I can also explore factors and mechanisms that shape the 
considerations of tenure security in the policy process (see section 2.6). These 
investigations consider change over time, and connections across levels and sites of 
policy-making (Keeley and Scoones 2003). The multilevel nested perspective entails 
examining, for instance, how local practices borrow elements from global framings and 
ideas that have in turn been informed by local experiences (Keeley and Scoones 2003; 
Tsing 2005) and analysing the role of mediation played at the national level (Brosius 
1999). This link between the questions and concepts is visualised in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1. Structure of the research   
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I conclude that analysing tenure security in relation to a policy process that brings 
together conceptions, practices and interaction between actors will reveal its 
multidimensional nature and underscore the influence of politics on such processes. As 
suggested in the literature review, this multidimensionality constitutes: i) authority, 
institutional, political, social and cultural relations; ii) legal, administrative and 
technological practices of securing tenure; and iii) interaction between global, national 
and local actors. The politics in turn stem from the inherent characteristics of land: the 
diverse representations people make about land, the importance of land for livelihoods, 
the link between land and social and cultural identities (and power), and the 
preponderance of land in philosophical and technical debates (Shipton and Goheen 
1992; Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; Li 2014). My main thesis is then that the possible 
oversight of the multidimensionality of tenure security and the politics of policy 
processes can intensify existing or generate new sources of tenure insecurity as well as 
lead to policy failures, in the face of the intended outcomes of public policies. The 
research then contributes to a literature on the politics of land (see e.g. Shipton and 
Goheen 1992; Berry 2002 and 2009; Peters 2004; Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; Sikor 
and Lund 2009; Boone 2014; Li 2014). By presenting concrete findings from 
Madagascar, I demonstrate what policies and reforms do in practice (Sikor and Müller 
2009). The research also builds a discussion with political ecology and social-
anthropology literature. Through the Malagasy example, I show the ambiguities of 
development interventions and public policies as well as demonstrate how these are 
elaborated, implemented and maintained (see Wedel and Feldman 2005; Li 2007; 
Corson 2016; Lavigne Delville 2017a). This deconstruction of the Malagasy land policy 
from the angle of tenure security then underscores that the blueprint solutions of 
recognition and registration of tenure rights are reductive, and that tenure security should 
be considered through wider perspectives (see Roe 1991).  
 
 
2.5. Disciplinary foundations of the research  
 
This research approaches tenure security from a constructivist perspective, assuming 
that knowledge and reality are produced by social actors through interaction and a 
variety of social influences such as language, history and overall cultural contexts 
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(Forsyth 2003). I further analyse the way these social interactions co-construct narratives 
(Forsyth 2003). I bring the knowledge of social actors, presented in the form of 
narratives, to the forefront, taking an interpretative stance to my data (see Chapter 3 on 
methodology).  
 
The research is interdisciplinary. While my background is in development geography 
and political ecology, in this research I also draw from social anthropology and political 
science. I consider these perspectives beneficial to examine a multi-faceted subject such 
as land tenure where social (actors, interaction) and environmental (land, resources) 
elements are linked. It equally adds value to an analysis of a policy process by revealing 
its complexities and power dynamics.    
 
From this interdisciplinary perspective, geography informs the relations people establish 
with their environment. These relations contribute in constructing territories and 
structuring discourses and action. (Pumain 2006) Political ecology then focuses on 
power relations between resource users and their broader political and economic 
contexts (Gezon 2006). Social anthropology enables an analysis of the interaction 
between social actors that represent different cultures and sub-cultures. It permits us to 
examine the constraints actors face and the strategies they deploy. It further describes 
the representations and meanings groups mobilise when interacting with each other, and 
also studies their transformation (Olivier de Sardan 1995). Finally, by drawing on 
political science, attention is paid to the ‘political aspects of social relations’ and ‘the 
distribution, exercise and consequences of power’ (Hay 2002, p.3).  
 
 
2.6. Conceptual framework 
 
The conceptions of tenure security, the practices of securing tenure and the interactions 
between actors are investigated in relation to the Malagasy land policy, which is the 
main object of analysis. I consider the Malagasy land policy a dynamic process that 
introduces changes and enters in a context of ‘development’ (see Olivier de Sardan 1995; 
Grillo 1997). The dynamism of the process means that its conceptions and practices are 
continually formed, contested and negotiated through social interaction (Long 1992b; 
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Corson 2016), which takes place in multiple institutional arenas or sites (Leftwich 2004). 
This dynamism can lead to situations in which the policy has unplanned consequences 
and side effects (Long 1992c).  
 
The policy process brings together a myriad of institutions and social actors with their 
knowledge, practices, interests and resources (Long 1992a; Olivier de Sardan 1995). The 
agency and power of these actors is dependent on the social networks to which they are 
linked (Long 1992b) and the structural constraints imposed on them (Cleaver 2003). 
These social networks can influence policy aims, conceptions and practices as well as 
encompass resources used to defend and create political spaces (Long 1992c). In this 
research, I consider these networks as assemblages where actors that might have 
different ways of seeing and doing things come together and gather around policy 
narratives and practices because they have a common goal (Li 2007). Some of the actors 
are equally linked to a range of assemblages, sometimes acting as brokers between them 
(see Olivier de Sardan 1995; De Landa 2006; Kumar 2014). These social actors can be 
individuals and organisations involved in policy development and implementation at 
global, national and local levels, people benefitting from or affected by the policy, and 
intermediaries of different sorts intervening between the policy sphere, projects and the 
ground. To provide a solid theoretical grounding for this line of thinking, I moreover 
draw from the concepts of policy narratives, assemblages and power as discussed below. 
 
2.6.1. Policy narratives 
 
The ‘studying through’ of the Malagasy land policy process entails identifying framings 
and dominant ideas around which the policy is formulated. I consider that a diversity of 
perspectives on complex issues and different ways of seeing the world are combined in 
the policy context with the objective of creating common conceptions, to give meaning 
to social and physical realities and to establish more coherent framings (Fortmann 1995; 
Hajer 1995; Dryzek 2013). These constitute storylines and narratives on social reality 
(Hajer 1995). Policy-makers, bureaucrats and practitioners use these narratives to reduce 
uncertainties and ambiguities (Roe 1991; Mosse 2005). 
 
The constituted narratives can maintain moral communities, validate action and 
reinforce one’s position in political debate (Fortmann 1995; Forsyth 2003). They also 
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reflect created coalitions and roles cast upon certain actors (e.g. heroes, villains and 
victims) (Hajer 1995; Adger et al. 2001). The narratives can end up creating apparent 
‘truths’ and ‘facts’, establishing knowledge and received wisdom, dominating thinking, 
being translated into institutional arrangements and determining the frames under which 
people are allowed and able to act (Fortmann 1995; Leach and Mearns 1996; Adger et 
al. 2001; Forsyth 2003). They can become hegemonic stories (see Goldman 2005) that 
persist, regardless of empirical evidence (Roe 1991). Roe (1991) illustrates the 
persistence of certain policy narratives through an example of the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’:  
Policy makers resort to the tragedy of the commons model in order to understand 
what is going on and what must be done in lieu of more elaborate and demanding 
analysis, particularly when such analysis leads only to doubts and uncertainties 
about just what the story is behind rural resource utilization.  
(p.290) 
 
I follow this line of thinking, considering the diversity of conceptions made of tenure 
security and analysing how these are brought together to constitute policy narratives. I 
examine how narratives are established, translated into practice and become dominant 
in the context of the Malagasy land policy. I attend to the ‘sites and spaces where 
dominant structures get constituted’, consider how ‘people try to subvert’ them, discern 
‘the political openings’ and analyse from ‘where alternatives arise’ (Goldman 2005, 
p.24-25). I identify a dominant policy narrative but also explore counter and competing 
ones that alter and contest the dominant narrative (Roe 1989, 1991 and 1994). The 
dominant and counter-narratives belong to ‘complex, multi-participant and multigroup’ 
assemblages (Roe 1994) and the different weight given to them depends of their access 
to economic and political power (Roe 1989).   
 
Overall, the examination of policy narratives is also a way to explain different actor 
positions and render some of their interests and choices more readable (Lavigne Delville 
2009). It informs the structures and dynamics of policy debates (ibid.) that are also 
investigated by relying on the concepts of assemblage and power.  
 
2.6.2. Assemblages of actors around policy narratives 
 
Furthermore, I examine the Malagasy land policy process by relying on the concept of 
assemblage, enabling us to picture interactions between social actors gathering around 
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policy narratives and practices and to recognise the existence of their different motives, 
and explaining ‘why orders emerge in particular ways, how they hold together, 
somewhat precariously, how they reach across or mould space and how they fall apart’ 
(Müller 2015, p.27). 
 
An assemblage is defined as an entity constituted from the interaction between people 
and characterised by its expressive (enunciations and signs) and content-related (actions 
and passions) elements (Deleuze and Guattari 1980; De Landa 2006). It can be either a 
loose and heterogeneous network of actors, or an internally coherent one with clear 
boundaries and identities (Deleuze and Guattari 1980; De Landa 2006; Kumar 2014). 
The interactions between people not only take place inside the assemblage, but also 
towards its exterior (Müller 2015). This means that the same actor can be part of multiple 
assemblages, adopt diverse positions in each and use all available opportunities for new 
connections (De Landa 2006; Kumar 2014). The interactions of actors towards those 
outside the assemblage furthermore impact and shape its characteristics (Müller 2015).  
 
What maintains the assemblage is a common motivation. This is well demonstrated by 
Kumar (2014) with an example of social mobilisation against a mining project in India 
that brought together a diverse set of actors. The common denominator for collective 
action between them was their opposition to the project. These actors were not otherwise 
interacting and their reasons to oppose to the mining project also diverged. However, 
through the assemblage the actors were more powerful than if they had acted alone, but 
this required flexibility and negotiating positions. Coming together also increased the 
number of strong and weak links established with other entities, such as state 
administration, which gradually provided new interactions. 
 
Scholars using the concept attend to the processes of making the assemblage – the 
processes of gathering, coherence and dispersion of actors (McFarlane 2009) as well as 
the processes of holding the assemblage together – the logics, practices and relationships 
of actors (Allen 2011). Hence, the focus is on the social processes that create and 
maintain the assemblage (Li 2007; McFarlane 2009; Davies 2012). Li (2007) has 
investigated these processes in relation to community forestry in Indonesia. For her, the 
ideas of community forestry have been created and hold together as a means of 
environmental management through six practices of assemblage, regardless of the 
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existence of opposing visions and positions:  
- forging alignments: linking together the objectives of the various parties 
involved in the assemblage 
- rendering technical: making sense so that an intervention developed as a 
response to a problem produces beneficial results  
- authorizing knowledge: defining required bodies of knowledge, confirming 
enabling assumptions and covering emerging critiques  
- managing failures and contradictions: making failures to look rectifiable and 
contradictions superficial; planning compromises 
- anti-politics: presenting political questions as technical ones, referring to 
expertise and limiting the agenda of public debates 
- reassembling: bringing in new elements and adapting old ones, using existing 
discourses to new ends and transposing the meanings of key terms 
Li (2007, p.265) 
These practices are furthermore associated with a common motivation to change things 
(‘will to govern’) to keep the assemblage together (Li 2007). In a more recent study, Li 
(2014) has analysed how land has been assembled as a global resource for the motivation 
of agricultural investments by a range of actors that have drawn on discourses on land, 
materiality of land, tenure relations and inscription devices such as maps, surveys and 
statistics. 
 
In the assemblage, social interaction takes place between a range of actors located at 
multiple levels. The question of levels can thus be seen from the perspective of 
transnational horizontal and vertical networks where both state and non-state actors 
interact and assemble around certain ideas and practices (see Ferguson and Gupta 2002). 
There can be forms of interaction in which the ‘global is folded into the local’, where 
‘power and authority register their presence through a variety of spatial twists and turns’ 
and where powerful and less powerful actors interact (Allen 2009, p.206). In this 
conceptualisation, actors can be assembled together whether they are public, private, 
central or decentralised (Allen and Cochrane 2010). This way of considering levels is 
interesting, as it means abandoning i) a territorial understanding where power radiates 
from one centre to its peripheries (Allen 2009); ii) a vertical postulate where one level 
dominates another (Escobar 2005; Allen 2009); and iii) a focus on the agency of a single 
actor or institution as a holder of power (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Pedersen 2016). 
 
By drawing on the concept of assemblage, I can therefore examine how assemblages of 
global, national and local actors are constituted (or not) around certain policy narratives 
and practices of securing tenure in the context of the Malagasy land policy. I can attend 
55 
 
to how these interactions constitute networks of interest that are maintained in time and 
space. I can investigate the motivations behind the assemblages, the mechanisms and 
practices that keep them together, and the tensions, contradictions and clashes that exist 
inside and between them (Allen 2011; Kumar 2014; Li 2014). This entails looking more 
closely at the concept of power.  
 
2.6.3. Power 
 
The Malagasy land policy process can be examined by relying on the concept of power. 
Indeed, the reality of the policy process is constituted of complex interactions between 
social actors, where power resides in the ability to persuade others to pursue certain 
goals and practices, to unite actors in networks of interest and to negotiate organisational 
resources (Allen 2009). Power manifests in the processes of decision-making and 
constitution of assemblages. It is plural, in continuous transformation and 
simultaneously operating across sites (McFarlane 2009). To define power, I rely on 
definitions made by political scientists who have applied it to policy processes. 
 
Lukes (2005) relates power to processes of decision-making and sees it in three 
dimensions: i) plural, visible forms of power in processes of decision-making; ii) hidden 
forms of power; and iii) invisible forms of power in processes of decision-making and 
control over a political agenda that are linked to discursive power (see also Gaventa 
2006 and http://stevenlukes.net). The first dimension is based on the work of Dahl, who 
described power as person A being able to make person B to do something person B 
would not do in other circumstances (Lukes 2005). This concentrates on observing the 
visible behaviour of people in decision-making processes involving multiple parties 
where the one with power sees his/her interests and preferences being adopted (Lukes 
2005). The second dimension is based on the work of Bachrach and Baratz. It includes 
processes of non-decision making, which in a policy process could involve the 
preparation of hidden agendas, leaving potentially contentious issues aside and bringing 
forward others (Lukes 2005; Hathaway 2016). The third dimension is Lukes’s own 
understanding of power, which is as domination where, for instance, potential issues are 
kept out of the policy sphere by shaping people’s preferences and interests (Lukes 2005). 
These could be actions taking place up-stream of the policy process where people’s and 
groups’ thinking is influenced and controlled such that they might not even be aware of 
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their real interests (Lukes 2005). 
 
Gaventa (2006) has added to these three dimensions or forms of power the notions of 
spaces and levels. He visualises power in a form of a cube, constituted of three axes: 
forms (visible, hidden and invisible), spaces (closed, invited and claimed) and levels 
(global, national and local) (Gaventa 2006). For him, the three spaces ‘exist in dynamic 
relationship to one another and are constantly opening and closing through struggles for 
legitimacy and resistance, co-optation and transformation’ (p.27), while the notion of 
levels sends us back to the earlier discussion on the interaction between actors. The 
notion of time is also crucial when talking about power. Hathaway (2016) reminds us 
about ‘exploring the historical evolution of a particular case in order to understand the 
role of power in the configuration of the status quo, the process of political formulation, 
the process of policy implementation, the ongoing societal impacts of policy and societal 
change outside of formal policy’ (p.123).  
 
In addition to these conceptions relevant to policy and decision-making processes, 
power can be described in negative or positive terms. Scholars talk about ‘power over’ 
where the powerful affect the powerless; (also first dimension of Lukes), ‘power to’ 
which describes the agency of actors to realise something; ‘power within’ where power 
stems from self-confidence and is a pre-condition for acting; and ‘power with’ related to 
synergies created through collaboration (Gaventa 2006). Power is therefore not only 
seen from a negative perspective of ‘power over’ but also in generative terms of ‘power 
to’ do something (Rowlands 1995). Scholars and development practitioners hence talk 
about empowerment. Rowlands (1995) synthesises empowerment not only as bringing 
people to decision-making processes and maximising their opportunities, but also about 
people being aware of their own interests and those of others, as well as people 
perceiving themselves as apt and legitimate to be part of the decision-making spaces. 
Empowerment in such circumstances can be personal with ‘a sense of self’, linked to 
agency in closed relationships or a collective endeavour working to achieve greater 
impacts (Rowlands 1995).  
 
These forms, spaces and levels of power, the positive and negative nature of power, and 
the presence of power in time and space all provide insight on the elements to be 
analysed. I intend to consider some of these characteristics of power when analysing the 
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establishment, operationalisation, translation, maintenance and contestation of policy 
narratives on tenure security and practices of securing tenure, and the constitution of 
assemblages of social actors around them. The conceptions around empowerment, in 
turn, enables us to examine the agency of local people in relation to the policy 
implementation. Overall, the focus on power explains the dynamics of the land policy 
process at global, national and local levels.  
 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I provided an overview of the research by examining literature on tenure 
security, presenting the research questions and discussing the theoretical structure. The 
literature review centred around three strands of literature analysing the sources and 
conditions of tenure security, the practices of securing tenure and the interaction between 
social actors in political and development contexts. First, the review enables me to define 
tenure security as a matter of authority, institutional, political, social and cultural 
relations between actors. Second, it situates Malagasy land policy in relation to dominant 
approaches to secure tenure, recording counter-proposals and awareness of additional 
ideas. Third, it facilitates consideration of interactions between global, national and local 
actors that influence tenure security. I argued there is a lack of connection between the 
different corps of literature. In fact, the dynamic aspects impacting the sources and 
conditions of tenure (in)security are rarely considered by the practices of securing tenure 
that do not consider the influences between levels.  
 
The literature review moreover guides the analysis of tenure security in the context of 
the Malagasy land policy. I analyse the policy by paying attention to conceptions around 
the notion of tenure security, practices of securing tenure and to interactions between 
actors. I consider the development and implementation of the Malagasy land policy an 
interactive process that involves social actors from global, national and local levels. In 
this process, policy narratives are established on tenure security that guide practices of 
securing tenure. Social actors with certain ways of seeing and doing things assemble 
around these narratives and practices motivated by common objectives, and power is 
played out between them in its various forms. The policy narratives, assemblages and 
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power dynamics moreover shape the considerations of tenure security and reveal the 
politics of the policy process.  
 
By looking at tenure security through a policy process, I am able to demonstrate the 
dynamism of the notion, to underline the ambiguities of considering it through singular 
practices of securing tenure and to showcase the influence of interactions on tenure 
security. The research hence highlights the inherently multidimensional and political 
nature of tenure security. It invites considering tenure security in land policies from 
multiple and complex perspectives and reflecting on the way in which the conceptions, 
practices and conduct of policy processes might enhance existing or create new sources 
of tenure insecurity and lead into policy failures. 
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3. Research design 
 
 
This research centres on the conceptions of tenure security, practices of securing tenure 
and interaction between actors intervening in the development and implementation 
process of the Malagasy land policy. In these examinations, I attend to factors and 
mechanisms, such as policy narratives, assemblages of actors and power plays, which 
shape the considerations of tenure security. To reveal these dynamics, I ‘study through’ 
the policy process from its elaboration and implementation to its results (Wedel and 
Feldman 2005). I also investigate the policy process through temporal and nested 
approaches, recognising that policy ideas and framings around tenure security, practices 
of securing tenure and power dynamisms around a range of actors evolve and take place 
in multiple sites/arenas at the same time (Keeley and Scoones 2003). Hence, I move 
away from a holistic single-site exploration to a nested one in which interaction, 
regularities and connections between levels are examined in a diffuse framework of time 
and space (Marcus 1995; Goldman 2005; Mosse 2005; Tsing 2005). The final research 
results are then organised around cross-case/level conclusions (Yin 2009). 
 
These questions and conceptual framings have shaped the research design. First, I have 
conducted research at three levels (global, national and local) to uncover the 
(dis)connections and regularities between them. Second, I have analysed the Malagasy 
land policy from its elaboration in 2004/2005 to its consolidation in 2015/2016 to reveal 
changes over time. This has entailed drawing on a range of policy documents and 
interviewing people who have intervened in the policy process at different stages. Third, 
I have aimed to elicit the conceptions of tenure security, practices of securing tenure and 
power dynamisms linked to the policy process in the actors’ own words. This has been 
done through qualitative research based on flexible and sensitive data collection, which 
aims to understand complexity in different contexts (Mason 2002). The qualitative 
nature of the work has also meant that the research has interpretative intentions (Mason 
2002).  
 
I have collected data from 2015 to 2017. I have relied on ethnographically-inspired 
observations, event ethnography, semi-structured interviews and document analysis. I 
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have combined these data sources to gradually identify actors involved in the policy 
process, record conceptions that constitute policy narratives and practices, picture 
interconnections between actors that form assemblages and reveal power dynamisms in 
the process. I have also attended to the narratives of actors in terms of what they say, 
how, when and in which contexts to highlight the subtleties of the policy process.   
 
In this chapter, I discuss the research design, implementation and analysis in more detail. 
I start by introducing the research sites and the levels involved, as well as the practical 
research implementation. I continue by discussing the methods used and present the 
orientations in terms of data analysis. I finish by reflecting on the research ethics, 
positionality and challenges. 
 
 
3.1. Research sites, samples and implementation   
 
The main research object is the Malagasy land policy process, analysed through a nested 
approach involving global, national and local elements. The global research attends to 
actors intervening in Madagascar and/or linked to international policy frameworks on 
tenure security; the national analysis centres on Malagasy land policy process; and the 
local investigations study tenure security as everyday experience and examines the 
participation of farmers in policy implementation. The sections below outline the sites, 
samples and practicalities of the research. 
 
3.1.1. Nested approach combining global, national and local research 
 
In reference to global level, the aim of the research is to understand how tenure security 
is framed in current debates and transposed in Madagascar. I focus on global policy 
arenas on land tenure, and on global actors intervening in the development and 
implementation of the land policy in Madagascar. Therefore, global understandings, 
practices and interactions are not analysed as such, but integrated into the consideration 
of Malagasy land policy. 
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The aim of the national-level research is to analyse Malagasy land policy in terms of 
tenure security. I focus on the policy process from its conception in 2005 to its 
consolidation in 2015 and the elaboration of the National Land Programme (PNF - 
Programme National Foncier) in 2016. I centre the investigations on the main 
innovation of the policy, which was the recognition of rights to land based on its current 
appropriation and use. This led to the elaboration of framework laws and regulations, 
new institutional structures, and adoption of an approach centred on decentralisation and 
certification. This framing means that I do not attend to the evolutions of the state land 
service, which used to control all land. Nevertheless, I do speak about the state land 
service in relation to the newly-introduced policy ideas and practices.  
 
Finally, the local level research strives to understand how the policy has been 
implemented on the ground and analyse local realities in terms of tenure security. This 
includes looking at the operations of the local land office at a municipal level, but also 
conducting more detailed research with potential beneficiaries in villages. The focus of 
my research is on rural land, as the land policy has mainly been implemented in rural 
and peri-urban municipalities involving the certification of agricultural parcels and rural 
housing plots.  
 
3.1.2. Choosing research sites and samples   
 
Having defined the orientations of the research, I selected specific research sites and 
samples for data collection. 
 
3.1.2.1. Global level 
 
The global-level research builds on my professional experience acquired in the land 
tenure team of FAO from 2008 to 2013. I was involved in the development and 
implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure, 
through which I became aware of debates on tenure, arenas for policy-making and actors 
intervening in the sector, which motivated me to examine the notion of tenure security 
and policy-making processes more closely. 
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In my research, I have used the global debates on tenure security as background. In the 
absence of on-going international negotiations on land, I participated in a range of 
conferences and meetings during the research period (see table 3.1.). These have been 
public open spaces and thus easily integrated in the research plan. One of the most 
central meetings is the World Bank Annual Conference on Land and Poverty, which 
brings together professionals in the land tenure and administration sectors. Some of the 
meetings were also linked to international frameworks such as the Voluntary Guidelines 
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure.  
 
This combination offered the most pertinent and regular occasions for taking note of 
conceptions of tenure security and practices of securing tenure. They are also sites where 
a range of social actors meet, and epistemic communities interact while exchanging 
visions and experiences, hence enabling me to examine relations between actors. These 
are stages for governance, framing and institutionalisation of agendas, and structuring 
of paradigm shifts by actors that are otherwise dispersed in time and space (Campbell et 
al. 2014; Corson et al. 2014).  
 
In addition to research in multiple venues, I attended to the work of actors who have 
been involved in the development and implementation of the Malagasy land policy, 
and/or participated in the elaboration and framing of international frameworks. The 
sampling was purposive (see Etikan et al. 2016). The interviewed actors are 
representatives of government institutions, donors, IGOs, CSOs, technical operators or 
individual consultants. Many of them are people I first met through my work in FAO 
and some are former colleagues.  
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Table 3.1. Global discussion arenas followed 
Arena Place and Date Characteristics Participants 
World Bank 
Annual 
Conference on 
Land and 
Poverty 
World Bank, 
Washington 
D.C., United 
States of 
America (USA)  
23-27.03.2015 
14-18.03.2016 
The conference aims to 
foster dialogue and 
review progress on land 
policy development and 
implementation. The 
conference is the main 
annual event that brings 
together people working 
on land tenure. It enables 
delegates to grasp the 
state of the art of 
professional debates on 
land tenure. 
Representatives of 
ministries and 
government agencies 
from around the world, 
IGOs, NGOs, CSOs, 
private sector players (e.g. 
consulting companies), 
donor agencies and 
researchers. Many 
participants are linked to 
World Bank projects.   
World Forum 
on Access to 
Land (WFAL) 
Valencia, Spain  
31.03-
02.04.2016 
The Forum was organised 
as a follow-up to the 
2006 ICARRD. It 
discussed evolution in 
access to land, 
redistribution of land and 
needs of rural 
communities. The Forum 
had a flavour of 
advocacy.  
Some representatives of 
ministries and 
government agencies, 
some IGOs, NGOs, CSOs 
and researchers. 
Participants came mainly 
from French-, Spanish- 
and Portuguese-speaking 
countries. 
Seminar on the 
governance of 
tenure and the 
status of the 
implementation 
of the 
Voluntary 
Guidelines.  
Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, 
Paris, France 
13.09.2016 
The Seminar was 
organised by the French 
technical committee on 
land tenure to elaborate 
the French position on the 
implementation of the 
Voluntary Guidelines. 
Government, CSOs, 
private sector and 
academic members of the 
French technical 
committee on land tenure. 
Committee on 
World Food 
Security 43rd 
session 
FAO, Rome, 
Italy (followed 
up online) 
19.10.2016 
A global thematic event 
of the 43rd CFS session 
discussed the monitoring 
of the implementation of 
CFS decisions and made 
recommendations on the 
monitoring of the 
Voluntary Guidelines.  
Representatives of 
countries to CFS, 
representatives of 
Ministries of Agriculture, 
“Rome-based agencies” 
and members of the CFS 
civil society mechanisms. 
Technical 
Thematic 
Forum to 
commemorate 
the 5th 
Anniversary of 
the Voluntary 
Guidelines 
FAO, Rome, 
Italy  
05-06.10.2017 
The Forum was held to 
share experiences on the 
implementation of the 
Voluntary Guidelines and 
to discuss ways forward 
for governance of tenure.  
Representatives of 
ministries and 
government agencies who 
have been implementing 
the Guidelines, 
representatives of 
countries to CFS, Rome 
based agencies, donors, 
NGOs and CSOs. 
Participants had direct 
links with the Guidelines.  
 
64 
 
3.1.2.2. National level 
 
I selected Malagasy land policy as an object for research because it has been strongly 
articulated around the notion of tenure security and has received attention in the global 
arena, especially in francophone countries.8 Its 2015 version took inspiration from global 
frameworks. I also analysed some aspects of the policy in my Masters thesis.9 
Furthermore, the natural richness of Madagascar associated with its economic poverty 
has attracted a range of development actors and investors to the country, especially in 
agriculture and conservation (Moreau 2006). Hence, the influence of these actors on 
Malagasy policies can be investigated (Corson 2016). In addition, an extensive quantity 
of policy documents, analysis and reviews have been written on Madagascar, but debates 
on land tenure are still on-going, and an array of development activities undertaken. 
While these are helpful in analysing the specificities of the Malagasy policy process 
from 2005 to 2016, they also enable examination of the cross-fertilisation of ideas and 
practices at global and more localised levels. 
 
My contacts to enter the national research site included employees of the Land 
Observatory, coordination unit of the PNF, Cirad (Centre de coopération internationale 
en recherche agronomique pour le développement)10 and FAO. Upon my arrival in 
Madagascar, representatives of FAO and the coordination unit invited me to attend 
policy discussions on the PNF, which set the basis for building other national-level 
contacts and mapping actors related to the policy. Suggestions for further contacts were 
also gathered during each interview and continuously provided by the coordination unit. 
The sampling was purposive (see Etikan et al. 2016) with the target of including 
representatives of government institutions, NGOs, CSOs and technical operators as well 
as individuals who had intervened in the policy process at different stages. During my 
                                                 
8 Malagasy experiences have often been brought into the global arena through research and the 
participation of Malagasy delegations in global and regional policy processes, as well as technical 
meetings. The representatives of the state land service, coordination unit of PNF, Land Observatory and 
NGOs participated, for instance, in the consultation and awareness-raising meetings on the Voluntary 
Guidelines and in meetings of the French technical committee on land tenure. Representatives of the Land 
Observatory also frequently attend the World Bank Annual Conference on Land and Poverty.    
9 My Masters thesis conducted under the supervision of Chantal Blanc-Pamard in University Panthéon 
Sorbonne (Paris 1) focused on Madagascar. It included a literature review on questions of participation in 
rural development, natural resource management and land tenure. At the time in 2007-2008, I did not have 
the opportunity to conduct field research in Madagascar, for which the PhD offered an excellent 
opportunity. 
10 The French agricultural research centre for international development 
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stay in Madagascar, I also attended a range of multi-actor or CSOs events (Table 3.2.). 
With the global and national research, I stopped the data collection and interviews when 
I felt I had reached saturation point. 
 
Table 3.2. National discussion arenas  
Arena Place and Date Characteristics Participants 
Provincial 
consultations 
on the PNF 
Toamasina, 
30.11-
01.12.2015 
Antananarivo,  
03-04.12.2015 
Consultation on the 
contents of the PNF. 
Presentation of the 
Voluntary Guidelines  
State land service, 
coordination unit of PNF, 
regional actors, land 
professionals, CSOs, 
farmers’ organisations 
Civil society 
workshop on 
gender and 
land tenure 
Antsirabe, 
03.03.2016 
Awareness-raising on 
gender and land tenure. 
Discussion of the Land 
Policy Letter (LPF) and 
PNF 
Members of the CSO 
umbrella organisation SIF 
(Solidarité des intervenants 
sur le foncier) 
Presentation of 
the PNF 
Antananarivo, 
17.11.2016 
Official launch of the 
PNF for 2016-2020 
High-level officials of line 
Ministries, state land 
service, coordination unit 
of PNF, Land Observatory, 
donors, NGOs, CSOs, 
researchers 
Multi-actor 
workshop on 
agricultural 
investments 
Antsirabe, 
09.12.2016 
Discussion of challenges 
and opportunities in 
agricultural investments 
State land service, line 
Ministries, coordination 
unit of PNF, Land 
Observatory, Cirad, 
researchers, private 
enterprises, individual 
consultants  
Presentation of 
a perception 
study on 
tenure security 
Antananarivo, 
13.12.2016 
Presentation of findings 
of a perception survey 
on tenure security 
Institut de recherche pour le 
développement (IRD), 
Cirad, Land Observatory, 
donors, students. There 
were no representatives of 
the state land service. 
Annual 
meeting of SIF 
Antananarivo 
23.12.2016 
Celebration of the 10th 
birthday of SIF 
Members of the CSO 
umbrella organisation SIF 
 
3.1.2.3. Local level  
 
After a couple of months in Madagascar and having met national actors, I decided to 
focus on the region of Vakinankaratra, located in the Malagasy Highlands south of 
Antananarivo, because the land policy has been heavily implemented in Vakinankaratra 
in terms of the number of land offices opened and certificates issued, and because I had 
solid regional contacts. 
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I first arranged interviews with regional administrators and actors who have played a 
role in policy implementation. These included the representatives of the state land 
service, the region of Vakinankaratra, the private sector, technical operators, CSOs and 
individual consultants. These actors were mostly based in the towns of Antsirabe, Betafo 
or Mandoto. My main access point was an officer in Vakinankaratra responsible for land 
tenure. He also introduced me to the Chiefs of the region and other high-level officers. 
 
The main local research took place in the municipality of Ankazomiriotra in the district 
of Mandoto. I chose it as the research site for several reasons: 
- it has a functioning local land office that opened in 2008. The office received 
support from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)11 from 2008 to 2009, 
and should be linked to an on-going World Bank project called CASEF 
(Croissance Agricole et Sécurisation Foncière); 
- it hosts the Land resource and information centre (CRIF – Centre de ressources 
et d’informations foncières) and agricultural offices of the district of Mandoto. 
This enables me to examine the implementation of the policy from the point of 
view of district and inter-communal structures;  
- it is in the ‘Moyen-Ouest’ of the region of Vakinankaratra that has been an 
agricultural frontier zone (Raison 1984), bringing a variety of land tenure 
situations; and  
- it is easily accessed from Antsirabe through national road RN 34.  
 
My entry point was an employee in the local land office, whom I met during an initial 
courtesy visit. He introduced me to the municipal actors, gave an overview of the local 
context and provided additional contacts. I spent the first weeks in the municipality 
getting a grasp of municipal life and conducting initial interviews with municipal actors, 
representatives of farmers’ organisations and agricultural services, and private actors. 
The sampling of these interviewees was purposeful (see Etikan et al. 2016). I also visited 
eight of the sixteen fokontanys12 in Ankazomiriotra, where I conducted interviews with 
the chiefs and met some elders.   
 
As the research progressed, I selected three fokontanys to conduct interviews with 
farmers. The selection of the fokontanys was based on their status in terms of the 
implementation of the policy and their geographical location (Table 3.3.). I chose 
                                                 
11 MCA is an office of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) of the USA. It is opened in countries 
to implement Compacts (funding agreements) signed between the host country (here Madagascar) and the 
MCC. 
12 A fokontany is the lowest administrative unit in Madagascar. It is a deconcentrated structure. Each 
fokontany has a chief. The fokontanys are often composed of several villages and/or groups of housing. In 
Ankazomiriotra they have in average 1800 inhabitants. 
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fokontanys with relatively high, medium and low numbers of certificates delivered. I 
also included in the sample one fokontany where a grouped certification programme 
called Kara-Tany Malaky had been undertaken. Furthermore, I excluded two central 
fokontanys because they are of a more urban nature. Finally, I sought to include 
fokontanys with varied distances from and with different conditions of access to the 
centre of the municipality. This was to see whether geographical location plays a role in 
tenure issues and the implementation of the policy. I have chosen not to name the three 
fokontanys or their focus villages in this research to preserve the anonymity of my 
interviewees.  
  
Table 3.3. Characteristics of the chosen fokontanys 
Fokontany Implementation of the 
policy  
(situation in April 2016 
when data collection started) 
Geographical location Other 
A 86 certificates issued  
Part of the Kara-Tany 
Malaky programme with 
three other fokontanys.   
45 minutes by foot from 
the municipal centre. 
Accessible by motorbike, 
bicycle, charette de zébu 
and foot. 
1142 inhabitants 
in 2016 
B 30 certificates issued  
Demands made on ad-hoc 
basis 
On the RN 34 some 5-7km 
from the municipal centre. 
Easily accessible. 
3219 inhabitants 
in 2016 
C 1 certificate issued 
Demands made on ad-hoc 
basis 
2.5-3 hours by foot from 
the municipal centre.  
Accessible by truck in dry 
season. Accessible by 
motorbike, bicycle, 
charette de zébu and foot 
all year. 
2500 inhabitants 
in 2006 (figures 
for 2016 not 
known) 
Source: Municipality, local land office and fokontany statistics 
 
Moreover, each fokontany has four to six villages13 established around family lineages. 
I selected two villages in each of the three fokontanys. This enabled me include several 
families in the research as well as keeping the number of villages manageable which 
was crucial for creating deeper relations in each site. In each village, the sampling had 
some random and convenient characteristics (see Etikan et al. 2016). I used the official 
electoral lists that name people over the age of 18 by village, as well as the lists of people 
with a certificate, to establish samples. The electoral lists were provided by the chiefs of 
                                                 
13 In French one would say îlot or hameau. I use ‘village’ here to describe these concentrations of houses.  
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each fokontany and lists of certificate holders by the local land office. The sample for 
each fokontany included 20 people proportionally divided between the two selected 
villages. I first stratified the sample based on two criteria: people with a certificate and 
people without a certificate in the two villages. I then tried to make the final number of 
people interviewed with or without a certificate proportionate to the total number of 
adults marked in the electoral list for the two villages. This means that I interviewed, for 
instance, every tenth or fifteenth person from the sample list. When only a few people 
had received a certificate per village I tried to interview them all. This means that at the 
end, some 13.7 percent of all interviewed farmers had a certificate (excluding the chiefs 
of fokontany) and a few others had applied for one. This is a higher proportion than the 
percentage of people with a certificate at the municipality but necessary to understand 
some of the logics that motivated farmers to demand for a certificate. With both lists, if 
I was not able to reach a person from the initial sample list, I interviewed another 
member of the same household. If that did not work out, I selected the next person from 
the sample list. There were cases where two people on the sampling list were part of the 
same household. In such cases, I considered the next person from the sample list.  
 
The sampling method allowed some space for hazard in the selection of interviewees. 
There was a good distribution between women and men, and young and elderly. Some 
women preferred, however, that their husbands were interviewed instead of them. The 
electoral list was furthermore a neutral way to justify why I am interviewing certain 
people and not others. It enabled me to avoid a sample influenced by key informants 
and/or a sample containing only the most vocal and welcoming people (e.g. those 
approaching us in a village upon arrival). It also gave a solid reason to refuse demands 
for interviews where people approached us independently, maybe in the hope of 
receiving one of the soap bars given to each interviewee.  
 
3.1.3. Practical implementation of the research  
 
The overall research expanded from October 2013 to the submission of the dissertation 
in December 2018. During this time, I was enrolled part-time (October 2013-March 
2016) and fulltime (April 2016 onwards). Data collection took place in March 2015, 
from December 2015 to July 2016, and September 2016 to January 2017 (Appendix 1). 
I visited Madagascar again in November and December 2017 during the writing up. This 
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enabled me to go to the same places over a period of 1.5 years and was useful for 
observing change and staying in contact with key actors. Especially at the local level 
people expressed their contentment at building longer-term relationships.  
 
I conducted the global and national research independently, in both English and French. 
I contacted interviewees by email or phone, introducing myself and asking for their 
availability and interests in participating in the research. If they agreed, I set a time and 
place for the meeting, gave some indication of the topics I would like to discuss and 
often sent the consent form. I met most of these actors personally in Paris, Rome and 
Antananarivo, and with others I conducted interviews through Skype.  
 
In general people were willing to talk and I did not receive direct refusals. From the 
global actors, only one person did not respond to my request for an interview (after 
having sent the consent form). At the national level, the representatives of the state land 
service were the most difficult to get hold of. I approached them via an official letter to 
the Director of the state land service, explaining the background of my research and my 
willingness to exchange information with some of the employees. In the absence of an 
official response, I followed up via an informal route and scheduled meetings directly 
with the secretaries of the different department directors. Overall, one global- and one 
national-level actor refused to record the interview. With the higher-level Directors, I 
did not to record the interviews to keep them relaxed and informal. On several occasions, 
the set appointments were cancelled requiring rescheduling. This meant stretching my 
own timelines and keeping the calendar flexible to be able to accommodate change. The 
transport in Antananarivo presented a challenge of its own, as it can take hours to travel 
from A to B. Therefore, I decided to have one meeting per day, ideally in the morning 
to avoid the afternoon rain that is common, especially in November and December. At 
the local level, I employed a research assistant (Hoby) who helped with the translation 
(Malagasy – French – Malagasy), facilitated discussions, organised logistics, and 
assisted with transcription and translation of the Malagasy interviews. Her assistance 
was crucial in entering the local research site and understanding its overall dynamics.  
 
During our stays in Ankazomiriotra from April to July 2016, October to November 2016 
and in December 2017, we lived with a community of nuns, with two families and in a 
local dispensary. I spend five working days per week in Ankazomiriotra and the 
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weekends in Antsirabe. This was to have a proper rest, so as to be able to sustain the 
research over several weeks. Approximately three weeks were spent in each fokontany 
to conduct interviews with farmers. We interviewed an average of three farmers per day. 
This enabled us to concentrate and take notes on observations and contextual matters. 
The bulk of the interviews were conducted after the harvest of rice and cassava, which 
are the main crops in the region. People were thus present in the villages and available 
to talk, except on the market days. We conducted the interviews during the morning 
hours due to overall insecurity, which forced us to be back in the host villages latest at 
3pm. The security situation was poor due to armed attacks by dahalos, who steal zébus 
(cattle) and mobile properties.  
 
Having established the samples, I started in each fokontany by meeting the chiefs and 
people responsible for security (quartier mobile). Their authorisation and help in 
identifying people from the list were vital. Yet, using the sample list was time-
consuming. Regardless of the assistance of the chiefs, I spent a lot of time trying to catch 
people and set appointments. In fokontany B, the chief also wrote an introductory letter, 
as due to the security situation, people might have been unwilling to talk to strangers 
without official approval.  
 
I asked for written consent from the municipal actors and oral consent from farmers, as 
many people are illiterate and might have been hesitant to sign papers, especially when 
the discussion dealt with their land and the overall security situation was fragile. A 
couple of farmers from the initial sample lists did not want to participate or I was not 
able to identify them. During interviews, I refrained from taking notes or having papers 
around me and memorised a set of overarching questions. Some people refused to record 
the interviews (in some villages 1/3 of interviewees), in which case, I took notes 
afterwards with the assistance of Hoby.  
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3.2. Methods for data collection 
 
I collected data through document analysis, observation, event ethnography and semi-
structured interviews.  
 
3.2.1. Document analysis, event ethnography and observation 
 
The document analysis and observation served as an introduction to the global, national 
and local research sites. Through them, I have been able to up-date myself on the latest 
debates, identify dominant narratives and aspects to be explored, note issues to be asked 
about in interviews and establish personal networks for further research.  
 
The document analysis has helped me go deeper in an understanding of policy visions 
and their ramifications in terms of tenure security, as well as compare these with 
interview data. I have considered international frameworks such as the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure. The analysis has centred on 
Malagasy policy documents, including the Land Policy Letters (LPFs) 2005 and 2015, 
the framework law and other laws linked to the policy, Land Policy Programme (PNF) 
of 2016, the evaluations made of the policy in 2008 and 2011, advocacy material of 
CSOs and documents of the on-going donor projects. I have also looked at documents 
from the local land offices, such as training and communication material.  
 
The event ethnographies conducted in global and national policy arenas provided 
valuable contextual information for analysis (Tables 3.1. and 3.2.), enabling me to 
consider the events themselves (e.g. the World Bank Conferences and WFAL) as objects 
of ethnographic investigation (Brosius et al. 2010). This meant observing the more 
formal opening, closing and plenary sessions but also attending to side events, 
interactions between conference participants and the overall conduct of the event 
(Brosius et al. 2010; Campbell et al. 2014; Corson et al. 2014). The added value of such 
an exercise lies in observing the interaction of actors in real life situations and the 
dynamics in the production of their stories. I attended to their spoken, written and 
expressive communication. Overall, these observations contributed to a more personal 
understanding of the stories being produced on tenure security and practices of securing 
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tenure, and dynamics existing between actors, thus enabling more detailed field work to 
take place, complemented by other data collection methods. 
 
In addition to the global and national levels, I conducted observation in Ankazomiriotra. 
The observations served as an entry point for establishing contacts with people, getting 
access to information and building a deeper understanding of the local context, including 
its complex power structures (Fauroux 2002a). My intention was to understand the work 
and challenges faced by the local land office, observe the interaction between the office 
and farmers, grasp some of the realities of local life, and appreciate the relations farmers 
hold with their land. Market days were suitable occasions for getting to know life in the 
municipality and the work of the land office. Walks in the countryside, time spent in the 
villages and work in the fields were additional occasions to observe the land use 
practices of farmers, such as how they delineate their boundaries, coordinate activities 
and link with public authorities, which I recorded in field notes (Gibbs 2007). These 
notes were useful in the data analysis to explain local contexts and actor positions, and 
reflect on my role in the research.  
 
3.2.2. Semi-structured interviews 
 
The semi-structured interviews constitute the main source of information and method of 
data collection. Their added value lies in being able to directly interact with actors, and 
they were conducted with global, national and local actors (Table 3.4.). Prior to the 
interviews, I defined key themes to frame the discussions and more targeted questions 
specific to each situation. Mason (2002) talks about big and mini-research questions 
decided on the spot during interview. The themes and questions provided overall 
guidance and structure for the interviews, rather than being too directive. My aim was 
to keep the discussions as open as possible to generate natural conversation, reflecting 
the constructions and orientations of the interviewee rather than of the researcher 
(Riessman 1993; Gubrium and Holstein 2009). 
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Table 3.4. Summary of semi-structured interviews  
Level Sample Number of interviewees  
Global Purposive 23 (9 representatives of IGOs; 5 government officials; 4 
financial and technical partners; 2 private consultants; 1 
CSO; 1 from the private sector) 
National Purposive 24 (9 representatives of national administration; 8 CSOs; 7 
financial and technical partners) 
Local Purposive 
(municipality); 
Some 
randomness and 
convenience in 
the sampling 
(farmers) 
1 focus group discussion (Chiefs of fokontany and elders) 
93 Interviews (7 representatives of local administration; 6 
regional administration and deconcentrated state land 
service; 7 local CSOs; 2 regional CSOs; 2 local economic 
players; 2 regional economic players; 9 chiefs of fokontany; 
58 farmers)  
 
3.2.2.1. Interviews with global and national actors 
 
The global actors interviewed have either contributed to the land policy process in 
Madagascar or to international initiatives. The national actors were directly involved in 
the policy process at some stage since 2005. The themes that structured the interviews 
focused on: i) the activities of the institutions and actors; ii) how tenure security has been 
conceived; iii) their engagement in the Malagasy land policy process; iv) visions and 
experiences of the policy process; and v) their interaction with other institutions and 
actors. I furthermore adapted more specific questions to the characteristics of each 
institution and social actor, and to the dynamics of each discussion, leading to a very 
diverse set of discussions.  
 
The discussions progressed easily when the interviewees were vocal and willing to share 
their opinions. They built their own narratives, in which I intervened by seeking 
clarification or introducing new topics. It was more demanding to manage the dynamics 
when the interviewees were restrained and/or maintained an institutional position. This 
could have been because of the more official nature of the interview (demand of consent, 
recording etc.) while off the record they spoke more openly. On those occasions, I had 
to direct the conversations more.  
 
I found it most demanding to reach out and conduct meaningful interviews with the 
directors of the state land service. They remained distant, did not show much interest in 
the subject and power imbalances existed between me and them. Therefore, the 
discussions often stayed superficial, involving an exchange on the policy in general. I 
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had to combine other sources of information (observations, document analysis) to 
properly capture their discourse of contest and resistance to the policy. Yet, the overall 
difficulty in reaching out to representatives of the state land service is also indicative of 
the conflicts in the policy process and the weak integration of the state land service in it. 
Because of these constraints, I ended up conducting many more interviews with actors 
who had been part of the policy process. Consequently, the story of the state land service 
is told to a large extent by the initiators and proponents of the policy, who might 
emphasize the negative characteristics of the state land service.   
 
A considerable aid in the global and national interviews was the ability to speak the same 
language (French or English) and play with words. However, the Skype conversations 
were more demanding. They had to be concise (one hour maximum) and I could not 
observe the body language of the interviewee, which would have enriched their stories.  
 
3.2.2.2. Interviews with local actors 
 
I started the local interviews by talking to municipal actors, farmers’ organisations, 
CSOs and economic players. I also organised a focus group discussion. The chiefs of 
the three fokontanys and two elders from each were invited to take part. However, only 
the fokontany C was fully represented. The discussion helped identify key tenure issues 
in the municipality and the selected fokontanys, and review questions related to policy 
implementation. I conducted further individual interviews with the chiefs of the three 
fokontanys and seven other chiefs. The interviews were particularly useful in gathering 
information on local history, developments and challenges in terms of land tenure. I met 
the chiefs of the three fokontanys on several occasions to build up longer-term relations 
and to learn the latest news. I equally conducted interviews with the employees of the 
local land office and CRIF. 
 
The main data collection consisted of interviewing 58 farmers selected on the basis of 
the sampling list. These interviews enabled me to understand local meanings of land and 
land tenure systems (Shipton and Goheen 1992), picture challenges of tenure security in 
the fokontanys, learn about local practices to secure tenure and the participation of 
farmers in the policy process, and the use they might have for certificates. I structured 
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the interviews around these elements. Again, I asked more specific questions, adapting 
to each interview. 
 
Tenure security being an abstract notion, I introduced the subject by talking about 
challenges, tensions and conflicts that might exist. The idea was to discuss any open, 
latent or probable issues inside families, between neighbours or towards outsiders. The 
issue was also introduced by talking about any real or perceived threats to tenure rights. 
Finally, I asked whether people feel confident in terms of access to, control over and 
management of their lands in the longer term. When introducing tenure security, I 
avoided referring to the local land office and the certificates, as these would have 
restricted the conversation. 
 
This leads me to the challenges of conducting interviews with farmers. First, my 
experience is that it is complicated to talk about tenure security. People might not be 
willing to expose sore points, admit possible vulnerabilities and reveal tensions to an 
outsider, especially if these exist within families. When I perceived tension in the 
interview situation, I kept the discussions more general, inviting the interviewees to 
reflect on their knowledge of what happens in the village or wider community, rather 
than directly sharing their own case. Furthermore, some people were reluctant to discuss 
their wealth, how much land they have land and where. Indeed, Shipton and Goheen 
(1992) also note the subtleties and challenges in statistically measuring land holdings. 
Therefore, I chose not to collect any quantitative data, identify precise locations of 
parcels or produce maps.  
 
Another challenge I faced was leading rich and reflective discussions especially with 
younger people and women. There were interviews that did not flow easily, in which 
responses to questions were short and the situation was more of an investigation than a 
semi-structured interview. I kept conversations short if I saw they did not lead anywhere. 
I also tried to talk about the local life in general and family history before introducing 
questions related to land. However, these shorter interviews are also valuable as they 
enabled me to observe differences between people and provide a richer picture of the 
villages. A personal challenge I encountered was developing clear and open-ended 
questions on the spot. First, I attended to separating my own analytic questions from 
content-related ones directed at interviewees. In fact, there were cases where the 
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interviewees asked me to repeat questions as they were not coherent enough. Second, I 
recognised the need to be careful not to direct the answers by the way the questions are 
framed when listening to recordings and observing my own practice. Third, a lot of 
interactional dynamics are lost in translation. 
 
A related challenge is about the extent of information collected. Throughout the data 
collection, I was concerned whether the interviews are deep enough, wondering if I 
asked the right questions and could have pushed the interviews further without intruding. 
My self-censure and shyness in this sense might have left some issues undiscovered. In 
general, I enjoyed the semi-structured interviews when they were built around a dialogue 
and an easily flowing thematic discussion into which I can drop questions to ensure that 
all key topics are covered. These are interviews that adapt to the characteristics of the 
interviewee and the dynamics of the situation. The nature of qualitative research enabled 
me to conduct this type of interview. The downside is that it is difficult to collect 
information in a systematic way. Therefore, they could be combined with more 
structured interviews to collect data on specific aspects.  
 
 
3.3. Data management and analysis 
 
The collected data constitutes documents, photos, recordings, personal descriptive and 
reflective notes, and transcripts. I have used the software Nvivo to manage them. In my 
data analysis, I attempted to concentrate on the narratives of my interviewees: what they 
say, how, when and in which contexts.  
 
3.3.1. Data management 
 
During the data collection, I took personal notes of my observations and interviews. 
These have been typed up or photographed. The focus group discussion and interviews 
were recorded when participants consented. I did not take written notes during the 
interviews but noted salient points and key impressions after each interview and 
discussion with Hoby. I decided to transcribe all the interview recordings to have a 
comprehensive database. This was done in the three months after the data collection. 
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Hoby transcribed and translated local interviews in French. I transcribed the national- 
and global-level interviews in the spoken language (French or English). I then used 
Nvivo to organise and cluster the data under various themes. All data were saved on my 
computer, external hard drive and in a password-protected cloud service. I have also 
used a coding system to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees. Daily back-ups have 
been made of the different chapters during the writing-up stage.  
 
3.3.2. Data analysis 
 
The research questions (structured around conceptions on tenure security, practices of 
securing tenure and interactions between actors) and the conceptual framings (organised 
around policy narratives, assemblages and power dynamisms) have informed data 
analysis (see Table 3.5. below). This analysis has been gradual. I have reflected on and 
analysed data as I collected it.  
 
I started by building general knowledge of Malagasy land policy process through event-
ethnography, document analysis and exploratory interviews. First, this entailed mapping 
national and international actors involved in the policy process. Second, this meant 
building a general idea of the policy framings, ideas and practices (Keeley and Scoones 
2003). These steps indicated how tenure security is officially conceived and practiced, 
shed light on how actors refer to global instruments or local experiences, and revealed 
the nature of links actors have with the policy. The elements emerging from this ground 
analysis also guided the interviews. 
 
I continued by recognising the way in which individual actors and institutions conceive 
tenure security and the practices they undertake to secure tenure. I also identified the 
concrete roles actors play in the policy process, the attitudes and positions they hold 
towards the policy, and the connections they establish between themselves. I first 
interviewed regional and local administrators, intermediaries, chiefs, elders and farmers. 
By the time of the national- and global-level interviews, I was aware of the key issues 
on which I invited the interviewees to elaborate.  
 
With the interviews, I tried to allow my participants to tell the story of the policy process 
from their perspective. I wanted to ground the analysis in the ‘everyday life experiences 
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and understandings’ of actors (Long 1992a, p.5). I have aimed to recognise the multiple 
realities of actors, be aware of on-going social processes and grasp the real dynamisms 
at play (Long 1992a; Olivier de Sardan 1995). This has been possible by keeping the 
interviews as open as possible and by attending to the narratives of interviewees in the 
data analysis. I consider that through stories interviewees communicate messages and 
make sense of events and actions (Riessman 1993; Adger et al. 2001). Therefore, aside 
from the regular discussions, I have taken note of what they said and how, the history of 
their accounts, the social context in which their accounts were constructed, the way they 
persuaded the listener of the validity of their stories, and the way they gave voice to 
actors not commonly represented (Riessman 1993; Gibbs 2007; Gubrium and Holstein 
2009). These elements have enabled me to highlight the lived experiences of actors and 
the dynamics of the policy process. 
 
I then listened to and transcribed the global- and national-level interviews, and read the 
translated local interviews. This enabled me to refamiliarize myself with their content, 
who said what and where, and continue writing reflective notes. The organisation of the 
data in Nvivo was also helpful for analysing key content-related issues. I clustered some 
data under themes that gradually emerged in this process. These clusters were in turn 
organised under wider groupings: i) overall meanings of land and views on the land 
policy process; ii) concepts of tenure security; iii) practices of securing tenure; iv) 
relations and power plays; and v) new sources of tenure insecurity. I did the clustering 
and grouping separately for local, national and global data. Furthermore, the clusters 
informed the organisation of the empirical chapters and enabled me to go back and forth 
with the thematic content during the write-up.  
 
Finally, drafting the thesis has enabled me to connect content with the conceptual 
framework and with personal reflections. I have recognised the diverse concepts of 
tenure security, captured the variety of practices undertaken to secure tenure, examined 
the translations of the policy on the ground and attended to the interaction between 
actors. By linking official sources with the accounts of actors and my own observations, 
I have analysed how actors relate to the different concepts, practices and other actors. I 
have also been able to identify (dis)connections between levels. This analysis has 
informed the identification of policy narratives, assemblages of actors and existing 
power dynamics, wherein some actors are included in, and others excluded from, the 
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policy process. In particular, the stories of the interviewees enabled me to go beyond the 
factual elements of the policy process and grasp how policy dynamisms manifest on the 
ground.  
 
In this final process, I have also been able to structure ideas, elaborate key messages and 
form a coherent narrative. I have described a dominant policy narrative, but also 
explored counter- and competing stories that alter and contest the dominant narrative 
(Roe 1989, 1991 and 1994). I have recognised that these narratives belong to ‘complex, 
multi-participant and multigroup’ assemblages of actors and the different weight given 
to them depends, for instance, on their access to economic and political power (Roe 1989 
and 1994). I have paid attention to the key actors producing, transforming and 
maintaining these narratives and assemblages as well as how they persuade others of the 
validity of their ideas (see Li 2007).  
 
Table 3.5. Analysis of key variables  
Variable Definition Elements to be considered (examples) 
Actors People and 
organisations involved 
in and/or affected by the 
land policy process.  
Farmers, (in)formal groups, associations, 
brokers, intermediaries, local administrations, 
advocates, private sector players, experts, 
government departments/ministries, donor 
agencies, international organisations, 
development projects etc. 
Concepts Definitions, framings, 
ideas about and 
approaches to tenure 
security. 
Direct definitions; ideas, framings and 
approaches; values given to land; references to 
sources of and conditions for tenure security 
(e.g. political, social, cultural, legal, 
administrative); references to conflicts, tensions, 
threats; references to practices of securing 
tenure; new sources of tenure insecurity; etc.  
Practices  Concrete actions, 
technical solutions and 
tools to recognise, 
respect and protect 
legitimate tenure rights.   
 
 
Policies and laws; titling, cadastre, certification 
and petits papiers; administration (registration, 
up-dating, safeguard of records and maps); 
taxation measures; land use planning; natural 
resource management practices; contractual 
arrangements; social and cultural relations; 
socio-economic positions; negotiations; dispute 
resolution mechanisms; new sources of tenure 
insecurity etc.  
Interactions  Connections between 
actors, quality of 
interaction and interests 
behind interactions 
Relations and networks; discontinuities; 
collaborations, oppositions; inclusion and 
exclusion; cross-fertilisation of ideas and 
practices; authority relations; financial flows; 
vision on policy process; new sources of tenure 
insecurity; etc. 
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Mechanisms  Processes shaping the 
consideration of tenure 
security in the policy 
process  
Policy narratives; assemblages of actors around 
certain ways of seeing and doing; power in 
policy and decision-making processes  
 
 
3.4. Reflections on the research process  
 
Engaging in qualitative research meant that I was an integral part of the research process 
through my physical presence in the research sites (Gibbs 2007). This highlights the 
importance of being reflective on how my background, experiences and preferences 
influence the research process (Gibbs 2007). Furthermore, the multi-sited and multi-
positional nature of the research required adaptability to diverse situations, and deal with 
cross-cutting and contradictory commitments (Marcus 1995; Mosse 2005). This means 
that I had to attend to my positionality as a European woman in Madagascar and the 
proximity of the research subject to my (previous) professional work. Moreover, ethical 
considerations are related to the conduct of qualitative research and the political nature 
of tenure questions. Their investigations could have revived latent or existing conflicts, 
especially in the context of an on-going policy process. In the next sections, I elaborate 
on the research ethics, positionality and overall challenges encountered.  
 
3.4.1. Ethics  
 
I received ethical approval for the research from the International Development 
Research Ethics Committee of UEA in February 2015 prior to starting data collection. I 
followed the ethical procedures described in the application throughout the research.  
 
I conducted research in an independent manner in Madagascar. My main institutional 
contacts were the coordination unit of the PNF (national level), region of Vakinakaratra 
(regional level) and the local land office (Ankazomiriotra), who all accepted my 
presence and were regularly updated on the research progress. However, I did not 
establish formal institutional agreements with them nor seek an official research permit 
for several reasons. Institutional arrangements would have been complex to set up, as 
clear practices of requesting research permits for social sciences did not exist in 
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Madagascar, and other researchers based in the United Kingdom or France have 
regularly worked without these.  
 
Prior to starting data collection in Madagascar, I met with the key institutional contacts 
and fokontany chiefs, prepared an introductory letter and a description of my research, 
and translated consent forms into French and Malagasy. I started the interviews by 
explaining why I would like to talk to people, presenting the research, asking for written 
or oral consent and seeking their approval to record the interview. I explained to the 
interviewees that the discussions are voluntary, confidential and anonymous. I also 
highlighted that they do not need to answer all questions if they find them uncomfortable 
and they can stop the interview at any moment or withdraw from the research until the 
write-up stage. I provided the interviewees with my contact details or explained to local 
people how they could reach me. I decided to offer a bar of soap (value 500 Ariary14) to 
the interviewed farmers and monetary compensation (3000 Ariary) to each participant 
in the focus group at the end of each discussion. I did not offer anything to other local 
or national- and global-level actors, as meeting researchers is one of their professional 
responsibilities.  
 
I kept the interviews short if I observed that people participated solely out of courtesy 
and felt uncomfortable during the discussion. While I aimed to conduct individual 
interviews, this was almost impossible at the local level. In most cases, other family 
members attended the interviews, neighbours followed them from a distance (e.g. from 
windows or from around the corner), and children were constantly running around. 
There could be some thirty people in the room, with several of them (women and men 
alike) contributing to the discussion. This posed, of course, concerns in terms of 
confidentiality, and so I steered the discussions towards more general debates on tenure 
issues, inviting everyone to participate rather than asking for personal details.  
 
Overall, respect for confidentiality and anonymity was a key concern for myself and 
Hoby. During interviews, I refrained from exposing points stemming from earlier 
discussions or referring to the views of other people. I recorded the interviews and took 
                                                 
14 One euro (main foreign currency used in Madagascar) was around 3400 to 3600 Ariary in 2016 and 
2017. A soap bar of 500 Ariary would then be around 15 Euro cents. As a comparison, the daily salary of 
an agricultural employee is 1500-3000 Ariary.  
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notes without marking down the name and affiliation of the person, and instead created 
a parallel coding system. Furthermore, I do not name people, the six target villages or 
the three fokontanys in this research. I rather identify people based on a rough group of 
actors with which they are associated. I also refrain from exposing details that could be 
easily traced back to the source of information or person described. Corson (2016) 
adopted a similar strategy in a study of the political economy of the conservation sector 
in Madagascar. She noted downplaying the roles of key individuals, identifying them by 
a general position. However, considering the limited number of national and global 
players interviewed, and the focal roles some of them have played in the policy process, 
it is almost impossible to achieve complete anonymity, as someone who has knowledge 
of the setting would be able to trace back to the right person.      
 
3.4.2. Positionality 
 
When conducting qualitative research, my values, views and background play out in 
how I perceive social realities and the environment, but also how the social actors with 
whom I interact see me. This in turn influences the production of knowledge. The 
question of positionality is diverse in my research, due to its multi-sited and multi-level 
nature. Being a European female in my mid-thirties with a previous professional 
background from FAO played out differently in each site. Therefore, I have been 
reflecting on my own actions and role in the research process (see Mason 2002). 
Especially in terms of interviews, I recognise that their interactional form has influenced 
the accounts of the interviewees (Elliott 2005). 
 
3.4.2.1. Global and national level 
 
At the global level and with national players in Madagascar, I had to distinguish between 
my former professional identity as a FAO officer and my position as an independent 
researcher. This was a concern when interviewing former colleagues and collaborators. 
I had previously established trusting relationships with them and could more easily 
address the challenges linked to the policy. Yet, I had apprehensions about interviewing 
people I knew, wary of the possible attitudes they might have towards my research topic. 
I was also careful not to put the interviewees in a delicate position where they would 
expose confidential information. To counter such risks, I clearly explained the objectives 
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of the research and my role as researcher. Most of the interviews were relaxed, with free-
flowing conversation. On one occasion only, my role as a researcher froze the 
interviewee, who adopted an institutional position in comparison to more collegial 
exchanges that we are used to have.  
 
With new encounters, I had more trouble accessing ‘inside information’. I was 
concerned whether higher level officials would take a younger female researcher 
seriously and share meaningful pieces of information, but also I had to ensure that my 
European background did not inspire a perception of wealth and power in the Malagasy 
context and thus create unnecessary imbalances in the interview situation. In general, 
examining a policy process as an outsider is demanding. I say this from a position in 
which I have been an insider of the development and implementation processes of the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure while working in FAO 
and now an outsider of the Malagasy land policy process. There is a significant 
difference in terms of access to information as a researcher compared to someone 
playing an institutional role. When these ‘institutional aids’ don’t exist, it demands more 
effort from the researcher to build up relations and networks. I find that this is possible 
only in the long term when trust has been built on both sides, requires a constant presence 
in the policy settings (difficult for a researcher due to time and resource constraints) and 
involves unofficial, personal encounters as well. Finally, it is important to note that the 
accounts presented here are the views of interviewees at a certain point in time. Also, 
while many of the aspects presented are widely acknowledged, they have been written 
down only rarely. Consequently, there is a risk that some people feel uncomfortable with 
the results or could contest them (Mosse 2005). It has thus been important for me to 
conduct the research in a rigorous manner, formulating solid arguments and grounding 
the research theoretically.  
 
Against this background, I recognise that the results are my interpretation of multiple 
existing realities. Following Corson (2016), I do not aim to critique the policy nor its 
key individuals ‘but to reveal the complex processes through which policy actions 
transpire’ (p.28). Therefore, the research should not be read as a singular evaluation of 
the policy, nor as a prognostication on its future. It is a piece of work that argues that the 
policy process has challenges and is affected by power dynamics. It explains the 
complex positions of policy actors who use similar mechanisms of power to establish 
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and maintain their ideas and practices. If I take a stance towards one group of actors over 
another, it is the people of Ankazomiriotra and the most vulnerable among them. It is 
from their point of view that any judgements are made.  
 
3.4.2.2. Local level 
 
In Ankazomiriotra, both I and Hoby were outsiders to the local context. We were 
perceived as the vazaha and the gasy – the foreigner and the Malagasy. We introduced 
ourselves as students, willing to learn from people’s experience of agriculture, land 
tenure and rural development. Introducing ourselves as researchers could have created 
suspicion (e.g. that we are looking for land). On several occasions, we had to clarify our 
positionality and correct misapprehensions. In fact, at times people thought we were on 
an awareness-raising mission or undertaking small scale development activities that 
could directly benefit the interviewees.  
 
We started the overall research gently by meeting key informants, hanging around in the 
centre of Ankazomiriotra and walking around the countryside. Little by little, people 
started to recognise us. As we conducted research in six villages, more time would have 
been required to approach these spaces gradually and meet people first in informal 
settings. Because of time constraints, we started interviews after meeting the chiefs of 
fokontanys and the elders and visited each village once or twice. This meant that some 
interviewees were still surprised to see us. Most people became more accustomed to our 
presence when they saw us returning to the same place a couple of months later.  
 
Power imbalances were omnipresent in the interviews with farmers. It came up as a 
difficulty in building up a meaningful dialogue, especially with younger people and 
women. Most of the farmers would not look me into the eye, but preferred to talk to 
Hoby. To mitigate these challenges, we dressed and acted in a modest way, accepted 
any hospitality shown by people, conducted interviews in spaces where we met people 
and refrained having any papers in view. We placed the recorder discreetly, talked with 
calm and soft voices, remained relaxed, and physically placed ourselves at the level of 
the interviewees (e.g. if they sat on the floor, we sat on the floor as well). Yet, asking 
for consent before an interview, even if oral, brought formality to the interaction and 
sometimes froze a social exchange that had otherwise been smooth.  
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During our stays in Ankazomiriotra we strived to keep cordial relations with everyone, 
not getting involved in local dynamics and community politics. Keeping such distance 
was easy, as we did not lodge in the villages where we conducted research and were thus 
not associated with a certain family or group. However, we were actively related to the 
employees of the local land office and the chiefs of fokontanys. These apparent contacts 
might have influenced the narratives of some interviewees (e.g. some farmers were 
determined to demonstrate their knowledge of the processes).  
 
3.4.3. Practical and personal challenges  
 
The nature and the context of the research have represented some challenges. It is 
demanding to conduct research in new cultural settings, in three languages and relying 
on assistance. I felt at ease with the global-level players as I could relate to them; and 
with national players, I could converse in French and manage the dynamisms of the 
interaction by playing with words, changing my tone of voice and following the 
dynamisms set by the interviewee. Locally, I relied on assistance, without which the 
research would not have been possible. Thus, it was challenging to establish a certain 
proximity with the interviewees through the translator and pass messages from one 
language to another. I am aware that details are lost in translation. Also, I had to manage 
relations with Hoby and consider her influence on the interviews. Moreover, the security 
situation in some villages was poor in June and July 2016. During one interview, the 
village was on alert against the Dahalos, who attacked the village the following day. Our 
host village was also under a nightly alert, meaning that life in the village stopped from 
5pm to 6am.  
 
Secondly, I have actively used English and French, and relied on Malagasy language 
assistance during the research process. This has implication for the written form of the 
research. I have chosen to use French abbreviations and wordings of technical terms 
when these are used in relation to the Malagasy land policy. Indeed, Malagasy land 
policy, laws and programmes were initially written in French. Many of these French 
terms (e.g. petits papiers) are used in francophone literature and circles to refer to the 
Malagasy case. I use Malagasy words (e.g. tanety, meaning hillside land) when their use 
is current in Anglophone and francophone literature, and direct translation more 
complex.  
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Thirdly, my own state of mind has impacted the research. At the beginning of my stay 
in Madagascar, I went through major set-backs in my personal life that remained 
unresolved for over six months. I was forced to change my initial fieldwork plans and 
my ability to work, think clearly and take decisions were also affected. While the 
fieldwork provided a distraction from personal issues, I conducted it under major 
emotional stress. This experience thought to me how our research projects and personal 
lives are intrinsically linked to one another.  
 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
The research examines concepts of tenure security, practices of securing tenure and 
interaction between actors in the context of the Malagasy land policy process. By relying 
on the concepts of policy narratives, assemblages and power, I highlight factors and 
mechanisms that have influenced the consideration of tenure security in the policy 
process. To go about the research, I have adopted a nested approach where research has 
been conducted with global, national and local actors involved in the policy process from 
its beginning to its consolidation in 2015. I have collected data through observation, 
event ethnography, semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The data has 
been analysed by paying attention to the narratives of actors, seeking answers to the 
thematic questions and investigated in view of the key concepts.  
 
In this chapter, I have exposed the research background, methodologies, methods, 
analysis and ethics. This helps understanding the logic of the research and the subsequent 
empirical chapters. In the next chapter, I introduce the context of the Malagasy land 
policy in more detail.  
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4. Overview of the Malagasy land policy context 
 
 
This research centres on the notion of tenure security in the context of the Malagasy land 
policy process. My intention is to ‘study through’ the policy process from its conceptions 
of tenure security, to practices of securing tenure, to interactions between actors and 
successes on the ground (Keeley and Scoones 2003; Wedel and Feldman 2005). In this 
chapter, I provide an overview of the land policy and the development contexts in which 
it operates. This overview is based on a literature review, information collected through 
interviews and personal observations. I demonstrate that conceptual differences, 
practical challenges and power dynamics shape tenure security and question the 
successes of the policy. These initial insights furthermore support the reading of the 
empirical chapters, which investigate in detail concepts, practices and interactions 
around the notion of tenure security (Chapters 5, 6 and 8) and explore local integration 
of the policy (Chapter 7).    
 
I begin by providing a background to the political and development context in 
Madagascar. I then introduce some factual details about the Malagasy land policy. 
Finally, I discuss the socio-economic development context in the focus municipality of 
Ankazomiriotra where the land policy has been implemented since 2008. 
 
 
4.1. National political and development context 
 
The land policy process should be considered against the background of wider state 
politics, societal evolution and development interventions in Madagascar. The most 
relevant of these for the research are the overall socio-economic context and political 
changes, development, conservation and agricultural investment priorities, and 
decentralised policies.  
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4.1.1. Impoverishment of population and prevalence of political changes 
 
Madagascar is an island in the Indian Ocean east of Mozambique (Figure 4.1.). Its 
favourable conditions for development (natural borders, availability of land, mineral and 
forest resources, unified culture, absence of major conflicts and limited human pressure) 
hide persistent socio-economic and political challenges (Razafindrakoto et al. 2014 and 
2015) (Table 4.1.).  
 
Figure 4.1. Localisation of Madagascar 
 
Table 4.1. Some characteristics of Madagascar 
Population 24.8 million, of which  
64% live in rural areas 
36% live in urban areas 
Land mass area 587 000 km² 
Agricultural land 71% of the land mass, of which 
1.5% permanent crops (620 000 ha) 
8.5% arable land (3.5 million ha) 
90% meadows and pastures (37 million ha) 
GDP  10 billion USD (in 2016) 
Economic growth 
rate 
Some 4% (in 2016) 
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Poverty 70.7% of people (17.5 million) live below the national poverty line 
Life expectancy 65.9 years (in 2014) 
Undernourishment 41.5% of people (10.3 million) (in 2016) 
Sources: FAO STAT (2016 and 2018); World Bank (2016 and 2018) 
 
Madagascar is hence characterised by scholars through the impoverishment of its 
people. Razafindrakoto et al. (2014 and 2015) argue that the purchasing power of the 
Malagasy has decreased by 40 percent since independence in 1960. Today, some 70 
percent of its 24.8 million inhabitants live below the poverty line (World Bank 2018). 
These socio-economic challenges have deep roots and are linked to longer periods of 
hardship. Pélissier and Sautter (1994), for instance, describe the 1980s as a period of 
crisis, impoverishment and despair:  
the Malagasy crisis of the eighties (...) reflects the unease of a country where the 
divorce has become particularly flagrant between a state apparatus (the fanjakana) 
trying to hide the decline of its means behind a growing bureaucratic stiffness, and 
a society in its majority essentially rural, increasingly monopolized by the concerns 
of daily rice, increasingly abandoned to itself in the name of decentralisation, 
increasingly alien to official discourse and its returns.  
(p.5) 
 
These socio-economic development challenges are closely tied to political instability. 
Razafindrakoto et al. (2014 and 2015) demonstrate a connection between the periods of 
economic growth that have been stopped by socio-political crisis, and this in a cyclical 
manner. Since independence there have been political crises in 1972, 1991, 2001-2002 
and 2008-2009, each time impacting living standards (Razafindrakoto et al. 2015). This 
lurching of the country from one political crisis to another (Razafindrakoto et al. 2014) 
impacts the development and implementation of policy processes, as we will see later in 
relation to the land policy. 
 
4.1.2. Development, conservation and agricultural investment priorities 
 
What interests us here are the sectoral evolutions adjacent to the land policy process. 
These have contributed to making land a transnational concern that is linked to neo-
liberal development endeavours (Peluso 1993: Peters 2004; Chouquer 2011; Hall 2013; 
Boone 2014). The political crisis of 2001-2002 brought President Ravalomanana to 
power, under whom the land policy was initiated. His overall political objective was to 
install a programme of ‘rapid and sustainable’ development, as a result of which 
Madagascar became a ‘front-runner’ of development in Africa in the 2000s, attractive 
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to donors (Blanc-Pamard and Rakoto 2003; Goedefroit and Revéret 2006; 
Razafindrakoto et al. 2014). One of these development ambitions was engagement in 
environmental conservation and agricultural investment. These endeavours were in 
parallel of the development of the new land policy. This led to a contradiction wherein 
the President simultaneously tried to increase the size of protected areas, allocate land 
to large agricultural operators and secure the tenure of smallholders through the 
registration of land (Teyssier et al. 2010; Chouquer 2011). Part of this paradox is the 
inability to find available land that has not been appropriated and used as well as 
supposedly enjoying legal security under the land policy, or to recognise right-holders, 
provide compensation and engage them in conservation and investment activities. 
 
President Ravalomanana became known internationally by promising to triple the 
protected area at the World Parks Congress in Durban in 2003. Corson (2016) argues 
that these conservation plans did not involve community consultation but rather 
reinforced ‘upward accountability to national politicians, foreign aid donors, and 
transnational conservation NGOs based in Antananarivo’ (p.179). The conservation 
sector became a playing field for these actors (Horning 2008) who started to act like 
states (Corson 2016). Indeed, these ‘actors shaped the boundaries, resource rights, and 
decision-making authorities associated with the new protected areas, thereby 
consolidating their ability to determine land and resource rights through SAPM’ (Corson 
2016, p.179).15 Given that poverty has also persisted, the conservation plans have led to 
a contradiction in which ‘there is more concern about whether local people are protecting 
the environment than knowing what they eat!’ (Blanc-Pamard and Rakoto 2003, p.189).  
 
In terms of (agricultural) investment, Ravalomanana saw the private sector as the motor 
of development, with the state acting as a facilitator (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2008). 
The investment law enacted in 2008 foresaw the creation of the Economic Development 
Board of Madagascar (EDBM) that became the interface between investors and the state. 
It also recognised the importance of enterprises accessing land. The state was ready to 
guarantee that there are no programmes of nationalisation, expropriation or requisition 
on lands allocated to investors (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2008).  
 
                                                 
15 SAPM stands for Système des Aires Protégées de Madagascar, meaning which translates as a System 
of Protected Areas of Madagascar. 
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The agricultural investment endeavours came to international attention through two 
intended investment cases in 2008 and 2009, and parallel political instability. While the 
government was negotiating with Daewoo for the allocation of over 1.3 million hectares 
of land, and with Varun International for over 200,000 hectares (Teyssier et al. 2010; 
Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011; Burnod et al. 2013), discontent with the 
Ravalomanana regime grew and power was taken by Andy Rajoalina in 2009. This led 
the country into a transition period that lasted until 2013. The political opposition used 
land-related arguments against President Ravalomanana, who was accused of selling 
ancestral land (tanindrazana) to foreigners (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011; 
Andriamanalina et al. 2014a).  
 
While the Daewoo and Varun investment plans failed, the transition government did not 
stop agricultural investment as such (Andriamanalina et al. 2014a), but worked case by 
case and aimed to bring more land under state control.16 Investment was one means, 
together with the exploitation of rosewood and mineral prospects, to seek new sources 
of funding, as international aid had largely been frozen due to the political coup 
(Razafindrakoto et al. 2015). Razafindrakoto et al. (2015) also observe that during the 
transition there were no meaningful oversight mechanisms, which led to illegal 
exploitation, increased corruption and misappropriation of resources within the 
administration. 
 
President Rajaonarimampianina, in power from 2013 to 2018 was not able to change 
these socio-economic dynamics even though the estimated economic growth has been 
above four percent since 2016 (World Bank 2016).17 In terms of agricultural investment, 
the government has continued to promote access to land for investors by planning the 
creation of agricultural investment zones (ZIAs) and the Ministry of Agriculture is 
reserving two million hectares of land for potential investors.18  
 
                                                 
16 Details presented by Perrine Burnod in a conference on Access to land organised by the Land 
Observatory on 31 October 2017 in the Institut Français de Madagascar in Antananarivo. 
17 Presidential elections are held in November and December 2018. The candidates include four previous 
presidents. The President Rajaonarimampianina had to resign from his post to be able to participate in the 
elections.    
18 Statement made by a Representative of the Ministry of Agriculture in a public conference on Access to 
land on 31 October 2017 in the Institut Français de Madagascar in Antananarivo.  
 
92 
 
Nonetheless, agricultural investment has been less important than initially foreseen. The 
Land Observatory notes that between 2000 and 2016 some 96 companies expressed their 
intention to access land and develop large-scale agriculture. Some 74 percent of these 
have abandoned their plans or stopped their activities, and only 25 000 hectares were 
cultivated.19 Andriamanalina et al. (2014a) explain these failures as due to difficult 
agronomic conditions, inexperienced operators, difficulty in accessing land, 
administrative costs, and resistance from people on the ground who received little 
benefit in return for their land. Others have also explained these failures through the 
impact of transnational activism on investment (Gingembre 2015) and internal power 
plays (Wolford et al. 2013).  
 
4.1.3. Decentralised policies  
 
Parallel to political and socio-economic change, Madagascar has implemented 
decentralised policies since 1990. Municipalities were created in 1994 as the legal and 
administrative structures of the state. They have become key sites for rural development 
and environmental management, and privileged interlocutors of external actors (Weber 
1998; Blanc-Pamard and Rakoto 2003; Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux 2004; Bidou et al. 
2008). In addition, inter-municipal public organisations (Organisme public 
intercommunal – OPCI) have been responsible for managing issues going beyond the 
municipal boundaries (Bidou et al. 2008). The implementation of the core approaches 
of the land policy has depended on these two structures.  
 
The Constitution of the 4th Malagasy Republic enacted in 2010 restates effective 
decentralisation as one of the means to achieve sustainable development and recognises 
municipalities, regions and provinces as decentralised structures (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2010). The constitution and accompanying organic law (loi 2014-018) 
furthermore add that village communities (fokon’olona, spatially organised in 
fokontanys) participate in municipal development programmes and are thus the basis for 
development and socio-cultural and environmental cohesion (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2014 and 2010). This decentralisation is moreover accompanied by 
                                                 
19 Details presented by Perrine Burnod in a conference on Access to land organised by the Land 
Observatory on 31 October 2017 in the Institut Français de Madagascar in Antananarivo. 
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deconcentrating the functions of the central state, raising questions of sharing of 
responsibilities and ensuring competencies.20 This issue is reflected in an organic law 
(loi 2014-018) that foresees the pre-eminence of the sovereign functions of the state and 
their deconcentration rather than decentralisation (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2014).  
 
The first advances in the allocation of responsibilities to local levels were in the 
environmental sector (Bidou et al. 2008), where devolution targeted local communities 
rather than municipalities. Some of these initiatives were under national environmental 
programmes in the 1990s and built the basis for the land policy, such as the law known 
as Gelose (Gestion locale sécurisée des ressources naturelles renouvelables)21 under 
which rights over the management of natural resources were transferred from the state 
to local communities, defined as such for the purposes of environmental management 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 1996). The management practices were defined through 
negotiation between local communities, decentralised authorities (municipalities) and 
state representatives (Babin and Bertrand 1998; Weber 1998 and 2000).  
 
The Gelose was complemented by a decree in 1998 on securing tenure that proposed 
three practices for securing community tenure: relative (SFR – Sécurisation foncière 
relative), intermediate (SFI – Sécurisation foncière intermediaires) and optimal securing 
of tenure (SFO – Sécurisation foncière optimale) (Maldidier 2001). These moved 
gradually from the simple cartography of parcels (SFR) to include cartography, the 
allocation of rights by judicial authorities and the inscription of the parcels on the 
cadastre (SFO) (see Appendix 2). These were all alternatives to existing land titling 
measures. According to Maldidier (2001) there were two motivations for their 
development: finding rapid solutions for securing the rights of communities on land they 
managed and initiating debate on the need for a new law on tenure.  
 
                                                 
20 In this research, I differentiate decentralisation from deconcentration. This separation is made in French 
when describing the Malagasy administrative structures. It is in line with the definition made by Ribot et 
al. (2006): ‘Deconcentration (or administrative decentralization) is said to occur when powers are 
devolved to appointees of the central government in the local arena. In contrast, political decentralization 
(also called democratic decentralization) involves the transfer of power to actors or institutions that are 
accountable to the population in their jurisdiction.’ (p.1865). Malagasy municipalities and their local land 
offices are part of political decentralisation. While opening offices of the state land service in districts is 
about deconcentration of the central government. 
21 Gelose refers to secure local management of renewable natural resources. 
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The spirit of the Gelose on community-based approaches found its way into specific 
land laws. In 2003, a law (loi 2003-029) modified a decree from 1960 that regulated the 
registration of lands and buildings under the titling system (decree 60-142). The changes 
enabled collective forms of registration in addition to individual titling. Demands for 
registration could be made either by the state, a community or an association, and should 
mention the delimitations and approximate surface of the zone in question and the 
modalities (titling, SFR, SFI or SFO) through which tenure is secured (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2003). Rochegude (2004) finds that by enabling recourse to different 
modalities of securing tenure, this law from 2003 built the first basis for the 
decentralisation of land administration and recognition of local practices.  
 
What stands out from this overview is the volatility of the national political and 
development context. State politics affect the implementation of policies; socio-
economic development challenges keep most Malagasy trapped in poverty; and 
fluctuations in strategic orientations (from the promotion of private sector-led 
agricultural development to the securing of community management rights) create 
friction between policies. These changes, priorities and policies furthermore engage with 
a range of global, national and local actors among whom tenure relations are played out. 
What this instability suggests for tenure security is that the authorities and institutions 
recognising and protecting rights are susceptible to change in line with wider political 
and development efforts. These influence the sources of and conditions for tenure 
(in)security and the administration of land. The unpredictability finally entails that the 
land policy is in a constant state of flux, as seen next.  
  
 
4.2. Malagasy land policy 
 
The purpose of the Malagasy land policy when it was launched in 2005 was to improve 
the conditions for investment, agricultural production, environmental management, 
decentralisation and social cohesion (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a). It hence 
addressed a range of development aims. The policy was furthermore consolidated in 
2015 with the objective to make land simply ‘a basis for development’ (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2015).  
95 
 
The elaboration and implementation of the policy has consisted of the drafting of Land 
Policy Letters (LPF – Lettre de Politique Foncière), publication of laws and regulations, 
setting up institutional structures and establishment of Land Policy Programmes (PNF - 
Programme National Foncier). In its early years, the policy received political support 
from President Ravalomanana and Minister of Agriculture Harison, and was funded by 
donors. The dynamics changed after the 2009 coup. Changes in the overall government 
policies and withdrawal of donors left the policy without political and financial backing 
during the transition period from 2009 to 2013. Its consolidation started in 2014 under a 
new government and with a slow revival of donor projects. An initial consolidated LPF 
was approved by the Government Council in May 2015 and a revised one in August 
2015. The consolidation process was marked by major institutional disputes. A new PNF 
was finally set in place in November 2016. 
 
4.2.1. Previous land administration system 
 
Before the new policy, and as in many sub-Saharan African countries, all lands were 
presumed to belong to the state unless the state land service had allocated statutory rights 
to people through legal recording or cadastral mapping (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 
2005a; Colin et al. 2009; Teyssier et al. 2009). These administrative processes were 
legislated for in 1897, 1911 and 1960, and orchestrated by the state land service based 
in Antananarivo or by its regional offices. There was little recourse to intermediaries 
such as notaries or private surveyors, and the customary authorities did not play any role 
in the statutory administration of land (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a; Omrane 
2008; Teyssier et al. 2009). Consequently, the state land service exercised statutory 
authority over land, which became constitutive of its power (Lund 2016).  
 
The registration of land was based on the Torrens Act, which proclaims all powers to 
titles against third parties (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 1960). This includes the physical 
identification of parcels on the ground, placing boundary markers and the registration of 
parcels and right-holders in the land registry (Rochegude 2011a). In theory, the process 
involves the consultation of neighbours and the write up of minutes of meeting 
(Rochegude 2011a). However, the statutory administration of land has faced challenges 
over the years. In 1967, Rarijaona noted a failure to implement land laws and achieve 
results through titling, which he attributed to the inflexibility of laws and processes, their 
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consideration of only some segments of the society, and their sporadic approach and 
heavy bureaucracy (Rarijaona 1967). Gasse (1971) added high costs, lack of human 
resources and problems of updating registries by the state land service.  
 
These challenges have persisted, providing a justification for the 2005 land policy, which 
was framed around a ‘tenure crisis’, a ‘massive demand’ for securing tenure and external 
threats. The tenure crisis refers to the failure of the state land service to allocate titles 
and manage administrative procedures. In parallel, people had adopted local practices to 
administer land through the allocation of petits papiers (literally small papers) 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a; Teyssier et al. 2009). This practice, together with 
customary land markets, was taken by policy-makers as a demonstration of a ‘massive 
demand’ for securing tenure on the ground. The starting point for the policy was thus 
the enhancement of the statutory administration of land and entering customary tenure 
rights in its sphere. This was finally seen to protect customary tenure right holders 
against any adverse claims coming outside of the local community.  
 
4.2.2. The core of the policy: 2005 Land Policy Letter and new statuses of land 
 
The development of the 2005 LPF was facilitated by a technical committee and its final 
version was validated by the Government Council in May 2005. The 2005 LPF outlines 
the principles of the policy, which aims to ‘respond to a massive demand for securing 
tenure […] through the formalisation of non-written tenure rights and through the 
safeguard and regularisation of written tenure rights’ (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 
2005a). To achieve this objective, the policy is designed around four strategies:  
1. restructuration, modernisation and digitalisation of land administration and 
archives (titles and topographical maps);  
2. enhancement and decentralisation of land administration; 
3. revision of regulations on land tenure; and  
4. establishment of education and training programme for land professions.  
Repoblikan’i Madagasikara (2005a)  
 
The above framing entails that the state land service continues to operate in parallel with 
the new decentralised administration. Indeed, the state land service received funds for 
the improvement of its titling and cadastre operations. (Strategies 1 and 4) Although 
these are important activities, in this research I focus on the novelties of the policy 
(Strategies 2 and 3) that proposed revised concepts of tenure security, generated changes 
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in approaches and practices of securing tenure, and caused shifts in power dynamics 
between social actors and institutions, all of which questioned the sole authority of the 
state land service over land. 
 
The policy framing also entailed a spatial distinction. In fact, the state land service kept 
responsibility for urban areas where titles are issued, and the municipalities gained 
authority mainly in rural areas where certificates can also be allocated (World Bank 
2006). The World Bank (2006) justified this spatial choice through economic 
rationalities: 
A modernized Torrens system is most appropriate for urban and other areas of high-
value land where land markets are fully developed, and the volume of transactions 
against which fees can be charged is significant enough to make the system 
affordable and sustainable. However, a lower cost system is needed for other areas. 
The policy therefore provides, in the spirit of the existing practice of “petits papiers”, 
a new and less onerous system, more appropriate for the smallholders of very modest 
means for whom the current system is too slow and too costly. 
(Executive summary) 
This statement resonates with the orthodox practices of securing tenure that seek clarity 
over rights where the value of land is the highest (Rose 1994) but also with the ‘pro-
poor’ practices underlining low-cost and flexible solutions (Zevenbergen et al. 2013; 
Enemark et al. 2014). This leads us to make a distinction between three approaches 
stratified based on the costs: titles, certificates and petits papiers. Hence, a ‘gradual’ 
system was introduced from the outset where three institutions with different legal and 
customary standing recognise and guarantee rights. I return to this in section 5.3.2.   
 
The validation of the 2005 LPF was followed up by the drafting of a framework law (loi 
cadre 2005-019) that institutes state land and private property as the two possible status 
of land in Madagascar (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005b; see Table 4.2). Private 
properties can be either titled properties governed by the state land service or non-titled 
private properties (PPNT – Propriété privée non titrée) governed by local (municipal or 
inter-communal) land offices.22 The policy-makers interviewed argue that the 
introduction of the legal status of PPNT is the main policy innovation. The lands falling 
under it can be registered by local land offices that allocate certificates and record 
changes to them (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a). The certificates are issued based 
                                                 
22 Local land offices are known as guichets fonciers in French and Birao Ifotony amin'ny Fananan-tany 
(BIF) in Malagasy. 
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on the current occupation of lands through a process of local recognition (ibid.).23 
Furthermore, information on parcel delimitations, parcel identification numbers and 
right-holders are inserted in Geographic Information System-based (GIS) local land 
occupancy status maps (PLOF – Plans Locaux d’Occupation Foncière).  
 
Table 4.2. New statuses of land 
i. There are lands that are held by the state domain, decentralised authorities or other 
subjects of public law. These lands can be either public or private.  
a. If public, they are inalienable and imprescriptible even though they might be 
registered. The state can provide 30 years concession rights on these lands.  
b. If private, they can be sold, leased (until 90 years), exchanged etc. These 
lands include those that have not yet been appropriated or occupied.  
ii. There are lands that are held by private people. These lands are either recognized by 
a title or held as a non-titled private property. 
a. If titled property, the lands have gone through an individual or collective 
registration process. The state land service and its deconcentrated offices are 
responsible for the allocation and administration of the titles under the 
Torrens system. The titles are definitive and indefeasible. A new law 
providing the details on titled property is being discussed by the state land 
service (situation in 2017). 
b. If non-titled private property (PPNT), the lands are being held ‘individually 
or collectively in a real, evident and permanent manner, and according to the 
uses of the moment and of the place, and according to the use of the land’ 
(Article 33, Loi 2005-019). The decentralised authorities are responsible for 
the allocation and administration of certificates on these lands. The 
certificates provide proof of ownership unless there is evidence to overturn 
them. The specificities of the PPNT are further outlined in a law published in 
2006 (Loi 2006-031).    
Source: Repoblikan’i Madagasikara (2005; Framework law 2005-019) 
 
Several observations emerge from this framework law. First, it differentiates land that is 
appropriated and used from land that is not. These are legal categories of land, not 
necessarily identified on the ground. Second, a slight difference in legal value is created 
between the titles and certificates where the former is definitive and indefeasible while 
the latter can be rebutted with evidence (such as a title provided on the same land earlier 
on). Third, the law introduces two authorities, in addition to the customary ones, even 
though complementarities and collaboration between them are required: i) state land 
service and its deconcentrated offices responsible for the state domain and titled private 
property; and ii) decentralised institutions, mainly local land offices, responsible for the 
                                                 
23 Local recognition is a process that land administrators would call adjudication process (see Simpson 
1976).  
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PPNT. Thus, there is considerable room for interpretation on the appropriation and use 
of land, and the value of the certificate.  
 
4.2.3. Evolution of the policy 
 
The Minister of Agriculture created an administrative coordination unit in 2006. It is a 
semi-parallel entity to the state land service and this under the same political decision-
making powers. It oversees the implementation of the policy under a National Land 
Programme (PNF) that had already kicked off in June 2005. The PNF started with a 
preparation period of two years after which its activities were supposed to be extended 
to 1,000 municipalities (out of some 1,395 existing in Madagascar) over ten to fifteen 
years (Teyssier et al. 2007). Twelve donors supported the policy implementation, in 
which the MCA provided 90 percent of the total funding in the beginning (Teyssier et 
al. 2009). Between 2005 and 2011, some 46.6 million USD24 was spent on the policy 
implementation, of which 45 percent was directed at the modernisation of state land 
service,25 38 percent at decentralised activities and 17 percent at supporting activities 
(Comby 2011). The first local land office was opened under the funding of the Agence 
française de développement (AfD)26 in February 2006 and 93 percent of the offices 
benefitted from donor funding in the early years (MAEP 2008; Comby et al. 2011). 
Policy implementation also received international attention at the end of the 2000s when 
Malagasy institutions were invited to the Annual World Bank Conferences on Land and 
Poverty, the Malagasy case was discussed during the consultation and awareness raising 
meetings on the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure, and 
Madagascar was one of the pilot countries to conduct the LGAF exercise.  
 
Implementing the policy involved opening local land offices and issuing certificates (see 
table 4.3. for annual figures nationally and in the region of Vakinankaratra27 where the 
                                                 
24 This would be some 67,242 million Ariary.  
25 Modernisation activities included the acquisition of aerial or satellite images, inventory of all land 
documents (19 offices), their digitalization (14 offices), construction or renovation of buildings (20 
offices), provision of office material (22 offices) and the creation of deconcentrated offices in new districts 
(growing from 29 offices to 36 between 2007 and 2010; and 38 in 2014). Twenty of these offices are one-
stop-shops for all the services of the deconcentrated land administration (Comby et al. 2011; Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2015a). 
26 AfD is the French development agency 
27 Madagascar has 22 regions. In terms of population, Vakinankaratra is the second-biggest region after 
the capital region of Analamanga, but in terms of area it is one of the smallest. 
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focus municipality of Ankazomiriotra is located). By December 2017, some 535 local 
land offices had been opened (38% of all municipalities) and 142,067 certificates 
delivered, covering 193,679 hectares (0.47% of all agricultural land). The region of 
Vakinankaratra contains 83 local land offices (15% of all offices) and only three of its 
municipalities do not have one, including the regional capital of Antsirabe. Initially, 
almost half of the certificates were delivered in Vakinankaratra but this proportion has 
slightly diminished since 2011. The statistics also describe the gap between the number 
of certificates delivered and applications made, showing that a backlog was created quite 
quickly. Indeed, in 2007 and 2008, around 35 percent of the applications were 
successful, the backlog being 65 percent. In 2017, the national backlog was still 45 
percent.  
 
Table 4.3. Statistics on local land offices, certificates and titles nationally and in the 
region of Vakinankaratra 
Year Region No. of 
land 
offices 
(cumulati
ve) 
No. of 
demands 
for 
certificates 
(cumulative) 
No. of 
certificat
es 
(cumulati
ve) 
Of which 
under a 
women’s 
name 
(cumulative
) 
Area 
covered 
(ha) 
(cumulati
ve) 
No. of 
titles  
(yearly 
rate) 
2006 National 30 2 074 925 198 999 No stat 
 Vakinan
karatra 
4 666 412 101 171  
2007 N 51 10 072 3 589 807 2 727 No stat 
 V 11 3 934 2 177 489 738  
2008 N 222 60 602 21 007 4 160 13 589 No stat 
 V 70 30 179 11 158 2 292 4 158  
2009 N 286 99 813 47 744 9 940 38 100 11 514 
 V 71 54 017 27 720 5 326 12 799  
2010 N 362 126 552 67 296 13 954 63 144 8 668 
 V 72 61 776 37 444 6 977 18 625  
2011 N 396 150 594 83 348 17 751 99 625 10 137 
 V 72 65 929 42 697 8 919 21 924  
2012 N 403 179 230 96 565 21 154 119 129 9 999 
 V 72 75 779 46 439 9 034 24 322  
2013 N 471 192 699 106 084 23 569 127 078 11 839 
 V 83 78 368 50 117 9 818 26 355  
2014 N 503 212 425 114 949 25 722 134 417 2 887 
 V 83 85 548 53 196 10 397 27 528  
2015 N 515 219 059 119 586 27 076 138 090 7 484 
 V 83 87 608 54 122 10 596 28 017  
2016 N 533 236 049 131 361 29 986 149 574 1 149 
 V 83 92 219 58 007 11 248 31 043  
2017 N 535 257 305 142 067  32 843 193 679 No stat 
 V 83 93 741 61 557 11 833 52 660  
Source: Land Observatory (http://www.observatoire-foncier.mg/cartegf.php)  
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These figures are lower than expected at the beginning. Indeed, implementation 
encountered challenges. Firstly, the political turmoil of 2009 affected funding the policy. 
The largest donor (MCA) withdraw from the country in line with the decision of the 
USA government. Interviewees explained that in a couple of months, the MCA project 
established a plan of retrieval in which technical findings were handed over to the 
government and material goods allocated to municipalities and civil society actors. The 
European Union (EU) was also obliged to end its activities. Some donors kept projects 
alive, however. The World Bank continued emergency funding; France provided 
assistance to the Land Observatory and funded an out-posted technical expert in the 
Ministry responsible for land; the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC) implemented a project called Matoy; and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) executed the first phase of its rural development project AD2M in 
the regions of Menabe and Melaky. These donor activities included some support for 
land tenure, including the extension of funding to existing and new local land offices 
(Andriamanalina et al. 2014b). After the withdrawal of MCA, many of the local land 
offices saw their subventions vanishing and were obliged to rely on self-funding. 
Interviewees said that this lead to the inoperability of some offices.28 Only their opening 
licenses remained valid, while all activity ceased because employees were not paid. 
According to a survey of the PNF in 2012, some 33 percent of the offices were 
autonomous, 56 percent faced technical, economic and institutional challenges, and 11 
percent were inactive (Andriamanalina et al. 2014b). 
 
Against this background, I argue that the relatively low number of certificates issued, 
the large backlogs and the operational difficulties of the local land offices are not 
representative of success in the administration of land.  
 
4.2.4. Consolidation of the policy 
 
The policy process continued regardless of emerging challenges. An external evaluation 
of the process was conducted in 2011 by national and international experts. They 
recommended the government consolidate the policy and this idea was taken on board 
at the end of the political transition period in 2013. Meanwhile, tenure issues had been 
                                                 
28 This is not reflected in the overall statistics of the Land Observatory as the offices remain open even 
though they are not operational. 
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integrated in the Constitution of the 4th Republic in 2010. Article 34 stipulates that the 
state guarantees individual properties and ensures access to land through appropriate 
legal and institutional means and transparent management of information (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2010).  
 
President Rajaonarimampianina launched the consolidation process in June 2014, which 
included multi-stakeholder workshops in four provinces. In parallel, a technical 
committee for the preparation of the land policy was established, bringing together 
politicians, administrators, civil society, public decision makers and private operators. 
A synthesis of these reflections was presented and discussed in a national land tenure 
forum held in February 2015 that was funded by the French government through FAO. 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a) This forum was also an occasion to present the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure to a wider Malagasy 
audience.  
 
The provincial workshops and the national forum formed the basis for the drafting of 
the new LPF, a first version of which was approved by the Council of Ministers in May 
2015. This letter and the process through which it was elaborated were, however, 
questioned by the state land service, which was on strike during the first half of 2015, 
disputing its development process and some of its key points that would have meant 
reducing its responsibilities (Razafindramiadana 2015). These demands were considered 
in a final version of the LPF, validated by the Council of Ministers in August 2015. The 
policy-makers and donors behind the first version felt that the premises of the 2005 
policy had been questioned. They wrote an open letter to the Minister expressing their 
concerns and asking for a multi-stakeholder workshop in which the modified 
orientations of the LPF could be discussed with decentralised actors and civil society 
(Délégation de l’Union Européenne et al. 2015). The workshop took place in November 
2015, but the wording of the LPF remained unchanged. I return to this when discussing 
tenure security and the power plays around the policy process. 
 
The 2015 LPF foresees ‘concerted and transparent administration of land, an inclusive 
planning of land use and an equitable and secure access for all, men and women, 
allowing sustainable development that is brought forward by people, open for 
investments and anchored in local dynamisms’ (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a). The 
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objective is to make ‘land a basis for development thanks to the securing of a diversity 
of rights, a concerted land administration and a conciliation between the current and 
future needs in land’ (ibid.). This is achieved through five thematic orientations: 
1. Securing the rights in their diversity 
2. Managing and planning land uses in a concerted manner 
3. Facilitating the access to and the valorisation of urban and rural lands 
4. Improving and creating synergies between the decentralised and deconcentrated 
forms of land administration 
5. Engaging in transparency and accountability in land administration. 
Repoblikan’i Madagasikara (2015a) 
The 2015 LPF furthermore sets operational axes for priority activities to be undertaken 
under the PNF until 2020, with a targeted budget of 67 million euros. These activities of 
the PNF were formulated by a preparation committee based on input from provincial 
workshops organised in November and December 2015. The PNF was launched a year 
later. According to the programme document, by 2020 Madagascar should have a land 
administration in place that is close to people, operates according to a revised legal 
framework and responds to the needs of local development actors (M2PATE 2016).  
 
The financial and operational objectives of the PNF are ambitious. First, they rely on 
donor support while only some 16 to 17 million euros had been secured by 2017.29 
Second, as stated in the document itself, the implementation of PNF requires the stability 
of the adopted institutional framework, the non-questioning of the LPF and regular 
operation in the adoption of laws (M2PATE 2016), while the current policy context is 
characterised by a tense political and institutional environment.  
 
 
This overview of the background, objectives and evolution enables us to situate the 
Malagasy policy in an overall political and institutional context. It sheds light on: i) 
emerging concepts of tenure security around the need to secure tenure through legal and 
administrative means; ii) mitigated results in the implementation of the policy regardless 
of the decentralised and cheaper certification approaches and practices; and iii) evolving 
                                                 
29 Seven donor projects were active or planned at the end of 2017. AfD and the EU were funding a project 
named ARSF around Antananarivo; the World Bank was finalising an emergency project called 
PURSAPS and entering into a new one called CASEF that focus on agricultural investments and securing 
tenure in growth corridor areas; the SDC was finalising the Matoy project; IFAD was planning the second 
phase of the AD2M project; FAO was starting pilot activities on the state land inventory in a rural 
municipality of Ankazobe; and Deutche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) was 
conceiving activities on land use planning in the region of Boeny. 
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power plays affecting the institutional dynamics of the policy. These elements 
potentially influence considerations and create new sources of tenure insecurity. I 
explore these conceptions, practices and interactions further in Chapters 5, 6 and 8. In 
addition, the policy is set in a range of local contexts where it is to be implemented. One 
such setting is the rural municipality of Ankazomiriotra that is the focus of this research. 
I present the characteristics of Ankazomiriotra in the next section with the objective of 
revealing (dis)connections between the national policy spheres and local development 
challenges.  
 
 
4.3. Local development context: an example of the municipality of 
Ankazomiriotra  
 
The land policy has been implemented predominantly in rural areas. Here, I focus on the 
local land office and the development context in the municipality of Ankazomiriotra, 
located in the region of Vakinankaratra. Historically, it has been an agricultural frontier 
zone. Today, almost 50 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty and 71 percent 
under the poverty line (Razafimahatratra et al. 2017). In this context land is a major 
economic, social and cultural asset. Comprehending the local geography, socio-
economic characteristics and value of land is thus important for future exploration of the 
implementation of the policy in Ankazomiriotra, farmers’ conceptions of tenure security 
and analysis of the motivation of farmers to apply for certificates. I introduce the local 
land office and the local setting in the next sections.  
 
4.3.1. Local land office  
 
The local land office in Ankazomiriotra was opened by MCA in 2008. Since the 
withdrawal of the donor, the office has operated independently. It received 1,037 
demands and delivered some 728 certificates by December 2017 (81 certificates per 
year). This is a slightly higher figure than shown in Table 4.4, in which figures are based 
on the annual statistics of the Land Observatory, last up-dated in June 2017. The land 
observatory data moreover shows that some 1,013 hectares of land are certified (2.5% 
of total municipal land area). In addition, according to the local land office, some 15 
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percent of the municipal area would have been titled over the years, mainly around the 
centre.  
 
Table 4.4. Statistics of the Land Observatory on certificates in Ankazomiriotra 
Year No. of demands 
(cumulative) 
No. of certificates 
(cumulative) 
Of which under a 
woman’s name 
(cumulative) 
Area covered 
(ha) 
(cumulative) 
2008 414 0 0 0 
2009 451 195 55 392 
2010 502 283 68 582 
2011 561 322 79 607 
2012 638 379 93 658 
2013 691 402 101 669 
2014 No data 
2015 760 470 111 876 
2016 883 583 144 961 
2017 
(June) 
905 636 156 1 013 
Source: Observatoire du foncier (http://www.observatoire-foncier.mg/cartegf.php)  
 
Image 4.1. Local land office of Ankazomiriotra  
The local land office occupies a 
central site at the ground floor of the 
main municipal building of 
Ankazomiriotra (Image 4.1.). It is a 
so-called ‘paper office’, which means 
that the digitalisation of information 
is done by the CRIF of the district, 
which is also hosted by the 
municipality of Ankazomiriotra 
because there is no reliable electricity in the district capital Mandoto. The CRIF is 
funded by all the municipalities of the district it serves. The municipality furthermore 
hosts three micro-credit organisations (CECAM, Otiv and Access Banque), the regional 
agricultural service office, a civil society-based agricultural service centre (CSA – 
Centre de service agricole), and veterinary services. 
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4.3.2. Geography: an agricultural frontier zone of the Moyen-Ouest  
 
Ankazomiriotra is part of the administrative district of Mandoto in Vakinankaratra, 70 
km west of the regional capital Antsirabe (Figure 4.2.). It is easily reachable by the 
national road 34 (RN34) that crosses the municipal centre. It has an area of 404 km² for 
a population of around 30,000 inhabitants (74 people/km²). It is furthermore composed 
of 16 fokontanys, each of which has 4 to 7 villages where the habitation is concentrated. 
The fokontanys of the centre of the municipality are more urban and bring together 1/3 
of the overall population.  
 
Figure 4.2. Localisation of the region of Vakinankaratra and municipality of 
Ankazomiriotra 
Ankazomiriotra is considered part of the Moyen-Ouest, term used to describe the 
western parts of Madagascar, pre-dominantly pastoral zones in which farming 
accelerated in the 1950s (Raison 1984). Interviewees described themselves as first-, 
second- or third-generation migrants of the Merina ethnic group from around Betafo and 
Antsirabe some 50 and 70 kilometres towards the Central Highlands. This is confirmed 
by a survey conducted in four municipalities of Ankazomiriotra by an agricultural 
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research project called SPAD. It found that 70 percent of people in Ankazomiriotra 
arrived in the municipality before 1991, 13 percent between 1991 and 2000, and 17 
percent after 2000 (Razafimahatratra et al. 2017). People migrated to seek employment 
and land, more recently because of insecurity (Razafimahatratra et al. 2017). Today, 
most of the land is in use. Available land remains close to the mountain or towards the 
south of the municipality, away from the RN34 (Razafimahatratra et al. 2017).  
 
The landscape is open, with views of the mountains (average altitude is around 1000 m, 
peaking at 1800 m). It is dominated by bas-fonds (shallow land) and tanety (hillside). 
(Images 4.2. and 4.3.) The bas-fonds occupy some 4,400 ha according to the local land 
office, consisting of irrigated lowlands and predominantly used for rice. The parcels are 
organised in terraces, surrounded by irrigation canals. In the off-season, some farmers 
use them for vegetable production (tomatoes, onions, salad leaves etc.). The tanety are 
rain-fed hillside lands where farmers grow rice, cassava, peanuts, corn etc. If adjacent 
to the bas-fonds and technically feasible, farmers transform the tanety into terraced, 
irrigated lands as these provide better yields and are more suitable for paddy rice. 
Grasslands are found on the tanety and on the mountainsides, and they are used for 
pasture among other things. There is no forest. Fruits trees are grown in and around 
villages, and trees like eucalyptus occupy some parcels or are used to mark boundaries.  
 
Image 4.2. Open spaces of Ankazomiriotra  Image 4.3. Bas-fonds and tanety 
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4.3.3. Socio-economic characteristics of farmers 
 
4.3.3.1. Small-scale farmers engaged in pluri-activity 
 
Most people in Ankazomiriotra are small-scale family farmers.30 They are engaged in 
pluri-activity associating agriculture, animal husbandry, commercial activities and 
agricultural employment.31 The SPAD survey found that around 35 percent of the 
households sell their agricultural produce in the market (Razafimahatratra et al. 2017). 
Agriculture goes beyond subsistence (ibid). Indeed, my observations and interviews 
indicate that farmers sell surplus directly in Ankazomiriotra or to collectors of rice who 
come to their villages after the harvest.  
 
There is, however, variability in the market prices depending on when the produce was 
sold (Table 4.5.). The longer the farmer was able to stock the produce, the better value 
for money it represented. However, most of the poorest households needed to sell the 
harvest directly to purchase other necessities. If their own stock did not last for the whole 
season, they had to buy rice from the market at a higher price (2100 Ariary/kilo in 
December 2017). There is thus a local proverb that farmers sell rice to the collectors in 
big bags (after the harvest in May/June) and buy it back in small bags (December to 
March).  
  
Households also have cattle (zebus), used as a workforce, source of fertiliser and means 
of transport. Other animals being raised include chicken, ducks, turkeys and pigs. 
Farmers can breed animals, sell them in the market and invest the surplus in other 
animals with a better market value, and finally rent or buy land with the money made.  
                                                 
30 I talk about farmers (rather than peasants) as a way to reflect the dynamics of the political economy of 
agrarian societies. Farmers are understood as a diverse group of social actors who make their living from 
agriculture and related activities, linked to commercial, administrative and political activities. Social 
differences and inequalities exist between them. Some of them relate to other spaces and are part of the 
wider political economy, others don’t. Yet, in French and in the national context in Madagascar actors 
often talk about peasants non-pejoratively. In the Malagasy context, a farmer might have received a more 
formal agricultural education from state institutions, have a commercial approach to agriculture and might 
have made an active choice to be a farmer. A peasant, instead, would farm by default and be more 
connected to subsistence agriculture. However, both can have legitimate and legal access to land. A 
peasant in French no longer means a person without land.    
31 In 2017, an average salary reported by interviewees was between 1500 and 3000 Ariary/day. These 
salaries vary according to the fokontany, season and availability of workers. The survey conducted by 
SAPD found that the average salary was 2350 Ariary/day (Razafimahatratra et al. 2017).  
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Table 4.5. Indicative prices of agricultural produce 
 Price of rice as 
sold to 
collectors in 
2016 
Price of rice as 
sold to collectors 
in 2017 
Price of cassava 
in 2016 
After harvest (May/June) 550 Ariary/kilo 600 Ariary/kilo 100 Ariary/kilo 
for fresh   
Low agricultural season, 
before new harvest32 
900 Ariary/kilo 1100-1300 
Ariary/kilo 
150-180 
Ariary/kilo for 
dried 
Vary maitso - Produce bought 
in advance of harvest to 
reimburse credit  
 400 Ariary/kilo  
 
4.3.3.2. Socio-economic differences 
 
The history of Ankazomiriotra as an agricultural frontier zone plays out in the socio-
economic differences between people. Malagasy society is often characterised as 
fragmented, with people are identified according to an inherited hierarchy based on a 
previous system of three castes (Razafindrakoto et al. 2015). Nevertheless, according to 
Raison (1984), economic factors have attenuated these caste-based fractions in the 
agricultural frontier societies of the Moyen-Ouest. He notes that while groups of higher 
caste live in small towns and centres, a key differentiation is made according to the 
anteriority of arrival in the zone and the number of zebus each household has (Raison 
1984). In fact, local notables benefit from possessing land and zebus, and have 
strategically limited the number of new arrivals by making it difficult to settle in the 
zone (ibid). Consequently, wealth and anteriority influence social position and the ability 
to negotiate one’s access to land and conditions for tenure security (see Peters 2004 and 
2009).  
 
Today, the differences in the moment of arrival are reflected in the type and amount of 
land households possess. According to the SPAD survey, more recent migrants hold 
slightly smaller areas of land (1.60 ha compared to 1.69 ha) (Razafimahatratra et al. 
2017). This difference plays out on the bas-fond (0.35 ha compared to 0.52 ha), while 
on the tanety recent migrants have greater areas of land (1.20 ha compared to 1.07 ha) 
(Razafimahatratra et al. 2017). In fact, as noted by some interviewees, the bas-fond have 
been appropriated first and have more agricultural value, thus leaving tanetys for more 
                                                 
32 This period is called période de soudure in French. There is no clear English language equivalent.  
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recent migrants. When land became scarcer, farmers had to seek parcels further away. 
Today, some farmers report walking one to three hours to reach their parcels. Also, the 
parcels tend to be smaller and more expensive where the demand is higher i.e. close to 
the centre of Ankazomiriotra and to the villages. 
 
This socio-economic differentiation is exacerbated by an increase in land prices (Table 
4.6.). In general, as argued by the SPAD survey, it is difficult for poorer farmers to 
access land in the bas-fond (Razafimahatratra et al. 2017). Throughout my interviews, 
farmers referred to significant increases in the price of land, especially over the past ten 
years. They associated this with the population increases and relative scarcity of land. 
The preference of people to transact inside families or between friends furthermore 
reduces the availability of land in the market.  
 
Table 4.6. Average price of 0.1 hectare of land in Ariary 
Period Tanety Bas-fond 
Before 1990 1,231 1,451 
1990-1999  3,655 7,639 
2000-2009 7,000 23,329 
Since 2010 8,659 41,898 
Source: Razafimahatratra et al. (2017) 
 
Based on my observations and interviews, I have classified households into three rough 
categories: high-, medium- and low-income.33 The high-income households were mainly 
living around the centre of Ankazomiriotra. They were thus outside my sample of 
interviewees in the three selected fokontanys, but I came across them conducting 
exploratory interviews and meeting with municipal or civil society players. In fact, the 
households interviewed in the three focus fokontanys mainly fall into the medium- or 
low-income categories. The SPAD survey also profiled households, but in four 
economic categories: prosperous, out of poverty, poor and extremely poor 
(Razafimahatratra et al. 2017). I bring the qualitative and quantitative data together in 
Table 4.7. This affirms that inequalities exist between households, and the poorest are 
most represented in Ankazomiriotra. (See Images 4.4. and 4.5.) 
 
 
                                                 
33 These should be considered only as indicative categories that help comprehend the situation in 
Ankazomiriotra. 
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Table 4.7. Categorising households based on qualitative and quantitative socio-
economic characteristics 
Qualitative 
category 
Observed socio-economic 
characteristics 
Quantitative 
category 
Surveyed 
characteristics  
High-
income 
households 
e.g. 
collectors 
of rice, 
doctors 
(outside my 
sample) 
Commercial, administrative and 
political activities. Linked to 
outside networks. Commercial 
agriculture. Employing 
agricultural work force. Large 
two-storey houses in concrete. 
Separate areas for living, cooking 
and sleeping. Fenced gardens. 
Equipment such as radios, TVs 
and mobile phones. Access to 
electricity at the centre. Solar 
panels in villages. Motorbikes. 
Children go to high school. 
Living mainly in the centre of the 
municipality. Some households in 
rural fokontanys  
Prosperous over 
1.1 million 
Ariary/person/year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12% of population 
Revenues from non-
agricultural activities, 
animal husbandry 
and agricultural 
produce 
Largest farms (3.71 
hectares) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium-
income 
households  
e.g. well-
established 
households 
in rural 
fokontanys  
Commercial and subsistence 
agriculture. Animal husbandry 
including zebus. Side activities 
such as shop-keeping. Involved in 
decision-making in fokontanys. 
Some contacts to municipality. 
Two-storey houses with terraces. 
Separate rooms for living, 
cooking and sleeping. Animals 
occupy the first floor of the 
house. Basic furniture and 
equipment. Solar panels. Bicycles 
Children go to secondary school 
Out of poverty  
600 001-1.1. 
million 
Ariary/person/ 
year (above 
national poverty 
line) 
17 % of population 
Revenues from 
agricultural produce 
and animal 
husbandry 
Medium farms (2.53 
hectares) 
Low -
income 
households 
e.g. small 
landowners 
or 
agricultural 
employees 
Subsistence agriculture with 
some surplus sold in the market. 
Some small animal husbandry.  
Work as agricultural employees. 
One or two floor rudimentary 
houses. Same areas for living and 
sleeping. Separate areas for 
cooking and animals. No 
furniture or equipment. Children 
go to primary school and then 
work in the fields. 
Poor  
420 001-600 000 
Ariary/ 
person/year 
(below national 
poverty line) 
 
 
 
22% of population 
Revenues from 
agricultural produce. 
Complementary 
revenues from 
agricultural 
employment and 
non-agricultural 
activities. 
Medium-sized farms 
(2.37 hectares) 
 
 
Extremely poor 
Less than 420,000 
Ariary/ person/ 
year 
49% of population 
Revenues from 
agricultural produce 
and agricultural 
employment. 
Small farms (1.2 
hectares) 
Sources: Observations, interviews, Razafimahatratra et al. (2017) 
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Image 4.4. Socio-economic differences   Image 4.5. Low-income households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.3.3. Strategies of survival 
 
In light of the above data, it is not surprising that most of the interviewees declared that 
they face economic difficulties. They linked these to the low market prices for 
agricultural produce, overall issues of insecurity present in the zone due to the theft of 
zebus by armed bandits called Dahalos, indebtedness and periodical financial hardship. 
In particular, the theft of zebus means losing one’s savings as well as an important 
workforce and source of fertiliser. Indeed, together with land, zebus are considered as 
the main forms of savings and investment:  
Land and zebus, they are like the bank of farmers. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA024), 10.06.2016 
To cover their losses and sudden needs in money, farmers reported selling movable 
goods, small animals, renting or selling parcels, lending money or asking for advances 
against future harvests. Some of them have invested in land instead of zebus to avoid 
theft. These observations are similar to those of Sandron (2007) who analysed strategies 
of farmers to mitigate risk in a municipality in the highlands of Vakinankaratra. In 
addition, Sandron (2007) found that farmers diversified their activities and had parcels 
scattered across different zones to be less vulnerable to climatic variations and plant 
diseases. The de-schooling of children, working as an agricultural employee or 
emigration were also common strategies (ibid.). It is worth noting here that a practice 
called vary maitso is recurrent in Ankazomiriotra. It means that a farmer takes a credit, 
most often from a collector of rice or a shopkeeper, agreeing to sell the new harvest to 
the creditor with a price set in advance. As shown in Table 4.5, this price is well under 
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the regular prices applied in the market. Consequently, the economic difficulties might 
lead the poorest farmers into a vicious circle of credit dependence on rice-collectors, 
merchants and local notables. Such a dependence further exacerbates the socio-
economic differences between people.  
 
Recourse to credit remains nevertheless sensible. The SPAD survey found that some 50 
percent of households did not use credit as it represented too many risks, was not their 
habit and posed management issues (Razafimahatratra et al. 2017). Those who borrowed 
money did so from micro-finance organisations (42%), merchants (31% – practice of 
vary maitso), extended family (22%), friends (3%) and banks (1%) (Razafimahatratra et 
al. 2017). This aversion to risks also came through in the interviews. Farmers were 
suspicious of micro-finance institutions and were wary of making formal requests, 
scared of losing their land or obliged to work as agricultural employees. Only a few (of 
middle- and higher-income) had dealt with micro-finance institutions, asking for credit 
to build a house or buy zebus.  
 
In a similar vein, most farmers are excluded from major outside networks. According to 
the SPAD survey, 80 percent of people did not report of being part of any professional, 
commercial or civil society network (Razafimahatratra et al. 2017) even though some of 
these organisations have offices in Ankazomiriotra. This isolation increases gaps 
between urban and rural areas of Madagascar where the latter are excluded from 
institutional and economic circles (Razafindrakoto et al. 2015). Belonging to outside 
networks can create differences between farmers in terms of the implementation of 
policies and development interventions. 
 
 
4.3.4. Multiple values of land 
 
The socio-economic characteristics of Ankazomiriotra demonstrate that land has natural 
and financial capital. Not surprisingly then, the farmers interviewed highlight that all 
their essential needs for a secure life start with land: food, crops and housing.  
For us the value of land is that it is the basis of our life, without land farmers cannot 
survive because it is the source of food and money. It is the value of the land, the 
basis of life. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA019), 07.06.2016 
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Above all, land has cultural and social values that influence the sources of and conditions 
for tenure (in)security. In general terms, the Malagasy refer to land as tanindrazana 
which means the land of ancestors, the living space of the lineage that unites people, but 
also the homeland of the Malagasy as a nation (Fremigacci 2014). Omrane (2008) 
explains that the identity of rural people is composed of three elements: being a 
descendent of an ancestor who created the village, holding land in that village and having 
a family tomb in the village. Accessing ancestral land moreover increases the social 
status of an individual (Omrane 2008) and anteriority is also a marker of socio-economic 
differentiation between families (see Raison 1984).   
 
In Ankazomiriotra, a tangible sign of the presence of several generations of the same 
lineage is the willingness of people to transfer entire family tombs from their regions of 
origin to Ankazomiriotra. This requires the consent of the ancestors and finding a 
suitable place for the tomb in one of the family parcels. The lands in Ankazomiriotra are 
thus becoming the lands of ancestors where it is a souvenir given by parents and received 
through inheritance. They become places where previous generations were born and 
where one will return upon death.  
 
Land indeed connects farmers to their past, but it is also the basis for their present and a 
link to the future. In the farmers’ accounts land, was often described in terms of its quasi-
sacred value. These sacred linkages can be as much linked to the ancestral belief systems 
as to Christian convictions where farmers describe it as God’s creation, given by the 
ancestors and/or God to produce food. Land enables life to take place.  
Land is sacred because it nourishes us. It feeds us and that is where we will end up 
after death 
Interview with a farmer (PEA040), 05.07.2016 
 
Land has a great value, it is thanks to it that we can produce, it is the origin of men 
too and it is there that we will end up. The land that God has left us is sacred.  
Interview with a farmer (PEA041), 05.07.2016.  
Securing access to and continuous holding of land is thus vital – any other behaviour 
might be considered immature and vain, neglecting the basis of life and one’s own 
survival.  
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For people who are not yet mature, they sell their land for any reason because they 
are unaware of the value of the land. Or even when they are aware of it and when 
they want something, they sell their land. But most people, I would say 90 percent, 
try to protect land because a farmer without land is not a farmer. [...] A life without 
land is not stable. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA039), 22.06.2016 
 
4.3.5. Combinations of ways to access land  
 
Because land is economically, culturally and socially valuable, accessing it is a 
challenge. Older generations might still hold parcels that they appropriated through the 
rights of occupancy. Older interviewees explained that when arriving to the village, they 
asked approval from the village elders or the chief of fokontany whose recognition was 
necessary to be socially accepted and directed towards available pieces of land. When 
the agricultural presence became more intense and settled, the use and appropriation of 
land started to be socially controlled. Newcomers had to negotiate access with people in 
place. According to Raison (1984), in such contexts good interpersonal skills were useful 
for social negotiations as well as knowledge of local settings and administrative support.  
 
Today, the settlements are established, and most of the land is appropriated and used by 
individuals or households who have acquired their parcels through various means, such 
as donation, heritage, purchase or renting. Land is also accumulated little by little and 
used as leverage to respond to each life situation.  
That is how we accessed to the land: when we were young, when we were still with 
our parents, we had some money and we did not spend it, but we bought land. We 
fed our children with the land we had bought before our wedding. We bought little 
by little, since we have many children we did not allow ourselves to have a big life. 
We thought about our children and to share land with them.  
Interview with a farmer (PEA008), 03.06.2016 
 
The first step, we were 7 and our parents' land was not enough for us. I was grown 
up and my brothers and sisters were still small. They gave me a part to cultivate 
when I got married. I farmed there and […] raised animals. Then there was land for 
sale and I was able to buy. I sold everything to buy the land. Later my parents were 
in trouble because my father had fallen ill, and I gave them the plot they gave me 
when I got married. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA004), 01.06.2016  
 
Table 4.8. combines two statistics on access to land: one specific for the zone of 
Ankazomiriotra and another on nine municipalities of Madagascar. It demonstrates that 
access through rights occupancy has become rare, especially around Ankazomiriotra. 
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Inheritance and purchase are the most common ways of accessing land in a permanent 
manner. 
 
Table 4.8. Modes of access to land 
 Four municipalities in the 
zone of Ankazomiriotra 
(% of parcels) 
(Survey of SPAD 2017)  
Nine municipalities of 
Madagascar, of which three in 
Vakinankaratra (% of parcels) 
(Survey of Burnod, 
Andrianirina et al. 2014) 
Rights of occupancy 1% 6.7% 
Inheritance 45% 51.8% 
Purchase 51% 37.1% 
Turning inheritance (heirs 
cultivate the parcels one after 
another, no official division is 
made) 
2%  
Other (donation, swapping, 
exchange) 
2% 4.4% 
Sources: Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014); Razafimahatratra et al. (2017) 
 
4.3.5.1. Inheritance 
 
The traditional pattern of inheritance is patrilineal where daughters obtain less land than 
sons or none at all. The farmers in Ankazomiriotra explain this as a way to ensure that 
the ancestral lands are not alienated from the family when daughters move to live with 
their spouses. In other words, it is a way of controlling the appropriation of land. 
However, when daughters lose the connection with the ancestral lands, they are not 
expected to carry out responsibilities towards the family such as (financially) 
contributing to family festivities, which is a duty of the heirs and can represent 
significant costs. Sometimes daughters receive small tracts of land from their parents. In 
these cases, their responsibilities towards the family are reduced or nil. Nevertheless, a 
number of farmers also acknowledged giving the same amount to daughters and sons. 
When a woman disposes of land, she does so independently from her partner i.e. she can 
transmit it to her children, give it to family members or sell it (Omrane 2008).  
 
Farmers also told me of donating land in usufruct to their children when they get married. 
These parcels might not, however, be held permanently by the children, but can be 
reallocated between family members either when other siblings get married or the 
parents die. In general, farmers found it crucial to be able to leave land to their children:  
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Especially for Malagasy, children must inherit from parents and it is shameful for 
parents not to be able to leave any inheritance for their children. 
Farmer in a focus group discussion, 02.06.2016  
In the tradition of the Merina ethnic group, it is frowned upon to give ancestral land to 
a person outside of the lineage (Sandron 2007). One farmer expressed this through a 
proverb:  
Heritage should not change hands.  
Interview with a farmer (PEA024), 10.06.2016  
Yet, many farmers were concerned whether they have enough land for their children to 
inherit. This is a real worry considering the size of the households (5.7 people on average 
according to Razafimahatratra et al. 2017), which leads to a decrease in the amount of 
land passed to future generations and the general fragmentation of land-holdings. The 
market remains an option to access land and to complete existing holdings. However, 
here again, the high prices mean that land is available only for the wealthiest, escalating 
inequalities between households.  
 
4.3.5.2. Markets  
 
Regardless of the strong ancestral value of land, a purchase and rental market exists in 
Ankazomiriotra. Yet, farmers told of prioritising the selling or renting of parcels to 
family members, followed by selling land to friends and trustworthy people with whom 
they did not have any tension or jealousy. If nobody among the extended family and 
circle of friends was interested in the land, it could be offered to a wider community of 
buyers and advertised in the fokontany or municipality. In the words of the farmers, the 
land market is based on social relations, negotiations and confidence. This means that 
farmers might not sell parcels, for instance, to neighbours they are jealous of, to avoid 
the accumulation of land by them.  
 
While all lands are valuable, farmers told of allocating most significance to lands that 
have already been passed on in the family and gained ancestral value. One would 
separate from them at the last recourse, meaning that land acquired by purchase would 
be sold first. As a common feature of lineage systems, farmers explained that when a 
parcel with an ancestral linkage is sold, a benediction from the ancestors or other family 
members should be sought. The farmers remark that such approval is often given when 
the reasons are about survival, livelihoods and better living conditions. In their words, 
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ancestors and family members are understanding but only for serious reasons. They 
considered other, profit-driven behaviour to be disrespectful towards the ancestors. The 
person separating from the ancestral land could also endure social and cultural loss by 
being left outside family traditions. This shows again that the possession of ancestral 
land ensures belonging to a group and a place (see Omrane 2008; Evers 2013).  
 
Considering cultural and social value, land is mainly sold as a last recourse after having 
separated from all mobile properties. Farmers told that transactions take place before the 
new harvest or before festivities such as exhumation (retournement des morts) when the 
need for money is the greatest. There is a paradox here as farmers might need to sell 
their ancestral land to be able to participate in the exhumation festivities to celebrate 
these same ancestors. Other farmers might also rent part of their holdings and start to 
work in parallel as agricultural employees to receive a regular salary and a single 
payment for the land to cover costs, rather than being obliged to rely on the harvest alone 
as a source of revenue. At some point, they might even sell land to the new occupiers 
and work for them. Finally, in some cases wealthier farmers might rent land out if they 
are not able to cultivate it and do not wish to employ workers.  
 
While most transactions are definitive, farmers confirmed that a practice of temporal or 
partial selling of land exists. It includes a clause that in the case of a resell of the parcels 
these would be offered to the initial owner first at the same price. When parcels are sold 
to family members, the sellers might wish to continue to use some parts. Sandron (2007) 
observes that when land is sold between family members, the seller might hope to take 
it back at later stage.  
 
In the rental market, the owner’s need defines the period for which parcels are made 
available, mostly from one to three years. The tenant is supposed to pay the whole rent 
in advance and they are not reimbursed for any works or investments made on the 
parcels. This diminishes the tenants’ ability to engage in longer-term contracts and limits 
access to tenants with initial capital. The tenants might also avoid long-term contracts 
so as not to rent parcels when they are fallow in their rotational cycle.  
 
This overview of Ankazomiriotra sheds light on a rural agrarian society where poverty 
is deep, outside integration weak and land (together with zebus) a marker of wealth, 
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social status and belonging. Land is accessed and governed through family and 
community relations, and few people have legal documents such as certificates and titles. 
This background indicates that tenure security is more of a question of authority, social 
and cultural relations inside households, families and communities rather than a legal 
and administrative matter requiring registration. Also, the key development challenges 
are related to agricultural production in general, the low market value of produce, 
population growth and insecurity. While land is economically, socially and culturally 
valuable, land tenure was not the main preoccupation of interviewed farmers. This 
overview is important as it enables us to contextualise the land policy in a rural setting. 
It equally helps explaining some understandings farmers have of tenure security (and 
tenure problems) and how they view the policy implementation. I analyse these aspects 
in Chapter 7. 
 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I provided an overview of national and local contexts which the 
Malagasy land policy falls into. Several points are worth highlighting. First, the national 
policy and development setting are characterised by political instability and economic 
challenges that have also impacted the implementation of the land policy. Second, 
parallel development, environmental conservation endeavours and agricultural 
investments raise questions about the ability of the land policy to secure the tenure rights 
of small-scale farmers. Third, decentralisation has been a policy approach since the 
1990s, but in terms of land administration it is questioned by the state land service, 
whose authority over land was reduced. This creates friction in policy implementation. 
Fourth, economic, social and cultural meanings of land as well as customary ways of 
governing land reign in a case study rural community questioning the legal and 
administrative basis of the policy. Finally, the policy has been elaborated and 
implemented with external actors – donors, experts, NGOs – that have influenced its 
course. These are points to be reflected in the next empirical chapters (5 to 8).  
 
In this chapter, I have also underlined elements that frame the research. Therefore, I 
examine Malagasy land policy in relation to its core elements of recognition of local 
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appropriations and uses of land, and decentralisation of land administration. I attend to 
other dimensions (e.g. modernisation of land administration) only when relevant. I 
analyse the policy from its endorsement in 2005 until 2016 when the new PNF was 
enacted. I recognise, however, the antecedents to the policy. I bring a global dimension 
to the discussion when it is directly related to Madagascar e.g. through the intervention 
of donors and other international actors. Finally, the local investigation focuses on 
Ankazomiriotra as a site where tenure (in)securities are made real and policies 
implemented.  
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5. Conceptions of tenure security in the Malagasy land policy 
 
 
The “studying through” of the Malagasy land policy process involves identifying 
different actors linked to it and analysing framings, objectives and approaches around 
tenure security (Keeley and Scoones 2003; Wedel and Feldman 2005). These 
investigations respond to the first research question that asks how actors conceive tenure 
security. The analysis is based on official policy and legal documents, event-
ethnography, and interviews with international and national actors involved in the 
elaboration and implementation of the policy at different stages. I can grasp the ‘official’ 
positions through document analysis and event ethnography, while the interviews 
illustrate the more individualised visions of actors and existing power dynamics. 
 
In this chapter, I demonstrate how some conceptions on tenure security have been 
institutionalised in the 2005 LPF. This contributed to the elaboration of a key policy 
narrative around the recognition and registration of locally legitimate tenure rights by 
decentralised authorities. Although conceptual similarities exist, this narrative was 
elaborated in opposition to previous more legalistic and administrative conceptions 
where tenure security was a matter of delineating parcels on the ground, legal 
involvement of the state and publishing information on private property rights. This 
positionality has generated power dynamics between proponents and opponents formed 
into loose assemblages of actors (see Roe 1991 and 1994). The proponents are those in 
favour of the key policy narrative: policy-makers, technical experts, civil society actors 
and donors who have conceived and maintained the policy. The opponents are those 
who have resisted the key policy narrative (mainly the state land service). The power 
plays between them (Chapter 8) as well as practical experiences of implementation 
(Chapter 6) and adoption of the policy by farmers (Chapter 7) have furthermore changed 
ways of seeing tenure security. These modifications are reflected in the 2015 LPF that 
provides novel direction for the policy.  
 
I start this chapter by analysing the problem framings of the 2005 LPF where it 
responded to a ‘tenure crisis’, a ‘massive demand’ for securing tenure and external 
threats to local communities. I then investigate the key policy objectives and approaches 
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that called for legal recognition of locally legitimate tenure rights and their certification 
by decentralised authorities. I continue by examining how the policy questioned state 
control over land, introduced a new system of land administration and overlooked local 
politics of land. I conclude by discussing tenure security in the consolidated 2015 LPF 
and changes it has introduced. Throughout these sections, I pay attention to actors linked 
to the policy process.  
 
 
5.1. Problem-framing by civil society organisations and technical 
experts 
 
The 2005 LPF is framed around a perceived ‘tenure crisis’ of land administration, ‘a 
massive demand for securing tenure’ on the ground and protection from external threats 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a). These problem framings stem from the experiences 
of CSOs and technical experts involved in field activities. For instance, the 
representatives of a French NGO Fert and a Malagasy farmers’ organisation Fifata34 told 
of having engaged in field activities at the end of 1990s and beginning of 2000s. Their 
activities included informing farmers about titling procedures, accompanying them 
through the application processes and following up on the delivery of titles. They had 
also provided material support for the state land service, which complained about a lack 
of resources (paper, computers and technical equipment), and assisted the service during 
field operations. A number of agricultural development, natural resource management 
and land tenure projects have also been on-going in Madagascar since the 1990s (see 
Appendix 2). Among these projects, multiple practices for securing tenure had been 
tested, ranging from cadastre and inventory of land to allocation of management rights, 
grouped demands for registering rights and simplified titling programmes. One objective 
was to find efficient ways to secure tenure and reach out to rural populations. However, 
the combined results remained disappointing and the land administration inaccessible to 
farmers. Thus, Fert and Fifata initiated debate in national fora.  
 
 
                                                 
34 Today, Fifata has some 200,000 members represented by 4770 local organisations and 13 regional 
farmers’ organisations in ten regions of Madagascar. The name Fifata comes from the Malagasy words 
‘Fikambanana Fampivoarana ny Tantsaha’. 
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5.1.1. Addressing a ‘tenure crisis’  
 
The ‘tenure crisis’ refers to a situation where the state land service and courts were not 
able to satisfy demands made of them. The state land service had faults in delivering 
titles, conserving titles and cadastral plans, and registering changes. The processes were 
complicated, repetitive and costly both for user and administration. (Teyssier et al. 2007 
and Teyssier et al. 2009) Indeed, to place a demand for a title, farmers had to travel to 
regional cities, which represented major costs on top of the actual application. To 
process a demand, a surveyor then had to visit the relevant village, which represented 
charges in terms of travel and time for the administration. 
 
In this setting, the CSO representatives and technical experts interviewed did not hesitate 
to denounce the difficulties of farmers accessing to titles. They criticised the physical 
distance between farmers and the state land service, inconsistencies in the titling 
procedures and the high costs of the titles, often linked to bribes. They highlighted stories 
of farmers who had been waiting years to receive their titles.  
For example, there is a farmer, he might already be dead, he is called the Dadabe, 
the grandfather. He said that since 1961 he has been going once a month to the state 
land service and the service tells him to come back, come back, come back, your 
file, we cannot find it. He said that since 1961 he has been going there with his 
canoe. 
Interview with a national technical expert (FTECHN001), 20.10.2016 
 
Therefore, the titling system was accessible mainly to the elite: urban people and some 
notables in rural areas with connections and money. The CSOs and technical experts felt 
that farmers should have the same opportunities as anyone else to acquire legal proof of 
their land and access to titles in a more straightforward manner. As told by one civil 
society representative, these feelings prompted the initial push and justification for the 
policy:  
And that was the first reflection on how to make so that the procedures are less 
slow, so that the costs are lower, accessible to farmers. And the farmers said: we 
want it to be closer to us, decentralised, so that we are not always obliged, all the 
time, to go to the state land service to get the land, and that there are actions that 
can facilitate more grouped actions to ease procedures. And it is from there that 
was defined the first sketch of the policy. 
Interview with a national civil society actor (CSON001), 28.06.2016 
 
In this situation, the capacity of the state land service to provide a satisfactory public 
service, guarantee property rights and proceed with registration were questioned 
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(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a; Teyssier et al. 2007; Teyssier et al. 2009). The 
official figures back up this statement. In fact, only 330,000 titles were delivered in a 
century and the process of allocating a title included 24 administrative steps, cost some 
600,000 Ariary35 and lasted more than fifteen years (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a). 
Some half a million demands for titles were pending (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 
2005a).  
 
The ‘tenure crisis’ has also been associated with a high number of court cases. In an 
interview, the President of the Court of Antsirabe estimated in 2016 that 60 percent of 
all cases were related to tenure issues. Policy actors link these cases to the recurrence of 
tenure conflicts in local societies, varying from tensions over border delimitations and 
socially illegitimate use of land, to illegal occupation and large-scale conflicts over 
rights. In addition, the President talked about problems in dealing with inheritance and 
with property divisions. A study analysing conflicts presented in court between 2005 
and 2010 demystified the highest figures and found that tenure issues represent some 20 
to 30 percent of all cases, and their prevalence had increased over the years 
(Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2012). Interviews with farmers equally suggest that 
conflicts are usually solved locally and courts remain accessible only for wealthy and 
well-connected people. 
 
Finally, official policy documents attribute several economic, social and political 
consequences to the ‘tenure crisis’. The 2005 LPF talks about generalised tenure 
insecurity, which represented constraints on investments made by farmers, degraded the 
social climate and led to the loss of credibility of the state (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 
2005a). More specific to the administration of land, the faults in conserving and updating 
records by the state land service meant a mismatch between the situation on paper (titles 
and topographical maps) and on the ground (Teyssier et al. 2009). People using some 
pieces of land could then be considered ‘squatters’ by the state as they did not have 
officially recognised rights and benefit from legal security (ibid). As mentioned by 
interviewees, these conflicts occurred especially on land that had been registered under 
the name of former French settlers. 
 
                                                 
35 In 2016, the exchange rate of one euro varied between 3400-3600 Ariary. 
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5.1.2. ‘Massive demand’ for securing tenure 
 
In parallel to the ‘tenure crisis’, the CSOs and technical experts observed a transition 
from customary tenure to an enhanced individualisation of the appropriation and use of 
land in line with the evolutionary theory of land rights (see Platteau 1996). This was 
about land becoming a marketed private good; in response, people were asking for the 
recognition of their rights. The 2005 LPF talks about people turning towards the state, 
indicated by the half a million demands for titles pending in the state land service. It also 
mentions people seeking written recognition of their rights in the form of petits papiers 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a). Indeed, the petits papiers serve as an evidence of 
the use, purchase, heritage, rental and division of land as recognised locally by the chiefs 
of fokontany or the municipality. This practice was translated in the official accounts as 
a citizen response to tenure insecurity and a ‘strong indicator of the existing demand for 
formalization’ (World Bank 2006).  
 
In addressing these questions, the 2005 LPF refers to a ‘massive demand’ for securing 
tenure in general. While policy-makers have recognised that this demand was most 
pressing in areas with high economic value and where common property systems had 
broken down (such as urban and peri-urban areas) (World Bank 2006), the 2005 LPF 
does not disaggregate this demand according to a certain group of actors. It does not 
mention, for instance, the position and needs of women, young people, pastoralists or 
other vulnerable groups in terms of securing tenure. Consequently, the politics of land, 
social dynamics and inequalities affecting tenure security are not considered (see Peters 
2004 and 2009).  
 
5.1.3. External threats to local communities 
 
An integral part of the overall problem-framing was the lack of legal recognition of petits 
papiers. As they have only local value, the petits papiers offer no protection from threats 
external to local communities (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a; Teyssier et al. 2009). 
These threats came across in interviews with CSOs and technical experts, who described 
the situation in 2005 and reflected on more recent changes. In their narratives, the threats 
are from outside actors appropriating land, such as better-off individuals living in urban 
areas or state employees and institutions. According to the interviewees, these outsiders 
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could claim land by showing a title they had received from the state land service, even 
though the land might have been appropriated and used locally. These situations arise if 
the outside actors are well-connected, able to use the state land service for their benefit 
and have funds to cover all costs related to titles. One civil society actor explained this 
type of threat and possible responses to it: 
So, for them [farmers] there was no problem, everyone knows whose land it is. But 
the problems have arrived the moment when there are people from the city, even 
from the city of Tana, who come to the provinces, who come with certificates, a 
land title, to say that this is our land, you have to leave because it is ours or because 
we are the owners. So, it was from there that there had been requests from farmers 
to be accompanied on [meetings related to] tenure security. At that time, it was 
really the term securing tenure so that farmers could work peacefully on their land 
and so that they could invest in their farms. 
Interview with a national civil society actor (CSON001), 28.06.2016 
 
In these stories, the local farmers are the potential victims. Their rights are respected 
only locally, and they do not have the means to contest titles, even if they refer to land 
they have been using in a locally legitimate manner. They might lack knowledge of laws 
that should protect them (since 2005), awareness of procedures to allocate titles or 
certificates, or the courage to question legal documents. An integral part of the problem 
is also the scant attention given by farmers to potential threats and to the need to protect 
their rights, as explained here:  
On the other hand, there is the occupant who always has the way of thinking that 
he does not need to register because between us it is good, between neighbours we 
agree that it is my land no matter if it is delineated or not. But they are not yet aware 
that in five years, the municipality will no longer be like that. It will be a 
municipality that will be like the city now. They don't know that yet. But I think for 
some time now they have been thinking that maybe it is time.... But they are not 
convinced yet. That is not yet the case. And that makes them really vulnerable. 
Interview with a national civil society actor (CSON008), 02.12.2016 
 
People remain in an unconscious ignorance until the moment when someone comes 
to their house to tell them to go as tomorrow we come to occupy your land because 
it is ours, until that moment.  
Interview with a national technical expert (FTECHN004), 22.11.2016 
 
These problem framings have furthermore justified the structuring of the policy around 
legal recognition of locally legitimate tenure rights, the reform of land administration 
and the registration of rights. These three elements contribute forming the dominant 
policy narrative.  
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5.2. Policy objectives and approaches conceived by technical experts 
 
The Minister of Agriculture Harison was receptive to the pre-policy observations and 
problem framings brought forward by CSOs and technical experts. He spoke of having 
first sought remedies inside the state land service by closing the offices for a month to 
clear the backlogs, but this was not enough, and more comprehensive reform was 
required. He created a technical committee in the Ministry of Agriculture in 2004. 
According to interviewees he gave carte blanche to this technical committee to conceive 
a land administration system that would reach the widest range of people with minimal 
costs.  
 
This technical committee was composed of international and national experts, including 
the directors of the state land service and line Ministries. It held internal discussions and 
organised workshops and consultations through which it was open to locally-elected 
people, chiefs of regions, representatives of the Senate, National Assembly and farmers’ 
organisations (Teyssier et al. 2007). Nevertheless, as described by an international 
expert, the technical committee faced challenges in reaching a common conceptual 
understanding. For him, two schools of legal thinking opposed one another: one was in 
favour of private property with titles, while the other valued customary tenure rights, 
proposing certificates. The first group represented the prevailing titling system, while 
the second meant a conceptual change wherein locally legitimate rights to land were 
recognised legally by issuing certificates. The point here is that the basis for divergent 
conceptions and practices were materialised.  
 
These divergencies are reflected in the principal policy objective of the 2005 LPF, which 
is formulated both around the safeguard and regularisation of written rights and the 
registration of unwritten rights (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a). The former directed 
technical approaches to the modernisation of the state land service and the latter initiated 
the registration of locally legitimate tenure rights by municipalities, based on the current 
appropriation and use of land. The latter was principally supported and stewarded by a 
handful of international and national experts outside the state land service. They wanted 
to go beyond the initial observations and ad hoc remedies proposed by the CSOs, 
previous development projects and Minister. They questioned the existing titling system 
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that relied on the state land service. This is where approaches of decentralisation and 
certification materialised.  
They [CSOs] had no solution. There was no technical solution, but they felt that the 
government was responsible to propose cheap titles, cheap cadastre. And they had 
financed little here and little there of participatory operations on state lands, but 
they had not thought of a change of paradigm, that is to say, to ensure that the 
registration of rights on land would not be the sole responsibility of the central state 
but also of decentralised bodies. 
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG001), 29.08.2016 
 
5.2.1. Legal recognition of locally legitimate tenure rights 
 
The policy innovation is part of a stream of thinking that foresees the legal recognition 
of locally legitimate tenure rights. It builds on the principles of the Gelose law that 
recognised local management rights, securing tenure (SFR, SFI and SFO) and the law 
on collective registration of land (loi 2003-029) (see section 4.1.3.). Furthermore, the 
notions of maîtrise foncier used by Le Roy and droit d’agir formulated by Rochegude 
inspired the policy (Teyssier et al. 2007).  
 
Le Roy (2011) defines maîtrise foncier as the exercise of power and control over the use 
of land that in turn generates (management) responsibilities for the person who holds 
this power. He distinguishes different categories of control (minimal, priority, 
specialised, exclusive and absolute) that interact with the diverse bundles of rights 
(access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation) of Schlager and Ostrom 
(1992). This model has been used in Madagascar in what Le Roy (2007 and 2011) calls 
the ‘patrimonial approach’ to the management of natural resources, where the multiple 
rights over natural resources are negotiated and mediated between the users and the 
statutory administration, and where natural resources as patrimonies have conservation, 
material, intellectual, cultural, and financial value, among others. These principles have 
been applied under the Gelose law. 
 
Along similar lines, Rochegude (2005) explains that the concept of droit d’agir opposes 
rights on land (such as those allocated by a title where land becomes exclusive private 
property) to rights to do something on land, where the right makes sense of the 
utilitarian, symbolic, economic and social value of land. In Malagasy land policy, this is 
about the recognition of rights based on the appropriation and use of land. Indeed, the 
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certificates take note of socially legitimate and pre-existing use rights, while the titles 
create rights (Comby 2011). Rochegude (2005) notes that droit d’agir targets social 
processes that are locally applied and legitimate, as well as accessible, indisputable and 
comprehensive for citizens in line with good governance. In the Malagasy policy, this is 
reflected by relying on local recognition commissions for validating the current 
appropriations and uses of land, and by ensuring that administrative processes are 
conducted close to people in an open manner.  
 
The objective of the land policy has thus been to recognise social practices that exist on 
the ground rather than trying to adapt these practices to the requirements of the statutory 
law (Teyssier et al. 2007). These policy principles are expressed in the 2005 LPF:  
The challenge of the land reform should thus be the reconciliation of the legitimacy 
of tenure practices of millions of local actors with the legality of regulatory texts of 
expensive and complicated application. It is about bringing closer the laws 
conceived at the central level, but little used at the local levels with generalized 
practices at the local level and make these recognised by public authorities.  
Repoblikan’i Madagasikara (2005a) 
 
The specificity of the Malagasy land policy consequently lies in the legal recognition of 
the locally legitimate appropriations and uses of land. It replaced the presumption of 
state domain with a presumption of land use. In interviews, the technical experts 
qualified this as the innovative and the revolutionary part of the policy. As one 
interviewee expressed it, the policy considers that a farmer who is using a piece of land 
has more rights to it than the state. Indeed, such pieces of land in the category of PPNT 
are protected by state-backed legal structures. Tenure security is then linked to a 
guarantee of being recognised and protected as the legal holder of land based on social 
legitimacy. This means that the policy engaged with the debate on legal plurality, 
reducing confusion emerging from situations where someone could have had state 
enforced rights (titles) on lands occupied by others under customary tenure systems (see 
Toulmin 2008; Lavigne Delville 2010). 
 
5.2.2. Decentralisation and certification 
 
Legal innovations were followed with international ideals on the registration of 
customary tenure rights by decentralised authorities (see Benjaminssen et al. 2008; Colin 
et al. 2009; Knight 2010; Rochegude 2011b) and through certification as a locally-
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adapted approach (see Zevenbergen et al. 2013). The policy allocated land 
administration responsibilities to municipalities rather than holding everything within 
the state land service. This meant the opening of local land offices operating under the 
supervision of mayors and delivering certificates to farmers on demand.  
 
The decentralisation of land administration is a key policy achievement mentioned in 
interviews with international and national technical experts. They see working with 
municipalities as viable options for administering, managing and securing land in line 
with international ideals.  
Yes, so it was to find simpler solutions, cheaper, faster than the title, which is quite 
complicated with the state land service that is concentrated and not in all districts. It 
was complicated. Therefore, a decentralised system had to be found, hence the idea 
of giving municipalities the capacity to issue property certificates. That was the 
revolution. 
Interview with an international technical expert (FTECHG004), 30.11.2016 
 
The principles of equitability, efficiency and cost-effectiveness justified the 
decentralisation of land administration (Teyssier et al. 2007; Jacoby and Minten 2007). 
The idea has been that the access to land is more equitable when handled locally, as there 
is social control through which people hold constituents accountable (Teyssier et al. 
2007; Ribot et al. 2006). By being physically closer and having better access to 
information, local governments should also be able to understand and consider more 
profoundly the aspirations and needs of people (Droy et al. 2006; Ribot et al. 2006; 
Bidou et al. 2008; Toulmin 2008). In turn, the administration of land is considered more 
efficient thanks to the proximity, inclusive procedures, simpler technological solutions 
and lower costs that are generally linked to decentralisation (Teyssier et al. 2007; 
Toulmin 2008). Finally, the land administration should respond to principles of cost-
effectiveness to be worthwhile (Jacoby and Minten 2007).   
 
Responsibility for the registration of rights were decentralised through issuing 
certificates as legal proofs of ownership, guarantees of tenure security and means to 
increase investments, as described here by an international actor:    
It meant that one was going to do the certification, one was going to make it 
accessible to many more people, one was going to do it nearby the municipalities 
etc. And that would lead to increased tenure security. And so obviously to an 
investment in land etc. I think that in the beginning one took this as an achievement, 
as achievement given in advance. 
Interview with an international technical expert (ORGINT001), 19.09.2016 
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Some technical experts highlighted the importance of having a state-registered paper 
proof of tenure rights. For them, oral knowledge, petits papiers or solely legal 
recognition were not enough. Rights had to be written down, identified on the ground 
and registered in national systems. Similarly, recording the names of women on the 
certificates together with those of their spouses was considered to enhance the position 
of women compared to a situation where only a legal prescription would exist.  
I insist on having a paper. A paper. Now if you see in relation to the certificate, you 
can have collective certificates too. You can be part of it. That is a question of 
organisation within the community. But for me, what I insist is that the rights must 
be written. […] Does the woman know that she has hidden rights behind [rights 
mentioned in the law]. No, I say. You lawyers know that, but not the people, so you 
always have to write the woman's name next to it [write in certificates, next to 
spouse’s name]. 
Interview with a national technical expert (FTECHN001), 20.10.2016 
 
A system of certification was consequently created. For Teyssier et al. (2009) it 
represented another novelty as it allowed the recognition and registration of private 
property without a title. It took inspiration from the petits papiers (Burnod, 
Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2014) by relying on the work of local recognition 
commissions and thus creating a link with local pre-existing practices. It also relates to 
international ideals of pro-poor registration of rights, based on simple low-cost 
administrative practices that can become more sophisticated with time (Zevenbergen et 
al. 2013). As expressed here by a local technical expert, the certification rendered the 
registration of rights more robust compared to petits papiers and more accessible, 
cheaper and quicker compared to titles. 
On the other hand, the granting of a title is very slow so that during 100 years of 
existence the state land service could deliver only hundreds of titles. So, the state 
had to have a different vision, to decentralise and reduce the cost so that people 
could have a paper, that's the overall goal of the program. To regularise the petits 
papiers at the level of the farmers, once regularised one can consecrate them a right. 
We want to give them a right, in the event of opposition or conflict or problem, at 
least they have that. That is the overall objective. 
Interview with a local technical expert (ECOR002), 18.05.2016 
 
Based on this analysis, I identify the legal innovations of recognising locally legitimate 
tenure rights, decentralisation and certification as the key elements of policy change and 
constitutive of the dominant policy narrative. Minister Harison, technical experts from 
outside of the state land service, members of the coordination unit, CSOs and donors 
have assembled around this narrative and stewarded it. Nevertheless, some differences 
132 
 
exist in how tenure security is conceived, and it has also faced resistance from the state 
land service.   
 
 
5.3. Policy consequences 
 
These policy changes ended the presumption of state domain and reduced the 
responsibilities of the state land service. However, state land service employees 
continued to see themselves as the administrators of land, nor did the changes remove 
the legal supremacy of titles. Thus, the policy changes led to a gradual change system 
of administering land and securing tenure in which legal and administrative views of 
securing tenure dominate.  
 
5.3.1. Breaking down the state control over land 
 
Policy change happened in a situation where the state land service had been the 
administrator of state domain and the guarantee of private rights people possessed 
relating to titled land and buildings. Land had been legally secure only when it had been 
titled. A guarantee of rights had been achieved by publishing (in land books) all rights 
and modifications that apply to them (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 1960 and 2005b). The 
previous laws talk about droit réels – rights that apply to lands and buildings (as opposed 
to other rights that apply to people) and that are considered absolute rights (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 1960). 
 
With the new policy, the legal and administrative responsibilities of the state land service 
were reduced to concern smaller areas of land. The state land service could access, 
exercise control over and manage lands that were titled in its name, or not appropriated 
or used locally. This remained the case in terms of the allocation of titles and the 
preparation of cadastral plans as well their updating and conservation. This happened 
predominantly in urban areas. The World Bank (2006) justified the choice of 
maintaining the state land service by the impossibility of abolishing an already existing 
system and granted rights.  
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Regardless of the policy changes, in interviews and policy workshops, the lawyers and 
surveyors of the state land service still saw their role as the ultimate protectors of tenure 
rights. They held legal and administrative conceptions of tenure security, claiming to 
protect the rights of people and taking pride at being the caretakers of information. Their 
understanding of tenure security could be seen through three pillars of land 
administration as expressed in interview by a lawyer: i) identification of the land in a 
cadastre (a task for surveyors); ii) establishment of a legal act that defines who possess 
what land and in which manner (a task for lawyers); and iii) publication of information 
on tenure rights to remove any dispute (a task for the land administration in general). In 
addition, they highlighted the need to make accurate delineations on the ground and 
place boundary markers, referring to the demands and perceptions of Malagasy people 
in general: 
People do not feel secure when it is not […] the central state that protects their land 
through a special regime. […] For the Malagasy when the land is delineated, it 
belongs to him at 100 percent. His right is founded when one has placed boundary 
markers of the parcels.  
Interview with an employee of the state land service (ADMR001), 17.05.2016  
 
In line of these conceptions, the lawyers and surveyors of the state land service qualified 
their role as a sovereign, quasi-sacred function of the state (fonction régalienne de 
l’Etat). For them, land administration should have remained within the central state, in 
the hands of appropriately educated employees, rather than decentralised to 
municipalities or private actors, as partly done under the land policy. Debate continues 
as to whether land administration is a sovereign function of the state. If so, the organic 
law on decentralisation (loi 2014-018) would justify deconcentration rather than 
decentralisation (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2014). The discourse on deconcentration 
has furthermore been taken up by the lawyers and surveyors of the state land service, 
who request to be present in all districts of the country. It has also found its way in the 
2015 LPF that calls for both decentralisation and deconcentration, reminding readers of 
the public nature of actions to secure tenure (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a). 
 
This public narrative on the primacy of state land service is in direct opposition with the 
problem framings that highlighted its faults in performing core tasks and justified the 
legal and policy changes that turned against it. This opposition moreover explains power 
dynamics that emerged during the policy implementation and changes in orientation 
reflected in the 2015 LPF.  
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5.3.2. Towards a gradual system of securing tenure 
 
The policy changes did not remove the titling system, but rather introduced certification 
as a cheaper and quicker way of recognising customary tenure rights and accessing 
statutory land administration. A legal distinction was also introduced between titles 
(which conserved their definitive and unopposable nature) and certificates (rebuttable 
with evidence, such as a title) (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005b). This legal distinction 
is taken up in the narratives of technical experts and scholars, including proponents of 
certificates. They think in terms of a gradual system where the level of security increases 
depending of the political, institutional and social position of the authority recognising 
the rights (see Benjaminsen et al. 2008; Sikor and Lund 2009) and the robustness of the 
system. For instance, Droy et al. (2006) talk about titles as a maximal form of securing 
tenure, while a certificate is considered an intermediate measure, and the World Bank 
(2006) differentiates the value between the titles and certificates according to the 
authority that guarantees them. The titles are thus supposed to provide the highest legal 
security and guarantee of ownership (Simpson 1976). When added to the petits papiers, 
a three-tier system emerges (Bidou et al. 2008; Teyssier et al. 2009). This hierarchy was 
eloquently captured by one interviewee:  
Everyone cannot drive in Rolls Royce, but everyone should be able to drive.  
Interview with an international technical expert (CONSG002), 18.01.2017 
 
When discussing these different systems, I could hear disappointment in the voices of 
some farmers and civil society actors. They were not against the titling system as such, 
but looked for simpler and more accessible options that could have meant working with 
and/or democratising the titles rather than creating a new system of certificates. This 
disappointment is enhanced because the secondary status of certificates is strongly 
entrenched in the minds of people and it then requires a lot of work to highlight the 
strengths of certificates and make them attractive. Wehrmann and Antonio (2011) hence 
argue that psychology should be considered when designing the forms and names of 
instruments for securing tenure to ensure their adoption. In subsequent chapters, I 
analyse further how the image created around the titles, certificates and petits papiers 
play a role in the way in how they are welcomed on the ground. I demonstrate that a 
gradual system can become unmanageable, enhance institutional plurality and hence 
increase tenure insecurity. In the Malagasy land policy, this gradual system has also 
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ended up playing in favour of the state land service, as it found in the narrative of the 
supremacy of titles a way to oppose the land policy and gain visibility for its demands 
in the 2015 LPF.  
 
5.3.3. Neglect of communities as managers of tenure relations and socio-economic 
dynamics 
 
The policy decision to decentralise land administration at the level of municipalities and 
allocate certificates as a way of addressing tenure security can moreover be debated. 
Blanc-Pamard (2002) invites us to consider whether municipalities are meaningful 
spaces of action for local people in the management of land and natural resources. Blanc-
Pamard and Fauroux (2004) argue that, for local actors, fokontanys would be more viable 
spaces as they correspond to the social and territorial organisation of rural societies 
compared to municipalities that regroup villages.36 In addition to being social spaces, the 
fokontanys are also the lowest level of state authority (Bidou et al. 2008). Rochegude 
(2002) furthermore advocates the definition of communities that are based on common 
ideas and functions, and for whom responsibilities could be decentralised. In 
Madagascar, such communities have been related to collective conventions such as dina 
and local committees established around the management of natural resources under the 
Gelose law (Bidou et al. 2008). Hilhorst (2010) equally finds that local communities 
would be best suited to deal with land management and tenure relations, and their actions 
could be overseen by local governments, such as the municipalities in Madagascar.  
 
These insights indicate some disconnection between conceptual thinking and technical 
approaches. The conceptual thinking highlighted multiple values and uses of land as 
well as recognised socially legitimate practices through which tenure relations could be 
managed (see Le Roy 2007 and 2011; Rochegude 2005). Taking note of these 
appropriations and uses (Comby 2011), the technical approaches have focused on setting 
up an efficient statutory administration and fine-tuning registration of land rights. This 
observation is in line with Neimark’s (2013) ideas on how ‘policy prescriptions 
concerning inclusionary land rights are generally geared towards building institutions’ 
                                                 
36 In Ankazomiriotra there are for instance 16 fokontanys, each constituted of 3-6 groups of housing. The 
municipality has an area of 404km². 
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monetary and material resources without delivering the decision-making power over 
natural resources to rural stakeholders’ (p.6). 
 
Furthermore, the politics that influence how land has been accessed and distributed 
among community members are incompletely addressed within the policy. Scholars 
have indeed demonstrated that variables like socio-economic inequalities, local power 
dynamics, and questions of ancestry and belonging play a role, for instance, against 
women, younger people and migrants in Madagascar (Raison 1984; Blanc-Pamard and 
Fauroux 2004; Evers 2013). In relation to the certification, Evers (2013) argues that local 
power holders and ‘masters of the land’ (tompon-tany – those who have cleared land 
first for cultivation) might access certificates more easily and influence the local 
recognition processes in favour of their fellows. She adds that ‘others in the village might 
also be reluctant to oppose such claims if they wish to keep on living in the village’ 
(Evers 2013, p.131). Consequently, the policy ‘might contribute towards elite 
appropriation of the system and trigger deeper divisions with communities’ (ibid., 
p.133). The interviewees admitted and reflected on some of these shortcomings. For 
instance, civil society actors provided examples of farmers becoming indebted to well-
off individuals and forced to leave their land to pay their debts. This can be to the 
advantage of the well-off individuals who can, little by little, buy land from the most 
vulnerable. The civil society actors also recognised the fragile position of people with 
secondary rights to land by commonly referring to pastoralists who might have 
contentious relations with farmers. These multiple uses and interests in land are more 
profoundly addressed in the 2015 LPF.  
 
Consequently, under the influence of the technical approaches, the land policy ended up 
seeing tenure security from institutional, legal and administrative perspectives rather 
than considering its links with political, social, cultural and power dynamics, in the 
management of which local communities would play a central role. Several technical 
experts involved in the policy process confirmed this omission, which they link to a lack 
of debate on the real meaning of tenure security in the policy elaboration phase. They 
mentioned that while tenure security was observed as a problem, the debate quickly 
moved to consider procedures for securing tenure rather than discussing the sources of 
and conditions for tenure security. As one actor pointed out, the focus on registration 
entailed considering tenure security from the angle of action and procedures (securing – 
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sécurisation foncière) rather than analysing the sources of the problem (tenure 
insecurity). These considerations furthermore influence how tenure security is 
conceived as a result (sécurité foncière). As Comby (2011) explains, tenure security is 
often taken as an objective for policies without defining its sources. This imprecision 
then complicates the evaluation of approaches in place, and which can be vehicles of 
tenure insecurity themselves (Comby 2011). We can identify the issuing of certificates 
as the action (securing) and the certificate as the result (tenure security) in the Malagasy 
context. Yet, I argue that a piece of paper, like a certificate, can never be a guarantee of 
security that is fundamentally defined through authority, institutional, political, social 
and cultural relations between actors as established here and in the literature review. 
Indeed, even a legally validated paper can be questioned, including by those same 
statutory authorities that provided it. Tenure security, even in the form of a certificate, 
is relative and related to the perception of people:  
Finally, you can have a title, a certificate and there can be someone who tries to 
steal your land without you being able to do anything. So, it's a little mixed. It's in 
the head to say I have a paper, nothing can happen to me. But anything can happen. 
Interview with a civil society actor (CSON007), 25.11.2016 
 
 
5.4. Consolidation of the policy in a climate of dispute  
 
The international and national experts, donors and the coordination unit requested the 
consolidation of the land policy in 2014/2015. They wanted to strengthen the basis of 
the 2005 LPF, recognising its innovations37 in a context where power dynamics with the 
state land service, political changes and implementation challenges had rendered the 
policy fragile. They also saw the consolidation as a chance to update the policy in line 
with international frameworks, best practice and development ideas. Regardless of these 
intentions, the 2015 LPF questioned the fundamentals of the initial land policy. This is 
explained by little details that the state land service introduced in its final version. I 
discuss the contents of the 2015 LPF and how it considers tenure security next.  
 
                                                 
37 The 2015 LPF enumerates these innovations as the recognition of legitimate tenure rights, the 
certification of tenure rights based on local processes, the revision of laws, the creation of local land 
offices, the enhancement of one-stop-shops (guichet unique) of the state land service, the creation of new 
information management systems such as the PLOF and the training of national actors (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2015a). 
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5.4.1. Diversification of problem-framing  
 
The 2015 LPF builds on the implementation experiences of the land policy. It is based 
on an observation that, regardless of the land policy, farmers have had limited recourse 
to registration, be it through a title or a certificate. This low demand is explained by the 
satisfaction of farmers with local recognition practices and the continued use of petits 
papiers as written proof of ownership. It also recognises that tenure security or the 
registration of rights might not be the main concern for farmers (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2015a). Furthermore, proponents have explained the low figures of 
delivered certificates by operational difficulties of land offices and the fees applied on 
certificates often remaining too high for farmers. These factors thus mitigate the initial 
narrative of ‘a massive demand’ without completely abandoning the aim of securing 
tenure. The 2015 LPF is rather framed around equitable and secure access to land for all 
and securing rights in their diversity. (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a)  
 
The 2015 LPF still recognises the symptoms of the ‘tenure crisis’, which apply this time 
to both titles and certificates. It talks about the poor safeguarding of titles and 
certificates, the lack of updating to tenure-related information and the weak registration 
of changes, leading again to a mismatch between the situation on paper (titles, 
certificates, topographic maps) and on the ground. Furthermore, tenure disputes still 
occur in court. (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a) 
 
New challenges are furthermore brought forward. The 2015 LPF admits the limits of the 
legal system in recognising tenure rights when people use lands regulated by obsolete 
decrees, titled but abandoned by their legal owners or managed by communal systems. 
Similarly, there is a need to consider urban issues, address legal questions regarding 
forests and investment zones or discuss challenges in accessing land. In general, 
coordination with other public policies and sectors is poor, slowing down public and 
private projects. Reference is also made to governance and transparency where access 
to information is complicated or sanctions against corrupt practices are non-existent. The 
difficult articulation of activities between the state land service and the local land offices 
emerged during the implementation of the policy. This is interlinked with challenges in 
managing and exchanging digital information, for instance, through the PLOF. Faults in 
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updating the PLOF risk creating insecurity where titles and certificates can overlap 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a).     
 
A difference exists also between the 2005 and 2015 LPFs in how they address questions 
of gender and refer to different group of actors. I noted earlier how the 2005 LPF was 
silent on these issues even though the question of registering women’s names on 
certificates came through in the narratives of policy-makers. The 2015 LPF then talks 
about women, young people, landless people, pastoralists, communal lands and 
customary systems. The policy vision foresees providing equitable and secure access to 
land to all, men and women. Women’s names should appear on certificates when they 
are owners or co-owners of properties. Institutions in charge of land tenure should also 
consider the diversity of actors in their decision-making procedures as well as in 
processes of management, securing and attribution of land. Young people, landless 
people and pastoralists are furthermore foregrounded in observations on the difficulty to 
access land. There is a proposal to create local development zones that reserve parcels 
of land to be distributed in a transparent and concerted manner for the needs of local 
people and, for instance, for the most vulnerable. Finally, community land should be 
identified in PLOF and management through prevailing community and customary rules 
enabled. (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a) 
 
Overall, we can observe a variety of challenges related to tenure security, drawing from 
lessons learnt during the ten years of implementation of the policy, but also connected 
to wider contexts of land tenure questions. The evolution of international debate on 
governance and multi-sectoral approaches, and challenges imposed, for instance, by 
agricultural investment on the most vulnerable segments of society, have been more 
strongly integrated in the problem-framing.  
 
5.4.2. Widening of policy objectives 
 
The 2015 LPF indeed considers land in broader terms of development and at different 
scales from local to international. The policy vision links the local to global by speaking 
about sustainable socio-economic development brought forward by people, anchored in 
local dynamics but at the same time open for investment (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 
2015a). The global level is equally present by referencing international and regional 
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policy frameworks such as the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure, the Framework and Guidelines for Land Policies in Africa and the CFS 
Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems. The 2015 LPF 
directly adopts some of the principles of implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines 
(section 3B), namely human dignity, non-discrimination, equity and justice, gender 
equality, consultation and participation, the rule of law and accountability. It does not 
speak about a holistic and sustainable approach, nor about transparency or continuous 
improvement, which were the other principles of implementation of the Voluntary 
Guidelines. It thus directly refers to the Guidelines at the discourse level by linking with 
the principles that are considered to guide any action on the governance of tenure. Also, 
the thematic orientations of the 2015 LPF fall under the responsible governance of 
tenure. This shows the responsiveness of the policy (on paper) to on-going global 
discussions.   
 
The policy objectives of the 2015 LPF consider land tenure as a basis for development. 
This entails securing rights, working on land administration and attending to future land 
use (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a). Compared to the 2005 LPF, the objective is not 
only to register rights and improve the administration of tenure, but also to address land 
tenure in terms of access, use, planning and governance, both in rural and urban areas. 
The scope of the policy is hence much broader. This widening into different policy 
spheres is also visible in the institutional hosting of tenure issues. During the lifespan of 
the policy process, tenure issues were first under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and then transferred to the ministries in charge of land use planning.38 So, 
from considering land tenure in terms of agricultural policies and interests of farmers, 
one has moved into considering tenure in transversal terms of development, applying it 
also to land use planning and investment activities, considering the interests of a myriad 
of actors (not only farmers).  
 
Tenure security is then one of the many themes contributing to the notion of land tenure 
being the basis for development. It is no longer the structuring focus of the policy. One 
of the five thematic orientations directly alludes to tenure security, hoping ‘to recognise 
                                                 
38 The name of this line Ministry has changed over the years. During the elaboration of the 2015 LPF it 
was called the State Ministry in charge of presidential projects, land use planning and equipment 
(Ministère d’Etat en charge des projets présidentiels, de l’aménagement du territoire et de l’équipment).  
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the diversity of tenure rights and to provide them legal protection’ (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2015a). With ‘diversity’, reference is made to different situations where 
lands need to be secured, including when they are managed by communities, when they 
are used in a temporary manner, and when registration has not been completed or has 
become maladjusted to current situation. The orientation also focuses on tenure 
transactions and on recording changes on certificates and titles attending to developing 
accessible certification and titling procedures (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2015a). This 
overview also suggests that the consideration of tenure security has broadened from the 
sole safeguard and regularisation of written rights and the registration of unwritten rights 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2005a) to consider also the transfer of rights and the 
management of secondary or more complex sets of rights. Consequently, the 2015 LPF 
underlines the institutional, social, cultural and power relations influencing the sources 
of and conditions for tenure (in)security in addition to addressing legal and 
administrative matters.   
 
5.4.3. Different version of the 2015 Land Policy Letter: contrasting views  
 
So far, I have discussed the general challenges, objectives and orientations addressed 
within the 2015 LPF without, however, revealing the real stakes that are found in its 
details. In fact, the process of arriving at the final 2015 LPF included the publication and 
approval of two versions in May and August 2015 (see table 5.1. and Appendix 3). The 
May version wanted to enhance decentralisation and certification, while the August 
version lacked these proposals, reflecting the claims made by the state land service 
during its strike in the first half of 2015. They had been against three key points in the 
May 2015 LPF: attribution of the same legal value to certificates as to titles, creation of 
local development zones managed by municipalities, and allocation of certificates on 
zones already in cadastre (Razafindramiadana 2015). Furthermore, they asked for the 
greater appreciation of the roles of the technicians of the state land service (ibid.).  
 
Table 5.1. Changes between May and August 2015 LPFs 
The August 2015:   
- removed a reference to the registration of land under the name of the legitimate user 
when the land in question is regulated by obsolete legal texts or by cadastre;  
- removed the possibility to make changes to certificates (instead these should be 
transferred into titles at the moment of changes); 
- rejects a proposal to provide the same legal value to certificates as titles; 
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- limits the possibility of conducting certification in urban areas; 
- removed some of the newly-proposed responsibilities of decentralised actors to 
administer lands and be included in policy processes; and 
- provided more technical, advisory and supervisory roles for representatives of the 
state land service. 
 
So, what do these amendments mean in terms of tenure security? They entail that 
legitimate tenure rights continue to be recognised only in areas qualified as PPNT while 
the proposals of the May 2015 LPF wanted to extend the perimeter to concern, for 
instance, areas where a cadastre exists or where legal texts are outdated. Moreover, the 
changes not only deny equal legal value for certificates and titles, but obliges certificates 
to be converted into titles when subsequent changes take place. Furthermore, they 
question the decentralised processes as a means to achieve tenure security, and 
municipalities as authorities managing land and guaranteeing rights. Instead, attention 
is turned back to titles as legal solutions and to the state land service as the administrator 
and the guarantor of rights. This indicates that the state land service is trying to take 
control back over land administration and continues to consider land as its own 
(Chouquer 2011; Pedersen 2016 on similar case in Tanzania). This also reinforces the 
notion that the municipalities and the central state do not have the same authority, and 
that titles and the certificates do not hold the same legal value, even though the difference 
is minor.  
 
Allusion here can also be made to the observations of Ribot et al. (2006) on how states 
seek to recentralise decentralised policies. The authors argue that central governments 
‘make policy and implementation choices that serve to preserve their own interests and 
powers’ (Ribot et al. 2006, p.1865). For Ribot et al. (2006), one mechanism to exercise 
such power is to apply spatial limitations on the responsibilities of local authorities: 'by 
controlling the amount of space or territory over which local authorities can exercise 
even extensive powers, and effectively, it becomes possible to control the extent of 
decentralization' (p.1879). This corresponds with the Malagasy scenario where the state 
land service attempts to restrict the allocation of certificates only to the PPNT and to 
rural lands.  
 
These changes have furthermore been reflected in interviewees’ stories on the policy 
process. These accounts reveal the existing power dynamics between those who drafted 
the May and August 2015 versions of the LPF respectively.  
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They [state land service] changed everything that was to be done with 
decentralisation. When we [proponents of the 2005 policy] said that municipalities 
must have land on which they can develop their infrastructures, they said no, if they 
want land, they ask us, we make land available to them on behalf of the state. When 
we said that the value of the certificate must be consolidated, they said no, the 
certificate must be converted into a title. There were three [or] four points on which 
we disagreed.  
Interview with a national technical expert (ADMN004), 13.12.2016 
 
The proponents maintain that the state land service did not want to consider any 
proposals that would strengthen the decentralisation and certification approaches of the 
initial policy, consolidate the legal value of certificates or expand the application of 
certification (e.g. urban and state lands). They are rather portrayed as wanting to keep 
control over land and administrative procedures. The proponents thus see the 
amendments as regressive. These views are also expressed in a policy document from 
the November 2015 multi-stakeholder conference: 
The return of the obligation for landowners to transform their certificates into land 
titles is a decision that reflects a step backwards towards the single system of 
registration, i.e. a step backwards in the decentralisation of land management, a 
questioning of the recognition of rights of occupation and enjoyment as a form of 
property or a questioning of property rights already established and confirmed on 
land. 
M2PATE (2015, p.15) 
 
Some civil society actors linked to rural areas also argue that the August 2015 LPF could 
create discontent among farmers who have received a certificate. These farmers could 
be surprised by the devaluation of the certificates in which they invested money and 
effort. Indeed, the security gained through the certificate could eventually be questioned 
because of policy changes. Such discontent was not yet visible on the ground when 
conducting interviews in Ankazomiriotra in 2016. Nevertheless, the civil society actors 
might use farmers to gain stronger standing for their claims than what they would have 
if only speaking for their own organisation.  
 
Overall, these changes questioned the foundations of the 2005 policy. The reasons for 
such changes, which are at the core of this research, are fundamentally about divergent 
views between proponents of the land policy and the state land service. I argue that 
everything comes down to the question of who can regulate access to, use of and 
management of land.  
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5.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrates that a range of actors with different backgrounds and interests 
have conceived, operationalised and maintained the key framings, ideas and approaches 
of the land policy. The initial demand for reform stemmed from the field experiences of 
CSOs and technical experts. They framed existing challenges around a ‘tenure crisis’ of 
the statutory land administration, a ‘massive demand’ for securing tenure on the ground 
and external threats questioning the local means for securing tenure. Minister Harison 
engaged with these insights and requested a group of international and national experts 
to conceive the policy objectives and approaches. He also set the institutional basis for 
the policy implementation that was financially supported by donors. 
 
Based on the three problem framings, the technical experts orientated the land policy 
towards legal recognition of locally legitimate tenure rights. In other words, the policy 
gave statutory standing to local tenure relations and thus initiated a line of thought 
aiming to resolve an existing conflict between legality and legitimacy (Toulmin 2008; 
Lavigne Delville 2010). The policy was thus preceding the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure in which legitimacy is a key concept. The policy 
approaches then intertwined the notion of legitimacy with the registration of tenure 
rights by decentralised authorities. These approaches brought forward legal and 
administrative notions of tenure security in addition to more institutional ones. This 
meant that the policy became a reform centred on the registration of rights where 
document-based statutory proof provides security, rather than an endeavour to deal with 
the more complex sources of and conditions for tenure security, such as local social and 
cultural power relations. However, a broader consideration of tenure security could have 
been possible if more extensive debate on its meanings had been held. Such a 
consideration could have implied: i) acting under the general policy guidance and legal 
prerequisites, such as that on the recognition of legitimate tenure rights; and ii) giving 
responsibility to local communities for the management of tenure relations rather than 
to municipalities for administering land. This could have avoided the current situation 
where several systems (titles, certificates, petits papiers) co-exist.  
 
145 
 
These framings, objectives and approaches have led me to identify the recognition and 
registration of the locally legitimate tenure rights by decentralised authorities as the 
dominant policy narrative. It brings together various framings and perspectives under 
common concepts and motivations for change, which furthermore enable the 
establishment of shared development practices and solutions (Roe 1991; Fortmann 
1995; Hajer 1995; Mosse 2005; Li 2007). Thus the narrative has assembled social actors 
and institutions that otherwise might have remained distant (see Roe 1994; Kumar 
2014). I have termed this assemblage the proponents: actors that are behind the 
conceptualisation, operationalisation and maintenance of the dominant policy narrative. 
I have illustrated that this policy narrative has been placed in opposition to the previous 
model of land administration, which even more strongly emphasised tenure security as 
a matter of identifying parcels on the ground, providing legal acts and publishing 
information on rights. It questioned the status quo of the surveyors and lawyers of the 
state land service whose authority and responsibilities were reduced, a group I have 
identified as the opponents.  
 
The interactions inside the assemblages and the confrontation between them have led 
into continually reframing, contesting and negotiating the conceptions over tenure 
security (see Long 1992b; Corson 2016). In particular, field experiences and 
international influences explain the widening of the perspectives on tenure security 
within the May 2015 LPF drafted by the proponents. In turn, continuous opposition to 
the dominant policy narrative explain the changes introduced in the August 2015 LPF 
by the state land service, which questioned the initial basis of the land policy.  
 
This chapter discussed conceptions of tenure security in the 2005 and 2015 versions of 
the Malagasy land policy before they are operationalised and adopted on the ground. In 
the next chapter, I focus on the practices and tools put in place to implement the policy. 
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6. Practices to implement the Malagasy land policy  
 
 
The dominant policy narrative convened actors in an assemblage of proponents 
favourable for the ideas of recognising and registering legitimate tenure rights by 
decentralised authorities. It provided a common framework for these actors for the 
implementation of the policy on the ground. I pursue the ‘studying through’ of the land 
policy by analysing the concrete actions, technical solutions and tools through which the 
dominant policy narrative has been operationalised and by examining their evolution 
over time (Long 1992b; Keeley and Scoones 2003; Wedel and Feldman 2005). This 
analysis responds to the second research question that considers the practices of securing 
tenure adopted by different actors. Throughout the analysis, I attend to the mechanisms 
through which the group in favour of the dominant policy narrative is held together (see 
practices of assemblage as defined by Li 2007)39 and through which power is played out 
between actors (Gaventa 2006; Allen 2009). These influence considerations of tenure 
security, the evolution of practices, and the adoption and the translation of the policy.  
 
Through this analysis, I show how the dominant policy narrative became a technical 
question of administration of land. Its success is measured by the opening of land offices, 
issuing certificates and updating information management systems. These are concrete 
physical demonstrations of the dominant policy narrative at the local level. They are 
conceived as elements proving access to statutory administration of land and 
guaranteeing security. However, policy implementation has faced challenges. I highlight 
how these have created new sources of tenure insecurity and generated local 
interpretations of the policy. The data for this analysis originated from semi-structured 
interviews conducted with international, national and local actors involved in 
implementing the policy from 2005-2017. The analysis also builds on personal 
observations and grey literature. The latter enables this thesis to underscore informal and 
formal practices, while the former underscores the experiences of actors. 
 
The focus is on the institutional implementation of the policy. I begin by analysing the 
policy implementation as conceived nationally and continue by exploring its 
                                                 
39 Li (2007) identifies practices of assemblage as the following mechanisms: forging alignments, rendering 
technical, authorizing knowledge, managing failures and contradictions, anti-politics and reassembling.  
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operationalisation in the local context of Ankazomiriotra. This institutional examination 
is then followed, in Chapter 7, by analysis of the practices of securing tenure employed 
by farmers on the ground and their motivation to engage with the policy process.  
 
 
6.1. Policy implementation as conceived at the national level 
 
International and national proponents conceived the approaches of decentralisation and 
certification through the opening of local land offices in municipalities, coordination of 
certification processes and updating of PLOFs. These practices draw on lessons learnt 
from over two decades of implementation of agricultural and environmental 
management programmes (Appendix 2). They were first piloted before being more 
broadly rolled out by donors. With the evolution of the policy, a myriad of other 
practices has emerged, diverting attention away from the core of the dominant policy 
narrative.  
 
6.1.1. Reaching a threshold and strengthening local land offices 
 
The first local land offices were created as pilots in donor intervention municipalities. 
The AfD funded an office via its watershed management project in the municipality of 
Amparafaravola, in the Alaotra-Mangoro region. NGO Hardi oversaw a pilot in 
Miadanandriana (Analamanga) and MCA opened its first office in Faratsiho 
(Vakinankaratra). These pilots enabled the proponents to define conditions for the 
opening of offices, guidance for their operations and set responsibilities for different 
groups of actors (Appendices 4 and 5). They also served as examples for other 
municipalities, encouraging them to engage with policy implementation. Opening and 
equipping an office became a key practice: straightforward and concrete for donors, who 
could spend funds on buildings, office materials, salaries, training etc.  
 
The number of local land offices expanded rapidly, covering mainly rural areas. For 
instance, the MCA started pilots with 22 offices, planned to open a total of fifty but 
quickly revised the numbers upwards to a total of 235. Behind this expansion was a 
willingness to ensure that a critical number of offices are opened in a short period of 
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time to consolidate activities of the dominant policy narrative. In addition, progressing 
quickly was a way of reducing or bypassing the resistance of the state land service.  
It was part of the strategies to go in force, precisely to reach a certain threshold so 
that one would never go backwards and that it (policy) would not be completely 
questioned. There really was some of this line of thinking. Among the international 
or Malagasy promoters of the policy, there was a feeling that the protest among the 
state land service was so strong that there was a risk of going backwards and 
deforming the policy. So, the idea was to do a lot and quick to reach an irreversible 
threshold. 
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG001), 29.08.2016 
Most of these local land offices were furthermore opened in rural municipalities with 
the easiest access, highest population density and the most established contacts with 
development projects (Burnod, Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2014). There is weak 
coverage of offices in urban areas. Burnod, Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. (2014) 
explain this through the lack of urban management policy and the request of the state 
land service to keep a hold on the more lucrative urban lands. Nevertheless, these 
differences potentially create spatial disparities in the access to statutory land 
administration at the national level (Burnod, Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2014). 
They also reflect project bias, where one development activity attracts others to the same 
space (Chambers 1980). 
 
Donors and technical experts highlight the positive experiences encountered with the 
operations of the local land offices while not denying the existence of challenges that 
grew with time.  
I see plenty of very interesting cases where the municipality has totally appropriated 
the local land office, the employee responds to the authority of the mayor, the 
mayor is well aware of all the forms, pays attention to the key points before 
validating the applications on which it is necessary to make a verification, the 
documents are well archived and kept, there are good examples. There are more 
bad experiences though. There are more things that have been discontinued. It is 
like I was telling you, opportunistic mayor, poorly trained staff or disruption of the 
dynamic of the project a few months after the launch of the offices.  
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG001), 29.08.2016 
These challenges are linked to operational matters, opposition of the state land service 
to the practices of the dominant policy narrative and external constraints. In 2008, the 
Ministry of Agriculture observed that municipalities required time to implement their 
new functions and become competent before rendering the offices operational. In 2011, 
an external evaluation pointed out institutional challenges. The policy was resisted by 
the employees of the state land service by, for instance, not collaborating with local land 
offices or declining attempts to externalise some functions to private operators, despite 
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the funds directed at modernisation (Comby et al. 2011). Most notably, the dependence 
on donor funding and work conducted by technical operators under donor projects made 
the offices fragile when external support ended after the political coup in 2009 (Comby 
2011). As a result, some eleven percent of the offices were inactive in 2012 
(Andriamanalina et al. 2014b). The regional offices of the coordination unit that 
exercised an oversight role also closed. 
 
Financial and technical support has been slowly reviving after the democratic elections 
of 2013.40 This time around, donors and technical experts talk about widening the 
responsibilities of local land offices and making them comprehensive tools for local 
development. They prioritise existing offices over new ones, maintaining that local land 
offices should broaden their responsibilities after the mass of certificates have been 
issued. Such activities would include the processing and managing of changes made to 
the certificates – an activity of basic land administration, the importance of which has 
already been highlighted in several evaluation reports (Observatoire du Foncier 2007; 
Comby et al. 2011), the handling of municipal administrative tasks, the oversight of land 
use planning and the provision of information on all processes regarding land tenure. In 
the view of the donors and technical experts, these activities should guarantee the long-
term existence of local land offices and justify their utility as a public service, especially 
in a context of opposition from the state land service. To be able to execute such 
activities, the proponents, including CSOs and municipal actors, propose that the 
employees of the local land offices become civil servants.41 This is seen to guarantee a 
more solid institutional standing, while also providing security of employment, to avoid 
high turnover of employees that can lead to significant losses of institutional knowledge 
and technical know-how for local land offices.  
  
Donors and technical experts also address the sustainability of the local land offices in 
terms of funding. They propose additional options to the existing sources of donor and 
municipal subventions, and fees for certificates. They have suggested the state cover the 
                                                 
40 The political transition period lasted from 2009 to 2013 during which most donors were absent from 
Madagascar. Donors accepted the 2013 elections as democratic, after which they have started to return to 
Madagascar.  
41 The employees are currently municipal officers. Their mission is related to the motivation of the mayor 
to maintain the local land office and employ them. Mayors are political appointees. 
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salaries of the employees;42 the offices become public-private structures; and property 
taxes be used to fund daily operations. Early on, Bidou et al. (2008) proposed 
establishing a ‘communal cadastre’ that combines the PLOF and information on 
property taxation, which would increase the responsibilities of municipalities in 
administering land. These proposals have been taken on board in some pilots as I explain 
in section 6.1.4. Based on international experience of decentralisation, cross-
subsidisation between smaller and bigger offices could be considered (see Hilhorst 
2010), but this has not yet been clearly addressed in debates. 
 
These proposals raise some questions. The broader functions of the local land offices 
would not remove their current operational challenges. Also, strengthening the position 
of local land offices and their employees might be contested by the state land service 
who, under the orientations of the 2015 LPF, aim to become the key node in land 
administration. Finally, some of these activities (like property tax) are major 
undertakings. They not only shift attention away from core of the dominant policy 
narrative where local land offices serve for certification, but also require the 
collaboration of the central state (salaries of employees as civil servants) or other actors 
(public-private partnerships), non-existent under the current circumstances.  
 
Nonetheless, these proposals demonstrate the interest that the international and national 
proponents pay to local land offices. They perceive municipalities as key counterparts 
with whom they forge alliances and conceive local land offices as core instruments 
through which the technical implementation of the dominant policy narrative is achieved 
(Li 2007). These collaborations with municipalities and local land offices are then 
concrete demonstrations of the dominant policy narrative on the ground. Therefore, the 
proponents are ready to manage failures and make compromises (see Li 2007) to 
maintain their presence at the local level. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 This will be the case if the employees become civil servants.  
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6.1.2. Mitigated success of certification 
 
The principal responsibility of the local land offices is to coordinate the certification 
process. The 2005 LPF enabled various conceptions of certification (Table 6.1.) that 
draw from previous experiences of technical experts and donors on securing tenure (see 
Appendix 2).  
 
Table 6.1. Modalities under which practices of securing tenure can be piloted 
Modality Practice 
Endowment A municipality receives a ‘Mother’ title. The title is divided into individual 
certificates after the work of a local recognition commission. The mayor 
approves the certificates. 
Cadastral 
operations 
Parcels are delineated on the ground and entered into a cadastre. Certificates 
of occupation are allocated. There is a possibility to continue the process until 
obtaining titles. 
Citizen 
cadastre 
Areas for securing tenure are delineated. Certificates are allocated after the 
work of a local recognition commission. The mayor approves the certificates. 
There is a possibility to transfer the certificates into titles. 
Source: Repoblikan’i Madagasikara (2005a) 
 
With time, these modalities have merged to constitute a more uniform approach of 
sporadic certification. It is regulated by a number of steps set in law (Repoblikan’i 
Madagasikara 2006): i) instruction of the demand of a certificate by an individual or 
collective; ii) publicising (15 days before the work of the local recognition commission); 
iii) recognition of the right-holders and parcels on the ground by a local recognition 
commission (identification and measurement of the parcels, note of the rights of 
occupation); iv) reception of objections until 15 days after the work of the local 
recognition commission; v) delivery and signature of a certificate by the mayor; vi) 
updating the PLOF; and vii) registration of the certificate in the paper parcel registry 
(registre parcellaire). A certificate is only given to the right-holder and no copies are 
kept by the local land office (Images 6.1. and 6.2.). However, the information is 
safeguarded in a digital form in the PLOF and written in the parcel registry (registre 
parcellaire), providing a legal guarantee.  
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Image 6.1. A copy of a certificate  
 
Image 6.2. A copy of a certificate  
 
153 
 
Those making an application bear the costs of the certificate. The price is defined by 
each municipal council according to their priorities. One interviewee found that some 
municipalities wanted to benefit financially by selling the certificates at a high price. 
Also, Andriamanalina et al. (2014b) noted that after the withdrawal of donors, some 
municipalities tripled the price of the certificate. These strategies have not, however, 
paid off in terms of the number of demands. In fact, as noted by an international technical 
expert, the price should ensure that the certificates remain accessible for most farmers 
(see also MoA 2008; Comby 2011).  
We have to question the cost of services and this is a bit difficult because it is certain 
that the services paid at the local land office must be used for its operations and at 
the same time they must be affordable for a rural population with extremely low 
income. And as you say, it must not only benefit wealthy people in rural areas, but 
also the most disadvantaged populations. This is a real headache because it is to 
find the right price for the certificate for example, in these conditions, it becomes 
very difficult. 
Interview with an international expert (ORGINT001), 19.09.2016 
It hence remains a challenge for the local land offices to be self-supporting financially 
while also providing quality service and charging fees that are affordable to most people.  
 
The sporadic approach to certification became the default option compared to systematic 
processes under which the whole population of an area would receive a certificate, 
subsidised by the state or donors. One international technical expert described how this 
was debated:  
Yes, there were fundamental debates in our teams between a systematic and a 
sporadic approach. Some said that the demand must be individual, and that people 
will come to the local land offices the day they have money and the day they feel 
the need, and too bad if it does not go fast but it will be built over time. (…) And 
then at the opposite, there were the people who thought that it would be necessary 
to make a type of local cadastres with the available resources, with the people in 
the municipalities to register and to push a little people to make register their lands 
and giving them the opportunity, the day D, when one passes in their fokontany, to 
come to register their lands, saying your neighbours already did it, hurry up because 
there will not be another occasion and if you do not do it now it will then be 
individual registration and that will cost much more.  
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG001), 29.08.2016 
Today, some actors justify sporadic certification as a way of avoiding situations of 
gratuity where things are given out without any effort. According to this logic such 
gratuity would remove incentives to take care of the sustainability of the certification 
system (e.g. registering changes to certificates). Also, the psychological effects of 
gratuity are questioned.  
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... there was always the principle of sustainability that should be adopted in these 
measures. One should never give things away free of charge, for example, the 
certificates or titles, because one wants that there is a continuity afterwards. So, to 
have this continuity for this securing of tenure, the beneficiaries would still have to 
participate. 
Interview with a national civil society actor (CSON006), 16.11.2016 
 
The subvention is, normally it is something the donor demands because it speeds 
things up. When one has money everyone wants to do it but really, psychologically 
what impact has it on the users? 
Interview with a national civil society actor (CSON008), 02.12.2016 
 
Together with the local land offices, the success of the policy implementation has been 
measured against indicators related to certificates: the number of certificates delivered 
(gender disaggregated), the total area (in hectares) covered and the number of demands 
received.43   
MCA, like us […], was under political pressure, the Minister was asking for results, 
and the result was the number of certificates. So, you had to push the machine to 
allocate certificates. So, it was a bit embarrassing, I remember fighting against that 
and then at the same time there was no choice against the Minister, superb we 
delivered 2000 certificates in a country that has 10 million parcels of land, it would 
have been ridiculous. So, he aligned to the demands of the President in terms of the 
figures and that one shows a really geometric dynamism. 
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG001), 29.08.2016 
 
Under pressure to show results, the MCA funded grouped operations called Kara-Tany 
Malaky. This entailed making public calls for applications in target fokontanys, 
processing a batch of applications together (most of the time by technical operators who 
digitised the information)44 and providing small subsidies to applicants. The objective 
was to deliver certificates quicker and cheaper without adopting a purely systematic 
approach.  
 
Comby et al. (2011) argue that these result-based strategies were necessary to justify the 
existence of the dominant policy narrative. Some interviewees moreover found that 
policy implementation had to be more ‘aggressive’ to legitimise certificates against titles 
and counter the opposition of the state land service.  
At a certain point in the policy implementation it was necessary once again to make 
results to show that it worked, to show that one was covering significant areas, one 
had to create demand rather than wait. And I think that at some point when the 
                                                 
43 The statistics are available on the website of the Land Observatory (http://www.observatoire-
foncier.mg/cartegf.php)  
44 This was not a systematic registration of an area. Only applications were grouped, and they were partly 
funded by donors. In some interviews, these are referred as systematic action. 
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policy was gaining momentum, let's not forget that donors have their own 
timetables, so money had to be spent at some point in time. So, at some point I think 
the process had to be made more efficient.  
Interview with an international technical expert (ORGINT001), 19.09.2016 
The Kara-Tany Malaky operations have not, however, been uniformly praised by 
proponents. Some interviewees criticised them as typical result- and project-based 
approaches that do not consider the policy in a more structural manner.  
So, saying that we want results every year, they (MCA) had agents calling the 
mayors, putting pressure on them and telling them that every month they had to 
have results. And since there were not enough results, there were operations, Kara-
Tany Malaky, grouped operations with reduced costs to encourage demand. It was 
really, you have to have results at the end. And it is perhaps a little to the detriment 
of the policy in its duration and of having a much more structural policy. 
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG002), 09.09.2016 
 
With the sporadic certification and efforts of Kara-Tany Malaky, a threshold of 100,000 
demands was reached in 2009/2010 and 100,000 certificates were delivered in 2013. 
Proponents praise these early results, taking as a point of comparison the total number 
of titles delivered in Madagascar previously, which by 2007 was some 300,000 (Teyssier 
et al. 2007).45 However, progress has been slower than initially expected. By the end of 
2017 some 142,067 certificates had been delivered and there was a backlog of 115,238 
certificates (see section 4.2.3.).  
 
These rather moderate results lead me to question whether an error of judgement was 
made in considering sporadic certification as the dominant technical solution, as 
opposed to systematic processes. In light of existing literature, experiences from other 
countries and overall development changes, it becomes evident that the sporadic 
approach to certification does not address issues of equity inside local communities. 
Dickerman et al. (1989) compared systematic and sporadic registration based on 
experiences from Africa. For them, systematic registration is more efficient and cheaper, 
although they suggest that costs should be covered by the government rather than 
individuals (Dickerman et al. 1989). Sporadic registration furthermore bears the risks of 
‘land grabbing’ where people who are receiving titles (or certificates in the Malagasy 
case) might claim parcels that legitimately belong to people whose lands are not being 
registered or who have not been consulted (Dickerman et al. 1989). Thus, it is possible 
                                                 
45 In 2007, Teyssier et al. reported that some 300,000 titles had been delivered in Madagascar with an 
average annual rate of 1,200 titles.  
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that sporadic registration benefits only the well-off, while a national policy should in 
principle benefit the whole society (FAO 2017a). Reflecting back to Madagascar, I can 
assert that the grouped operations of Kara-Tany Malaky (closest to systematic 
approaches) were only considered from the angle of efficiency and coverage without 
attending to its possible benefits in terms of equality if the exercise had been extended. 
Equality did neither appear in the reflections on the challenges of a sporadic approach.  
 
In purely numerical terms, the Malagasy figures seem insignificant when compared to 
the experiences of registration from other African countries. In Ethiopia, for instance, 
around 20 million parcels of rural land were registered in four regions in five years 
(Deininger et al. 2008). Some 6 million households received certificates at the cost of 
one dollar through a programme that allocated non-alienable use right certificates, 
through decentralised adjudication processes and the use of low-cost spatial information 
(ibid). In Rwanda, the Natural Resource Authority rolled out a registration programme 
through which 11.4 million parcels were demarcated at the cost of 6 dollars per parcel 
in three years (Nkurunziza 2015 in Ali et al. 2016). These are examples consistently held 
up as best practices in the international arena, for instance in the World Bank Annual 
Land Conference.46 They are also used by proponents as a way of persuading the 
Malagasy government to aim higher. As an example, a comparison with the Rwandan 
case was made by a donor representative during the launch of the PNF in Antananarivo 
in 2016.   
 
Finally, the figures seem low when compared to other on-going development 
endeavours, such as the intention in 2008/2009 to allocate 1.3. million hectares to 
Daewoo and 200,000 hectares to Varun International, as well as the current plans of the 
Ministry of Agriculture to reserve two million hectares for new investors (Teyssier et al. 
2010; Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011; Burnod et al. 2013; public communication 
of the MoA). Even though agricultural investment has been largely unsuccessful 
(Andriamanalina et al. 2014a), these figures represent another range compared to the 
193,679 hectares covered by certificates at the end of 2017. Against this background, 
sporadic certification seems minor when the real challenges concern much larger areas 
                                                 
46 I present these examples as an indication of numbers that can be reached through systematic registration 
practices. I do not present these examples as best practice in terms of their social, cultural and governance 
impacts, which should be assessed separately. 
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of land. In such a context, rather than focusing on certification, proposals are made to 
legally ensure the protection of all local rights on the PPNT, including pastures and 
forests, enabling local land offices to mediate between the state, farmers and investors 
(Burnod et al. 2013; Andriamanalina et al. 2014a). However, the former seems 
complicated considering the aim of the state land service to control land and the latter 
seems unrealistic considering the difficulties faced by local land offices.  
 
6.1.3. Local land occupancy status maps as key technological solutions 
 
The third key element in the implementation of the dominant policy narrative is PLOFs, 
which are conceived as tools and technological solutions for information management 
(see Li 2007 and 2014). Information on the occupancy of lands – including information 
on titles, cadastre and certificates – is recorded and safeguarded here. PLOFs also enable 
sharing data between local land offices and the state land service. They exist in parallel 
to paper parcel registries that refer to all certificates delivered by a municipality, serving 
as legal backing for certificates. 
 
As with any information management system, PLOFs and parcel registries require 
updating and collaboration between institutions. This has been a challenge in 
Madagascar. In 2007, the Land Observatory recommended creating protocols of 
exchange between local land offices and the deconcentrated offices of the state land 
service (Observatoire du Foncier 2007). At least in the case of Ankazomiriotra, such 
protocols have not been adopted and data exchange is ad hoc. In 2008, the Ministry of 
Agriculture noted that the PLOFs were incomplete in terms of information on titles and 
municipal boundaries (MoA 2008). The 2011 evaluation report highlighted challenges 
with municipalities accessing the tool, updating background information, conserving 
paper versions of the PLOF and saving and exchanging updated information (Comby et 
al. 2011). In public meetings and interviews, proponents recognised challenges, which 
are also mentioned in the 2015 LPF. Representatives of the state land service, however, 
by-passed the institutional challenges, taking no responsibility for them and blaming 
technical difficulties and errors on external operators or municipalities.  
 
Regardless of institutional and operational defects, both proponents and opponents see 
much wider uses for PLOFs. Their management is hence a practice that is not questioned 
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by the state land service, but rather connects the discourses of the two assemblages. The 
representatives of the state land service were, for instance, underscoring how a 
technically functional PLOF is a key tool for land administration and the accuracy of 
information is a question of tenure security. They were speaking in favour of making the 
PLOFs a common reference system on which the state land service should assume more 
responsibilities instead of external operators. Hope thus remains among both 
assemblages of making the PLOFs reference tools for managing information and 
extending its scope to activities of property taxation and land use planning. This notion 
of PLOFs serving wider functions of land governance is visible when exploring multiple 
new practices proposed. In these future plans, the PLOFs become veritable ‘inscription 
devices’ through which land can be administered, managed and assembled for various 
purposes such as the consolidation of state power over land (see Scott 1998; Li 2014). 
The references to PLOF finally renders the policy implementation even more technical, 
side-tracking the politics related to land (see Li 2007).  
 
6.1.4. Multiplication of practices for diverse purposes  
 
The local land offices, certificates and PLOFs are strongly rooted in the dominant policy 
narrative. The PLOFs also enter the worldviews of the state land service. In parallel, 
multiple other practices have gradually appeared, as intentions, plans or on-going pilots, 
including proposals to i) systematically inventory parcels for taxation purposes; ii) make 
parcel censuses and maps to protect the rights of communities; iii) inventory and 
catalogue state land to bring clarity over state ownership; iv) delineate PPNT to protect 
legitimate tenure rights as well as separate the operational areas of local land offices and 
the state land service; v) develop land use plans; and vi) set agricultural investment zones 
(Appendix 6). These practices divert attention away from the core of the dominant policy 
narrative by bringing in new elements, adapting older concepts or giving new meanings 
to key terms (see Li 2007). They are often proposed by different actors including 
technical experts, donors, civil society actors and the state land service. The intensions 
of these actors diverge, thus making the proposed practices separate. Yet, there are strong 
conceptual and technical similarities, as explored here.  
 
Most of the proposed practices intend to bring clarity over land holdings and mapping 
lands. For instance, some civil society actors consider that locally-prepared maps have 
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a value in information about a situation on the ground, providing a tool for negotiation 
with outsiders and securing tenure rights.   
If you go to a municipality and ask the mayor, “where is the land that does not yet 
have an owner?” etc., he is not going tell you much [laughs]. But the objective for 
us is that they have a tool to say that ah, in such fokontany it is occupied, there is 
no more land available, there are already people there. And to make plans, when 
they use the map, they can say that ah, in such a place, I have to negotiate with such 
and such person.  
Interview with a national civil society actor (CSON007), 25.11.2016 
These maps proposed by the civil society actor are based on local legitimacy and social 
validation. Participatory approaches are then ways of providing the maps with local 
standing (Fogelman and Basset 2017), but also ways of mitigating any attempts at false 
claims by more powerful local actors that might see an opportunity to consolidate their 
position (Neville and Dauvergne 2012). Although they might not provide legal 
protection, under international best practice, they should be accepted as evidence of a 
person’s tenure rights if a subsequent registration takes place (FAO 2017a). Civil society 
actors also found that such maps could also serve external actors – investors and the state 
– to identify areas in which they could intervene and people with whom they should 
negotiate. The CSOs are bringing forward mapping as a solution, a method that 
previously relied on states (Walker and Peters 2001; Peluso 2005) and that has strong 
descriptive and prescriptive powers (Scott 1998; Li 2014). While the intention is to 
protect legitimate tenure rights, the final use of these maps cannot be controlled. 
 
In addition to maps focusing on individual uses of land, some technical experts are 
proposing to delineate in space the PPNT, currently identified only in legal terms. 
According to these experts, such delineation would also spatially clarify and separate 
the operational areas of each authority responsible for the different statuses of land: 
municipalities having responsibility over the PPNT, and state land service over state 
land and unused land. Such delineations would contribute to protecting the rights falling 
under it.    
 
Some of the practices propose a systematic approach to the identification of parcels, uses 
and users of land in a given area. This is, for example, the case of the inventory of parcels 
for taxation purposes currently being piloted by a project called Matoy. The inventory 
involves identifying the geometry, size and parcel holders, entering these details on GIS-
based maps and combining the maps with alphanumerical data, for instance, on the 
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payment of taxes. Groundwork is hence laid for the creation of PLOFs and the 
information can be used for certification of rights. As baseline data exist, certification 
should become quicker and cheaper. These costs are further reduced by grouping 
demands from one area together and organising common local recognition commission 
processes, following the example of Kara-Tany Malaky. However, these mapping 
exercises run the risk of leading to rigid outcomes (Walker and Peters 2001; Peluso 
2005). Civil society actors expressed concerns that delineating PPNT, for instance, 
would restrict agricultural practices in a confined area, not allowing expansion onto 
unused lands that legally belong to the state. Therefore, there should be a mechanism 
wherein lands can be transferred from one purpose and legal category to another. One 
technical proposal was then to delineate a flexible buffer zone around the PPNT.   
 
Many of these activities also involve the introduction of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) and thus require continuous management (Peluso 
2005). This bears risks in the local contexts of Madagascar. For instance, the systematic 
inventory of parcels and land use planning are proposed to be channelled through the 
local land offices. Yet, these offices lack human and financial resources, the capacity to 
manage and update the systems and basic means for running them (starting with 
electricity). These practices thus sound unrealistic in the current working conditions of 
most of the rural offices, such as Ankazomiriotra.      
 
Moreover, the purposes and possible effects of these practices on local people raise 
questions. The inventory of the state land is particularly vulnerable, as many people are 
using land that can be legally classified as belonging to the state. Publicly, some state 
representatives refer to people occupying these lands as squatters. Others are more 
moderate, differentiating between legitimate and illegal occupation.  
There are legitimate occupations and there are abusive occupations. [...] This is the 
real problem of the inventory: reconciling information from the office and 
information from the field. There is the requirement, we do not speak directly of 
[…] formalising occupations but of exercising a resolution. If we really see that the 
occupations are legitimate, we can regularise these occupations. But if there are, 
say, abusive occupations, then we must assert the rights of the state and help 
relocate these people. 
Interview with a national technical expert (ADMN001), 01.12.2016 
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As the quotation above suggests, it is not clear how the state land service understands 
legitimate occupation of land. Under the current law, all appropriation and use of non-
titled land should be recognised, while all unused land falls under state control 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2006). If the land is titled under someone else’s name, then 
the law requires continuous presence on and use of land for twenty years before the user 
can claim it (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 1960) This is called prescription acquisitive. 
The issue here is that in practice the state land service has ignored the dimension of 
appropriation of land linked to PPNT, and only recognised permanent use of land 
(Burnod and Andriamanalina 2017). For Burnod and Andriamanalina (2017), this non-
recognition has been a way to title not only unused but also possibly appropriated land 
in the name of the state, and later offer these to agricultural investors. Some international 
technical experts and civil society actors expressed similar concerns in interviews. They 
were worried that the inventory of state land could enforce state power over non-titled 
land to the detriment of the rights of local people. This could be the case for land in 
which appropriation and use are not permanently visible on the ground (for instance, 
land that is used seasonally). It is evident from these discussions that the state wants to 
protect its rights and avoid the expansion of occupations considered irregular, either on 
state titled land or currently unused land. These discussions reveal one of the key policy 
disputes: the definition of appropriated and used land. Therefore, defining these 
categories and delineating them in space ultimately determines who can control them: 
municipalities or the state land service. The definition becomes a political issue and a 
question of authority over land.  
 
I have explored here the multiplication of technical practices that appeared under the 
policy. A question remains on where this widening of perspectives stems from. First, I 
find that it is linked to the broader orientations of the 2015 LPF, whether in its May or 
August versions. Attention is turning away from securing tenure through certification to 
other ways of administering and managing land for the purposes of ‘development’. 
Nevertheless, some of these new proposals continue to allocate responsibilities to local 
land offices and most of them highlight PLOFs as key tools for land administration. The 
dominant policy narrative is thus diverting to multiple directions bringing in new 
elements and adapting older ones, as suggested by Li (2007) as being a key mechanism 
of reassembling. Second, I concur that they reflect the eagerness of the state land service 
to regain control of land administration. The inventory of state land, although presented 
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as a technical endeavour, is yet another demonstration of this pursuit of power (see Li 
2007). To gain support, it partly adopts the language of the dominant policy narrative 
(e.g. on PLOFs) or seeks back up from international frameworks (e.g. the Voluntary 
Guidelines), which highlight the importance of public land management. Third, I argue 
that this is connected to the tense institutional environment. The opposition of the state 
land service has restrained the scope of action of proponents, who need to find new ways 
to pursue the dominant policy narrative. They are conceiving various ways of protecting 
rights and administering land, first by piloting them on the ground and then trying to 
bring them to the policy and legal sphere if opportunities arise. Fourth, I note that this is 
a consequence of the project-led policy implementation wherein technical actors and 
donors pursue their own ideas and practices, rather than there being an overarching 
strategy, as the coordination unit would see it. Consequently, under these multiple 
activities the policy becomes a laboratory of practices where things are tested by several 
actors, but not sustainably or widely rolled out. It is no longer about the 
operationalisation of the core of the dominant policy narrative.  
 
 
6.2. Policy implementation in Ankazomiriotra 
 
Ankazomiriotra is one of 535 rural municipalities in which the policy has been 
implemented. Practices are centred on the core of the dominant policy narrative 
(operations of the local land office, coordination of certification and updating the PLOF) 
and the new practices only appear as a sideline in the accounts of the municipal actors. 
Discrepancies exist between the practices as conceived at the national level and as 
operationalised on the ground. I examine policy implementation in Ankazomiriotra, 
attending to local challenges in and translations of the policy implementation.  
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6.2.1. Open local land office regardless of technical challenges and weak 
institutional anchorage   
 
6.2.1.1. Office open since 2008 
 
The local land office was opened in 2008 with MCA funding and benefitted from 
technical assistance provided by French technical operator FIT Conseil. It had two 
employees during the first year and one remains today. Having had the same employee 
from the outset has benefitted the operations of the office by ensuring the safeguarding 
of institutional knowledge and the continuation of practices. The employee is well-
known and seen as the focal point on land issues in the municipality, reflected by the 
unwillingness of other municipal or civil society actors to pronounce on matters of land 
administration. 
 
When discussing the creation of the office with municipal actors, they gave an 
impression of an idea imposed from the outside. This means that the proponents and the 
donor MCA had exercised power by persuading the mayor and the municipal council to 
open an office (Allen 2009). Ankazomiriotra was hence linked to the wider assemblage 
of the dominant policy narrative and organisational resources were reserved for it (Allen 
2009). If the office was seen as ‘imposed’ from above in the beginning, over time 
municipal actors found that people have gradually come to appreciate its utility. Its 
presence has not been questioned locally, even though political leadership in the 
municipality has changed. This chimes with Burnod, Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 
(2014), according to whom the surviving offices are in municipalities that saw a real 
advantage in their operation and in the certification process. The example of 
Ankazomiriotra also confirms that this survival is related to the ability of municipalities 
to cover the salaries of their employees through its own budget or fees charged for 
certificates. They have also found complementary administrative activities for their 
employees. Observations indicate that sometimes employees have created side activities 
for themselves (e.g. printing businesses), especially if their salaries are not paid on time.  
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6.2.1.2. Relative proximity to people 
 
One of the logics behind the dominant policy narrative was to decentralise land 
administration at the level of municipalities, bringing them closer to people. According 
to Teyssier et al. (2007), this would ensure more equitability and efficiency. Based on 
observations and interviews, I identify physical, psychological and behavioural 
proximity between people and the local land office. The office is located on the main 
square, on the ground floor of the main municipal building, meaning that people can 
visit it while dealing with other administrative issues, especially on Thursday market 
days during which people gather in the main square. Considering that the employee of 
the office is well known to local people, there should be few barriers to asking questions 
and seeking solutions. People also have an opportunity to monitor and exercise control 
over the operations (Teyssier et al. 2007; Ribot et al. 2006). It is thus common to see the 
chiefs of fokontany and farmers passing by the office asking for information, checking 
on the progress of their demands, making first contact or just seeking discussion.  
 
The difference between the local land office and deconcentrated offices of the state land 
service, the court and the notarial offices is notable. These are in Antsirabe or Betafo, 
half a day away from Ankazomiriotra. The first two have long waiting times before 
accessing services, while the third is a very polished and coded environment. I observed 
these psychological and behavioural distances myself. Visiting a notarial office or the 
court in Antsirabe is like entering an unfamiliar environment. Staff dress smartly, use 
legal language and behave very formally. The offices are shiny and neat compared to 
the regular municipal offices. For me, these are ways of exercising power as spaces are 
restricted to a certain type of people (Gaventa 2006). Indeed, these are spaces to be 
accustomed to and their codes to be learned before being able to lead meaningful 
discussion, make demands and request services. This distance was eloquently expressed 
by a national civil society actor:  
It is far away, it is expensive to travel, especially if you have to make several trips, 
and the people in the city also scare off farmers. Here they have ties with clean 
shoes. 
Interview with a national civil society actor (CSON001), 28.06.2016  
 
By bringing services down to the municipal level, some of these barriers could be 
removed. However, the municipal building can still remain physically intimidating to 
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farmers coming from further away fokontanys of Ankazomiriotra and the administrative 
services remain inaccessible to illiterate people. Local society is not exempt from 
behavioural codes. A visit to a municipal office might require clean clothes and wearing 
shoes – something that is not a given for all farmers. When observing municipal life, I 
can see farmers washing themselves in the river before going to the centre, wearing their 
only set of clean clothes and finally timidly going up the stairs to the main offices with 
a couple of papers in their hand. There is then the formidable need for an ability to 
understand administrative procedures, read and write.  
 
These barriers are reflected in the attitude of farmers towards administrative processes. 
It was clear in several interviews that illiterate people are afraid of signing papers and 
being involved in official procedures, afraid of their signatures and consent being 
misused.  
That is why people are afraid because maybe it is a letter that accuses them, for 
example, they leave from their place in the countryside and a person who has 
studied prepares a letter and asks them to sign. They sign the letter, but they did not 
know that the letter was an act of sale. That's why people are afraid of offices. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA003), 04.04.2016 
Some farmers hence feel powerless. To counter such situations, one chief of fokontany 
observed that illiterate parents prefer sending their children (those with school 
education) to handle administrative matters, as they might have more facilities to read, 
write and follow the administrative codes, and thus ensure that their rights are respected.   
 
Consequently, the accessibility of the local land office and certificates remains relative. 
I demonstrate further in Chapter 7 that it is mainly the wealthier, those with education 
and with a certain ease when dealing with municipal affaires who visit the office and 
apply for certificates. They are the most empowered (Rowlands 1995) and could have 
potentially visited the deconcentrated offices of the state land service as well.  
 
6.2.1.3. Information dissemination relying on key brokers 
 
The dissemination of information is reactive where the employees of the local land office 
respond to specific demands, and passive where notices are available to farmers. 
Information is displayed on posters, leaflets, notices and administrative circulars inside 
and outside of the office, thus readable by anyone literate passing by (Images 6.3. and 
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6.4.). Some of these posters and leaflets date back to the MCA funding, thus including 
information on the project and adopting its branding. In addition to written materials, 
the local land office organised public meetings in fokontanys when it still benefitted 
from MCA funding. These meetings were opportunities for the mayor, municipal actors 
and chiefs of fokontanys to enhance the local presence of the office, promote certificates 
and talk in favour of the Kara-Tany Malaky process. Such meetings do not exist 
anymore. The employee of the office does not have time to visit fokontanys personally. 
Information is rather passed on from the municipality and local land office to the chiefs 
of fokontanys, and from the chiefs to farmers.  
 
Image 6.3. MCA project poster Image 6.4. Information displayed outside of office 
 
 
 
 
 
The observations and interviews indicate that information flows from the municipality 
to the fokontanys. The local land office maintains close links with the chiefs, who gather 
in the centre of the municipality each Thursday to receive updates on municipal matters. 
These meetings are also used to share information on tenure issues. In addition, it is 
common to see the chiefs in the local land office exchanging view with the employees. 
The chiefs have furthermore disseminated information to the inhabitants of the 
fokontanys at their own meetings. Some of them confirmed being available individually 
to advise farmers. For instance, one chief explained encouraging people to certify their 
land rather than registering the bills of sale and other petits papiers at the level of the 
arrondissement. The former is not only cheaper but also provides legal proof of 
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ownership. Another chief described collecting applications and transferring them to the 
local land office on behalf of the inhabitants. This practice was confirmed by the farmers 
of the fokontany. By playing these roles, some chiefs claimed stronger roles for 
themselves than what is foreseen in the law. They positioned themselves as the middle 
men between farmers and the municipality and consequently fit the description of 
brokers (Olivier de Sardan 1995; Bierschenk et al. 2000; Mosse 2005).  
 
The mayor, the employee of the local land office and the chiefs are thus key agents 
defining the success of the policy and how it is perceived locally among the final 
beneficiaries. There are, nevertheless, risks in relying on these local actors who can gain 
power from brokering and who also retain political positions. For instance, the 
certification process can be used for political purposes. The Ministry of Agriculture 
(2008) observed that in some places candidates for municipal elections had made 
promises for cheaper certificates to gain popularity prior to elections. Political changes 
can also impede implementation if new-decision makers question the value of the 
certificates or do not have an interest in awareness-raising. Furthermore, if the policy is 
associated with some key brokers, power imbalances can be created in which people 
close to them benefit from the policy while others are excluded. Finally, while these 
people play a role in increasing awareness, it is not possible to tell from the qualitative 
data to what extent their personal efforts contribute to the rise in the number of 
applications.  
 
6.2.1.4. Institutional isolation 
 
While the local land office is functional and linked to the fokontanys, the interviews 
indicate that it operates with reduced institutional contacts at regional and national 
levels. Working relationships exist with the employees of the CRIF and other local land 
offices of the district of Mandoto, but there is no direct higher supervision. Furthermore, 
the municipality of Ankazomiriotra and the OPCI are not able to advise on tenure issues, 
but only serve as funding bodies. This means that daily activities are conducted in 
isolation, based on guidance and training received at the beginning of the policy 
implementation. This creates some frustration among the employees. A feeling of 
powerlessness can be observed where the employee does not benefit from ‘power 
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within’ i.e. a self-confidence that would enable more proactive policy implementation 
(Gaventa 2006).  
 
The degree of institutional supervision and technical assistance changed during the 
policy implementation. The local land office and CRIF used to communicate with a 
regional coordination unit of the land policy located in Antsirabe. This unit supervised 
local land offices and technical operators of MCA. Its former employees felt that they 
were at the disposal of the demands of the central coordination unit and the MCA, not 
always knowing to whom they should report. In addition to institutional links, the local 
land office and CRIF benefitted from training programmes, for instance, on the 
certification procedures, land legislation, taxation and communication, delivered by the 
technical operator of MCA. Employees in the local land office keep the training guides 
and documents in one of the office cabinets with all the bookkeeping material and 
administrative circulars and refers to them in cases of doubt. After the withdrawal of 
MCA in 2009, the regional unit was closed, and the technical operators stopped their 
activities. This left the local land office to operate alone. Yet, the current institutional 
isolation should not exist. In fact, the 2005 LPF foresaw policy supervision, coordination 
and technical assistance roles to bureaux spécialisés that are part of the deconcentrated 
offices of the state land service. According to the municipal actors, these offices are 
almost non-existent, and no relations have been established with them. Instead, the 
decentralised and deconcentrated administrations function separately.  
 
Due to the lack of institutional contacts, the information flow between decision-making 
levels (local, regional, national) is slow. Policy resolutions and operational decisions 
arriving from Antananarivo take months to reach Ankazomiriotra. This furthermore 
affects the operations of the office. A concrete example is the case with a repeal to a 
resolution that had prevented the allocation of certificates on tanety. It took four months 
for the repeal to arrive at the local land office, in which time the office followed previous 
instructions, not allowing farmers to certify lands on tanety. Another case has been 
encountered with guidance on book-keeping. It was not until 2017 that the local land 
office realised that the paper parcel registry (registre parcellaire) is a legal guarantee of 
ownership. Locally, certificates had been issued and information entered in the PLOF 
without taking a written note of them in the parcel registry. Some municipalities of the 
district of Mandoto have not even had enough funds to buy the book. Consequently, 
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administrative sources of tenure insecurity can be created due to lack of information and 
funds.  
 
When institutional connections are weak, people rely on personal contacts. The 
employees of the local land office and CRIF affirmed being in contact with some private 
operators and regional officers for information. These are people in Antsirabe who used 
to work for the technical operator of MCA or for the regional coordination unit. They 
pass by the local land offices if they are going to the field for other matters, but mainly 
check the procedures and book-keeping ensuring that rules are respected and details up-
to-date. They consequently continue to act as intermediaries, even though this is no 
longer their institutional role (Olivier de Sardan 1995). 
 
6.2.1.5. Uncertain future   
 
Section 6.1.1. outlined how donors and technical experts see the local land offices as 
nodes for local development and sustainability. Such plans are, however, invisible and 
unrealistic in Ankazomiriotra. The municipal actors did not express any vision for the 
local land office, nor proactivity in policy implementation. This could have included 
estimating the potential number of future applications for certificates, showing 
willingness to revise the prices of certificates in line with the expectations of farmers, 
planning awareness-raising activities and foreseeing modifications to certificates.47 
Rather, the office is standing there, with its physical equipment deteriorating.48 Its 
employee works on a day-to-day basis handling ad hoc demands for certification. The 
neighbouring office of the CRIF, in turn, is usually closed, mobilising its resources when 
it is time to digitise certificates. The computers are covered in dust and the printers have 
stopped working. There are delays in the payment of salaries by the OPCI due to internal 
disagreements persisting since the previous municipal elections (see also Bidou et al. 
2008 on the challenges of OPCI).  
 
In this situation, both the local land office and CRIF hope for new funding that could 
render their practices more dynamic. While nothing concrete had been signed by the end 
                                                 
47 However, since opening the office, only 14 changes have been registered to the certificates, representing 
a minor workload and source of revenue. 
48 At my last visit in November 2017, the office desk (funded by MCA in 2008) had also just broken. 
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of 2017, the influence of the World Bank CASEF project, for instance, could be felt 
through the advancement of some pending matters, such as the updating of databases 
and clearance of backlogs. Moreover, some training programmes were running again in 
the region, benefitting employees not formed under the MCA project. Finally, the 
employees have started to refer to local land use plans and taxation approaches in their 
narratives without having, however, a clear idea what they entail.  
 
This discussion of the operations of the local land office in Ankazomiriotra underlines 
discrepancies between the plans elaborated in Antananarivo and the realities on the 
ground. Policy-makers may set requirements that the local land offices are not capable 
of meeting. In Ankazomiriotra, working with digital material and expanding its 
responsibilities beyond ad hoc certification remains a distant vision. The example of 
Ankazomiriotra also shows the futility of setting up offices, operations and 
communication mechanisms based on the assistance of technical operators and donor 
funding. In this light, the criticism of some proponents in regard to the project-led 
character of the policy implementation is valid. Finally, the case of Ankazomiriotra 
demonstrates the pitfalls of decentralised approaches where responsibilities are 
transferred to local government, but this is not followed by the transfer of resources (Le 
Bris and Paulais 2007) or mechanisms of supervision. More sustainable institutional 
structures are needed to prevent local land offices working on their own and responding 
ad hoc to outside ideas and practices. 
 
6.2.2. Issuing certificates  
 
6.2.2.1. Sporadic certification with local adaptations 
 
Between opening in 2008 and December 2017, the local land office delivered 728 
certificates.49 The price of a certificate is defined by the area of the parcel, starting at 
24,000 Ariary for one hectare and an additional 3,000 Ariary for administrative costs. 
The price increases at a rate of 10,000 Ariary for each additional hectare, and ten hectares 
is the maximum one can certify in Ankazomiriotra. Farmers were asked to pay 24,000 
                                                 
49 The statistics provided by the local land office and the CRIF on the number of certificates delivered in 
Ankazomiriotra do not match. I refer here to figures communicated by the employee of the local land 
office. The certificates are allocated by parcel and not by person. One person can have several certificates. 
Therefore, the number of beneficiaries is lower than the number of certificates allocated. 
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Ariary at the beginning of the procedure and the rest at the end. The office noted seasonal 
variations in applications. Farmers complete applications after the harvest season when 
they have money to cover the fees. For instance, during the first twenty days in April 
2016, there were twelve demands, with only a couple in December 2015.  
 
The applications mainly concern parcels less than one hectare. They target irrigated rice 
fields in the bas fond that are most valuable and where tensions exist between 
neighbours. They also focus on housing and agricultural parcels in urban and peri-urban 
areas of the municipality, where land use change is the quickest. Indeed, most of the 
applications were received from the fokontanys around the municipal centre. There are 
three fokontanys where there have been no demands, all located on the periphery of the 
municipality.  
 
Some local translations of the official procedures can be perceived. In fact, the local land 
office requests farmers to include petits papiers in their applications, even though this is 
not required by law. Similar cases have also been observed by Burnod, Andrianirina et 
al. (2014) nationally and by Boué (2013) in Faratsiho. The practice entails that farmers 
procure a petit papier from the chiefs of fokontany before applying for a certificate, 
which then represents extra costs.50 The practice also reinforces concepts of a property 
ladder where a petit papier is a prerequisite for a certificate.  
 
The existence of these local adaptations can be explained by a couple of factors. First, I 
find that for the local land office, the petits papiers serve as initial proofs and historic 
records of land-holding. Boué (2013) has also argued that petits papiers represent a pre-
local recognition, diminishing the likelihood of conflict during the certification process. 
Such avoidance of conflict was also perceptible in the operational strategies of the local 
land office in Ankazomiriotra, where responsibility for conflict resolution was delegated 
to the chiefs of fokontany and village elders. Second, I conclude that the practice stems 
from a willingness to keep cordial relationships between the local land office and the 
chiefs of fokontany. It ensures the existence of the petits papiers as a practice and 
guarantees continued responsibilities and revenue streams for the chiefs (see also 
Burnod, Andrianirina et al. 2014).  
                                                 
50 The chiefs of fokontany reported that the cost of the petit papier is around 5,000 Ariary. 
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These examples show how bureaucratic (local land office) and socially embedded (petits 
papiers managed by chiefs) institutions merge their strategies to maintain social 
consensus and solidarity (Cleaver 2003). An institutional bricolage exists in which land 
administration practices ‘are borrowed or constructed from existing institutions, styles 
of thinking and sanctioned social relationships’ (Cleaver 2003, p.16).  
 
This bricolage brings together a number of actors and demonstrates how complex it can 
be to introduce changes that modify authority relations. In the example of 
Ankazomiriotra, the local land office plays the role of development agents that are 
supposed to advance the dominant policy narrative, but they also defend their own 
interests and mediate between local interest groups (Olivier de Sardan 1995). This means 
accepting the authority of the chiefs of fokontany and the value of the petits papiers, 
integrating them into the certification process. By doing so, the dominant policy 
narrative is implemented without major friction. The chiefs of fokontany then act as self-
declared brokers in addition to their more institutional roles as members of the local 
recognition commission. In Ankazomiriotra, they underscore this by handling petits 
papiers, coordinating demands for certificates and voluntarily disseminating official 
messages. This role has consolidated their position at the level of the fokontany (they are 
the first interface for farmers with the statutory land administration) but also at the level 
of the municipality (they have become an integral part of the certification process) (see 
Olivier de Sardan 1995; Bierschenk et al. 2000; Mosse 2005). The chiefs of fokontany 
have consequently kept their responsibilities by finding ways to adapt official practices 
for their benefit. This example from Ankazomiriotra finally demonstrates that the 
fokontany remains the most meaningful level of action for local land administration and 
management, and the choice of officially allocating all responsibilities to municipalities 
can be questioned (see Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux 2004; and discussion in 5.3.3.)  
 
6.2.2.2. Grouped certification process 
 
Everyday certification is based on a sporadic approach, but at the beginning Kara-Tany 
Malaky operations were undertaken in four fokontanys. After the two central fokontanys 
of the municipality, these are places where most of the demands have been made for 
certificates. The local land office received some 400 demands during the Kara-Tany 
Malaky process. The applications were handled and digitised by the technical operator 
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of the MCA project. Of these, the local land office has issued 230 certificates, meaning 
that 170 are still pending.  
 
The Kara-Tany Malaky process promoted certificates for farmers at a discount (15,000 
Ariary for a parcel of one hectare) for a limited period. Some chiefs of fokontany found 
that the process was rushed, making it difficult for farmers to gather the documents 
needed for an application.  
Because it was an order from... here it came from... the delegate of the commune. 
The communal delegate receives orders from the land services that everyone must 
make the certificate, and everyone rushed to do so. 
Interview with a chief (FOK007), 31.05.2016 
Also, even with the discount, farmers felt that the fees were too high, demonstrating that 
the perception of farmers regarding the prices differ from the concepts of the proponents 
of the dominant policy narrative, who promoted certificates as a cheap way to access 
statutory land administration. In reality, the certificates still remain out of reach for most 
farmers. 
 
It is perceptible from the interviews that the Kara-Tany Malaky created frustration 
among the municipal actors, chiefs of fokontany and farmers. After the withdrawal of 
MCA, the municipality was left with pending applications. However, it has not agreed 
to pay the difference between the price of the normal certificate and the Kara-Tany 
Malaky, and the farmers do not wish to pay higher fees either (they should cover an 
additional 12,000 Ariary as they have already paid 15,000 Ariary). As underlined in 
Chapter 7, this situation is likely to create a negative reputation for certificates and 
damage the motivation of farmers to make further applications. Yet, the local land office 
and the municipality did not seem aware of the loss of credibility, nor did they show 
determination to resolve the pending cases. Hence backlogs remain, and farmers are 
impatient to receive their certificates. 
 
The Kara-Tany Malaky process is yet another example of the limits of project and result-
based practices. The actions were rushed and there was no thought given to institutional 
sustainability. With the withdrawal of donors, all activities ended and the municipality 
and the chiefs of fokontany as the local actors were left alone to deal with the 
consequences.  
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6.2.2.3. Local recognition with limited ability to deal with power plays 
 
The work of the local recognition commission is the most concrete step of the 
certification process. Under the law, its purpose is to allow competing claims to be 
reviewed and mediated by a committee constituted of a representative of the 
municipality, the chiefs of the fokontany and the elders of the village in which parcels 
are located (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2006). The process brings together the owner 
of the parcel and all neighbours of the adjacent parcels. The employee of the local land 
office plays an administrative role and does not, for instance, take part in conflict 
resolution.  
 
Local recognition is supposed to be the moment when the social, cultural and power 
relations influencing the sources of and conditions for tenure security are dealt with. It 
builds on practices undertaken when signing petits papiers. The proponents thus view it 
as a local social process in which reciprocity is created between neighbours: if I am 
present for my neighbour, my neighbour is also more inclined to testify for me. It is not 
without risks, however. Local recognition can lead to situations where neighbours only 
testify in favour of each other. Some neighbours could also build a strong front, 
excluding people who are afraid to step forward and testify against them. The social 
process has also taken on some administrative characteristics. In fact, local recognition 
results in the elaboration of minutes of meetings, which are important for retracing the 
legitimacy of rights holders (Observatoire du Foncier 2007). The Land Observatory 
(2007) qualifies these minutes as the masterpiece of the whole certification process, used 
to resolve contentious cases. Yet, if power imbalances exist during the process the views 
of the dominant actors alone end up being recorded.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
I observed three local recognition processes (Appendix 7). These were straightforward 
events. They gave a feeling of theatre, rather than being a moment for mediating 
differences. In the first two cases, local recognition seemed to be conducted out of 
obligation. The parties walked the borders, took measurements and completed 
paperwork. No other importance was given to the process. The third case was supposed 
to be more contentious; indeed, the local land office mentioned that some unresolved 
issues existed between the neighbours, but the parties tried to negotiate the case prior to 
the meeting. On the ground the process followed the same procedures as above, 
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suggesting that the disagreements had been resolved elsewhere, but it is not clear how 
this was done. It also reinforces the position of the local land office as unwilling to 
engage in disputes. Local recognition thus confirms pre-agreed cases without being a 
true moment for dealing with the cultural, social and power relations influencing tenure 
security. 
 
The examples from Ankazomiriotra suggest that the local recognition process and the 
steps taken behind the scenes are not exempt from power dynamics. For instance, in 
interviews one farmer laconically expressed how the certification process had been 
executed quickly and orchestrated by the local land office. Another farmer said that there 
had been many people demanding a certificate, sometimes under pressure:  
They took the shape of the plots. They put them in a big notebook. They... each 
wrote his name and certificates were issued 
Interview with a farmer (PEA010), 03.06.2016  
Also, the parties supposed to be involved in the process are not always present. In the 
observed cases, only one neighbour was present at each time. The local land office also 
mentioned that some neighbours might live far away or were difficult to reach, and extra 
costs might be required to ensure their participation. These could fall onto the applicant. 
Indeed, in one of the observed cases money changed hands to cover transport and meal 
costs of all the participants.  
 
The rapidity with which the local recognition process is conducted depends also on the 
location of the parcel. The local land office finds it uncomfortable to go to the furthest 
away fokontanys, which might require an hour on a motorbike and a couple of hours of 
walking. Therefore, the office tries to group the local recognition processes of these 
fokontanys. Considering the small number of applications, someone making a demand 
might have to wait a while before recognition takes place. Similar logic was seen in the 
work of some agricultural services that avoided the most remote fokontanys due to lack 
of access and problems of insecurity. This indicates that the ‘development’ endeavours 
focus around fokontanys conveniently reachable from the main road RN 34. This leads 
to what Chambers (1980) call roadside bias, in which development action follows main 
communication axes and does not reach out to more remote areas, thus failing to reach 
the poorest segments of the society.  
 
 
176 
 
6.2.3. Challenges in using the local land occupancy status maps 
 
The local land office in Ankazomiriotra is a so-called paper office. It works on the paper 
images of the orthophotos, draws parcel delineations on them, and provides sketches to 
the CRIF to be digitised and included in the PLOF. The baseline maps of these PLOFs 
have been prepared by the deconcentrated office of the state land service in 
Antsirabe/Betafo or previous external technical operators. They are supposed to conduct 
an inventory of the existing topographical maps, cadastral plans, and titles, digitise and 
vectorise the information, and insert georeferenced details. These provide information 
layers that are superimposed onto orthophotos to constitute a full PLOF. When the CRIF 
digitises information, it allocates an identification number to each parcel and links it 
with information on the tenure right holder.  
 
The local land office and the CRIF have faced some challenges in using the tool. First, 
the orthophotos were purchased under the MCA project and reflect the situation in 2006. 
These photos have not been renewed, implying that inconsistencies might occur between 
the situation on the photo and on the ground. This potentially concerns the peri-urban 
areas where land use change is rapid. Second, the office has also lost some paper 
versions of the orthophotos, or some images have heavy cloud-cover, rendering the 
visualisation of spatial information complex. Third, the weakest link in the use of the 
PLOF is the lack of coordination with the deconcentrated office of the state land service. 
The first update between the databases was made only in June/July 2017. In the 
meantime, the CRIF had one version of the PLOF and the state land service another. The 
databases were not coordinated with latest details on the allocated titles and certificates. 
In terms of land administration, this is a recipe for disaster as the databases are 
incompatible with each other. The local PLOF also becomes vulnerable to the loss of 
information if it is not safeguarded elsewhere.  
 
The PLOF is therefore fragile due to the operational difficulties and weak institutional 
linkages. The fragility of the PLOF calls into question its ability to act as the key 
technological solution through which land is administered – a role given to it by both 
proponents and opponents at the national level. This fragility also questions the legal 
and administrative security of the certificates, which can quickly become void if they do 
not reflect the situation on the ground. There is a risk that titles, cadastre areas and 
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certificates overlap. Without a back-up copy, the destruction of the PLOF (on desktop 
computer and CDs) could also mean the loss of all digital information. Only a copy of 
the certificate would remain with the land holder, and paper notes in the parcel register 
(if up-to-date and intact). This means that the administration is vulnerable, and its 
fragility could be easily misused, for instance, for corruption. These sources of tenure 
insecurity demonstrate the importance of following convened procedures when tenure 
security has become a legal and administrative matter, as in the case of the Malagasy 
land policy. 
 
 
6.3. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the dominant policy narrative was 
operationalised and rendered technical by the creation of a new municipal statutory land 
administration that combines decentralised ideals, previous national experiences and 
existing local social processes (see Li 2007). In practice, policy implementation became 
a question of opening local land offices in municipalities, issuing certificates on demand 
to farmers and managing information management systems (PLOFs). For the 
proponents, the number of offices opened, certificates allocated, and hectares covered 
were quantitative indicators of success. These were physical demonstrations of the 
presence of the dominant policy narrative on the ground in the face of opposition from 
the state land service. To further maintain their position, the proponents foresee the local 
land offices as nodes for local development around which a set of new activities of land 
administration and management can be created. 
 
I find that the technical practices set in place enforce the legal and administrative 
conceptions of tenure security within the dominant policy narrative. A certificate issued 
by a municipal authority through local recognition processes and backed up by an 
information management system and book-keeping procedures is considered secure. 
The example of Ankazomiriotra underlines, however, that these processes need to be 
governed and managed to guarantee legal and administrative security on a sustainable 
basis. Otherwise, they risk creating new sources of tenure insecurity stemming, for 
instance, from the lack of safeguarding and updating information, power abuses and lost 
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public trust in the system. This would then mean that the policy reduces rather than 
procures security, especially if does not effectively address the authority, political, social 
and cultural sources of and conditions for tenure security.  
 
During policy implementation, a set of new practices emerged, responding to wider 
objectives of land tenure as a basis for development. They shift attention away from the 
core practices of the dominant policy narrative by paying less attention to certification 
as a solution for recognition and registering legitimate tenure rights. These are novel or 
recycled ideas and solutions proposed both by proponents and opponents to counter 
implementation challenges and consolidate their positions. They contribute to what Li 
(2007) calls managing failures and reassembling where compromises are planned, and 
existing discourses are used for new ends and meanings of key terms are transposed 
from one context to another. Under the influence of these emerging activities, I argue 
that the policy is becoming a laboratory of practices without a coherent plan for securing 
tenure.  
 
The analysis of the institutional policy implementation shows that it has faults typical of 
decentralisation. First, the municipalities were drawn into the process by donors without 
a democratic demand for a new land administration (Larson and Ribot 2004). Second, 
the creation of municipal land administrations has not been followed by a proper transfer 
of resources from the central level to the municipalities (Le Bris and Paulais 2007). 
Instead, local land offices need to bear the consequences of the project-led 
implementation of the policy and the resistance of the state land service. The former has 
meant direct cuts in support and supervision after 2009 and the latter has been translated 
into a lack of collaboration and data-sharing from the outset. Third, the local land offices 
have not reduced administration, but added a new layer to it (Le Bris and Paulais 2007). 
Indeed, local translations of the policy implementation have entailed keeping up with 
the authority of the chiefs of fokontanys and guaranteeing an administrative value for 
the petits papiers, and the resistance of the state land service to power transfers has 
maintained the institutional position of the titling system (Larson and Ribot 2004). The 
party who loses out in this scenario is the farmer, who needs to pay to move from one 
rung of the property ladder to the next. The next chapter explores policy implementation 
from the perspective of farmers.  
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7. Land policy facing a local context: the example of 
Ankazomiriotra 
 
 
In this chapter, I pursue the ‘studying through’ of the policy process by examining how 
the dominant policy narrative fits with local conceptions of tenure security and practices 
of securing tenure, as well as investigating interactions between farmers and the policy 
(Keeley and Scoones 2003; Wedel and Feldman 2005). In doing so, I respond to all three 
research questions from the perspective of farmers. I engage with a literature on the 
politics of land (e.g. Shipton and Goheen 1992; Berry 1997; Peters 2004 and 2009; Sikor 
and Lund 2009), the forms, spaces and levels of power (e.g. Rowlands 1995; Gaventa 
2006) and development interventions (e.g. Olivier de Sardan 1995) to explain local 
dynamics at the interface of the dominant policy narrative. I also refer to two quantitative 
studies throughout the chapter: Boué (2013), which examines the establishment of a 
local land office and the allocation of certificates in the municipality of Faratsiho in 
Vakinankaratra; and a survey coordinated by Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014) on the 
perception of tenure security in nine municipalities of Madagascar that were part of the 
policy implementation. I couple their quantitative survey results with qualitative 
findings drawn from personal observations and interviews conducted with farmers and 
local administrators in Ankazomiriotra.  
 
I demonstrate a lack of connection between national and local levels. Farmers have 
weakly subscribed to the dominant policy narrative, questioning the added value of the 
certificates, which they place between titles and local practices of petits papiers. This is 
due to the relatively high cost of the certificates, but also lack of awareness of the 
certification process, doubts about its purpose and the presence of more pressing 
development priorities. I find that it is the well-off farmers who have financial capital 
and the ability to plan who are more likely to make demands and thus benefit from 
statutory recognition. I also show that the certification process has not been able to 
address some of the inherent power dynamisms, nor deal with the authority, social and 
cultural relations generating sources of tenure insecurity, especially for the most 
vulnerable segments of the society.  
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I begin by examining the dominant scenarios of tenure insecurity in Ankazomiriotra and 
local means of securing tenure. Together, these enable a grasp of the concepts and 
practices of tenure security among farmers in Ankazomiriotra and analyse their 
correspondence with the dominant policy narrative. I finish by analysing the awareness 
of farmers of the certification process, their motivation to apply for a certificate and the 
value of certificates.  
 
 
7.1. Scenarios of tenure (in)security  
 
The sources of and conditions for tenure (in)security in Ankazomiriotra are linked to 
intra-family tensions, conflict between neighbours, insecurities in market transactions 
and some external threats. The socio-economic, cultural and power positions of farmers 
(either inside the family, between neighbours or among the community) influence tenure 
security. This indicates that a wider set of issues are at play than the conflicts and 
external threats presented as problems in the dominant policy narrative. I consider 
various scenarios of tenure (in)security to understand local concepts and analysing their 
fit with the dominant policy narrative.   
 
7.1.1. Intra-family tensions 
 
I explained in Chapter 4 that inheritance is one of the main means of accessing land, 
however, the process is not necessarily secure. Indeed, farmers underscored in 
interviews that families had a tendency to postpone the processing of inheritance 
between siblings after the death of parents. This was to avoid any tension in a situation 
where the parents had not clearly defined the rules of tenure and decided who will hold 
what. Older children might have received land as gifts from their parents while the 
younger ones were still living and working in the family home. The older siblings might 
thus claim the donated parcels even though not officially inherited, and dispute any 
redistribution. Such a situation might furthermore undermine the position of younger 
offspring in accessing the best land. As told by one farmer, inheritance can create 
inequality between siblings:  
 
181 
 
In the family, there are seniors and younger ones. The seniors have many more 
advantages than younger ones, and that influences their standard of living after the 
parents' death. Those who have more land want to get richer and those who have 
no means can do nothing. If there is a property to be shared equally, the seniors 
impose their decision. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA049), 25.10.2016 
 
These tensions might stay latent until a sibling demands, for instance, the certification 
or sale of a parcel. These processes require formalising the inheritance, which might 
have been based on oral agreements and established practices on the ground. One heir 
might then proceed without informing the others. This creates conflict or generates 
tenure insecurity for the buyer if the other heirs also claim the parcels.  
 
Women are placed in an insecure situation during inheritance and divorce, under both 
statutory law and in practices on the ground. The inheritance law foresees that in the 
absence of a testament, spouses do not inherit from one another as a priority. Rather, the 
surviving party is considered in eighth position for inheritance after the cousins of the 
deceased, but before the state (Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 1968). This applies to both 
men and women (ibid.). The law also claims that women can receive their part of 
inheritance in money (rather than in land or other forms) (ibid.). The law on marriage 
(Repoblikan’i Madagasikara 2007) states that the husband is the chief of the family. This 
places women in a secondary position even though the law also notes that in the case of 
divorce common goods are shared between the spouses, while individual goods are not 
(e.g. land donated by parents to their daughter). However, practices observed in the 
Highlands indicate that common goods are usually divided into three parts, with the 
husband receiving 2/3 of the property and the wife 1/3 (Omrane 2008). The death of the 
husband or the dissolution of the marriage can thus be sources of tenure insecurity for a 
woman if she is not recognised as the right-holder of land appropriated by the couple, 
has lost access to her parents’ land and/or cannot return to her family of origin. She 
might become landless and see her rights overridden by her children or her husband’s 
siblings and cousins.  
 
The story of Lalao is indicative of the hardship women can suffer in terms of the 
recognition of land rights during and after a marriage. The practices pursued in her case 
followed custom rather than statutory law, demonstrating how women’s tenure rights 
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are conditioned by social relations within families (Jackson 2003; Whitehead and 
Tsikata 2003; Rao 2017).  
Lalao is a woman in her mid-thirties originally from a middle-income, well-
connected family. She got married in her early twenties and moved to her husband’s 
village some five kilometres away. The families have a double knot as Lalao’s sister 
is married to her husband’s brother.  
 Together with her husband, Lalao built a house and grew some crops. The land 
was registered in the fokontany under the name of her husband. One day the 
husband had sold some parts of the land without asking her consent. The couple 
divorced after some ten years of marriage. Lalao moved back to live with her 
parents who were kind enough to host her. She is also cultivating land that her 
parents donated to her. These pieces of land are some 1.5 hours walk away from 
home. 
 After the divorce, she was only able to take some furniture. Everything else – 
the house and parcels – remained with her husband. However, with the help of her 
family, she could claim monetary compensation. They did not ask for a part of the 
house or the land, to keep good relations with her husband’s family, as her sister 
was still linked to it. 
Extracts of Lalao’s story were collected when conducting interviews with her 
family in December 2017. 
 
What I want to demonstrate here is that families are not harmonious units or exempt 
from power plays. Social differences exist, and pressure can be put on family members 
and their tenure rights questioned (Berry 1997). A lot thus depends of the quality of 
relationships. If tensions and misunderstandings emerge, some members might see their 
parcels taken away or their rights contested, placing them in a situation of insecurity. 
Siblings who have moved away from the zone (absentee owners), children who have not 
been officially recognised as descendants of their parents, younger siblings and divorced 
or widowed women are particularly vulnerable.  
 
7.1.2. Disputes between neighbours 
 
In addition to intra-family tensions, conflicts between neighbours are common, affecting 
tenure security. Farmers explained that these disputes are often about encroaching onto 
the land of a neighbour, little by little at the edges of a parcel. They are about disputes 
over borders and changing the boundaries of the parcels that end up diminishing the 
overall area.  
People who are likely to grab the land are not the outsiders but the neighbours. [...] 
If it is well delineated, even if people install contours they always exceed the limits. 
That is what people are afraid of […] neighbours who go beyond the limits. And if 
at the beginning one has a parcel like this, the area gradually decreases. 
Interview with a farmer (FOK006), 13.05.2016 
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These conflicts concern both the bas-fond and tanety. Especially on the more fertile bas-
fond, each square metre counts and opportunities to increase the surface of parcels are 
taken, for instance, by moving the canals that serve as boundaries. Farmers confirmed 
that parcels most at risk are those confined between others, which risk being gradually 
encroached upon from both sides. The parcels on tanety are more open and their borders 
less visible, thus easier targets for larger-scale encroachments. Such conflicts can be 
related to opportunistic behaviour and the use of power over others in a hidden manner 
(Gaventa 2006). In the example below, a wealthy person is observed registering parcels 
of poorer farmers in his name:  
Some people have no money and others have money and they silently register the 
land in their name, because the plots are adjacent, and they show evidence that the 
plots belong to them. 
Intervention in Focus Group discussion, 02.06.2016 
 
These behaviours can also occur if intra-family tensions have rendered a person 
vulnerable. Farmers mentioned that a neighbour can see an opportunity for an 
encroachment when an inheritance is pending and thus there is a lack of clarity over the 
legitimate holder. Other vulnerable moments occur when land is sold or certified. A 
farmer gave an example in which an owner had not informed neighbours of his intentions 
to sell and had included in the selling agreement parts of the neighbours’ parcels. The 
case had been revealed only when the new owner started to use those pieces of land. 
Another example concerned a case where a seller had exaggerated the borders of the 
parcels. The error came to light when the neighbours wanted to certify the land and had 
to clear up the misunderstandings during the local recognition process.  
 
The feeling of insecurity vis-à-vis neighbours can furthermore increase if parcels are 
located at a distance from the homestead and/or have been recently acquired. This 
suggest that the social knowledge that enables a farmer to confirm and protect rights is 
weaker and farmers might not have established trusting relationships with their 
neighbours, serving as a guarantee of rights (Shipton and Goheen 1992; Berry 1997; 
Goodwin 2013). Indeed, in such situations Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014) noted that 
land holders are scared that only few people can confirm their rights and that their 
neighbours have more facility in changing the borders and claiming land. A certain 
mistrust towards neighbours thus persisted.  
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Overall, farmers remarked that conflict over the parcel delimitations occurred when 
pressure on land increased. When less land was available for clearing in the agricultural 
frontier zone of Ankazomiriotra, farmers’ attention was focused on existing parcels, 
tracks of land between parcels and any open space that could possibly be used. This and 
the above observations suggest that conflicts between neighbours are related to disputes 
over small areas of land. Farmers did not fear that all their land would be appropriated 
by their neighbours unless their neighbours were the most powerful members of the local 
community.  
 
7.1.3. Lack of trust in market transactions 
 
In Chapter 4, I explained that land is mainly transacted among family members, friends 
and trusted acquaintances (see also Bellemare 2012). This is to ensure a certain trust in 
the transaction process and to guarantee that land of sentimental value remains in good 
hands. The question of security hence emerges as a key point. As Palmer (1996) argues, 
security in land markets concern both parties in a transaction (seller and buyer; landlord 
and tenant). Both seek to ensure the trustworthiness of the other party and guarantee 
their ability to adhere to the contract (Palmer 1996), as can be seen in a couple of ways 
in Ankazomiriotra. 
 
First, farmers indicated that the current owner needs to ensure sufficient economic 
compensation for the land. This entails assessing the reputation and wealth of the 
potential buyer/renter, for instance, by considering the number of zebus, other animals 
and valuables that can be turned into money. The process is explained by a farmer:  
It depends on what society thinks of you. For example, if a person is considering 
selling a parcel of land, he calculates how many zebus I have, 2 or 4, and informs me 
that he will sell his plot if I have the means to buy it. If I am interested, I sell my 
zebus and buy it. Or if there are other livestock such as pigs or agricultural products. 
That is how people can buy land. 
Interview with a farmer (FOK002), 29.04.2016 
 
The rental market is slightly more complicated. In general, the importance of finding an 
honest and economically viable tenant (ideally, a family member, friend or someone 
recommended by them) still stands (Bellemare 2012). What counts the most is the 
knowledge over rights as explained by farmers in Ankazomiriotra. A dispute could occur 
if the owner was an absentee and not well known locally. There is a risk that the tenant 
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gradually gains local legitimacy and claims ownership of the land. Farmers clarified that 
to minimise this type of risk and maintain control of one’s land, leases are kept short 
(two to three years, maximum five years).  
 
On the other hand, those farmers relying on tenancy agreements for their subsistence are 
in a vulnerable socio-economic position. As the rental contracts are short, tenants are 
forced to change parcels after a couple of seasons. This restricts the choice of crops and 
might dissuade the tenants from improving the land. Feelings of injustice might be 
created when the owner takes back the land and does not provide compensation for extra 
work. One farmer, however, challenged this overarching logic. As a tenant, he made 
improvements to the land to enhance his yields and to prove his commitment to the 
owner, building up his social reputation as a responsible tenant and strengthening his 
social legitimacy (see also Broegaard 2005).    
You should not rent the plot and just cultivate it, but maintenance is not to be 
ignored. Because if you rent a plot and you have not maintained it there will be no 
other people who want to rent his plots for you. But if you take care of it, people 
will not hesitate to rent you his land because they have seen that you maintain the 
plots, so it is win-win. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA039), 22.06.2016 
 
Second, the buyer/tenant needs to ensure that the seller/landlord is the legitimate and/or 
legal holder of the parcel to avoid any subsequent conflict. The interviewed farmers 
frequently described confusing selling processes. An owner might sell the same parcel 
twice; an heir might sell land without the consent of siblings; parents might sell land 
without informing their children. These scenarios place the new owner/tenant in an 
insecure position, as other parties might contest newly-acquired rights (see also Burnod, 
Andrianirina et al. 2014).  
 
7.1.4. External threats 
 
I established in section 5.1.3. how external threats have been used in problem framing 
at the national level, with farmers portrayed as potential victims. In terms of 
Ankazomiriotra, there were no outside operators that would have created major 
conflict.51 Nevertheless, some well-informed farmers were aware of potential threats of 
                                                 
51 Only the Groupe Star, the main beverage company in Madagascar based in Antsirabe, sought 
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outsiders or the state expropriating land for investment purposes. They were not able to 
put forward concrete examples, but had heard stories from neighbours, acquaintances, 
radio or television.  
 
In more concrete terms, state officials, civil servants, urban people and wealthier outside 
farmers were perceived as actors who could contest locally legitimate tenure rights. 
Farmers were afraid that these actors could access land using institutional contacts and 
knowledge, passing through the state land service and requesting a title regardless of the 
parcels being used by local farmers. The power imbalances existing between the parties 
represented a threat.   
But sometimes people from the city do stupid things, they arrive and settle like that. 
People in the countryside are really afraid, they are afraid of the offices and nobody 
will dare contradict people from the city. They will let them do whatever they want. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA057), 01.11.2016 
 
7.1.5. Local social relations and power plays 
 
The above scenarios confirm that properties are established, and tenure security is sought 
in social relations and networks (Shipton and Goheen 1992; Broegaard 2005; Goodwin 
2013). People continuously interact, negotiate and defend their positions, building 
common understandings of tenure among families, neighbours and communities (Rose 
1994; Fortmann 1995; Berry 1997). However, these are not harmonious, nor 
homogenous groups. As Olivier de Sardan (1995) notes, multiple divisions exist in rural 
African societies that are linked to the status of people, competition over means of 
production, power plays and rivalries both formal and informal. Some farmers are then 
better placed than others to access land, secure tenure locally and respond to outside 
threats. Specifically, socio-economic status, length of presence in the zone, gender, age 
and tenancy situation impact tenure security (Berry 1997; Peters 2004 and 2009).  
 
These social interactions indeed hide major power imbalances. The powerful can affect 
the powerless, exercising their influence in visible and invisible ways and exploiting 
others’ vulnerabilities. The powerful can also draw from networks and outside contacts 
to enhance their position (Rowlands 1995; Gaventa 2006). For example, Blanc-Pamard 
                                                 
collaborations to grow barley during the off season in 2016. In Marogoaika, two farmers had responded 
to the offer, while others preferred not to enter into contractual arrangements. There is a planned ZIA in a 
neighbouring municipality of Vasiana. 
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and Fauroux (2004) talk of a ‘participatory illusion’ in community management of 
natural resources in Western Madagascar. On the surface, everyone is given the right to 
speak, but behind the scenes the elders and the most powerful (for instance, 
representatives of the original lineages of the village, rich land- and cattle-owners) retain 
power over final decisions. Similarly, they find that in the participatory gatherings core 
issues are not tackled, in order to avoid visible confrontation (ibid.). Evers (2013) 
concurs that it is the local power holders and tompon-tany (‘masters of the land’ – those 
who have cleared land first for cultivation and gained local legitimacy) who hold 
decision-making power over land and are seen as the ‘sovereign prerogative’ by others 
(p.129). An interviewed farmer eloquently expressed that he feels secure thanks to his 
influential position in the local community. While he was originally a migrant, he 
acquired local recognition by being involved in village affairs and a local association. 
He qualified himself as a grande personne (someone who is respected). He also 
underlined having contacts in town from whom he can seek advice and assistance. Poor, 
illiterate farmers might find themselves in a much weaker position, finding it challenging 
to access land because of the prices and guarantees demanded, struggling to deal with 
official procedures and being vulnerable to dishonest practices. 
 
I argue that these social and power dynamics are not fully considered by the 2005 and 
2015 LPFs, nor by the certification process on the ground. I demonstrate this through 
examples of women and the local recognition process. First, the national discourses of 
proponents encourage women to certify their land and add their names to certificates 
regarding land belonging to a couple to enhance their tenure security. However, Widman 
(2014) has observed that while women have applied for certificates on their own land, 
in the case of the common land certificates have rather strengthened the position of the 
primary right-holders (men as the statutory and customary heads of the household). One 
reason for this was expressed by a farmer in Ankazomiriotra: a common certificate 
would question the unity of the couple. Indeed, Widman (2014) has observed similar 
behaviour where joint certificates were seen as undermining the authority of the 
husband. Jackson (2003) argued that joint titles might be taken as signs of distrust in a 
marriage. This indicates that the certification of common properties does not necessarily 
benefit women. Nevertheless, it does protect the couple as unit against the outside in the 
case of external disputes, provided the marriage is not dissolved (Widman 2014). 
Second, the dominant policy narrative sees the local recognition commissions as places 
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to handle local differences. However, the experience of Ankazomiriotra demonstrates 
that these are often for show, with disputes dealt with elsewhere, if at all. Evers (2013) 
also notes how local recognition processes might be captured by local power-holders, 
who might prefer testifying in favour of their fellows. She adds that ‘others in the village 
might also be reluctant to oppose such claims if they wish to keep on living in the village’ 
(ibid., p.131). Consequently, the process ‘might contribute towards elite appropriation 
of the system and trigger deeper divisions with communities’ (ibid., p.133). Power 
imbalances behind the local means of managing tenure relations and resolving conflicts 
can thus benefit the most powerful segments of the society and do not address inherent 
inequalities in social position. These can further tip the certification process towards the 
more powerful (Evers 2013). The question then is whose tenure security policies aim to 
protect, against what, and how. 
 
 
7.2. Customary practices of securing tenure 
 
One of the problem framings of the dominant policy narrative was the existence of 
‘massive demand’ for securing tenure, based on people seeking written recognition of 
their land holdings by signing petits papiers. Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014) found 
that some 83.8 percent of households relied only on petits papiers or tax receipts as 
proofs of ownership; 8.2 percent had made a demand for a certificate; 8 percent did not 
have any formal proofs thus relying on local social recognition; and 0.9 percent had 
made a demand for a title.52 In other words, some 91.8 percent of people trusted locally 
sourced tenure security (petits papiers and local recognition) and 9.1 percent had sought 
statutory recognition (Burnod, Andrianirina et al. 2014). I examine these customary 
practices of securing tenure here before analysing the motivation of farmers to adhere to 
the policy in the following section.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 These are the figures given by the survey of Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014). However, when adding 
them up a total percentage of 100.9 is given. This is probably because people who had asked for a title 
had also asked for a certificate. 
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7.2.1. Appropriation and use of land visible in space 
 
Ankazomiriotra used to be an agricultural frontier zone (Raison 1984). Today most of 
the land has been appropriated by individuals or households (Razafimahatratra et al. 
2017) and the parcel structure has become clearly visible on the ground. The fact of 
labouring the soil is then considered as a sign of appropriation that others should respect:  
If you grow it, it is because it is yours. You cannot farm on land that is not yours 
unless you rent it out, we cannot work or cultivate other's land. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA020), 07.06.2016 
In addition, some farmers use markers to signal their presence and delineate parcels 
(Image 7.1.). Fences and hedges are used to protect parcels from roads, tracks and 
pathways. On tanety, the markers can be trees growing at the extremities of the parcels 
and hay sticks placed on fallow land. They can be lines drawn on the ground with a 
plough, or hay, vetiver, sorghum and sisal growing on the borders, or rocks placed in the 
corners. Markers can also be placed at the centre of the parcel: something visible from 
far, like a hay stick at the middle of field of groundnuts. The plantation of trees is 
furthermore a way of reinforcing one’s presence. On bas-fond, the parcels are usually 
delineated by irrigation canals and terraces. People also grow sugar cane, banana trees 
and other fruit trees, and at the extremities of the parcels these can serve as boundary 
markers.   
For example, two neighbouring parcels, one is ours and the other belongs to the 
neighbour, there is a canal that separates them. The neighbour does not dare to enter 
mine and I would not dare to cross the limit, each one occupies his plot even if 
people are not brothers and sisters. The neighbour does not dare trample my parcel 
and I will not dare trample his. The channel is the limit. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA019), 07.06.2016 
 
Image 7.1. Parcel structure visible in space 
The border delimitations bring 
physical clarity and might facilitate 
everyday farming practices. 
However, for many farmers they are 
just an add-in. The real difference is 
social recognition and knowledge of 
who holds what and where, as well as 
associated cultural and social norms 
that ensure knowledge is valued. The 
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rights of the first cultivators and their heirs are particularly respected (Evers 2013) and 
they can control the access of others to land (Raison 1984). In such contexts, the tomb 
of the ancestors becomes the concrete sign of family authenticity (Evers 2013) and 
belonging to a place guarantees security and continuity (Boué 2013). Families are thus 
starting to transfer tombs from their regions of origin to Ankazomiriotra as markers of 
long-term presence. 
 
7.2.2. Social knowledge as guarantee of tenure rights 
 
Social knowledge is gradually built on the tenure rights of the first arrivals and the more 
recent migrants as well as on subsequent transactions. This knowledge is maintained and 
passed on inside families, between elders and from one chief of fokontany to another. 
Farmers mentioned that the knowledge of the holders of parcels is as common as 
information on the owners of houses. The role played by the elders is explained by one 
farmer: 
The chief of fokontany is an elder in the village, he lived with others who are 
already dead. He is a referee in the village because he saw the history of the parcels 
in the village. Mr X cultivated on this land, it is his. We have not yet talked about 
the official papers, but the words of the elders are not to be discussed, it is they who 
say that it really belongs to X or it does not belong to X but to Mr Y.  
Interview with a farmer (PEA034), 20.06.2016 
 
Farmers call upon the elders and chiefs of fokontany if someone is contesting their 
presence, but also when parcels change hands. The elders and chiefs might invite family 
members and neighbours to join in to provide additional testimony. Together they agree 
on the owners, characteristics and limits of each parcel. The process can lead to signing 
petits papiers by the chiefs of fokontany. Observations and interviews indicate that a 
distribution of responsibilities existed between the elders and the chiefs. In fact, the 
chiefs, especially younger ones, explained allowing elders to find solutions, while they 
prefer to act as facilitators in the mediation process. 
 
In numerical terms, local conflict resolution mechanisms seem to work. The chief of one 
of the target fokontanys confirmed that some 95 percent of conflicts are solved locally 
and amicably. If the conflict is not resolved, it is passed up to the municipal council and 
the mayor, and the gendarmerie might be involved in the case of suspected criminal acts. 
As discussed earlier (section 6.2.2.3.), the local land office tends to stay out of these 
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cases. As a final recourse, conflicts are transferred to the court in Antsirabe. Farmers felt 
that the court is only for people with connections and money who are able to go through 
administrative processes and pay fees.  
 
Nonetheless, local society also evolves, changing the cultural and social basis on which 
tenure relations have been established. Some elderly people were preoccupied by the 
lack of trust among families, neighbours and community members. For them, the 
solidarity and confidence on which social relations had relied on was fading away. For 
them, the fact of writing written contracts such as petits papiers was a concrete 
demonstration of this lack of trust.  
 
7.2.3. Writing down holdings and transactions: the practice of petits papiers 
 
Petits papiers are recurrent in Ankazomiriotra. Farmers explained that the physical 
presence on the ground (especially as regards the most distant parcels) and oral 
knowledge were not enough to guarantee security. Farmers preferred signed agreements 
because they considered paper proofs as more tangible. One chief expressed this by a 
proverb: “Words fly but the written stays”. According to farmers, written contracts are 
means to manage the scenarios of tenure insecurity that are linked to betrayal, dishonest 
practices and the risk that one of the parties denies the existence of a transaction.  
The first reason for making acts of purchase is the change in people's mentality and 
the current situation where there is no longer absolute confidence, some even deny 
a sale. That is a reason and we have to make an act with witnesses and it goes to 
the fokontany. Another reason is that sometimes it is land belonging to another 
person that someone sells, if it is simply oral or secret, and not necessary in the eyes 
of the society, the buyer may lose his money, he will farm and the real owner will 
show up. When it is written and passed on to the leaders, people can confirm that 
it really belongs to him. 
Intervention in a Focus Group discussion, 02.06.2016 
 
Three different type of petits papiers exist in Ankazomiriotra: act of purchase or lease, 
act of inheritance and an attestation of the use of land. The practice draws on existing 
social knowledge. Together, neighbours, elders, the chief of fokontany and other people 
enumerate on paper the parcels concerned in a transaction; describe their characteristics 
such as the estimated length, width and use; provide indications on borders; name the 
neighbours; record the identities of right-holders; and state the period of rental if 
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relevant. These pieces of information seem important for the interviewed farmers – they 
are tangible, descriptive and relevant. 
First, the family and grandparents know the land delimited by the children. And 
then we make a list at the sale, when you buy land, the dimensions are mentioned: 
100m long and the width is as follows. And there are witnesses on the side of the 
seller and the buyer. We make the bill of sale, but it is not printed, and we go 
through the committee, the quartier mobile [responsible for security issues], the 
president and so on. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA024), 10.06.2016 
  
The petits papiers are furthermore signed off by the chiefs of fokontany or by the chief 
of the arrondissement. This guarantee was valued by farmers and is shown via a red 
stamp on the petits papiers. The documents are most often produced in three copies: one 
for the chief of fokontany and/or arrondissement (depending on the authority of the 
signatory), one for the current owner and one for the buyer. The process costs 3 percent 
of the value of the parcel when the papers are signed by the fokontany and 14 percent 
when signed by the arrondissement. They can be kept in a registry in the fokontany or 
arrondissement. However, to keep their validity, these registries need updating on the 
initiative of the holder of the parcel.  
 
Some chiefs of fokontany considered that the local registries would be sufficient to keep 
track of transactions and land-holdings, and thus secure tenure locally in addition to 
social knowledge. They found it problematic, however, that these registries have not 
been valued by the state. For them, this lack of recognition can cause tenure insecurity 
if more powerful and connected people claim parcels regardless of the existence of petits 
papiers, as expressed by one chief: “a simple paper does not stand against the power of 
money”. Consequently, they would like to see local registries given proper legal value 
so that these could serve as reference points.  
 
I have demonstrated above that the customary practices of securing tenure focus on 
confirming existing situations on the ground, establishing common shared knowledge 
on tenure, mediating differences, removing opportunities for dishonesty and seeking 
more tangible paper proofs of land-holdings. These practices bring together different 
authorities with a diversity of power. Starting from the families, men hold power as the 
heads of the household. In village communities, first arrivals are respected, and elders 
are regarded as sources of social knowledge and authority. The elders give some space 
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to chiefs of fokontany with the practice of petits papiers, facilitation of social relations 
and distribution of information. The chiefs are solicited to provide additional guarantees 
as local representatives of the state (Omrane 2008). These authorities retain power, and 
can use it to confirm their tenure, or to empower others through the mediation of 
differences and facilitation of access to land. Therefore, the practices of securing tenure 
alone do not remove the inherent power dynamisms and social variety that create sources 
of and conditions for tenure (in)security, but rather the way in which power is used by 
these authorities. The certificate then brings along a new set of authorities without, 
however, removing the socio-economic and power imbalances between farmers. 
 
 
7.3. Farmers’ participation in the certification process   
 
The dominant policy narrative thus enters a local context were land has important 
economic, social and cultural value; differences in socio-economic position impact 
access to land; tenure security is predominantly a question of authority, social, cultural 
and power relations among families, between neighbours and inside communities; and 
securing tenure relies on customary practices. These factors influence how farmers have 
responded to and participated in the certification process that introduced local land 
offices as new authorities in managing land. The next sections discuss the differences 
that exist in farmers’ awareness of the certificates and their motivation to apply for one.  
 
7.3.1. Differences in awareness of local land office and certification process  
 
There are differing levels of awareness about the existence of the local land office and 
the details of the certification process. The survey of nine municipalities in Madagascar 
found that 72 percent of households were aware that their municipality had a local land 
office, but knowledge of prices, legal value and designated holders of the certificates 
varied, particularly in terms of having visited the office (22%), having applied for a 
certificate (8.2%) or possessing one (6.2%) (Burnod, Andrianirina et al. 2014). Based 
on my observations, I have identified three configurations in the awareness of farmers 
that apply to all three fokontanys (and six villages) included in the research.  
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The most knowledgeable were farmers in households identified as high and middle-
income (see section 4.3.3.2.). Some of them had also applied for or already had a 
certificate.53 They are senior members of local society and often engaged in fokontany 
or municipal politics. In interviews, they were able to describe the details of the 
certification process and enumerate the perceived advantages or disadvantages of having 
a certificate. Some of them told their stories to me in a schoolbook official manner, as if 
responding to an exam question and wanted to affirm their knowledge. They were 
described by local administrators as ‘civilised’ farmers, educated and aware of the 
municipal actions. The farmers themselves considered people aware of such 
administrative processes were those living in urbanised areas (for instance the centre of 
Ankazomiriotra) with easy access to information sources (TV, radio, municipal offices, 
other services).  
In the countryside, people are not aware of things but in the city centre because they 
watch TV, they know that it is necessary to certify the land. Besides in the 
countryside, we can say that we are in the countryside, it is those who have studied 
who know that land must be certified, but those who have not studied have nothing 
to do with that. They know nothing, even entering offices frightens them. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA003), 04.04.2016 
 
There were also farmers with some knowledge of the process, but who had not applied 
for a certificate. They were able to express opinions on the certificates but did not show 
a current interest in applying for one. These could be both farmers belonging to middle 
and low-income households. There were finally farmers without knowledge about the 
local land office or the certificates (roughly a third of the interviewees). As with the 
survey results of Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014), these were often the low-income 
farmers, the youngest ones or those with less education. These people attend to everyday 
survival rather than administrative matters; they do not have land that could be claimed 
as theirs own; they might be illiterate; and rarely visit the municipal centre to receive 
information on administrative matters.  
 
The survey results furthermore found that almost half of the households had heard about 
the local land office through its employees (44.4%). Other means of information had 
been family members and neighbours (22.2%), mayors (20.3%), radio and newspapers 
(12%), state land service (0.6%) and other means (0.5%) (Burnod, Andrianirina et al. 
                                                 
53 Some 13.7 percent of all interviewed farmers had a certificate. 
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2014). People do not solely rely on official means of communication but conversations 
between family members and villagers play an important role in disseminating 
information and building an overall image of the local land offices and the certification 
process. In some cases, the messages were distorted in Ankazomiriotra as they were 
transmitted from one person to another. For instance, in the extract below, one farmer 
describes rumours about the certificates. It was not fully clear to her why the certification 
process had to be undertaken unless it was to reaffirm one’s holding in a situation where 
the older generation cannot guarantee it anymore.   
I heard a rumour from the municipality that the certificate exists. I asked why the 
land has to be certified, and people told me that they do not know either, but this 
way the land really belongs to you and the certificate is important for future 
generations. When there will be conflicts because the parents are no longer there 
and when the land is certified, there will be no one to say you do not know where 
you are [...] because the land is certified. That is what we heard from the 
municipality. And we, and I do not hide it, but we have not made it because the 
land is not yet in our name, it is as if we rent it, it is still in the name of his elder 
brother. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA018), 07.06.2016 
 
These disparities in awareness and the image of the certification process, moreover, 
influence farmers’ ability and motivation to participate. Next, I analyse reasons to 
demand a certificate, showing that high and medium-income households are most likely 
to follow the process.  
 
7.3.2. Reasons for making a demand for a certificate  
 
The survey of nine municipalities in Madagascar found that households most commonly 
demanded a certificate as protection against disputes and as a guarantee of transmission 
of land to children (Burnod, Andrianirina et al. 2014; see Table 7.1.). Widman (2014) 
also identified these as dominant reasons in the municipality of Soavinandriana in the 
region of Itasy. Some 8.2 percent of the households declared feelings of insecurity, the 
same percentage as those who had applied for a certificate (Burnod, Andrianirina et al. 
2014). The authors do not explain this relationship, and it remains unclear whether, for 
instance, the awareness-raising campaigns have affected people’s perception of tenure 
security and associated this with the certificates.   
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Table 7.1. Reasons to demand a certificate in nine municipalities of Madagascar54 
82.2% to be sure that nobody contests rights 
43.4% to secure the rights for children 
23.6% to secure parcel delimitations 
21.1% to end a conflict 
11.8% sensitised to the policy 
5.4% do not like one’s neighbour 
2.4% credit, investment, selling or renting 
Source: Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014)  
 
The research in Ankazomiriotra enables us to indicate some factors that motivate farmers 
to apply for a certificate, such as the opportunity to receive proof from the state that one 
was the incontestable holder of a parcel. The certificate was seen to procure a stronger 
legal position in the case of disputes. 
People trust that when it is certified it is official. They are confident. To our 
knowledge no one will dare touch this land if it is certified. [...] The certificate is 
much more valuable than the bill of sale because it is official, and it comes from 
above. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA 012), 04.06.2016 
 
To my knowledge, if two people argue over a parcel, automatically the one who 
does not have a certificate will lose because even if it happens, in court the 
certificate will prevail. If the state did it, it works. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA030), 14.06.2016 
 
The main motivation is the fear of land conflicts. Because if there are people who 
want to take over the land, the owners will not be able to do anything without an 
official proof of their ownership. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA 048), 08.07.2016 
 
Most often several motivations were associated together as indicated by the case of 
Bodo.  
Bodo is a woman in her mid-thirties living with her husband and three children 
close to the centre of Ankazomiriotra. She is engaged in commercial and 
agricultural activities and can be considered as being part of high-income 
households of the municipality. She had recently bought a parcel of land some two 
kilometres away from her home. She would like to raise pigs on the land. She had 
already made petits papiers on the transaction but found that the certificates 
provided a stronger assurance for her ownership of the parcel. She was worried that 
if she does not certify the land, someone can contest her presence, or the state can 
ultimately take the land back. With the certificate she sought to guarantee the 
transfer of the parcel to her children and ensure that they are recognised as owners 
later even if not living in the zone anymore.  
 She was very well informed of the certification process. She had already certified 
the housing plot, was thinking of asking for certificates on parcels on tanety as this 
had recently been re-authorised in the municipality and had a pending demand for 
a title. The demand for a title had been made in 2013 and coordinated by a private 
                                                 
54 Respondents were able to choose more than one option. 
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operator. She was still waiting for the final decision of the state land service. 
Ultimately, she would like to title the certified land as well. In her view, the title 
provides the strongest security.   
Extracts from an interview with Bodo (PEA003), 04.05.2016  
 
Compared to titles, farmers associated certificates with the proximity of services to 
home, quicker processes and cheaper procedures. These benefits were also highlighted 
by the proponents of the dominant policy narrative. Indeed, the titles would have cost 
farmers millions of Ariary with processes that might have remained uncompleted unless 
advanced with bribes.  
It takes several years [to title land] and requires millions of Ariary because the file 
is sent to Ambositra, comes back to Antsirabe and then it goes to Antananarivo and 
then they place the boundary marker. After that, it is totally secure. But if you do 
not boost it, it will not be over. But if you boost by giving money it is faster. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA002), 03.05.2016 
Therefore, some farmers, like Bodo in the above story, thought first of applying for a 
certificate and then seeking to transfer it into a title. They had an impression that passing 
by the certification process would be easier than asking for a title directly. However, 
according to the local land office, only 18 cases had come up by April 2016 where the 
holder of a certificate had requested to transform it into a title.  
 
Different rationales determined the choice of parcels to be certified, and these are 
strongly linked to perceived sources of tenure insecurity. Some farmers told of starting 
with larger parcels and leaving smaller ones for later, to maximise the added value of 
the certificates.55 Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014) also found that larger parcels are 
more likely to be certified. 
I have made efforts to certify medium sized plots but small areas I have not yet 
done because it requires money 
Interview with a farmer (PEA004), 01.06.2016  
Others based their decision on the mode of acquisition of the parcels, prioritising 
purchased parcels. Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014) also note that farmers prioritise 
certifying parcels that have been purchased, then those that have been inherited or 
claimed through rights of occupancy, and finally gifts. Boué (2013) had observed in 
Faratsiho that when the parcels had been purchased from someone outside the family 
circle, they were more likely to be certified. This indicates that there is greater social 
recognition and trust inside families, requiring less statutory recognition. Yet, when 
                                                 
55 The fees of certification in Ankazomiriotra were the same up to one hectare. 
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explored from another angle and as mentioned in section 7.1.1, family members might 
avoid formalising inheritance to avoid activating latent conflicts. Indeed, certification of 
tenure rights could be interpreted by other family members as an act of individualism, 
redefining intra-family relations and reducing options in terms of parcels and crops 
(Burnod, Andrianirina et al. 2014).  
 
Quantitative surveys found that farmers certify land that is most valuable in terms of 
food security and subsistence (Boué 2013; Burnod, Andrianirina et al. 2014). According 
to Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014), the perception of tenure insecurity was also highest 
on these parcels. For farmers in Ankazomiriotra, land is valued in terms of food 
production, cultural links and to guarantee the livelihood of future generations. Yet, 
economic value and paying for the certificate matter as well. According to the local land 
office, certificates were requested mainly for parcels in the bas-fond and those close to 
the centre (these have the highest economic value). The bas-fond parcels are also held 
by well-established middle-income and wealthy families. 
 
The decision to apply for a certificate is finally based on the distance at which the parcels 
were located from the homesteads to protect against encroachment from neighbours. 
This was, for instance, the case for Bodo, whose land was not close to home. She could 
not exercise direct control over it or develop extensive relationships with the neighbours 
to mitigate tenure insecurity and thus sought statutory guarantees. Boué (2013) also 
observed that land further away might be certified first to reinforce appropriation and 
avoid disputes. She also found that relations with neighbouring owners and conflicts 
were determinants of certifying parcels (ibid).  
 
These observations suggest that by certifying land, farmers aimed to mitigate some 
potential sources of tenure insecurity. The certification targeted parcels where tenure 
security was relatively low: those where continuous presence is not possible; those for 
which there is least social recognition; and those less guaranteed by trusting social 
relations. Farmers also targeted parcels where the potential losses are highest, either in 
terms of food security or economic value. Indeed, Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014) 
observed that the probability of feeling insecure increased when the food security value 
of the parcel increased; when it had been acquired through use or donation; or when the 
owners did not originate locally. This indicates some limits in the customary practices 
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to secure tenure, especially in cases where people are less integrated and engaged in the 
local community relations. The value of the certificate thus lies in the fact that it comes 
from an authority and can serve as protection against disputed claims (Sikor and Lund 
2009). However, some farmers also recognised that this security is relative. The state 
can always take back the land if it wishes, regardless of whether it is certified or not, but 
the certificate should at least increase the possibility of compensation.  
 
The interviews with farmers in Ankazomiriotra indicate that the demand for a certificate 
was not only based on a voluntary, rational choice to consolidate and secure one’s 
holding. There was a sense of obligation in the stories of some farmers where 
certification was felt to be imposed by the state, particularly in the fokontany that had 
taken part in the Kara-Tany Malaky process, where more consistent awareness-raising 
had been conducted. Farmers explained that municipal and fokontany leaders had asked 
them to apply for certificates and that otherwise they might risk losing their land if a 
dispute was raised:  
They said it is mandatory. The certificate is mandatory.  
Interview with a farmer (PEA012), 04.06.2016  
There were also rumours that outsiders or the state could appropriate non-certified land.  
I am afraid because in the countryside the land is very expensive and the agents at 
the local land office are raising awareness, the officers have said that it is a duty to 
make [an application for the] the certificate and that I must secure my land because 
we do not know what will happen afterwards, we must make [an application for] a 
certificate. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA004), 01.06.2016 
 
We do not [know] whether the state will take back the land or not, but it has put it 
in place and we do what it asks us to do because the land is the basis of our life 
and we must follow the instructions of the state. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA019), 07.06.2016 
 
Here and in the earlier story of Bodo, we can see that some farmers sought to certify the 
parcels to seek protection from the state. Bodo’s fear of state expropriation stemmed 
from a case where the former President Ravolamanana appropriated some land in the 
region for his own business, and from a more recent example presented in the media that 
land is required for investment.  
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They spread publicity that it is necessary to certify land and that what will not be 
certified will be taken away by the municipality. The President of the Republic has 
already taken, during the Ravalomanana regime, he took part of the land in this 
region. I heard on TVM [Television Madagascar] that they are going to take back 
200 hectares per province and that is why people want to certify the land. 
Interview with Bodo (PEA003), 04.05.2016 
Boué (2013) also observed in Faratsiho that there were rumours of the possibility of the 
state taking uncertified land. These rumours were linked to earlier experiences of state 
expropriation.  
 
Based on my experience in Ankazomiriotra, I argue that these fears not only stem from 
historic cases but also from the awareness-raising messages disseminated during the 
certification, encouraging farmers to certify land to protect themselves against probable 
outside threats without there being a concrete pressing need. By doing so, they had also 
created doubt about local social relations and customary practices of securing tenure. 
Hence, the way awareness-raising messages are interpreted can itself create a feeling of 
insecurity among some farmers:  
Since my arrival until now, there has been this trust, but recently they have said that 
we must certify the land, declare it, there will be people from outside who will 
arrive, but I think these are lies. But before, this confidence reigned but today this 
confidence decreases, and we start to make papers at the municipality and the state 
land service. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA035), 20.06.2016 
 
The increased feeling of insecurity can be interpreted as a side-effect of awareness-
raising. Following Olivier de Sardan (1995), it is about the inadaptability of the technico-
scientific knowledge of certification packaged in awareness-raising messages to local 
cultures and systems of meaning. The farmers then draw from these sets of knowledge 
and systems of meaning to make sense of the world and circumstances they are facing 
(ibid).  
 
If the awareness-raising campaigns conducted at the beginning represented a certain 
push factor towards the certification, the example provided by other farmers and the 
impact of early experiences should not be neglected either. A farmer who played a 
central role in a fokontany served as an example to others. He was among the first to 
apply for a certificate. Some farmers then followed his example, while others preferred 
to wait to evaluate the usefulness and the value for money of the certificates, especially 
if they had had previous negative experiences. 
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I became aware of it because I have responsibilities at the level of fokontany and 
there is this programme that the municipality has undertaken, and I have an 
obligation to do so.  
Interview with a farmer (PEA007), 01.06.2016 
 
I thought that was enough, but as they say we have to declare the parcels, certify 
them, they also say that even zebus and chickens are to be declared. What people 
do, I do too. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA035), 20.06.2016 
  
In general, people are reluctant because we no longer want to spend time and money 
when we get nothing, we prefer to wait. 
Interview with a farmer (FOK007), 31.05.2016 
There is thus a gradual distribution of the innovation from the forerunners, who are most 
often farmers from high or middle-income households. Regional actors argued that a 
‘watch and wait’ attitude has been a common strategy within the policy implementation.  
There are people who do not do it, but there are people who do. That is what 
Malagasys are, when there is a goal to reach, inside they want to do it, but they wait 
for other people to do it, if there are one or two or three people who give a model 
they all do it. [Laughs] 
Interview with a regional technical expert (ECOR002), 18.05.2016 
 
Sandron (2008) links this strategy to the notion of fihavanana, a system of rules, norms 
and customs that defines the dynamics of local societies, interpersonal relations and risk-
aversion strategies. For Fermigacci (2014), the fihavanana leaves little space for 
individuals’ free choice. It can thus slow the adaptation of innovations and participation 
in development projects, as people transfer the individual risk to the community 
(Sandron 2008). Therefore, in order not to harm to the community, a person might be 
scared of the novelty unless it has a guaranteed rate of success (Gannon and Sandron 
2003 in Sandron 2008). As we have seen earlier, this success has not been achieved with 
certification and thus farmers remain hesitant to enrol in the programme. I look at 
reasons for not demanding a certificate next.  
  
7.3.3. Reasons for not making a demand for a certificate  
 
The price of the certificate stands out as the main reason for not making an application 
in Ankazomiriotra as well as in the survey of Burnod, Andrianirina et al.’s (2014) (see 
Table 7.2.) on the nine municipalities in Madagascar, in Widman (2014) and in an earlier 
research of the Land Observatory (Observatoire du Foncier 2007). The proponents of 
the dominant policy narrative have spoken of the importance of choosing a suitable price 
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accessible to most farmers (see section 6.1.2.). Nevertheless, most farmers in 
Ankazomiriotra considered the applied fees to be unaffordable and impractical for small 
parcels, because the prices started at one hectare.56 This would have entailed, for 
instance, that a farmer with three non-adjacent demi-hectare parcels paying 24,000 
Ariary for each of them and 3,000 Ariary in administrative costs (81,000 Ariary in total). 
Some farmers spoke of having to sell a parcel to cover the certification fees for their 
remaining parcels. Hence, there is hardly any economic incentive to participate in the 
process unless farmers already have capital.  
 
Table 7.2. Reasons not to demand a certificate in nine municipalities of Madagascar 57 
56% lack of money 
19% lack of time 
16% little awareness about the local land office 
4% too complex procedures 
1% lack of confidence 
1% scared of property taxes 
3% other reasons 
Source: Burnod, Andrianirina et al. (2014)  
 
Because of the perceived high fee, farmers carefully weighed the value of the 
certificates. Some might have been more interested if the price was lower. For most of 
the farmers, a fee of around 10,000 Ariary for a parcel of one hectare would have been 
more acceptable. Farmers living in fokontanys that had participated in the Kara-Tany 
Malaky process also noted that the prices at the time (15,000 Ariary/hectare) were more 
attractive. When the process ended, unsurprisingly, very few additional demands for 
certificates were made at the new price.   
 
Some farmers had established strategies to pay for the certificates gradually. Sometimes 
applications were submitted, and local recognition commission work had taken place, 
but the applications were left uncompleted in the local land office because farmers could 
not pay the final fees. They might have to wait a couple of seasons before they had 
earned enough money. The first evaluation of the policy moreover suggested that 
farmers value the local recognition commission process and consider certificates 
redundant when the minutes of the commission meeting are already archived by the local 
                                                 
56 The fees were 24,000 Ariary for one hectare plus 3,000 Ariary in administrative costs, and 10,000 Ariary 
for each additional hectare. 
57 Respondents were able to choose more than one option. 
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land office (MoA 2008). According to this logic, there was no perceived added-value in 
editing the certificate when the necessary level of security appeared to have been 
achieved. This explanation was less common in Ankazomiriotra as by doing so farmers 
would pay a higher price for local recognition than when signing the petits papiers for 
the chief of fokontany (3% of the selling price), which includes a similar recognition 
process. The difference then lies in the minutes of the commission meeting and the 
higher-level authorities involved (local land office and municipal employees), which 
might procure a greater feeling of security.  
 
Considering that certificates are expensive for most farmers, they could become means 
of socio-economic differentiation. Only a few high or middle-income households 
voluntarily enrolled in the process and acquiring a certificate already required some 
effort at saving for middle-income households. The process is out of the reach of low-
income households, which represent the majority in Ankazomiriotra. Based on 
quantitative surveys, Boué (2013) found that households that had a certificate also 
possessed the largest rice fields, had most agricultural equipment, were working less as 
agricultural employees, were less engaged in small activities of service, were most often 
members of institutions of micro-finance, and had houses constructed with solid 
materials. These are the high- and to lesser extent medium-income households in 
Ankazomiriotra. Thus, certification is not benefitting the poorest households, but rather 
farmers who already hold a certain amount of capital, such as Bodo and her family. The 
certificate reinforces their social position and statutorily secures their land, generating 
further power imbalances: 
Farmers know them, but so far there are several who do not have a certificate. That 
is why there are still conflicts because there are people who have certificates 
because they have the means...because you cannot register your parcels and pay 
taxes if you do not have the money. While people do not yet have money to ask for 
the certificate or declare their parcels. This is the cause of the problems because 
there are people who have the means and dominate those who do not. 
Interview with a farmer (FOK008), 11.06.2016 
 
Some farmers moreover were hesitant about the process because of a lack of trust in the 
municipality and the state. They wondered whether certificates are yet another way to 
collect tax. Boué (2013) also found that some farmers in Faratsiho considered 
certification as a means for the municipality to reinforce tax collection and therefore 
were cautious. In general, there were feelings of disapproval and injustice towards 
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taxation measures in Ankazomiriotra. In discussions, farmers said that they pay all kinds 
of taxes58 for a minimal return. Most recently, they paid fees to cover security measures 
(charges to the gendarmerie, military and quartier-mobile), without any noticeable 
improvements. This made people lose confidence in municipal and state initiatives.  
 
Other farmers rightly questioned the sustainability of certificates. Based on experience 
of other policies, they were critical of state-led actions. Cynicism towards the state could 
be heard in their voices, as well as those in Faratsiho a couple of years earlier (Boué 
2013). Another factor that generated doubt was the operation of the local land office. In 
particular, farmers living in the fokontany that participated in the Kara-Tany Malaky 
process expressed reservations towards certificates. Either farmers were still waiting for 
their certificates or they had heard complaints from their neighbours:  
We already asked for a certificate, the parcels were measured, and we paid the 
money, I do not recall how much, it was in ...maybe in 2010. But so far nothing 
Interview with a farmer (PEA057), 01.11.2016  
Due to these pending applications, farmers were wary of making subsequent or first 
demands. They were also suspicious of the local land office, thinking that the Kara-Tany 
Malaky was just a way to collect money. A representative of local farmers’ organisation 
found that farmers were suspicious of certification because they were scared of the state 
expropriating their land in the process. He explained this was due to lack of clarity about 
the purposes of certification, some titling actions undertaken by the state land service on 
parcels, and a general fear of the state. Therefore, this fear of the state could work both 
in favour of making demands for the certificates (see section 7.3.2.) and against it.   
 
Finally, farmers in lower-income households, women or younger people showed a 
certain indifference towards the process, supporting the argument of Evers (2013) that 
those who found the least benefit from the certification were likely to doubt it the most. 
They could not see a use for certificates in situations where they managed land in short 
time-frames and did not possess permanent tenure rights. Their main concern was food 
security from one day to the next, rather than a certificate. Because of their socio-
economic situation, they did not have an opportunity to plan long-term.   
I do not know, not at all, and to be honest I did not care about […] the certificate 
and you understand we are farmers and, in the morning, we go to the fields to come 
back in the evening. It is always like that because life is really hard, even the green 
                                                 
58 For instance, the municipality collects taxes from the selling of poultry (500 Ariary /head), zebus, pigs, 
rice (5% of the selling price), etc. 
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leaves, if you do not grow them, you will not eat them. Right now, there are no 
more green leaves you can pick from the fields because the weather is dry. [...] 
Even the cassava leaves are gone. I did not think about the certificate at all, not at 
all. 
Interview with a farmer (PEA018), 07.06.2016 
 
The discussion of reasons or not to make an application indicates that farmers consider 
structural constraints and the extent of their agency (Cleaver 2003). As Cleaver (2003) 
would put it, they are both ‘conscious and unconscious social agents, deeply embedded 
in their cultural milieu but nonetheless capable of analysing and acting upon the 
circumstances that confront them’ (p.16). There is no single logic that explains their 
(non)participation in the certification process. Their rationales are influenced by a 
number of constraints, norms and ambiguities linked to local society (Olivier de Sardan 
1995). Based on the above, I find that these rationales have been incompletely 
considered by the dominant policy narrative. Above all, policy implementation has 
remained silent on the side effects of the policy (e.g. creating feelings of tenure 
insecurity due to awareness-raising) and the social consequences stemming from the 
differentiated access to the certificates. Certification does not benefit the poorest and 
most powerless segments of local society, but rather reinforces the position of socio-
economically powerful farmers, who are able to pay fees and control the local 
recognition processes (Evers 2013). In addition to customary ways of securing tenure, 
they can receive state-backed guarantee of their land-holding.  
 
7.3.4. Certificates between petits papiers and titles  
 
The weak priority allocated to certificates is understandable when tenure relations 
continue to be managed through local relations and practices (Andriamanalina et al. 
2014b) and when titles are considered the ultimate guarantees of security. Indeed, a 
conception of the ‘property ladder’ apparent in national debates also exists locally. The 
interviewed farmers recognised that the higher up the formal recognition of rights, the 
better it was. The petits papiers are the first step of formal recognition, followed by the 
certificate, and finally boundary-markers and titles.  
 
This property ladder combines different social and formal practices (Burnod, 
Andrianirina et al. 2014), reinforced by the local adaptation of the policy that requires 
farmers to have a petit papier for any certificate application (see section 6.2.2.1.). One 
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chief of a fokontany explained the importance of having a double guarantee: a socially 
localised one from the fokontany register, and a statutory one from the local land office. 
Hence, certificates are linked to a higher authority and guarantees against adverse 
claims, especially those coming from outside and/or unresolved through local relations. 
Farmers considered them more robust, which was embedded in the information the 
certificates contain and the process through which they are allocated. Indeed, in addition 
to the information on the petits papiers, certificates include a map locating the parcels 
in the surrounding area. Not only is this crucial for the operations of land administration, 
this aspect of visualisation and localisation was important for some farmers. For them, 
the map formalises arrangements agreed with neighbours and the local recognition 
commission. The farmers also appreciated the public display process in which the work 
of the local recognition commission is announced 15 days before and after the 
commission visits the field and there is an opportunity to appeal against the claims being 
made. For farmers, this was a way of gaining visibility for one’s demand and making it 
publicly known at municipal level.  
 
While in the eyes of the farmers, the certificates are more robust than the petits papiers 
they are not as desirable as titles and boundary-markers. In the imagination of many 
interviewed farmers across the wealth categories, titles and boundary-markers were 
considered the ultimate guarantees of security. There was a fascination with the 
boundary markers, the value of which lay in their materiality. For farmers, they were 
visual concrete proofs of ownership placed on the ground by the representatives of the 
state land service as the highest known authority of land administration. They are 
theoretically unassailable, indestructible and respected by the state. I suggest that the 
fascination with titles and boundary markers also related to their rarity. Indeed, they 
remain out of the reach of most farmers and are associated with wealthy urban people. 
This idea is enforced locally as the few people having titles and boundary-markers are 
those well connected with town and high-income households. Also, titles and boundary-
markers have a longer administrative history. Some farmers thus had a clearer 
understanding of them, while the more recent certificates remained confusing and 
elusive.  
 
These concepts indicate two matters in which the policy has not succeeded as initially 
planned. First, the certificates complement the petits papiers rather than replace them 
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(Boué and Colin 2018) as intended by the dominant policy narrative. Second, the 
changes in the national debate demonstrate that considering certificates as steps towards 
titles can simply lead to questioning their legitimacy rather than seeing them as fully-
fledged alternatives to titles (Observatoire du Foncier 2007). This makes it unclear as to 
whether there was a need yet for another system of administration of land, which faces 
institutional and operational challenges, has a disputed authority and reinforces socio-
economic and power disparities locally (Evers 2013; Boué and Colin 2018).  
 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the ‘massive demand’ for securing tenure predicted 
by the dominant policy narrative did not materialise in an extensive number of 
applications for certificates. This does not, however, mean that tenure insecurity is not 
an issue. Through the example of Ankazomiriotra, I have established that the sources of 
and conditions for tenure (in)security are intertwined with local power dynamics and 
linked to recognition by the authorities (Sikor and Lund 2009; Lund 2011), management 
of social relations (Shipton and Goheen 1992; Berry 1997; Peters 2004 and 2009; 
Goodwin 2013) and cultural belonging (Omrane 2008; Boué 2013; Evers 2013). The 
everyday politics of land are then played out inside families, between neighbours and 
among community members. Men as the heads of the households, first migrants and 
wealthy households are in a powerful position to secure their tenure, exercise power over 
others in social interaction and retain power in decision-making processes (see 
Rowlands 1995; Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux 2004; Evers 2013; Widman 2014). These 
power imbalances emerge as much in the customary practices of securing tenure as in 
the certification processes. Disparities in the ability of farmers to participate in securing 
tenure can furthermore reinforce differences between them. These investigations 
contribute to the literature on the politics of tenure, highlighting the necessity of 
understanding the dynamic perspectives of tenure relations in problem-framing, 
developing policies and implementing practices of securing tenure. 
 
The case of Ankazomiriotra moreover shows that the certification process has not 
corrected local inequalities. The certificates are rather known to serve high- and some 
middle-income households to enhance their presence on the ground and address sources 
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of tenure insecurity. Consequently, it is the most powerful that receive legal and 
administrative recognition of rights in the form of a certificate. These same households 
could have eventually made a demand for a title; decentralisation has simply brought 
statutory recognition closer to them (see Leeuwen 2017 on similar conclusions in 
Uganda). The certificates remain, however, out of reach of most farmers. In addition to 
inherent power dynamics, I argued that this is due to limits on participating in the process 
(for instance high costs), doubts about the purpose of certification and other, more 
pressing development priorities. Indeed, as remarked by the Land Observatory, people 
seek first general security and continuity in agricultural production before securing 
tenure (Observatoire du Foncier 2007). This then means that the risks pointed out by 
Dickerman et al. (1989) in regard to registration programmes are more likely. The 
authors stressed that sporadic registration processes in sub-Saharan Africa have 
increased inequalities compared to systematic ones and those who have been able to 
afford the costs of registration have been able to take advantage (Dickerman et al. 1989). 
Consequently, certificates in Ankazomiriotra do not seem to empower the most 
vulnerable segments of the society nor provide security for them. 
  
My investigations furthermore indicate that the dominant policy narrative has been 
transposed to the local level rather than emerging from the grassroots. The proponents 
tried to generate interest in the policy through awareness-raising, which in 
Ankazomiriotra predominantly took place during the Kara-Tany Malaky process. 
However, this generated confusion, feelings of obligation and fear of external or state 
appropriation of non-certified land:  
In general, people feel confident about their property rights, but when laws and 
reality are explained to them they are afraid. But in ignorance, they feel confident 
and it is when the problem arises that they no longer know what to do. 
Interview with a regional civil society actor (CSOR002), 04.11.2016 
 
A similar paradox was perceived by Leeuwen (2017) in Uganda, who notes that ‘the 
promotion of the state system to assure security of tenure also created feelings of tenure 
insecurity, by popularizing the notion that without a state-issued title, claims to land 
were insecure’ (p.219). This demonstrates that security is above all something perceived 
and messages disseminated around practices of securing tenure can have a negative 
impact. There is, then, a disparity between the knowledge of technical experts and the 
local systems of meaning (see Olivier de Sardan 1995). The former manufacture tenure 
insecurity as a problem and then sell certification as a remedy to the latter.  
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Finally, the farmers’ experiences of the certification process influenced their 
perceptions. When the purpose of certification remains unclear, the process faces 
institutional and operational challenges, and farmers wait a long time to receive their 
certificates, the overall feelings are frustration and suspicion. However, for a certificate 
to provide security, people need to believe in it. They need to trust the authority 
providing the certificate (municipality/state) and they need to value the certificate as a 
proof of property. Otherwise, the authority is weakened in its function to validate rights 
(see Sikor and Lund 2009) and the certificate becomes void in the eyes of the farmers, 
as yet another piece of paper filed in a drawer, as bluntly described by one farmer. 
Considering the challenges faced by the certificates, one can then question their political, 
institutional and social stability (Benjaminssen et al. 2008), especially in a context where 
a property ladder exists in the minds of local and national actors. In the next chapter, I 
consider some of the interests that explain the continuous support of the dominant policy 
narrative against all odds and also the power plays around it. 
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8. Politics behind the policy: Power plays around the dominant 
policy narrative  
 
 
The previous chapters have shown how the policy was established around a dominant 
policy narrative of recognising and registering legitimate tenure rights by decentralised 
authorities, operationalised through a myriad of concentre actions and technical 
solutions. The example of Ankazomiriotra suggests, however, that implementation has 
faced challenges due to institutional and operational difficulties, and lower uptake of the 
policy by farmers than expected. Moreover, I have indicated that the dominant policy 
narrative has not been unilaterally accepted within the national policy sphere, nor has it 
been homogenous in its composition.  
 
In this chapter, I focus on the power dynamics around the policy, to respond to the third 
research question that asks what interactions exist between actors and around which 
interests. I demonstrate how actors have formed and maintained two assemblages 
(proponents and opponents). I underscore the means of power used by these assemblages 
explicitly referring to the three axes conceived by Gaventa (2006): forms (visible, 
hidden, invisible), spaces (closed, invited, claimed) and levels (global, national, local). 
I also highlight power shifts that have appeared during the policy implementation 
(Keeley and Scoones 2003; Hathaway 2016). These two sides are not unified networks 
of actors. Interaction and brokerage take place between them, divergent ideas and 
practices have emerged inside them, and similar means of power are used by them to 
influence policy conceptions and practices (Long 1992c; Olivier de Sardan 1995; Allen 
2011; Kumar 2014; Li 2014).  
 
The analysis is based on semi-structured interviews conducted with international and 
national actors, event ethnography in the national policy arena, and analysis of policy 
documents. The interviews inform attitudes and strategies actors have towards the 
policy, the observations decrypt the overall dynamics between actors, and policy 
documents provide details of what was said at key points in time.  
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I consider the policy in its national dimension, as it played out in Antananarivo from its 
elaboration in 2005 to its consolidation in 2015. I start by exploring the dynamics that 
enabled the policy to emerge and gain force, attending to the agency of the proponents. 
I continue by analysing the growing resistance of the state land service and the political 
changes that weakened policy implementation. I finish by examining the most recent 
power plays during the consolidation of the policy and any attempts at mediation and 
brokering.  
 
 
8.1. Building support for the dominant policy narrative: proponents 
 
As established in chapter 5, the development and early implementation of the land policy 
was possible thanks to the political will and engagement of the Minister of Agriculture 
Harison. He became aware of tenure challenges through the advocacy of CSOs, 
developed more detailed ideas with a handful of international and national technical 
experts, and set the institutional basis for policy implementation in the form of the 
coordination unit. The technical experts then drafted the core orientations that constitute 
the dominant policy narrative, financially supported by donors. The interviewees 
underscore the crucial role played by this group of actors in ensuring that the policy 
emerged, gained support and persisted in the face of resistance from the state land 
service. They form the core of the proponents. The next sections explore the interactions 
between and power of these actors.  
 
8.1.1. Civil society claiming spaces for debate and mediating between levels  
 
The interviewed civil society actors portrayed themselves as the initiators and 
consolidators of the policy. As initiators, CSOs, such as Fert and Fifata, had played a 
brokering role helping farmers access titles and the state land service to improve its 
practices. Dissatisfied with the results, they brought their observations on the ‘tenure 
crisis’, ‘massive demand’ for securing tenure and external threats to the national policy 
arena, asking for change alongside other civil society organisations. A concrete 
demonstration of this ‘claiming of the space’ and ‘power with’ gained through 
collaboration (Gaventa 2006) was the organisation of a national meeting to discuss 
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tenure security and rural development in Antananarivo in 2003, also attended by Prime 
Minister Sylla, Minister Harison, and representatives of the state land service, tribunals 
and chiefs of regions. It is notable is that the initial demands of the CSOs focused on the 
access of farmers to titles. As explained earlier, they did not question the paradigm of 
titles as such, but rather sought to remedy the existing system; only later in the policy 
implementation did they align behind the decentralisation and certification approaches 
of the dominant policy narrative.  
 
The early engagement of the CSOs pushed forward the creation of a national umbrella 
organisation on land tenure called SIF (Solidarité des intervenants sur le foncier) that 
has found power within its cooperation mechanism between global, national and local 
influences (see Gaventa 2006). During the policy implementation, SIF has become a key 
interlocuter for the coordination unit and donors when they wish to link with farmers on 
the ground. SIF is equally associated with international networks. Its creation was 
supported by Fert and later it became part of the International Land Coalition (ILC).59 
In addition to receiving regular support (e.g. training and exchange of information)60 the 
connection to international networks has served to gain credibility. Several civil society 
actors made it clear that communication backed up by international organisations (for 
instance the ILC) is more likely to be considered by the government and the state land 
service than communication solely made by national CSOs. These actors also found that 
they can generate pressure more effectively by referring to global frameworks, best 
practice and indicators that should speak to governments.  
 
Yet, there is a fine line to be observed if decision-makers are to remain open for CSO 
initiated debate, advocacy and international influence. For example, the ILC has 
encouraged policy debate under its National Engagement Strategies (NES) programme. 
The idea has been to set up and strengthen multi-stakeholder platforms as well as 
establish joint strategies for people-centred land governance.61 However, while policy 
proponents and coordination unit have shown openness towards the civil society, the 
                                                 
59 ILC is an international umbrella organisation, bringing together CSOs, NGOs and IGOs. 
60 Training has been offered on conflict mediation, lobbying and policy processes, among other things.  
Information has been exchanged, for instance, with Benin and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which 
have both been interested in the Malagasy experience. 
61 People-centred land governance is the ‘slogan’ of ILC. See: http://www.landcoalition.org/en/national-
engagement-strategies. 
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state land service has been less receptive. Indeed, the Malagasy civil society 
interviewees reported difficulties in bringing core actors together, as the state land 
service had not considered them legitimate parties to set up platforms and facilitate 
debate. Questions thus remain in terms of finding a suitable place in the national arena. 
 
The legitimacy of civil society actors can also be questioned in terms of the grass-roots 
they claim to represent. In fact, while some members of the CSOs are farmers from rural 
areas, others are ‘experts’ with university degrees living in the capital, rather than the 
direct voices of these geographical and social spaces. These experts master the political, 
legal and administrative languages of the national policy sphere and their knowledge of 
rural areas has been gained through field projects over the years. At best, they can be 
considered intermediaries acting between levels where they try to translate policy ideas 
into local languages and practices, and furthermore bringing experiences from the 
ground to the policy sphere (see Olivier de Sardan 1995).  
 
From the early claiming of space for debate, the CSOs have gradually gained standing 
as awareness raisers, solution seekers and watchdogs over the land policy 
implementation. Their role in the current policy scene was synthetized by one technical 
expert as follows: 
The first point is awareness raising with a view of facilitating the implementation 
of the land tenure security project [...], its awareness raising. The second point is 
the search for solutions to various problems that pass to the local level in terms of 
tenure security or securing tenure. Because these are civil societies, they will have 
access to the population. So, to the different problems they have already applied 
different measures, they can propose solutions to these problems. And the third, is 
that if there are really problems they find that are not normal and that are the fault 
of this or that institution or structure, they will organise advocacy. 
Interview with a national technical expert (FTECHN002), 01.12.2016 
 
While the CSOs collaborate with the coordination unit and donors, they maintain some 
independence in decision-making regarding partnerships they wish to enter. For 
instance, they consider whether the collaborations fit with their underlying interests and 
image, whether the policy implementers and donors seek CSO collaboration only to 
satisfy participatory requirements or whether real leverage for action is possible. For 
example, the SIF was hesitant in accepting 10,000 USD funding from the 53 million 
USD World Bank CASEF project in 2016. There were tensions over the visions of 
agricultural development, the intentions for CSO participation and the level of CSO 
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funding. Sometimes, however, Malagasy CSOs conform with donor requirements, but 
under the surface they spend money on their own priorities as well (Duffy 2006). These 
points are evident in the extract below: 
So, when we make projects, we try to see, does this project allow us to speak freely, 
to challenge, to influence, to advocate. Does it limit us to certain things, to a number 
of things? If it is really very limited, we do not commit to it. It is an internal strategy. 
But there are the projects that we will execute as such. And then, if it allows us to 
do anything else, that is fine. 
Interview with a national civil society actor (CSON007), 25.11.2016 
 
This overview suggests that the CSOs claimed the space for debate and are now acting 
as intermediaries in the wider assemblage of proponents (policy-makers, technical 
experts, donors etc.). My take is that the CSOs have co-opted the conceptions and 
practices of the dominant policy narrative, paving the way for change in the 
administration of land and making it more accessible to farmers. While they operate 
under some structural constraints within the assemblage of proponents (Cleaver 2003), 
they do seem to have agency of their own that enables them to question, for instance, 
the dominant visions of agricultural investment or the conditions for collaboration.   
 
8.1.2. Political will, determination for change and engagement in policy 
implementation  
 
Political will, determination for change and engagement in the policy implementation 
process were underscored by proponents as important factors in the emergence of the 
land policy. These elements are associated with the actions of the Minister Harison. First, 
he was receptive to the observations made by the CSOs and technical experts who had 
claimed space for debate. He also acknowledged having been personally touched by the 
difficulties farmers faced in accessing titles. Indeed, he spoke of the first title he signed 
as a Minister, which involved meeting the farmer himself.62 The application took twenty 
years to complete. The farmer cried when receiving his title and was touched by the 
Minister’s attention. In the words of the Minister, this experience convinced him to look 
for solutions nationally, first within the state land service and then through policy 
reform.  
 
                                                 
62 Under the old system, titles were signed at the highest administrative and decision-making levels. 
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Second, the Minister set up the technical committee for the elaboration of the policy. 
This brought together international and national members both from inside and outside 
the state land service, and also opened up to a wider audience during consultation. 
Nevertheless, this policy space gradually shrank due to the open conceptual differences 
between its members (see Gaventa 2006). As widely admitted by the interviewees, a 
handful of experts ended up drafting the 2005 LPF and the framework law behind the 
scenes (Lukes 2005). The existing CSO and donor projects then served these experts as 
means to pilot and roll out activities (see Appendix 2).  
 
Third, the Minister resisted the pressure against the policy change. According to him, 
the labour unions of the state land service were against the policy from the outset, 
organising several strikes to demonstrate their opposition. The Minister visibly imposed 
his political will (Gaventa 2006) and confirmed that he had given a clear message to the 
state land service: either you are with us for the change, or you need to step down.  
 
Fourth, the Minister engaged in policy implementation. This included ensuring 
government backing of the policy in a context where President Ravalomanana was 
promoting large-scale investment in agriculture. He also created an administrative 
coordination unit for policy implementation within the state land service. This strong 
ministerial backing lasted until 2007 when Minister Harison stepped down, and it 
declined markedly during the political transition period (2009-2013) where the new 
government sought to distance itself from the policies of its predecessor. A national actor 
mentioned that during the transition period the land policy was trademarked as being of 
the old political regime, assisted by the USA. Thus, with these political changes, the 
power relations between the proponents and opponents have also shifted.  
  
8.1.3. Donors driving policy implementation  
 
When the 2005 LPF started to take form, the international and national experts, together 
with the coordination unit and Minister Harison, secured funding from some twelve 
donors (Teyssier et al. 2009). These funds were directed towards both the modernisation 
of the land administration as well as for decentralisation and certification. Even though 
the donors are part of the wider assemblage of proponents, some friction emerged with 
technical experts and CSOs. In fact, the donors, especially MCA as the largest funder, 
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quickly started to drive the policy implementation process (Table 8.1). For some 
proponents, this meant that the coordination unit lost its grip over the conception of 
strategies and overall implementation of the policy. It rather served the purposes of the 
donors that had power to decide which actions were funded and where (Gaventa 2006). 
In other words, donors started to take up functions otherwise carried out by state 
institutions (such as the coordination unit) and these functions were realised according 
to the needs of the donors (Corson 2016). For some proponents, the orchestration of the 
policy implementation by donors was thus a sign of the weakness of the government.  
If we have a government, if we have a national program, I think we can negotiate 
by saying that we need this, and we want to run it like this. You walk, or you do not 
walk. It is like bilateral agreements. 
Interview with a national civil society actor (CSON003), 11.10.2016 
 
Table 8.1. Some examples of a donor-driven process as described by interviewees 
- The donors channelled their support to their own projects rather than contributing to 
an overall basket fund of the coordination unit. When money was designated to cover 
the operational expenses of the coordination unit, these funds were (and continue to 
be) earmarked for employees responsible for serving the interest of the donor.  
- Each donor had its own requirements and procedures in terms of monitoring and 
reporting, which the coordination unit needs to respect.  
- The donors decided the regions in which their projects were located. These are often 
the regions in the Highlands, relatively close to Antananarivo and easily accessible.   
- The donors created new institutions and used these for their own implementation and 
monitoring purposes, such as the regional coordination units of the PNF and the Land 
Observatory. The Land Observatory has nevertheless widened its responsibilities 
over the years from simple monitoring and evaluation to analysing wider changes in 
the land sector.  
- The donors outsourced their project activities to technical operators who at times took 
over the responsibilities of the local land offices and the state land service.  
- Locally, the policy is associated with donors and their technical operators rather than 
the coordination unit (Observatoire du Foncier 2007). This is also visible, for 
instance, in Ankazomiriotra where the local land office still has MCA posters 
displayed on the walls. 
Sources: Interviews 
 
Losing decision-making power to external actors has been described by some 
proponents as an element of fragility in the policy. For them, policy implementation 
became donor-dependent, responding to a logic of projects rather than long-term 
development. This fragility was visible after the withdrawal of donors in 2009, which 
weakened the operation of the national coordination unit, its regional units and local 
land offices.  
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Nevertheless, the involvement of donors has enabled the policy to receive global 
attention. In particular, the donor-supported Land Observatory has been the international 
window of the policy, in addition to the coordination unit and the SIF. Their 
representatives have translated the successes and challenges of the policy for 
international audiences, for instance, in the Annual Land Policy Conference of the World 
Bank, in the meetings of the French technical committee on land tenure and 
development, and in the consultation and awareness raising meetings on the Voluntary 
Guidelines. The Land Observatory also coordinated the World Bank’s LGAF exercise 
in Madagascar. Furthermore, the Malagasy example has served for donors as a 
francophone African model on decentralisation and certification, as expressed by an 
international actor.  
I think that given the scale of the policy and the support of the donors, twelve donors 
around the table anyway, given the amount of money placed inside, the massive 
aspect of the policy, yes, it was clearly a textbook case.  
Interview with an international technical expert (ORGINT001), 19.09.2016 
 
8.1.4. Proponents: key actors and loose networks 
 
So, the policy has emerged, gained support and been sustained by actors such as Minister 
Harison, international or national technical experts, administrators of the coordination 
unit, CSOs and donors. They talk about the policy in personal terms and frame their 
stories around individual successes. They see Minister Harison as the father of the policy 
and casually refer to him as ‘Harison’. When referring to the birth of the policy, they 
portray themselves as the agents of change. They describe how they were opposed to the 
‘business as usual’ approach of the state land service, and took decisive, heroic action at 
difficult moment (see Hajer 1995; Adger et al. 2001). They still express pride in the core 
conceptions and practices as well as voice concerns over the sustainability of the policy.  
 
While constituting the core of the assemblage around the dominant policy narrative, 
these actors have also been part of other multiple entities and adopted varied positions 
(see De Landa 2006; Kumar 2014). Indeed, they have been mobile over the years, 
changing responsibilities and institutions. They have been exposed to other ideas, such 
as those on agricultural investment, but still attached to the dominant land policy 
narrative. For example, Minister Harison became the Director of the EDBM, an agency 
welcoming investment activity in Madagascar. Some former members of the 
coordination unit or Land Observatory started to work for donors, IGOs or technical 
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operators (or vice versa), and several actors have combined multiple responsibilities. I 
find that this mobility among the core actors has enabled new openings for interaction 
helpful in persuading others to pursue policy goals and negotiating financial support 
from donors and IGOs (see Roe 1989; Allen 2009; Kumar 2014). This may explain the 
maintenance of the dominant policy conceptions and practices against all odds.  
 
Around these core actors is a wider group of proponents, who have often worked for the 
implementation of the policy, but for shorter periods of time; or they have followed up 
its implementation through their organisations. They are in favour of the dominant 
policy narrative in general, but also express strong criticism of some of its concepts and 
implementation mechanisms. They respect some key actors in this group while 
criticising others, based on their professional standpoints. This demonstrates, then, that 
the assemblage brings together actors that would not necessarily be in contact otherwise, 
due to different professional ways of seeing and doing things (see Kumar 2014). The 
land policy as an element of change serves as the unifying component for them. 
 
This suggests that land policy is constituted around a core group of actors. It has 
mobilised and stabilised relations among a wider assemblage of technical experts, 
donors and CSOs who recognise the need for change and have aligned with the 
decentralisation and certification approaches. The power of the assemblage has 
consisted of the ability to create networks, negotiate resources and pursue policy goals 
(see Allen 2009). Several axes of power have been mobilised by the members of this 
group (see Gaventa 2006). The spaces for power were claimed when it was about starting 
a debate, became invited with the problem framings and policy ideas, and ended up 
closed for the drafting of the policy conceptions and practices. Political power was 
openly imposed on the state land service, but it took hidden forms when controlling who 
accesses the decision-making table and whose ideas are heard. Local-level experiences 
inspired the framings while the policy development itself was steered by national and 
international actors. Donors and international standards and frameworks have been used 
to gain support, credibility and visibility. These means of power have often been used 
in opposition to the state land service, as seen next.  
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8.2. Resisting the dominant policy narrative: opponents 
 
The state land service resisted the dominant policy narrative and process, seen in 
concrete actions of resistance and the accounts of both proponents and opponents. As 
illustrated earlier, Minister Harison silenced the counter arguments arising from the state 
land service. Resentment continued in the background, gained force with the first 
difficulties of the implementation of the policy, became open after the political coup of 
2009 and escalated during the consolidation of the policy in 2015. The end of donor 
funding was an opportunity for them to regain power.  
 
The 2011 evaluation report explains the overall dissatisfaction as due to four factors: i) 
the piloting of the policy was made by a parastatal coordination unit; ii) the 
administrative values and culture related to titling were questioned; iii) the decentralised 
structures competed with the state land service, even though its employees were less 
qualified professionally; and iv) the state land service lost its privileges (Comby 2011). 
This consequently entails that the policy was not integrated with the worldviews and 
practices of the state land service. Institutional dualism was created, which was a source 
of conflict (Comby 2011). I look at some of these dynamics in the next sections.  
 
8.2.1. Demonised and undervalued state land service 
 
Some proponents recognised that the dominant policy narrative challenged the 
prevailing conceptions and practices of the state land service, which had been the sole 
authority responsible for the statutory administration of land. The dominant policy 
narrative demonised the service, giving it the role of ‘villain’ rather than trying to 
integrate it into the change process (see Hajer 1995; Adger et al. 2001). While the service 
benefitted from funding directed at modernising their administrative operations, these 
remained institutionally separate from the dominant policy narrative. The state land 
service did not participate in the implementation of the latter, nor did it adopt new roles 
under the policy, also due to its own resistance. Some of proponents acknowledge that 
the employees of the service must have felt threatened:  
In fact, it was a real coup against the state land service. Clearly, they felt left out. 
At the time Mr Martin said if we do not do that, if we do not impose the certification 
system, it will never work. It is true, it happened that way. 
Interview with an international technical expert (FTECHG004), 30.11.2016 
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What happened with the land services was that with the policy […] they felt totally 
dispossessed. And so that means that at some point you have to find a consensus 
[…] However, for the time being, the policy has put in confrontation finally a local, 
decentralised approach with the deconcentrated services which suddenly felt totally 
dispossessed of their functions. This does not prevent their jobs from also evolving. 
That is to say that normally the function of deconcentrated services is to come to 
ensure all that is to control legality, validation of the certificates that are issued.  
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG005), 12.10.2016 
 
The feeling of being undervalued also emerged from the interviews with the 
representatives of the state land service. They resented the defects of the service being 
pinpointed and felt jealous when the dominant policy narrative was internationally 
acclaimed. Still today they feel that they were not heard, because their recent proposals 
for improvement (e.g. creation of offices in each district) had not been fully considered. 
One representative explained that the state land service wanted to receive the same level 
of attention for their activities as was the dominant policy narrative. They wanted to 
benefit more widely from donor funding. The representative considered that competition 
over funding generated rivalry and caused the duality of the administration.  
 
8.2.2. Vested interests  
 
In another interpretation, the proponents see the resistance of the state land service as 
due to a wish to maintain its interests and keep control over land administration. This is 
an argument formulated by Bruce and Knox (2009) in relation to decentralised land 
tenure policies in Africa. They argue that land administration institutions have vested 
interests in the existing systems, which they defend forcefully (ibid). For Bruce and 
Knox (2009) this bureaucratic resistance appears when the employees of central 
administration want to maintain their privileges, either because they doubt the abilities 
of the decentralised structures or because they wish to preserve their jobs, salaries and 
bribes. Larson and Ribot (2004) also observe similar behaviour in relation to 
decentralisation of natural resource management that can be interpreted by the central 
authorities as a threat conducting to a loss of income and patronage. For the authors, this 
threat then produces resistance. Reflecting these back to Madagascar, we can note that 
the policy questioned the state control over land, thus reducing revenue streams of the 
state land service, which had to share responsibilities, authority and incomes with the 
new decentralised structures. For the proponents, this loss of money is a key explanation 
for the resistance. 
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[The inspectors of the state land service] are in a position where they want to defend 
their rights and privileges, they are really nobles, former nobles who want to keep 
their privileges, their small businesses. 
Interview with an international technical expert (FTECHG004), 30.11.2016 
 
When talking about ‘small businesses’, the proponents refer to corruption, in two ways: 
i) an inherent problem among the state land service; and ii) an explanation for the 
resistance of the service. In their opinion, civil servants want to maintain complex and 
bureaucratic titling practices to ‘sweeten the ends of their months’ with corrupted money. 
This is also because of their low salaries. 
The struggle of the labour unions of the inspectors of the state land service is a 
struggle for these hidden revenues. We must not be disillusioned. So, as long as no 
one attacks this problem, there will still be this basic problem that will prevent a 
peaceful solution from being found. And that depends of the government.   
Interview with an international technical expert (ORGINT001), 19.09.2016 
 
Corruption remains a sensitive subject for discussion. First, at the policy level the 2005 
LPF mentions corruption as one of the consequences of the ‘tenure crisis’ and links it to 
the operations of the state land service. The 2015 LPF considers corruption more widely, 
mentioning it as a persistent issue and a line of action. It is associated with both the state 
land service and local land offices. Second, international proponents openly use the 
word, while national proponents are less direct, for instance enumerating external signs 
of richness in state land service employees. These remarks are followed by 
uncomfortable laughter and wondering aloud where this wealth has come from: 
But I think it is still taboo to talk about it like that, especially if you are talking to 
an inspector or a surveyor. But with the users it is something very, we can talk about 
it. 
Interview with a national civil society actor (CSON008), 02.12.2016 
After highlighting the corrupted practices inside the state land service, the proponents 
then acknowledged that the local land offices are not excluded from them either.  
Then there was a place, where there were a few local land offices where there must 
have been some misappropriation of funds also in small municipalities. Anyway, 
there is no reason that there will not also be problems of honesty in the 
municipalities.  
Interview with an international technical expert (FTECHG004), 30.11.2016 
 
The narratives of these representatives of the state land service are opposite. In 
interviews and observed meetings, they referred to corruption solely in regard to the 
local land offices. In their accounts, they pinpointed the faults and challenges existing 
in the certification process, such as corruption and cases of overlapping titles and 
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certificates. They doubted the abilities of local land offices to administer land, 
questioning their competence, and casting themselves as responsible corps of actors (see 
Hajer 1995; Adger et al. 2001), thus justifying their own existence. 
 
8.2.3. Justifying own existence 
 
The narratives of the representatives of the state land service are hence structured around 
the importance of their role (see also 5.3.1.). They portray themselves as the guardians 
of tenure rights who work for the common good. They tell of making precise 
measurements in the field, working with maps and satellite images, and conserving 
documents in contrast to the ‘quick and dirty’ practices of certification. They are highly 
educated in land administration and ensure core services of the state (fonction régalienne 
de l’Etat). They refer to the statistics on the number of titles allocated (according to the 
official statistics, around 8,000 per year since 2009) and deconcentrated state land 
services opened (growing from 28 offices in 2005 to 50 offices in 2017). Nonetheless, 
the official statistics continue to speak in favour of certificates (around 13,800 
certificates issued yearly since 2009).   
 
With such statements, the representatives of the state land service draw a line between 
themselves and the decentralised actors. However, they also express resentment towards 
private professionals who could take over basic topographic, field measurement and 
boundary-marking activities under the policy. Representatives of the state land service 
considered that there is not enough professional expertise among the private actors to do 
so (even though private professionals and civil servants have the same education) and 
the overall land administration system is not yet ready for out-sourcing. They also felt 
bitter at technical operators executing activities, such as the preparation of baseline maps 
for the PLOFs. With the consolidation of the policy, their objective is thus to handle all 
technical activities in-house and take control of tasks falling under their remit (such as 
mapping). Consequently, they aim to restrict the space for action on land administration 
in their favour (see Gaventa 2006). Yet, they cannot hide from the operational 
difficulties and existing backlogs, which they explain as due to a lack of financial and 
human resources.  
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It was noted that there are many files pending, the files are not yet processed. This 
situation is due to several reasons such as insufficient staff resources at the service 
level because retirees are not replaced so the number of staff decreases and work 
increases. This is one of the reasons for the high number of pending cases. 
Interview with an employee of the state land service (ADMR004), 18.05.2016 
This lack of financial and human resources has been a recurrent argument to claim 
funding regardless of the existence of ‘modernisation’ activities within the policy 
strategies.63  
 
8.2.4. Downplaying policy achievements and setting up administrative constraints  
 
The proponents accuse the state land service of downplaying policy achievements, 
attempting to talk down the policy as a strategy to resist. Some of them observed how 
the service sought to propagate false information on the certificates, questioning their 
legal value. This information was disseminated to banks and micro-finance agencies 
behind the scenes. Some proponents also found that the state land service uses any 
irregularity in the operation of local land offices as an opportunity to doubt them, using 
hidden and discursive forms of power for their own ends (see Lukes 2005; Gaventa 
2006). 
Something that is even worse is the discourse that some people in the state land 
service hold on the local land office saying that the certificate has no value, the title 
is the only document that can guarantee your rights. You see, they use malicious 
arguments to denigrate the certificates and local land offices. 
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG001), 29.08.2016 
 
You know that the certificates, banks do not accept them. Microfinance institutions 
do not accept the certificates. Yet it is written in the law. Because there are people 
in the administration who tell them that it is not a document they can use. Well, it 
is an eternal fight to denigrate one and another. 
Interview with a national technical expert (CSON007), 25.11.2016 
 
So, there is one or two things that have been a little irregular, and let’s go. They 
jumped on it and said, you see, we need to block everything. So, one morning this 
order was rescinded. Yes, it is clear, it is a struggle between the state land service 
and the proponents of the land policy. 
Interview with an international technical expert (FTECHG004), 30.11.2016 
 
The proponents furthermore find that the state land service has exercised legal and 
administrative power to influence local policy implementation (see Gaventa 2006). An 
                                                 
63 As mentioned in section 4.2.3, according to Comby (2011), between 2005 and 2011, some 46.6 million 
USD had been spent on the policy implementation of which 45 percent were directed to the 
modernisation of state land service, 38 percent to decentralised activities and 17 percent to supporting 
activities. 
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example is a policy resolution elaborated among the state land service that prohibited 
certification practices in tanety before a land use plan had been established in the 
municipality.64 In fact, by requesting a land use plan, the idea was to clarify the status 
of land in a municipality. 
The state land service also says that it is necessary to stop the certification without 
the SACs (land use plans) because otherwise one does not know the other statuses 
of the lands. So that is pretty much how we stopped certification. 
Interview with a national technical expert (FTECHN005), 23.11.2016 
 
Some proponents saw this resolution as an attempt by the state land service to complicate 
the certification processes, even though in a municipality like Ankazomiriotra farmers 
were more interested in certifying the bas-fond. For them, through the resolution the 
state land service wanted to identify areas of tanety that are not appropriated or used so 
that they could claim these as state land. The resolution would thus have imposed limits 
on the notion of PPNT and reduced its expansion.  
 
The proponents further explained that employees of the state land service had visited the 
local land offices, demanding the cessation of the certification on tanety before the 
official written decision reached the ground.  
And then the decree is as always, the decree says something, and people understand 
more. And so, the decree allowed to certify homes and rice fields of less than five 
hectares and there are many local land offices that had not received the decree but 
had been visited by the agents of the state land service saying, you stop certifying, 
it is prohibited by law now. And people respect the Fanjakana [state] anyway so 
they stopped everything, but the law did not say that. 
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG001), 29.08.2016 
However, as explained earlier (section 6.2.1.4.) it took time for the repeal to arrive to 
Ankazomiriotra, for instance. In the meantime, local land offices continued to allocate 
certificates only for bas-fond and housing plots. 
 
When discussing the policy resolution with representatives of the state land service, they 
described it as a way to control abuses that had taken place in the allocation of 
certificates. For instance, they claimed that a certificate had been issued for an area of 
3,000 hectares, which they found an unimaginable area for a Malagasy farmer. 
Therefore, for them, a resolution requiring a land use plan and limiting the maximum 
                                                 
64 The certification remained possible on bas-fond up to five hectares and on housing parcels. 
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area of parcels to be certified was necessary to limit such abuses.65 They considered this 
to protect the rights of farmers. 
 
The resolution enters in a wider context when states claim to regain authority and control 
over land (see Sikor and Lund 2009). Burnod et al. (2013) have put forward a similar 
case in Madagascar in relation to agricultural investment. Through an administrative 
circular (circulaire 321-10), the state made it obligatory for investors to receive approval 
from the state land service before accessing land. The authors argue that: 
through this new circulaire, central state officials reasserted their authority to 
investors and, above all, to regional and local officials. Former arrangements with 
local officials were cancelled and all the investors who had begun legal procedures 
before the circulaire was published were expected to restart the procedure and to 
gain approval from the central government. 
Burnod et al. (2013, p.369)  
As affirmed by the authors, the point here is that the central state acts as the ‘owner’ and 
‘manager’ of land (ibid.). One way of gaining physical control has then been to contest 
the definitions of appropriated and used land, and rather only consider permanent 
presence as legitimate (Burnod and Andriamanalina 2017).  
 
These remarks suggest that the state land service foresees re-centralisation of land 
administration. A similar attitude was found in Tanzania by Pedersen (2016) who noted 
that the central government regretted the loss of authority over land to local governments 
and thus the possibility to allocate land to investors, but had not succeeded in its 
recentralisation endeavours. The Malagasy state land service has, then, had more 
success. All the above observations, moreover, join the arguments of Ribot et al. (2006) 
on how central governments exercise power over decentralisation. The authors claim 
that central governments: i) create new oversight mechanisms for local governments; ii) 
constrain decentralisation by controlling information on new policies; iii) control the 
physical areas on which local governments can exercise authority; and iv) maintain 
ambiguity over policies (Ribot et al. 2006). These points are transposable to Madagascar 
and we can hence note that the state land service: i) established a resolution to limit 
certification and a circular on investments; ii) did not communicate the repeal of the 
resolution to municipalities; iii) limited the authority of municipalities to allocate land 
                                                 
65 As indicated in section 6.2.2.1., the maximum area one can certify in Ankazomiriotra was 10 ha per 
parcel. However, to my knowledge the 2005 LPF and laws linked to it do not impose any such limits. 
226 
 
to investors and disputed the definition of PPNT; and iv) disseminated conflicting 
information on certification, for instance, to micro-credit organisations.  
 
Consequently, recentralising endeavours are part of the resistance of the state land 
service to the dominant policy narrative. Competition over power is palpable. The state 
land service visibly opposed the policy from the outset by organising strikes. It has then 
employed hidden and invisible forms of power to influence decision-makers and 
administrative procedures. It has furthermore claimed space trying to get its message 
heard, claim funds and regain control of land management. Finally, it acts both at the 
national and local levels. (see Lukes 2005; Gaventa 2006) These power plays have 
accrued during the consolidation of the policy.  
 
 
8.3. Balance of power during the consolidation of the policy 
 
The consolidation of the policy took place in a context of institutional competition where 
the friction between the proponents and opponents continues, developing into open 
conflict during the drafting of the 2015 LPF. I analyse these power dynamics in the next 
sections.  
 
8.3.1. Open consultations and closed drafting of the May 2015 Land Policy Letter 
 
For proponents, the consolidation of the land policy was initially meant to strengthen 
the dominant policy narrative in a context where it had become politically, institutionally 
and administratively fragile. For donors, who financed the consultation workshops and 
the national land tenure forum of February 2015, the consolidation process was an 
opportunity to express public support of the dominant policy narrative, underscore the 
importance of municipality and civil society views, and present the Voluntary 
Guidelines in the hope of aligning the policy with international guidance.66 They hence 
drew a line between the dominant policy narrative and the claims of the state land 
service. Consolidation endeavours also found some political support from the line 
                                                 
66 Prior to the meeting, FAO had commissioned a comparative study analysing the correspondence 
between the 2005 LPF and the Guidelines. 
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Ministry and the Presidency. Yet, this political backing did not contain the resistance of 
the state land service. The land forum, for instance, took place in a hostile atmosphere.   
Nevertheless, it was possible to hold the national forum in February 2015, trying to 
introduce the Voluntary Guidelines as an attempt to consolidate, through their 
principles and recommendations, the achievements of the policy. The forum was 
very tense. Very, very tense. 
Interview with an international technical expert (ORGINT001), 19.09.2016 
 
The forum was followed up by the drafting of the May 2015 LPF, orchestrated by a few 
international and national experts. A national actor told how the drafting took place 
behind closed doors. The document was written in a week, drawing on experience 
acquired over ten years of policy implementation and feedback received from the 
consultations, to which participants had been invited. (see Gaventa 2006) Because of the 
persistent power plays, according to the national actor, drafting the policy letter in a 
restricted committee was a way to shorten the chain of consultation, avoid the state land 
service intervening in the process and have a document quickly at the disposal of policy-
makers. It also offered an opportunity for the drafters to bring on board issues that had 
been secondary in the public discussions, but considered crucial by them (e.g. 
community rights, status of pastoral lands, legal value of certificates). Hence, a very 
similar modus operandi to that of 2005 was adopted. This strategy worked in the first 
instance as the May 2015 LPF was approved by the Government Council and published 
by the main media outlets. 
 
Nonetheless, this way of proceeding first through public consultation and then behind 
closed doors raises questions. For me it indicates that consultation was a way to grasp 
some current issues that were then used in line of the proponents’ own policy ideas and 
purposes. Consultation served more to strengthen the support of municipalities, civil 
society organisations and donors in favour of the dominant policy narrative and their 
adherence to the wider assemblage of proponents. Consultation did not, however, 
remove the friction with the state land service.  
 
8.3.2. Policy reversal 
 
The resistance of the state land service grew into an open conflict during the drafting 
process. Its labour unions started a strike in the first half of 2015, closing the central and 
all deconcentrated offices for two months and organising demonstrations outside the 
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headquarters in Antananarivo. It opposed how the consolidation process was conducted 
and the points of the May 2015 LPF that foresaw decentralisation and the strengthening 
of certificates, reducing the responsibilities of the state land service (see also section 
5.4.3.).  
 
The proponents described the strike as long and visible, and the last turning point in the 
consolidation of the policy. It culminated in the August 2015 version of the LPF that 
introduced changes, questioning the basis of the dominant policy narrative. This version 
was approved by the same Government Council as the previous one three months earlier. 
For the proponents, the government thus gave way to the demands of the state land 
service that had found power within the institution (see Gaventa 2006). The proponents 
describe these moves of the state land service as malignant also because some of them 
were on holiday when the changes were introduced and were not able to contest them. 
Their response could be established only in October 2015 during which they planned a 
‘counterattack’, as expressed by a national actor.  
 
In the policy turnaround, proponents see a battle over who can control land and related 
information, and who can access revenue streams generated by land (see also Sikor and 
Lund 2009; Chouquer 2011; Pedersen 2016). As explained earlier, the changes request 
the transformation of certificates into titles at the moment of subsequent transactions and 
modifications. Ultimately, this entails that all land fall back under the administration of 
the state land service.67 The state land service would become the administration retaining 
all up-to-date information on land. In line with previous observations, it is indeed 
recentralising the decentralised policy (see Ribot et al. 2006).  
 
While the obligation of transforming certificates into titles reinforces the institutional 
position of the state land service, it also means an increase in workload. Therefore, 
proponents questioned the ability of the service to undertake the new recentralised 
responsibilities when it already has considerable backlogs and scarce funding. For them, 
the policy has consequently returned to its starting point of non-functioning land 
administration.  
 
                                                 
67 This, of course, if the subsequent changes are voluntarily registered by the holders of the certificates. 
Yet, experience from Madagascar and elsewhere shows trouble in registering changes. 
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That is to say, when you are 500,000 titles late, how dare you come and say that 
you consider that this policy is of no use and, in addition, recover everything they 
call subsequent operations, that is, if tomorrow there is a division of the certificate, 
then it must be transformed into a title. Then we are back in the same problem. 
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG005), 12.10.2016 
 
8.3.3. Reaching the status-quo 
 
The proponents responded to the policy reversal in the second half of 2015. The civil 
society actors flagged inconsistencies between the May and August 2015 LPFs. Donors 
responded by joining forces, meeting directly with the Minister, and sending a jointly 
signed letter to him. The stakes were high: the basis of the policy had been questioned, 
and the donors had planned to engage in projects that supported the May 2015 version 
of the LPF. As a way forward, they suggested another workshop to debate the latest 
changes with the state land service, the coordination unit, civil society and decentralised 
actors.  
We do not hide our wish to be able to include the continuation of our long-term 
support to Madagascar's land policy in the assurance of the orientations that you 
reaffirmed during our meeting, particularly with regard to the importance of the 
decentralised level of land management, the legal value of the land certificate and 
the balance between the different levels of land management. A national workshop 
could give us these assurances and other information needed to continue the 
implementation of ongoing land programmes and to prepare new interventions 
related to land management, local development and decentralisation. 
Letter of EU Delegation, AfD, African Development Bank, the World Bank, FAO 
and GIZ to the State Minister in charge of infrastructure, equipment and land use 
planning (2015) 
 
The above extract indicates that the Minister had orally confirmed the continuation of 
the decentralisation process and the value of the certificates. These issues were further 
debated at the donor-funded workshop in November 2015 without solving the 
disagreements. As laconically observed by national actors, the engagement with 
dialogue stopped there and the Minister was balancing between the requests of the state 
land service and donors. The policy thus continued, but no significant advances were 
made.68 This could be heard in the voices of the proponents, as a disappointment and as 
a lost opportunity. 
 
                                                 
68 This was the situation in 2017 when the last fieldwork was conducted. 
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Donors nevertheless pursued their support of the Malagasy land policy, relying on the 
oral commitments of the Minister. They focused on the local level, on concrete tangible 
activities and experimenting with new approaches while waiting for a suitable moment 
for more structural changes. These pilots concentrate on aspects that were removed from 
the August 2015 LPF (such as the allocation of certificates by municipalities to areas 
entered in the cadastre) and that can eventually advise on subsequent legal changes, as 
explained below by an international actor. 
So, the problem is that the Land Policy Letter, we did not agree at all with the last 
version, so we did this workshop to talk about things that were annoying. We 
received a letter from the Minister of Land saying good, on this we do not question 
you, we try to move forward without a law but in the form of experiences. We draw 
conclusions in a participatory way and then we legislate them. He says that and at 
the same time they are preparing (a new law on titled land), they are always 
contradicting themselves constantly. 
Interview with an international technical actor (FTECHG004), 19.09.2016 
 
8.3.4. Inertia during the elaboration of the National Land Programme 
 
The elaboration of the PNF started when the final debates on the LPF were still on-going 
at the end of 2015. Again, the process included the organisation of consultation 
meetings.69 The overarching lines of discussion had been defined by two technical 
experts (international and national) and these directed the formulation of operational 
strategies and activities. While the proponents had defined the agenda and facilitated the 
meetings, they found that the state land service sought to control the attendees (see 
Gaventa 2006). Indeed, some 80 percent of the proposed participants were employees 
of the state land service thus leaving the decentralised actors and CSOs 
underrepresented, as described below.  
But after the strike, the sabotage of the land services, everything changed. All of a 
sudden, there were changes even in the selection of participants because they put 
people from the state land service. And I asked, listen but yes, it is true that you are 
the guardians of the topic but that does not mean that others do not have opinions, 
things to say.  
Interview with a national technical expert (FTECHN004), 22.11.2016 
 
This power imbalance was perceptible in the two consultation meetings I attended.70 The 
discussions had administrative and legal flavours. The potential beneficiaries of the 
                                                 
69 Meetings were organised in provincial capitals, funded by the EU and facilitated by a national consulting 
company. 
70 Toamasina 30.11-01.12.2015 and Antananarivo 03-04.12.2015. 
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policy (farmers) were left out of a discussion that focused on improving the operations 
of the state land service. At times, the facilitators aimed to direct the debate towards the 
decentralisation and certification approaches of the policy. The EU, as the funder, openly 
expressed its discontent and its message was seconded by a representative of the civil 
society. Their interventions were simply ignored, and the coordination unit also played 
them down, hoping to maintain cordial relations with the state land service.  
 
The proposals stemming from the consultation meetings were worked on by the two 
technical experts and taken up by a technical and a political piloting committee, both 
regrouping representatives of line Ministries and the state land service. The committees 
took almost a year to launch the five-year plan for the PNF in November 2016. National 
actors tell that the World Bank had exercised pressure, as the adoption of the new PNF 
was a legal covenant in its CASEF project. The launch event was unfruitful. The 
coordination unit presented the overarching lines of the PNF that incline toward legal 
and administrative experimentation. With a recentralised programme, it announced a 
targeted budget of 67 million euros, seeking additional support71 from donors, who at 
the same time backed decentralisation, certification and participation as well the need to 
accelerate efforts.  
 
Examination of the consolidation process hence underscores a balancing of powers 
between proponents and opponents. Both sides pursue their conceptions and practices 
as usual. Both sides blame the other. There is thus continuous conflict (either latent or 
open) and the land policy is in limbo. In this process, both sides have used similar 
strategies and practices to gain power for their side. Power has been played out through 
the set of agendas, participants, consultation, expertise, funding, advocacy networks and 
international frameworks, access to decision-makers, dissemination of information, 
administrative circulars and strikes.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 Some 16 to 17 million that had already been advanced by the EU, AfD and the World Bank. 
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8.4. Some attempts at mediation and brokering  
 
Some attempts at mediation and brokering between the two sides have been made at the 
national level (Olivier de Sardan 1995; Bierschenk et al. 2000; Mosse 2005), via the 
coordination unit as an intermediary and individuals as brokers, and efforts to use 
international frameworks as a basis for finding common ground.  
 
8.4.1. Coordination unit and individuals acting between the two sides  
 
The coordination unit was created in 2006 to oversee the implementation of the land 
policy. It is supposed to accommodate and mediate the interests of the state land service, 
international technical experts, donors, decentralised actors (e.g. municipalities) and 
CSOs. It is the intermediate body receiving external funds that it allocates between the 
policy strategies (including those on the modernisation of land administration and those 
on decentralisation and certification) and implementing parties. It finally follows up on 
the spending of these funds.  
 
The unit is physically located in the premises of the state land service and institutionally 
linked to it. Some of its directors have been representatives of the state land service. 
However, the unit has its own identity, ideology and modes of operation. It is the 
interface with donors. It also regularly employs consultants at great expense, rather than 
engaging with the civil servants of the state land service. Some of these consultants align 
with the group of proponents. The unit is hence seen as being part of the proponents’ 
‘side’, and undervalued by the state land service. This lack of recognition within the 
state land service and the absence of a proper institutional status renders the unit fragile 
(Comby 2011) and the advancement of the decentralisation and certification approaches 
difficult within an administration that is intrinsically attached to the old regime. The time 
that it took to come up with a final PNF in 2016 is a demonstration of this weak, 
intermediate position. 
 
When the power plays emerged and the coordination unit as an institution was rendered 
fragile, it then came down to leading individuals to act as brokers towards the state land 
service. National actors told of ‘playing the game’ of the state land service, speaking 
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their language and taking care of them. They confirmed having organised training 
sessions and more convivial events for the employees of the service. In addition, they 
provided rewards in the form of access to project cars, motorbikes and ICT. These were 
long-term strategies to gain the support and approval of the state land service for the 
land policy and maintain cordial everyday relations. In their accounts, the state land 
service was portrayed as a needy child with power over decision-making and operations.  
 
8.4.2. Mitigated use of international frameworks 
 
International actors and discourse generally present global frameworks as something 
around which common ground could be built at the national level. This assumes that the 
frameworks are overarching consensus-based documents agreed upon by governments 
in association with other actors, such as civil society (the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure and LPI) or that they are ‘neutral’ assessment 
documents (LGAF) that can both trigger debate and common visions. These 
assumptions ignore the politics of land, which furthermore explains the various ways in 
which international frameworks have been used during the consolidation of the land 
policy. I take here the Voluntary Guidelines as an example.  
 
While the key principles of the Guidelines appear in both May and August 2015 LPFs, 
one international actor found that they were devoid of meaning due to the changes made 
between the letters. Indeed, the fact of leaving the overall reference to the Guidelines in 
a policy letter that did not fully respect legitimate rights created discord between the 
August 2015 LPF and the Guidelines. The Guidelines were first presented to a wider 
Malagasy audience at the February 2015 national land forum. Nevertheless, the 
interviewees had mixed feelings, reporting that many participants perceived the 
Guidelines as imported and imposed by FAO. The international actors at the forum also 
described the tensions in the room and the fervour with which the Malagasy and both 
sides questioned the Guidelines. 
 
This opposition to the Guidelines occurred even though key people from the Malagasy 
government (as much from the state land service as proponents of the land policy) and 
civil society organisations participated in the consultation and awareness-raising 
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meetings.72 Also, Madagascar had been one of the examples interviewed actors 
mentioned having referred to in the consultation and intergovernmental negotiations on 
the Guidelines to highlight the recognition of legitimate tenure rights. This background 
was then forgotten when it then came to assess national practices against the Guidelines. 
In the eyes of the national actors, they had no reason to be in Madagascar. Some 
international actors found that the caution towards the Guidelines is due to the political 
moment at which they were introduced. In February 2015, the situation between the 
proponents and opponents was explosive. Actors from both sides were not receptive to 
outside guidance, initiative or influence even though some of them had personally been 
connected to the process. Thus, the use of the Guidelines remained superficial.  
 
Regardless of the mitigated political adherence, the coordination unit promoted the 
Guidelines in consultation meetings on the PNF and translated them into Malagasy. 
Through the translation exercise, technical experts of line Ministries and CSOs have 
agreed on the Malagasy vocabulary and concepts to be used. Some experts mentioned 
having acknowledged the importance of respecting legitimate tenure right-holders after 
having fully read the Guidelines and others associated the instrument with participatory 
approaches. In addition to the activities led by the coordination unit, the state land 
service has furthermore justified the inventory of its land by referring to the Guidelines 
that call for states to determine the use and control of public resources (CFS and FAO 
2012). This overview demonstrates how the Guidelines can be used to serve multiple 
purposes, but in the accounts of some actors it also raises a risk of them being 
instrumentalised. For example, with the inventory of the state land there is a risk that the 
state land service claims land that legally falls under PPNT and to which people hold 
legitimate tenure rights. According to the Guidelines, such rights should be respected. 
 
While the Guidelines received a mixed political welcome from national actors, they have 
been used as a set of standards and elements of persuasion by international actors. As 
explained below, international actors have referred to the Guidelines when dealing with 
the state land service and the line Ministry during the policy turnaround.  
The Guidelines are not a tool that serves only when everything goes well. When 
there is also a strong conflict in terms of defining land policy, it can also serve as a 
reference point. It served as a point of reference in the forum that took place in 
                                                 
72 When working for FAO, I was responsible of the organisation of the consultation and awareness-raising 
meetings for francophone Africa. 
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November 2015, which opposed to some extent donors, civil society and the 
government. The Guidelines served as a point of support to argue. […] It has also 
been used as an argument to extract from the government a promise, that is worth 
what it is worth, we will see what the future holds for us, but at least a promise to 
say that we will not touch the land law for at least five years and we can continue 
to take action on the ground that goes along with the policy even if the land services 
do not agree. 
Interview with an international technical expert (ORGINT001), 19.09.2016 
 
The Guidelines have also offered a basis for collaboration for donors by providing all of 
them with the same understanding of the overarching issues. Yet, as described below, 
debate subsists on the different ways of proceeding to secure tenure.   
Because everyone agrees to support the Voluntary Guidelines and behind them 
recognise that securing legitimate land rights is important. After how we do it, is 
where we do not necessarily agree. 
Interview with an international technical expert (GOVG003), 14.09.2016 
 
The relationship between the Guidelines and the Malagasy land policy is thus an 
interesting one. They have proved useful to international actors as a tool of persuasion 
rather than to national actors as a point of reference for mediating differences. The 
Guidelines have not served as a basis for bringing actors together, developing a common 
understanding on issues and actions, and creating a wider consensus – a role that FAO 
would have liked them to fulfil. Rather, they are being used by some actors to endorse 
their own endeavours. 
 
 
8.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter exposed the politics behind the land policy, which has been characterised 
by a competitive game between actors taking place in the capital, at some distance from 
the realities on the ground (see also Horning 2008). I have demonstrated how 
assemblages of proponents and opponents have formed around the dominant policy 
narrative. The divergencies emerge from concepts and practices rooted in different 
traditions of land administration. Between these positions, some grey areas exist, 
however. I have highlighted that the two sides are loose networks of actors within which 
ideational differences, critical voices and mobility occur.  
 
236 
 
The friction between the two sides is evident in the narratives of actors. I have showcased 
how the proponents portray themselves as ‘heroes’ introducing a new system compared 
to titles and describe the state land service as the ‘villain’. The state land service then 
sees itself as the ‘victim’ of the policy or alternatively as the ‘protector’ of rights. It does 
not hesitate to blame the decentralised actors for difficulties with the policy 
implementation. (see Hajer 1995; Adger et al. 2001) It is remarkable that both 
proponents and opponents have relied on similar means of power. The framework 
proposed by Gaventa (2006) has been helpful for analysing the forms, spaces and levels 
of power. It enables this thesis to pinpoint concrete examples and show the resemblance 
between the behaviour of actors. (See Appendix 8 on a synthesis of actor interests and 
means of power used.) 
 
Behind these power plays is the question of who has authority over land administration. 
The proponents use the dominant policy narrative to impose decentralisation and 
certification on the ground, giving authority over land to municipalities, while the state 
land service tries to contest and silence this narrative. Indeed, as I have underscored, the 
dominant policy narrative reduces their responsibilities and the areas of land falling 
under their administration. It alters their authority, revenue streams and security. These 
conflicts between the assemblages then politically, institutionally and administratively 
question the stability of the policy and thus tenure security of those farmers who have 
benefitted from the dominant policy conceptions and practices.  
 
The power plays between the assemblages have been reinforced by the modus operandi 
of the policy process, which has not sought to build consensus or bridge dualities, 
regardless of some efforts at mediation and brokering. We could then find explanations 
for some challenges of the Malagasy land policy is the argument of Mosse (2005), 
according to which ‘policy ideas are important less for what they say than for who they 
bring together; what alliances, coalitions and consensuses they allow, both within and 
between organisations’ (p.15). For me, this statement explains the core dynamisms of 
the Malagasy land policy. The policy has indeed mobilised and stabilised relations 
among a wider group of technical experts, donors and CSOs who recognise the need for 
change and align with the decentralisation and certification approaches (see also Corson 
2016). However, the policy has not gained support within the state land service that 
contests its ideas, practices and modes of elaboration. Nonetheless, the state land service 
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is the single most important institution: it has privileged access to the highest decision-
making levels, especially since the political transition period, and it dominated land 
administration and still wants to keep control of it. Undermining this institution indicates 
to me that the policy has been incompletely managed as a change process, with 
consequences for tenure security.  
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9. Conclusion  
 
 
In this research, I have examined the Malagasy land policy process from the angle of 
tenure security. To guide the research, the overarching question asked was: how has 
tenure security been conceived, practiced and maintained in land policy development 
and implementation processes in Madagascar? This has entailed analysis of how tenure 
security has been conceived as a key policy idea (Chapter 5), examination of its 
operationalisation and translation in practice (Chapters 6 and 7) and investigation of the 
dynamisms of the policy process (Chapter 8). In doing so, I have also considered 
interactions between global, national and local levels. My aim has been to show the 
complexities of the notion of tenure security and the ambiguities of policy processes 
established around it. 
 
I have been able to demonstrate the complicated political, institutional and social life of 
the Malagasy land policy by ‘studying through’ the process and attending to its framings, 
dominant ideas, practices, inclusion and exclusion of actors, and power dynamics 
(Keeley and Scoones 2003; Wedel and Feldman 2005). I have identified a dominant 
narrative around which key policy changes are articulated (Roe 1991 and 1994), 
analysed the forming of assemblages of global, national and local actors around it (De 
Landa 2006; Kumar 2014; Müller 2015), and examined the use of means of power in 
the policy process (Rowlands 1995; Lukes 2005; Gaventa 2006). This has entailed 
analysing the constant reformulation, contestation and negotiation of conceptions and 
practices by multiple social actors located in different institutional arenas (Long 1992b; 
Leftwich 2004; Corson 2016) and explaining the diverse positions and interests of actors 
(Lavigne Delville 2009). Such approaches have enabled the thesis to explain some 
unintended policy consequences in terms of tenure security and failures in gaining wide 
support. The research findings then invite considering tenure security in land policies 
from multiple perspectives, throughout the policy processes and by attending to the 
inherently political nature of land. Policies should go beyond the simple blueprint 
solutions of recognition and registration of tenure rights rather seeing tenure security an 
institutional matter influenced by authority, political, social, cultural and power relations 
between actors of different levels.  
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In this conclusion, I bring together the core findings and contributions. I start by 
synthetizing the most salient empirical findings stemming from Chapters 5 to 8. I 
continue by discussing the theoretical, methodological and policy contributions of the 
research. I finish by calling for a paradigm shift in how tenure security is considered by 
public policies.  
 
 
9.1. Synthesis of empirical findings  
 
The 2005 LPF set the institutional basis for the land policy. It was framed around: i) 
observation of ‘a tenure crisis’ in the existing statutory land administration managed by 
the state land service; ii) ‘massive demand for securing tenure’ linked to the customary 
practices of petits papiers through which farmers sought local recognition; and iii) 
external threats facing local communities, associated with the state, investors and urban 
people acquiring land in rural areas. I have explained that these framings stemmed from 
the observations and experiences of civil society representatives and some technical 
experts. They received support from the Minister of Agriculture, who established the 
political and institutional foundations for policy development and implementation.   
 
I have argued that there was little debate on the meanings of tenure security when the 
policy was developed in 2005. Instead, international and national technical experts 
quickly sought strategies for action based on the problem framings and global 
conceptions that valued customary tenure rights and called for the devolution of land 
administration. Legally, the policy recognised the rights of farmers based on the current 
appropriation and use of land. These had to be socially justified and enforced 
(MacPherson 1978; Lund 2011). It reconciled legitimacy with legality (Rochegude 
2011b). Administratively, the policy entailed decentralising the functions of land 
administration to local land offices and certifying legitimate tenure rights (Teyssier et 
al. 2007; Teyssier et al. 2009). Together, these are ultimately about legal recognition and 
registration of locally legitimate rights by decentralised authorities. I have identified this 
as the dominant policy narrative, which sees tenure security from legal and 
administrative perspectives. It considers, however, social legitimacy as a prerequisite for 
any statutory measure and these social relations are supposed to be handled by the local 
recognition commissions.    
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The dominant policy narrative assembled international and national technical experts, 
the Minister of Agriculture, donors, civil society representatives and institutional 
structures set up for the policy implementation. These are social actors and institutions 
that otherwise might have remained distant, due to their various ways of seeing and 
doing things (see Roe 1994; Kumar 2014). I have called these actors the proponents. 
The policy narrative offered them a common conception of the overarching situation and 
a basis for shared development practices (see Roe 1991; Fortmann 1995; Hajer 1995; 
Mosse 2005; Li 2007). The proponents gained force through political and financial 
support, but also through a common enemy: the state land service. The dominant policy 
narrative questioned the authority and responsibilities of the state land service. The 
service represented the previous model of land administration that even more strongly 
emphasised tenure security as a matter of identifying parcels on the ground, providing 
legal acts and publishing information on rights. It also highlighted its own role as the 
guarantor of rights, the key service of the state and the holder of professional knowledge.  
 
I have demonstrated how the dominant policy narrative was operationalised and 
rendered technical (see Li 2007). Donors drove the creation of local land administrations 
through which municipalities, as the decentralised authorities, were loosely linked to the 
assemblage. Policy implementation became donor-driven and its success was measured 
in the number of local land offices opened, certificates issued, and hectares covered and 
inserted in the PLOFs. I find that these technical practices have reinforced the legal and 
administrative conceptions of tenure security within the dominant policy narrative, 
leaving social considerations aside. I have demonstrated that these quantitative 
achievements of the policy can be questioned. While 1/3 of the Malagasy municipalities 
have an open land office, these are facing difficulties due to lack of funding and weak 
institutional coordination, as shown by the example of Ankazomiriotra. A sporadic 
approach to certification has also meant that a number of certificates have not been 
delivered. Indeed, between 2005 and 2017 only some 142,000 certificates have been 
issued by the local land offices (728 in Ankazomiriotra). Finally, the PLOFs that should 
safeguard spatial and analogical information on both certificates and titles are not backed 
up or updated.  
 
I have argued that the dominant policy narrative ended up creating rather than reducing 
institutional plurality. It resulted in three systems (petits papiers, certificates, titles), 
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authorities (fokontany, municipality, state land service) and procedures (social 
recognition – signing of a paper; application – social recognition – publication – issuing 
of certificate – updating of PLOF; application – surveying and placing of boundary 
markers – recording of rights in registries) through which tenure relations are formally 
managed.73 These systems, authorities and procedures endure in the narratives of 
international, national and local actors, creating an understanding of a ‘property ladder’ 
in which three formal arrangements co-exist and are valued differently, even though the 
certificates were supposed to replace the petits papiers and be low-cost alternatives to 
titles (see Observatoire du Foncier 2007; Boué and Colin 2018). 
 
The examples from Ankazomiriotra show that the dominant policy narrative has had 
mixed results locally. The local land office was opened under the auspices of a donor 
project without popular or political demand in the municipality (see Larson and Ribot 
2004). Recourse to certificates has also been minor and without democratic distribution 
among farmers. Indeed, qualitative research indicates that the certificates are accessible 
only to the wealthier, more educated and more connected households that can bear the 
costs and the administrative processes. They can consolidate their properties by 
receiving legal guarantees and/or address sources of tenure insecurity not handled 
through customary practices such as social recognition and petits papiers. For most 
farmers, the certificates remain too expensive and they face more pressing development 
challenges. Some farmers are also suspicious of the purpose and sustainability of the 
certification process, and others are simply unaware of it. They are not empowered by 
the process (Rowlands 1995). Consequently, it is the socio-economically most powerful 
that receive legal and administrative recognition of rights in the form of a certificate. 
These same farmers could have eventually applied for a title. Some of them might 
furthermore be local power-holders that dominate everyday politics, influence social 
relations and retain strong cultural positions for the benefit of their tenure security (see 
Evers 2013).   
 
In response to the various challenges faced on the ground, the most recent actions of the 
proponents aim to address the financial, technical and institutional sustainability of local 
                                                 
73 I consider the petits papiers as formal as they publicly record who holds what and where. They remain 
a customary practice with local legitimacy compared to certificates and titles that are statutory practices 
recognised by the law.    
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land offices. This includes creating new responsibilities for the offices and using the 
PLOFs for wider purposes of land management. In parallel, a number of other practices 
are emerging at the discourse level, varying from inventory of parcels to mapping of 
areas being appropriated and used. Some of these aim to secure rights of farmers; others 
collect taxes or consolidate state properties. Together, these intentions and actions divert 
attention away from the core challenges and certification as a key solution for securing 
tenure. I find that one explanation behind the multiplication of practices is the difficulty 
in enforcing the dominant policy narrative in a context of institutional competition. It is 
seen as more acceptable and justifiable by donors and technical experts to continue to 
test practices and tools rather than address the roots of the problem, and in the new 
practices the state land service finds an avenue to capture the language of the proponents 
and demand support. Consequently, these practices are used to manage failures and 
reassemble the dominant policy narrative (Li 2007). This multiplication is also reflected 
in the 2015 LPF that sets tenure security in a wider context of development, rather than 
considering it through decentralisation and certification as was the case in 2005.  
 
This leads me to consider power plays in the capital that further disconnects the policy 
from realities on the ground. I have underscored the challenges that proponents have 
faced in conceiving, operationalising and maintaining the dominant policy narrative. 
They have not been able to gain the support of the state land service, which has disputed 
the ideas and practices of the narrative from the outset. I argue that this opposition stems 
from excluding the state land service from the policy process, undermining its 
competencies, questioning its authority and reducing its revenue. In this battle, both 
parties have had recourse to similar means of power to gain visibility, control the policy 
process and maintain their position. The full ‘power cube’ of Gaventa (2006) is 
employed when power is played out between global, national and local actors in its 
visible, hidden and invisible forms, as well as in closed, invited and claimed spaces. 
There has been little recourse to mediation, for instance, using global frameworks. I have 
found that the ultimate stakes have been about regaining and exercising control over 
land, and about individual pride in maintaining one’s own way of seeing and doing 
things. 
 
The balance of power between the proponents and opponents has changed over the years. 
While the dominant policy narrative benefitted from political will and financial support 
243 
 
in the first years, the political coup of 2009 played in favour of the opponents. The policy 
implementation was also weakened locally and nationally due to superficial institutional 
rooting, dependence on donor funding and project mode implementation (Comby 2011). 
The political determination in favour of the policy never returned to its initial levels. A 
demonstration of the shifting balance of power is the 2015 LPF that firmly questions the 
core approaches of the dominant policy narrative, requiring the transfer of certificates 
into titles at the moment of subsequent changes and refusing any spatial extension of the 
responsibilities of municipalities. 
 
 
9.2. Theoretical, methodological and policy contributions  
 
The theoretical approach of the research has enabled a better understanding of the 
considerations of tenure security in and the dynamics of the policy process. This has 
been possible by deconstructing the policy process as well as by attending to dominant 
policy narratives, assemblages of actors and power. The research then contributes to 
literature on the politics of land (see e.g. Shipton and Goheen 1992; Berry 2002 and 
2009; Peters 2004; Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; Sikor and Lund 2009; Boone 2014; Li 
2014) by looking what policies do in practice (Sikor and Müller 2009). I have been able 
to single out unintended consequences and side-effects of the policy in terms of tenure 
insecurity (Long 1992c). The research also builds a discussion with political ecology 
and social-anthropology literature. It analyses the elaboration, implementation and 
maintenance of development interventions and public policies (Li 2007; Corson 2016; 
Lavigne Delville 2017a) and explains how these might fail by not being able to create a 
wide basis for support (Mosse 2005). This ‘studying through’ of the policy process has 
required a qualitative and nested research approach conducted at global, national and 
local levels. It has enabled a take on the ‘complexity, ambiguity and messiness’ of the 
policy process (Wedel and Feldman 2005, p.2), understanding it from the point of view 
of actors involved. Such overarching analysis finally brings new reflections on land 
policy as a practice and shows how some ways of seeing and doing things sustain 
regardless of counter evidence (Roe 1991).  
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9.2.1. Theoretical contributions 
 
9.2.1.1. Unintended consequences of policies: new sources of tenure insecurity 
 
Tenure security has become a key notion in public policies on land, in which it is 
portrayed as crucial for economic growth, poverty reduction, social cohesion and 
governance (Palmer 1998; Byamugisha 2013). As I argued in the introduction, there is 
no unilateral conception of tenure security, but it is conceived and practiced in multiple 
ways by a range of social actors. According to Gelder (2010) this haphazard use of the 
notion and confusion around it can have theoretical and policy consequences. My point 
with this research has been that undermining the multidimensional nature of tenure 
security and the politics of the policy process, as presented in the literature review and 
the example of Madagascar, can enhance existing (or generate new) sources of tenure 
insecurity. Socio-economic benefits associated with tenure security cannot then be 
reclaimed. Some of these sources of tenure insecurity came through in the empirical 
chapters and the synthesis of findings. I follow them up here with four theoretical points.   
 
First, the Malagasy land policy enhanced institutional and legal plurality. While plurality 
existed prior to the policy in the form of the petits papiers and titles, a new layer was 
constituted with the introduction of the certificates. This co-existence of institutional 
systems, authorities and procedures can generate problems of tenure insecurity where an 
actor ‘shops around’ to find the most favourable outcomes (Benda-Beckmann 1981; 
Broegaard 2009). This ‘forum shopping’ can then generate inequalities between farmers 
as only some have access to the institutions retaining statutory authority over land 
(Benda-Beckmann 1981). The example of Ankazomiriotra confirms that the ability to 
‘shop around’ is only available to the most powerful people – those who have the wealth, 
education and connections who, in addition to petits papiers, can apply for certificates 
or titles. These people can seek the highest level of guarantee for themselves and in so 
doing might override the legitimate tenure rights of others.  
 
Second, the findings demonstrate that the social, cultural and power sources of tenure 
insecurity are handled by local recognition commissions. These act as the social arenas 
where rights are negotiated between social actors (Berry 1997; Benda-Beckmann et al. 
2006). They provide legitimacy to tenure rights, which are then legalised by a certificate. 
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The example of Ankazomiriotra nevertheless indicates that the local land office strives 
to stay away from any socially disputed case. Scholars have also observed that it is the 
local power holders, better-off families and men as the heads of the household that 
benefit from these social processes and certificates at the expense of women, younger 
people and migrants (Platteau 1996; Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux 2004; Evers 2013; 
Widman 2014). Therefore, there has not been a systematic consideration of the structural 
divergencies in peoples’ abilities to negotiate their rights before these are formalised by 
a certificate (Peters 2004 and 2009), nor a consideration of the power abuses that 
generate insecurity for less influential tenure right-holders (Platteau 1996). Unless these 
local power dynamics are effectively addressed or access to certificates more 
democratically expanded, the Malagasy land policy risks becoming one of many 
registration endeavours that ‘modernise’ existing tenure insecurities and inequalities, 
consolidate wealth differences among community members and ignore secondary rights 
to land (Jansen and Roques 1998; Benjaminssen et al. 2008; Toulmin 2008; Colin et al. 
2009). 
 
Third, the policy generated competition over authority between the local land offices 
and the state land service, and then between the local land offices and the chiefs of 
fokontany. This struggle is visible in the on-going debate on legal jurisdictions: in 
essence, the concrete intervention areas of the local land offices versus those of the state 
land service. While a judicial definition of the various statuses of land exists, there is no 
clarity over the delimitations on the ground. This offers an opportunity for the more 
powerful actors (the state land service) to assert their authority at the expense of others 
(local land offices). Burnod and Andriamanalina (2017) report that the state land service 
is titling lands under its name to regain control of land and to offer this to agricultural 
investors. They use a territorial strategy to claim back their authority (Lund and Sikor 
2009). This competition has materialised in the August 2015 LPF that removed any 
proposal for increasing the jurisdictional areas of the local land offices and for 
reinforcing the legal value of the certificates. Indeed, according to Chouquer (2011) the 
state land service considers land as theirs and the state domain as a concept is regaining 
force. This institutional competition again showcases how control over land is 
constitutive of political and state power (Scott 1998; Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; 
Toulmin 2008; Sikor and Lund 2009; Lund 2011; Boone 2014; Lund 2016).  
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While open competition subsists with the state land service, local institutional bricolage 
has contributed to maintaining social consensus with the chiefs of fokontany (Cleaver 
2003; Boué 2013). This is demonstrated by the fact that a petit papier is requested in 
each application for a certificate. This policy translation then guarantees continuous 
authority for the chiefs of fokontany, enables smoother policy implementation for the 
local land office, but represents additional costs for the applicant. These local 
translations have not, however, removed the doubts farmers have regarding the 
certificates.  
 
Overall, local land offices are squeezed between the state land service and the chiefs of 
fokontany. As a newly-created administration, its authority should be recognised by 
other public authorities, by the chiefs dealing with customary tenure and by farmers to 
be valid (Benjaminssen et al. 2008). Yet, the enduring politics behind the policy 
undermine the authority of local land offices (Sikor and Lund 2009). This is detrimental 
for the certificates, as to provide security people need to trust the authority allocating 
them and value the certificates as proof of land-holding. In addition, political changes in 
the wider fabric of society, such as the political coup in Madagascar, can destabilise the 
on-going policy process (Sikor and Lund 2009). Consequently, the authority of the local 
land offices and the security procured by a certificate might be weakened.  
 
Fourth, we have seen that the policy created a new statutory land administration system. 
As opposed to the existing central state-led one, it is decentralised and applies simpler, 
low-cost and participatory solutions (see Colin et al. 2009; Zevenbergen et al. 2013; 
Byamagisha 2013; Enemark et al. 2014). Being an administration, however, it needs to 
follow clear procedures, safeguard information, and update records and practices if it 
wants to remain valid (Scott 1998; Rochegude 2005). Its governance and management 
are equally necessary for building institutional trust required to serve as the authority 
guaranteeing rights (Sikor and Lund 2009). As seen in Ankazomiriotra, local land offices 
have faced institutional and operational challenges questioning the sustainability of the 
policy, solidity of the administration, and ability of offices to offer the same level of 
protection and administrative security provided to a single certificate. 
 
The fit of the local land offices to the rural areas can also be questioned, starting with 
the technologies being used and resources available. Farmers might not apply the 
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procedures that would require, for instance, updating the records after the death of a 
relative. Such an action involves paying administrative fees for things that, in the 
perception of the farmers, do not provide extra security. They are satisfied to leave the 
situation latent until it generates tension. Also, the introduction of a new system and 
awareness-raising linked to it can provoke feelings of insecurity. Indeed, the awareness-
raising undertaken during the Kara-Tany Malaky operations in Ankazomiriotra produced 
confusion, feelings of obligation to participate in the process and fear of external threats 
among some farmers. Consequently, there is a disparity between the conceptions of the 
dominant policy narrative and the systems of meaning of farmers, where the former 
manufacture tenure insecurity and sell certification as a remedy (Olivier de Sardan 
1995). This suggests that actors external to the local space have decided what the tenure 
insecurity issue is and how to address it (see Duffy 2006 on similar case with the 
environmental sector in Madagascar). A disconnection exists between the local level and 
the national and global ones.  
 
These examples on land administration show again that tenure security is subjective and 
perceived (Migot-Adholla and Bruce 1994; Place et al. 1994; Sjaastad and Bromley 
2000; FAO 2002; Broegaard 2005; Bouquet 2009; Simbizi et al. 2014). What is a 
satisfactory level of security for one might not be  for someone else. Therefore, I argue 
it is complicated to fix tenure security at a universal level and tricky to operationalise 
the notion. In Madagascar, securing tenure was sought via a set of approaches, solutions 
and tools, such as decentralisation, certification and mapping. However, as affirmed by 
an interviewee, farmers indeed want tenure security, but not necessarily in the form of 
an administrative paper such as a certificate. 
 
By drawing on the literature on the politics of land, I have been able to highlight new 
sources of tenure insecurity that stem from how the dominant policy narrative has been 
conceived, practiced, translated, maintained and questioned. This analysis places the 
dominant policy narrative in a different light, demonstrating that tenure security is not 
solely a legal and administrative matter as largely conceived by the policy. The research 
underscores the importance of considering the authority, political, social, cultural and 
power aspects of tenure security, as well as its perceived nature. These stem from 
interactions and negotiations between social actors and institutions. The research 
consequently contributes to the literature on the politics of land by applying it to the 
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specific study of tenure security and by bringing forward a concrete case from a policy 
process.  
 
9.2.1.2. Dominant policy narrative failing to create widespread support 
 
Understanding the unintended side effects on tenure security has been possible by 
examining the policy as a dynamic process from its elaboration to its implementation. 
Regardless of these side effects, the institutional and operational challenges with the 
policy implementation, and the constant power plays, the proponents have maintained 
the dominant policy narrative. By striving to maintain their ideas, positions and interests, 
the proponents have, however, failed to create widespread support, which would have 
ensured a more sustainable implementation of the policy narrative in practice.    
 
The maintenance against all odds of the dominant policy narrative demonstrates the 
power of development ideas (Roe 1991). Its longevity can be explained by drawing on 
the framework of Li (2007) referring to the ‘practices of assemblage’ that sustain 
relations between actors. First, the narrative ‘forged alignments’ between various parties 
and brought together their ways of seeing and doing things under a common framework. 
These actors made sense of the narrative by ‘rendering it technical’ and operational. 
They reduced action in concrete technical measures such as construction of land offices 
and evaluated success in quantitative terms. They have tried to ‘manage failures and 
contradictions’ by adapting old activities to new circumstances, planning new 
approaches and piloting activities. In so doing, they have engaged in a continuous 
‘reassembling’ of the narrative. While recognising the underlying politics of land and 
weak demand on the ground, they have not addressed these issues in a proactive manner. 
Rather, they have rendered the land policy ‘anti-political’ and have ‘authorised their own 
knowledge’ by attributing difficulties to and directing critiques at their opponents – the 
state land service (Li 2007).  
 
Through these ‘practices of assemblage’, relations have stabilised among a core group 
of technical experts, donors and CSOs. The assemblage responds to their logics of 
expertise (Lavigne Delville 2006). While it has been loose and flexible towards the 
outside, adapting to changing circumstances (Müller 2015), it has failed to gain support 
among the state land service as the single most important public institution. For me, the 
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continuous opposition and power plays with the state land service not only explain the 
maintenance of the assemblage (the actors have a common enemy, as in Kumar (2014) 
on India) but also illustrate its failure to widely implement the dominant policy narrative. 
Indeed, Mosse (2005) has underscored that development policies become important 
through the actors they bring together and the alliances, coalitions and consensuses 
formed. In the Malagasy case, proponents have not been inventive enough to respond to 
power challenges, to respond to criticism, and to persuade their opponents to engage 
with their activities and assemblage (Goldman 2005). This is not necessarily detrimental 
to the dominant policy narrative as an idea which persists in the mind of the proponents 
(for Li (2007), the idea of a community forest was maintained, regardless of opposition), 
but rather its widespread implementation and success. 
 
The assemblage around the dominant policy narrative has also failed to engage in wide 
public debate on tenure security (Lavigne Delville 2006 and 2017a). Such a debate could 
have ensured a more meaningful and democratic basis for the policy locally (Larson and 
Ribot 2004) as well as enabled the mediation of different meanings associated with land 
(Li 2014). Some feedback mechanisms between levels do exist through individual 
intermediaries and brokers, as well as through CSOs. These are ways for international 
and national proponents to acknowledge institutional and operational challenges in the 
policy implementation. However, they have not proactively addressed the lack of 
popular demand for the ideas and practices of the dominant policy narrative. The 
narrative has consequently been resistant to counter-arguments and evidence that 
questions its existence (Roe 1991).  
 
The combined use of the concepts of policy narratives, assemblages and power has been 
an original way to reveal how actors conceive and operationalise policy ideas and 
practices, gather around them as well as maintain and question them using various means 
of power. I have highlighted how some ideas and practices resist regardless of opposition 
and counter evidence but with consequences on their implementation. I argue that this 
type of exploration is crucial to underscore the inherent politics and multiple 
perspectives behind any policy on land tenure. In the Malagasy example, the capturing 
of the opponents to the assemblage would have required first acknowledging the political 
nature of land and then mediating differences. 
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9.2.2. Methodological contributions  
 
This research has been qualitative, to comprehend the complexity of the policy process 
in different contexts (Mason 2002). It has been interdisciplinary, drawing on geography, 
political ecology, social anthropology and political science to understand 
representations, actions and strategies of actors on tenure security as well as the power 
dynamics and political aspects of their relations in the policy process (Olivier de Sardan 
1995; Hay 2002; Gezon 2006; Pumain 2006). I have adopted a temporal and nested 
approach where the land policy is ‘studied through’ from its elaboration to its 
implementation in different sites (see Marcus 1995; Keeley and Scoones 2003; Goldman 
2005; Mosse 2005; Tsing 2005; Wedel and Feldman 2005).    
 
I see two forms of added value in the chosen methodology. The first is to appreciate the 
dynamics of a policy that is not only about objectives, implementation of activities and 
attaining quantitative results, but interaction between social actors at global, national 
and local levels, and the everyday politics between them. I have thus been able to 
disentangle policy outcomes and explain ‘how and why they often contradict the stated 
intensions of policy makers' (Wedel et al., p.44). The second is to explain the strategies, 
positioning and relations of social actors (Lavigne Delville 2017a). In the Malagasy case 
this has meant going beyond blaming the state land service and rather trying to 
understand the agency and power of all actors involved. I have aimed to ‘uncover the 
constellation of actors, activities and influences that shape policy decisions, their 
implementation, and their results’ (Wedel et al. 2005, p.30). 
 
With these points in mind, my intention has not been to take the side of one actor over 
another, but rather to give space for all them and let them tell the story of the policy 
process. To ground the analysis in the ‘everyday life experiences and understandings’ 
(Long 1992a, p.5), I have conducted some 140 semi-structured interviews with 
representatives of IGOs, donors, the Malagasy government and administration, CSOs, 
local land offices as well as individual technical experts and farmers. I have attended to 
the content of their stories and noted how these were told and the social contexts to 
which they were linked (Riessman 1993; Gibbs 2007; Gubrium and Holstein 2009). This 
focus on stories has shed light on different actor positions, highlighted multiple realities, 
described the dynamics at play and illustrated the complexity of the policy process (Long 
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1992a; Olivier de Sardan 1995; Lavigne Delville 2009). These stories also reflect the 
coalitions and roles casted upon some actors (Hajer 1995; Adger et al. 2001).  
 
The struggle, however, in analysing the complexity of a policy process is to get into its 
essence. This starts with access to policy sites and relevant actors and understanding the 
subtleties in a set timeframe. I have not only conducted research as an outsider to the 
policy process and the local context, but also in foreign languages. This undeniably 
means that I have missed some details and my depth of comprehension is limited. 
Nevertheless, being an outsider can have advantages by being able to present some 
(hopefully) un-discovered angles of the process, for instance, underlying similarities in 
the conceptions, practices and intentions of actors as well as to demonstrate the 
unintended results of the policy process. Because my research is interpretative, these 
remain my visions of reality, but can, however, enlighten the overall complexities at 
play.  
 
9.2.3. Policy contributions 
 
The added value of ‘studying through’ the policy process and attending to the stories of 
actors is to highlight the qualitative successes and failures of the dominant policy 
narrative. Throughout the research, I have underscored the institutional and operational 
challenges with the local land offices, the low uptake of the certificates on the ground 
and the subsisting power dynamics at the national level. These have all affected the 
success of the policy and generated new sources of tenure insecurity. I discuss next five 
policy conclusions drawn from the research findings, which go beyond the usual techno-
managerial fixes and compromises (Li 2007). 
 
The first point is that tenure security should not be reduced to the registration of tenure 
rights. Researchers have consistently affirmed that land holdings in sub-Saharan African 
countries are complex, variable and fluid (Shipton and Goheen 1992). With this 
research, I have underscored that the sources of tenure insecurity are above all linked to 
authority, political, social, cultural and power relations. Yet, the practical approaches 
tend towards legal recognition and the administrative registration of rights (be it through 
decentralised, participatory and low-cost solutions) rather than being responsive to the 
arrangements on the ground, understanding authority and social processes affecting 
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tenure relations, acting in institutional arenas where negotiations are made, and 
considering the spaces and temporalities of tenure security (Rochegude 2005; Sikor and 
Müller 2009; Sjaastad and Cousins 2008; Bouquet 2009).  
 
Against this background, I concur that the statement of Shipton and Goheen (1992) still 
stands: ‘the stakes are high enough so that humility, cautious and open-minded 
experimentation, careful local observation, and time must surely be part of any 
prescription’ (p.318). This entails questioning the purposes for which any policy 
‘prescription’ is made. I then argue that establishing local land offices and issuing 
certificates were not required. These do not resolve or remove the sources of tenure 
insecurity that predominantly stem from local social and cultural relations as well as 
from power disparities. If a more formal proof of land holding is necessary locally, the 
petits papiers exist. Boué and Colin (2018) argue along similar lines, interrogating the 
added value of establishing yet another land administration. I then propose that legal 
recognition could have directly been given to the petits papiers and these administrative 
practices could have gradually been rendered more sustainable using adapted and 
available technology. This could be coupled with legal protection given to areas 
classified as PPNT. Such legal recognition can indeed procure a more widespread 
feeling of security, especially in terms of outside threats. Legal recognition of the PPNT 
already exists in law, but there have been issues rendering the protection effective and 
ensuring it is respected by the state land service (see also Burnod et al. 2013; 
Andriamanalina et al. 2014b). This scenario could then translate upstream in overall 
policy guidance, legal protection of all land falling under PPNT and respect of 
administrative frameworks and principles, and downstream in community-based 
management of tenure relations and social mediation of conflicts. These proposals 
somewhat follow the thinking of Fitzpatrick (2005) who suggests adapting 
administrative solutions for securing tenure to the sources of insecurity. The caveat is 
that the proposals do not remove the inherent power dynamics and inequalities inside 
local communities, which call for other types of social protection; nor do they remove 
the unwillingness of the state land service to recognise the PPNT (Burnod, Andrianirina-
Ratsialonana et al. 2014), which demands paying attention to the politics of land and the 
way in which policy processes are conducted.  
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The second point concerns the conduct of the policy as a process of change. I argue that 
land policies that improve access to services and document already existing rights often 
adopt a techno-managerial bias. They fail to consider the diverse interests linked to land 
and deal with the political dimension of tenure relations (MacPherson 1978; Li 2014). 
This should be attended to by considering how the policy development and 
implementation processes are led, managed and controlled, as a way of creating 
legitimacy and ownership.  
 
The research findings demonstrate that the Malagasy land policy questioned the well-
established position of the state land service that (understandably) felt threatened. Yet, 
trying to implement a change process without listening to the state land service and 
gaining its support as the key government agency has been fatal. This failure happened 
already during the preparation of the 2005 LPF. Interviews with both proponents and 
opponents confirmed that there was no attempt to find a broad consensus. Instead, a 
clear-cut opposition was established, consolidated by the 2005 LPF and unresolved ever 
since. Consequently, as stated by Mosse (2005), ‘governance brought by development 
schemes cannot be imposed; it requires collaboration and compromise’, it demands the 
social production and maintenance of policy interpretations, and it calls for ‘the strategic 
generation/manipulation of a network of actors within different discourses’ (p.7 and 8). 
This has not been the case in Madagascar towards the opponents of the dominant policy 
narrative. 
 
The third point is that decentralisation has been incomplete, starting from the legal 
prescriptions on the status of land. Indeed, the municipalities do not have authority to 
act on all land under their jurisdiction, but on that considered appropriated and used. The 
titled and unused land remained the responsibility of the state land service. This has then 
opened a means for the service to contest the definition of appropriated and used land. 
The power plays that have emerged have furthermore enabled the service to impose 
other limitations on decentralisation, as shown throughout the empirical chapters (see 
also Ribot et al. 2006). The paradox is that the decentralised approaches exist thanks to 
the central state, but at the same time act against it (Chouquer 2011). Yet, as argued by 
Larson and Ribot (2004), in theory there should not be a tension between a strong central 
state and decentralised authorities:  
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Decentralisation should strengthen both central and local government. It is not 
about dismantling the state in order to replace it with local democratic sovereigns. 
Decentralisation is about bringing the state back in, but this time as a positive and 
legitimate democratic institution.  
(p.7) 
 
As I have maintained, the pitfall in Madagascar was that the proponents of the dominant 
policy narrative failed to integrate the state land service into their assemblage. The 
decentralisation neither built on a solid democratic basis and popular participation on 
the ground (see Larson and Ribot 2004), nor involved a transfer of resources from the 
central state to the municipalities or reduced the levels of administration of land (see Le 
Bris and Paulais 2007).  
 
The fourth point is that if ever a land administration is created, it should be sustainable 
from the outset. The examples from Ankazomiriotra and policy evaluations indicate that 
there was a failure to address the sustainability of the system and thus the security 
provided by the certificates (Comby 2011). Yet, these are basic principles of land 
administration. FAO (2017a and b), for instance, reminds that there is a need to address 
mechanisms for the maintenance of the system and the updating of records when the 
process for recognition of rights is designed, to ensure effective operating budgets, to 
take care of management and to have a service focused on customers. The operations of 
the land administration system, as well as the guarantee of the symmetry and availability 
of information, are furthermore constitutive of legal and administrative tenure security 
(Simbizi et al. 2014). Technical and financial sustainability might in turn require cross-
subsidies and exchange between smaller and bigger offices (see Hilhorst 2010), but these 
interactions have not worked in the Malagasy case.  
 
Finally, the Malagasy land policy opted for a sporadic voluntary registration of rights, 
when it could have had better quantitative and qualitative results through systematic 
registration. In fact, research shows that systematic solutions are cheaper, fairer, more 
efficient and more democratic (Dickerman et al. 1989). FAO (2017a) furthermore 
affirms that the whole of society should benefit if a national registration policy is 
introduced. Therefore, a wide distribution can only be achieved through a systematic 
registration that includes comprehensive awareness-raising, inclusive adjudication 
processes (local recognition), effective public scrutiny, and financing from government 
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or by donors. Yet, one still needs to consider which lands are included in such a process, 
and that is an inherently political decision. 
 
 
9.3. Conclusion  
 
The originality of this research has been to deconstruct the Malagasy land policy process 
and analyse it from the angle of tenure security. Based on this research, my overarching 
argument is that tenure security in land policies should be considered from multiple 
perspectives and throughout the policy process, attending to the politics of land. First, it 
is about going to the roots of the notion by considering it as a matter of social actors and 
institutions validating, guaranteeing and protecting rights to land (FAO 2002; Lavigne 
Delville 2010) and acknowledging its subjectivities. Second, it is about elucidating the 
sources of and conditions for tenure (in)security that stem from authority, political, 
social, cultural and power relations between actors and institutions in relation to land. 
Third, it is about considering policy development and implementation processes, 
attending to the side effects of practices of securing tenure. Fourthly, it is about 
scrutinising it in relation to global, national and local power plays investigating the 
influence of politics of land on tenure security. Fifthly, it is about recognising the 
policies as a process where the creation of legitimacy and ownership among actors are 
more important than the sole construction of policy ideas and their implementation on 
the ground. These considerations are required to prevent enhancing existing or creating 
new sources of tenure insecurity and to avoid implementation failures of policies.  
 
I argue that this widening of perspectives is even more important when tenure security 
has become a key object for public policies and an indicator of their success. There is a 
need for a paradigm shift that goes beyond the resistant policy narratives and blueprint 
solutions centred around legal recognition and administrative registration of land rights 
as well as their most recent variants on mapping (Roe 1991). For research, this can entail 
examining the forces behind the hegemony of land registration in different policy 
contexts. It also means strengthening the focus on the politics of land and analysing the 
way power manifests in land policies. An enhanced understanding of these matters, in 
line of this research, is required to conceive alternative strategies and practices that 
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foresees tenure security through means other than the simple recognition and registration 
of tenure rights.  
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Appendix 1. Organisation of the data collection 
 
Location Target Data collection 
method 
2015 2016  
(number of month) 
2017  
(number of 
month) 
 3 1
2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 1
0 
1
1 
1
2 
1 1
0 
1
1 
1
2 
Washington 
D.C. 
World Bank Conference; 
Global and national actors (Government, 
Inter-Governmental Organisations 
(IGOs), donors, CSOs, individual experts) 
Event 
ethnography 
x    x             
Valencia WFAL; Global and national actors 
(Government, IGOs, donors, CSOs, 
individual experts) 
Event 
ethnography 
     x            
Antsirabe Regional workshops, study tours; 
Regional actors (Representatives of the 
region, deconcentrated state land 
administration, CSOs, private sector, 
individual experts) 
Observations 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 
   x x x x x x  x x     x 
Ankazomiriotra Life in the municipality; 
Local actors (Local land office, CRIF, 
chiefs of fokontany, farmers)  
Observations 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
     x x x x  x x     x 
Antananarivo National seminars and workshops; Global 
and national actors (Government, IGOs, 
donors, CSOs, individual experts)   
Observations 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 x x x  x     x x x   x x 
Paris 
(+ skype) 
Workshops; Global actors 
(Donors, private players, individual 
experts, CSOs) 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
         x    x    
Rome 
(+ skype) 
Workshops; Global actors  
(IGOs, donors, CSOs) 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
         x    x x   
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Appendix 2. Practices of securing tenure from the 1980s until 2005  
 
The land policy takes an inspiration from multiple practices that had been tested and piloted under programmes of natural resources management, 
agricultural development and land tenure since the 1980s/1990s. The table below shows that tenure questions were rooted into other sectorial 
programmes (natural resource management and agricultural development) as a concern for more effective actions. In addition, simplified cadastre 
and registration activities were piloted with an objective of efficiency and out-reach to rural populations. The experiences stemming from these 
programmes nourished the thinking of technical experts and donors on the practices to be piloted under the 2005 policy which exclusively focused 
on land tenure. 
 
 By whom Where When Objectives Practices of securing 
tenure 
Challenges 
National 
Environmental 
Programme 1 
 
Ministry of 
Environment, the 
World Bank 
National End of 
1980s, 
1990s  
 
Integrated conservation 
and development 
project. Securing of 
tenure was seen as a 
condition for 
sustainable 
development. 
Development of 
cadastre for protected 
areas 
 
Difficult association 
of conservation and 
development 
concerns. Little 
participation of local 
populations. 
Simplified 
cadastral 
operations on state 
land (ODOC - 
Opération 
domaniale 
concertée) 
State land service, 
ONG Care, Fifata 
Cap Masoala End of 
1980s, 
1990s 
Development of 
cadastral operations 
Grouped demands for 
the acquisition and 
registration of state 
lands 
Initiated by state land 
service. Remained 
complicated. 
Project Imamba-
Ivakaka; 
Watershed 
management 
project. 
Ministry of 
Agriculture; AfD 
Lac Alaotra 1989-
1993 
Tenure component 
sought to secure land 
of farmers who 
participated in 
Provision of titles 
through simplified 
processes. A ‘Mother’ 
title was allocated to an 
association who would 
Weak capacities of the 
state deconcentrated 
land service to 
respond to demands. 
Only 25 out of 600 
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watershed management 
activities 
divide it to ‘Child’ titles 
according to the 
number of parcels 
concerned. 
farmers received a 
title. 
Cadastre project State land service Antananarivo 1990s Digitalise cadastre in 
and around 
Antananarivo 
Digitalisation of 
cadastre to facilitate 
operations and titling 
procedures 
Regardless of 
digitalisation of 20 out 
of 29 offices no titles 
were allocated. Loss 
of digitalised data. 
Gelose. Part of 
National 
Environmental 
Programme 2. 
Ministry of 
Environment, 
National 
environmental office, 
deconcentrated state 
administrations 
National 1996 
onwards 
Management of natural 
resources by local 
communities. 
Establishment of 
management contracts 
through practices of 
mediation. 
Inventory of land tenure 
by communities and 
validation by 
deconcentrated state 
land service. 
Management rights 
transferred to local 
communities. 
Collaboration between 
state authorities and 
local communities 
Relative 
securisation of 
tenure (SFR - 
Sécurisation 
foncière relative) – 
Intermediate 
securisation of 
tenure (SFI - 
Sécurisation 
foncière 
intermédiaire) – 
Optimal 
securisation of 
tenure (SFO - 
Ministry of 
Environment, 
National 
environmental office, 
State land service 
National 1998 
onwards 
Provide gradual 
options for securing 
tenure in the context of 
Gelose 
SFR: Cartography of 
parcels; SFI: 
Cartography of parcels 
and allocation of rights 
on the ground by 
judicial authorities; 
SFO: Cartography of 
parcels, allocation of 
rights on the ground by 
judicial authorities and 
inscription of parcels on 
cadastre. 
No significant 
difference between 
pilots of simplified 
cadastral operations 
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Sécurisation 
foncière optimale) 
Contractual 
management of 
forests (GCF - 
Gestion 
contractualisée des 
forêts), Part of 
National 
Environmental 
Programme 2. 
Ministry of 
Environment, 
National 
environmental office, 
deconcentrated state 
administrations 
National 2000 
onwards 
Transfer of rights to 
manage forests to local 
communities who can 
choose the 
management option: 
right of use, economic 
valorisation or 
conservation. 
Lack of dimension of 
securing tenure. 
Applied only to 
forests. Simplification 
of contracts and lack 
of dimension of 
mediation of Gelose. 
Municipal 
cadastral/parcel 
plan 
Municipality of 
Vinaninkarena 
Vinaninkarena, 
Vakinankaratra 
End of 
1990s, 
beginning 
of 2000s 
Reduce tenure 
conflicts and increase 
fiscal incomes 
Establishment of hand 
drawn cadastral/parcel 
plans as a municipal 
reference 
Locally induced 
practice without legal 
value 
Establishment of 
communal land 
books 
Municipalities of 
Faratsiho, Isalo and 
Ankotrofotsy 
Faratsiho, 
Vakinankaratra; 
Isalo, Ihorombe 
and 
Ankotrofotsy, 
Menabe 
End of 
1990s, 
beginning 
of 2000s 
Protection against 
appropriation of lands 
Establishment of land 
books as registries of 
transactions and 
holdings at municipal 
level 
Locally induced 
practice without legal 
value 
Facilitation of the 
acquisition of titles 
by farmers 
ONG Hardi with 
funding from the 
Embassy of France; 
state deconcentrated 
land service 
Miadanandriana, 
Analamanga 
Beginning 
of 2000s 
Facilitate the access of 
farmers to titles 
Subvention of costs 
related to the 
acquisition of titles by 
farmers 
Unclear expenses; 
length of procedures 
Sources: Maldidier (2001), Teyssier et al. (2007), Arial (2008); interviews 
 
282 
 
Appendix 3. Comparison of differences between May and August 
2015 LPFs 
 
May 2015 (in French) August 2015 (in French) Differences (in English) 
A. Pourquoi consolider la politique foncière 
1. Perspectives historiques 
2. Les acquis de la réforme foncière de 2005 
3. Constats 
4. Enjeux 
5. Une politique en cohérence avec les cadres existants 
6. Un processus participatif et inclusif 
B. Vision, objectifs et principes de la Lettre de politique foncière 
1. Vision et finalité 
 L’intensification de 
l’opération de sécurisation 
foncière massive. 
The August LPF has 
added the massive 
intensification of 
operations of securing 
tenure as a final 
outcome.  
2. Objectifs 
C. Orientations et axes stratégiques 
Orientation 1. Sécuriser les droits dans leurs diversité 
Axe 1.1. Actualiser l’information foncière liée à l’immatriculation et à la Propriété 
Privée Titrée (PPT) en partant des réalités de terrain 
Les problèmes existants sur 
les terrains régis par des 
textes obsolètes ou 
abandonnés de longue date 
par leurs propriétaires mais 
occupés par des tiers seront 
résolus à court terme. Sur la 
base d’une identification 
préalable, et selon des 
procédures simplifiées, 
innovantes et peu coûteuses, 
les terrains seront enregistrés 
au nom de leurs occupants 
légitimes.  
Les problèmes existants sur 
les terrains régis par des 
textes obsolètes ou 
abandonnés de longue date 
par leurs propriétaires mais 
occupés par des tiers seront 
résolus à court terme. Sur la 
base d’une identification 
préalable, et selon des 
procédures simplifiées, 
innovantes et peu coûteuses, 
les terrains seront enregistrés 
au nom de leurs occupants 
actuels sous certaines 
conditions fixée par la 
règlementation.  
The August LPF does 
not make reference 
anymore on the 
registration of land 
under the name of the 
legitimate occupants on 
land that is 
administrated by 
obsolete legal texts. It 
talks about the 
registration of land 
under the name of 
current occupants and 
under certain conditions 
fixed by the regulations.  
 
> The legitimate use of 
land administered by 
obsolete legal texts is 
questioned. This could 
change the basis on 
which rights are 
recognised on those 
lands.  
Les opérations cadastrales 
inachevées seront 
régularisées pour permettre 
la sécurisation des droits sur 
la base des acquis (PVCB, 
acte de jugement) et des 
Les opérations cadastrales 
inachevées seront 
régularisées et finalisées pour 
permettre la sécurisation des 
droits sur la base des acquis 
(PVCB, acte de jugement) et 
The August LPF has 
removed reference to the 
possibility to certify 
lands in areas where 
unachieved cadastral 
operations have taken 
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situations actuelles par 
l’immatriculation, ou la 
certification pour les cas où 
les jugements n’ont pas été 
prononcés. 
des situations actuelles par 
l’immatriculation. 
 
place and final 
judgement had not been 
made. 
   
> This means that the 
lands can only be 
entered in cadaster or 
titled. The area on which 
certification applies is 
thus reduced. 
L’importance des dossiers de 
demande d’immatriculation 
en instance sera résorbée par 
la mise en œuvre d’une 
stratégie spécifique de 
liquidation. Les usagers 
seront invités à confirmer 
leurs demandes 
d’immatriculation et à 
poursuivre la régularisation, 
à défaut de quoi, les 
demandes seront rendues 
caduques après un délai 
déterminé. 
L’importance des dossiers de 
demande d’immatriculation 
en instance sera résorbée par 
la mise en œuvre d’une 
stratégie spécifique de 
liquidation. 
 
The August LPF has 
removed the reference to 
the need of users to 
confirm their demand 
for registration. If not 
done their demands 
would not be valid after 
a certain period. 
 
> This means that once 
demands have been 
made for titling, they 
remain valid even if not 
followed up by the user. 
En l’absence d’archives, ou 
de preuve de succession, en 
cas de documents détériorés 
(boky rovitra ou autres), 
l’occupant actuel bénéficie 
d’une présomption de 
propriété qui sera reconnu 
par des procédures spéciales 
simplifiées, publiques et 
contradictoires. Ces 
procédures seront élaborées 
avec les instances 
juridictionnelles. Elles 
devront inclure l’avis d’une 
commission foncière locale 
et pourront éventuellement 
prévoir, selon les cas, la 
participation des Tribunaux 
Terriers Ambulants et des 
notaires. 
En l’absence d’archives ou 
de preuve de succession, en 
cas de documents détériorés 
(boky rovitra ou autre), 
l’occupant actuel bénéficie 
d’une présomption de 
propriété qui sera reconnu 
par des procédures spéciales, 
publiques et contradictoires. 
Ces procédures seront 
assurées par les Tribunaux 
Terriers. 
 
The August LPF has 
removed a reference 
towards simplified 
procedures (in the 
context of presumption 
of property). Instead of 
elaborating the 
procedures with judicial 
instances in general, the 
August LPF refers to 
‘Tribunaux Terriers’ 
which are related to the 
state land service only. 
The August LPF has 
removed the reference 
toward the inclusion of 
opinions of local land 
commissions.  
 
> The participation and 
the responsibility of the 
local actors are 
questioned.  
Axe 1.2. Sécuriser les espaces à gestion communautaire 
Axe 1.3. Accompagner la sécurisation des transactions et favoriser l’inscription des 
mutations 
Des outils 
d’accompagnement (modèles 
d’acte et registre, 
informations, etc.) seront mis 
 
 
The August LPF has 
removed the paragraph. 
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à disposition au niveau des 
communes (voire des 
fokontany) pour améliorer la 
sécurisation des transactions, 
dans le cas de transfert 
temporaire de droits 
(métayage, location, prêt) 
comme dans le cas de 
transferts définitifs (vente, 
donation ou succession). 
> The LPF does not 
foresee making 
available accompanying 
tools to local 
municipalities. These 
could help improve the 
security of transactions.   
Pour actualiser l’information 
foncière et favoriser 
l’inscription des mutations 
dans le livre foncier et le 
registre parcellaire, deux 
types d’actions seront 
engagées. D’une part, les 
procédures de mutation 
seront allégées : en trouvant 
des alternatives à la 
reconstitution des 
successions, en diminuant 
leurs coûts, et en optimisant 
l’organisation administrative. 
D’autre part, les droits 
d’enregistrement et la 
fiscalité portant sur la 
mutation de terrains titrés ou 
certifiés (vente, donation, 
succession) seront fortement 
réduits voire annulés (sur une 
période déterminée de 
plusieurs années). 
Pour actualiser l’information 
foncière et favoriser 
l’inscription des mutations 
dans le livre foncier, deux 
types de d’actions seront 
engagées. D’une part, les 
procédures de mutation 
seront allégées : en trouvant 
des alternatives à la 
reconstitution des 
successions et en optimisant 
l’organisation administrative.  
D’autre part, les droits 
d’enregistrement et la 
fiscalité portant sur la 
mutation de terrains titrés 
(vente, donation, succession) 
seront fortement réduits voire 
annulés (sur une période 
déterminée de plusieurs 
années). 
 
The August LPF has 
removed the reference 
towards parcel registry, 
diminution of costs and 
certificates.  
 
> By removing the 
reference towards 
certificates when talking 
about changes taking 
place because of selling, 
donation or succession, 
the August LPF 
questions the possibility 
to make changes to 
certificates.  
Axe 1.4. Mettre en place les conditions favorables pour la certification et 
l’immatriculation 
Mettre en place les 
conditions favorables pour la 
certification et 
l’immatriculation et les 
adapter au milieu urbain 
Mettre en place les 
conditions favorables pour la 
certification et 
l’immatriculation.  
 
The August LPF has 
removed the direct 
reference towards urban 
spaces. Reference to 
‘urban’ has been 
removed throughout the 
LPF.  
 
> This could be to 
contour the application 
of certification to urban 
spaces and keep it only 
as a rural issue. 
La valeur probante du 
certificat foncier sera 
consolidée afin qu’il soit 
opposable aux tiers sans 
restriction et qu’il n’y ait 
La certification sera 
consolidée et améliorée afin 
que le certificat foncier soit 
opposable aux tiers. 
The August LPF has 
removed the reference 
towards the value of the 
certificate and its same 
hierarchical position 
with titles. It only talks 
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plus de hiérarchie avec le 
titre foncier. 
about the consolidation 
and improvement of the 
certificate. 
 
> This entails that the 
title would remain, at 
least in the imagination, 
stronger than the 
certificate. 
 Toutefois, sa transformation 
en titre foncier devrait être 
requise avant toute opération 
subséquentes et/ou après un 
délai règlementaire, et ce, 
afin d’assurer, d’une part, la 
sécurisation foncière 
optimale et d’autre part, 
l’unicité de preuve de droit 
de propriété à Madagascar. 
The August LPF has 
added a new paragraph. 
It talks about the 
obligation to transfer 
certificates into titles if 
any changes are going to 
be made on them. This 
is to ensure an optimal 
security and unity of 
proofs of property in 
Madagascar.  
 
> By not allowing to 
make changes to 
certificates as such, their 
existence is questioned. 
All certificates would 
thus be transferred into 
titles as soon as changes 
are introduced to them.   
En milieu urbain, les 
procédures de certification 
seront adaptées à l’initiative 
des communes (car celles-ci 
ne peuvent pas reposer 
uniquement sur la 
reconnaissance sociale 
locale) grâce à une levée 
topographique et un éventuel 
recours au plan régulier, à 
l’ajustement de la 
commission de 
reconnaissance locale (par 
exemple en incluant la 
participation des services 
techniques de la commune), 
voire à l’utilisation de 
marqueurs physiques. 
 The August LPF has 
removed the paragraph 
that talks about 
certification processes in 
urban spaces. 
 
> This could be to 
question the recourse to 
certification in urban 
areas. 
Des opérations 
d’immatriculation collective 
innovantes seront conçues et 
développés après 
expérimentation dans des 
zones adaptées, notamment 
en urbain et périurbain. 
Des opérations 
d’immatriculation collective 
innovantes seront conçues et 
développés. 
The August LPF has 
removed reference to 
experimenting the use of 
collective titling 
processes in urban and 
peri-urban areas.  
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Orientation 2. Gérer et planifier de façon concertée les usages du foncier 
Axe 2.1. Etablir progressivement le Plans Locaux d’Occupation Foncière sur tout le 
territoire 
Axe 2.2. Identifier dans les zones prioritaires les statuts fonciers de façon participative 
Axe 2.3. Articuler la gestion foncière et la planification territoriale 
Axe 2.4. Améliorer la gestion du domaine public 
L’implication des 
Communes dans la gestion 
du Domaine Public, de l’État 
ou de la Commune, sera 
renforcée. Cela passera 
notamment par une 
redynamisation des actions 
de la police domaniale. Par 
ailleurs, le Domaine Public 
communal sera étendu aux 
espaces dédiés aux 
infrastructures communales 
(école, centre de santé…). 
L’implication des Communes 
dans la gestion du Domaine 
Public, de l’Etat ou de la 
Commune, sera renforcée. 
Cela passera notamment par 
une redynamisation des 
actions de la police 
domaniale.   
 
The August LPF has 
removed the reference 
towards the extension of 
municipal public land to 
concern local 
infrastructure. 
 
> This could be to 
restrain the control over 
and management of land 
by municipalities. 
Axe 2.5. Repréciser de façon concertée les limites et usages au sein des aires protégées 
et du domaine forestier 
Axe 2.6. Accompagner la restructuration des quartiers informels et des bidonvilles en 
milieu urbain 
Orientation 3. Faciliter l’accès et la valorisation du foncier urbain et rural 
Axe 3.1. Gérer de façon active le patrimoine de l’Etat pour sa valorisation 
Les services fonciers 
poursuivront l’inventaire du 
Domaine Privé de l’État titré 
ou affecté, et recenseront sur 
le terrain leur type de mise 
en valeur. Sur cette base, et 
en concertation avec toutes 
les parties prenantes, ils 
optimiseront ou réorienteront 
leur affectation et attribution 
en faisant de la paix sociale 
un objectif prioritaire (sur les 
terrains occupés, les 
occupants seront sécurisés 
ou, sous réserve de leurs 
acceptions, indemnisés). Sur 
les terrains affectés ou cédés 
de façon temporaire à des 
tiers (notamment via des 
baux), ils renforceront 
également la sécurisation, le 
suivi et le recouvrement des 
recettes. 
Les services fonciers 
poursuivront l’inventaire du 
Domaine Privé de l’Etat titré 
ou affecté, et recenseront sur 
le terrain leur type de mise en 
valeur. Sur cette base, ils 
optimiseront ou réorienteront 
leur affectation et attribution 
en faisant de la paix sociale 
un objectif prioritaire.   
 
The August LPF has 
removed the reference to 
consultation of all 
stakeholders when 
dealing with state lands. 
The references towards 
the securing land users 
that occupy state lands 
and the securing lands 
that have been given for 
third parties in 
permanent manner have 
also been removed.  
 
> The LPF questions the 
presence of land users in 
its lands and their 
security of tenure. 
 
Axe 3.2. Définir les modalités de création et de gestion des statuts spécifiques 
La loi précisera que les 
terrains objets de ces statuts 
spécifiques seront délimités 
dans le PLOF et sécurisés 
selon des modalités et des 
La loi précisera que les 
terrains objets de ces statuts 
spécifiques seront 
immatriculés et délimités 
dans le PLOF. 
The August LPF has 
added a reference 
towards titling of lands 
with specific status. It 
has removed the 
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coûts adaptées à chaque 
situation, sans recours 
systématique à 
l’immatriculation. 
 reference towards 
securing the lands 
according to appropriate 
modalities and costs, 
and without a systematic 
recourse to titling. 
 
> The changes reinforce 
the position of titling 
compared to securing 
lands through other 
means. 
Les zones de développement 
local seront dédiées aux 
usages et besoins locaux 
(extension de l’agriculture 
familiale, extension de 
l’habitat, extension de la 
ville, reboisement, 
investissement à petite 
échelle, 
etc.…) et gérées par les 
Collectivités Territoriales 
Décentralisées. Les terres 
seront allouées de façon 
transparente et concertée. 
Elles seront créées en priorité 
là où les besoins des 
populations et en 
infrastructures sont aigus, par 
exemple dans les zones 
urbaines et périurbaines. 
Elles pourront bénéficier 
dans certains cas à des 
populations vulnérables et à 
des usages prioritaires 
(logement urbain et social, 
agriculture de proximité, 
etc.…). Elles pourront être 
appropriées sur des 
superficies ajustées et 
certifiées. 
Les zones de développement 
local seront dédiées aux 
usages et besoins locaux 
(extension de l’agriculture 
familiale, extension de 
l’habitat, extension de la 
ville, reboisement, 
investissement à petite 
échelle, etc.…) et gérées par 
les services fonciers 
déconcentrés, dont les modes 
de gestion seront prévus par 
les textes sur les statuts 
spécifiques. Les terres seront 
allouées de façon 
transparente et concertée. 
Elles seront créées en priorité 
là où les besoins des 
populations et en 
infrastructures sont aigus, par 
exemple dans les zones 
urbaines et périurbaines. 
Elles pourront bénéficier 
dans certains cas à des 
populations vulnérables et à 
des usages prioritaires 
(logement urbain, agriculture 
de proximité, etc.…).  
 
The August LPF has 
removed the reference 
towards decentralised 
collectivities that could 
manage local 
development zones. 
Instead, responsibilities 
are given to the 
deconcentrated state 
land service. The LPF 
has removed the 
possibility to have these 
lands on adapted and 
certified areas.  
 
> Responsibilities are 
removed from 
decentralised players 
and allocated to 
deconcentrated ones. 
Restrictions are placed 
on the characteristics of 
land.  
Les zones d’investissement 
seront dédiées aux projets 
sectoriels (agricoles, 
touristiques, etc.), et gérées 
par les services fonciers en 
concertation avec les 
communes. 
Les zones d’investissement 
seront dédiées aux projets 
sectoriels (agricoles, 
touristiques, etc.), et gérées 
par les services fonciers en 
concertation avec les 
départements ministériels 
concernés. 
The August LPF has 
replaced the 
municipalities with 
concerned ministerial 
departments that will be 
consulted in the 
management of 
investment zones. 
   
> The responsibilities of 
decentralised actors are 
questioned.  
288 
 
Axe 3.3. Faciliter l’accès à la terre dans des zones dédiées au développement local et des 
zones d’investissement 
Axe 3.4. Repréciser les conditions de mise en cause de la propriété privée 
Axe 3.5. Accompagner le marché foncier urbain et rural 
Orientation 4. Améliorer et mettre en synergie la décentralisation et la déconcentration 
de la gestion foncière 
Axe 4.1. Améliorer et étendre la gestion foncière déconcentrée 
Afin de simplifier les 
procédures et de garantir un 
coût abordable aux usagers, 
les guichets uniques seront 
réorganisés et un délai 
maximum et optimal de 
traitement des dossiers sera 
instauré. 
Afin de simplifier les 
procédures et de garantir un 
coût abordable aux usagers, 
les services fonciers seront 
réorganisés en guichet 
unique. 
 
The August LPF has 
removed a reference to 
the maximum delay and 
to the optimal 
processing of cases by 
deconcentrated one-
stop-shops. 
 Valoriser les agents de 
l’Administration foncière par 
l’amélioration de leurs 
conditions de travail entre 
autres la formation, la 
protection et le cadre 
régissant la profession. 
The August LPF has 
added a new paragraph 
that entails improving 
the working conditions 
of the employees of the 
state land service.  
Axe 4.2. Améliorer et étendre la gestion foncière décentralisée 
Il s’agira de permettre à 
toutes les communes de 
disposer d’un guichet foncier 
communal pouvant instruire 
les demandes de certificat 
foncier. Par ailleurs, ce 
service sera accompagné par 
le renforcement d’autres 
fonctions dévolues à la 
commune dont, le conseil 
aux citoyens, la sécurisation 
des actes, la gestion des 
zones de développement 
local, l’appui à la résolution 
des litiges, la maitrise de la 
fiscalité foncière et 
l’aménagement du territoire. 
Il s’agira de permettre à 
toutes les communes de 
disposer d’un guichet foncier 
communal pouvant instruire 
les demandes de certificat 
foncier. Par ailleurs, ce 
service sera accompagnée  
par le renforcement d’autres 
fonctions dévolues à la 
commune dont, le conseil 
aux citoyens, l’archivage des 
actes, l’appui à la résolution 
des litiges, la maitrise de la 
fiscalité foncière et 
l’aménagement du territoire.  
 
The August LPF has 
replaced securing 
documents by their 
archival. The LPF has 
removed the reference 
towards the 
responsibilities of 
municipalities to 
manage local 
development zones.   
 
> This means reducing 
the responsibilities of 
the municipalities. 
 
Axe 4.3. Renforcer l’articulation entre les guichets fonciers communaux et les 
services fonciers déconcentrés 
En accompagnement au 
processus de 
décentralisation, 
l’articulation des services 
déconcentrés aux communes 
sera renforcée et optimisée 
en termes d’appui-conseil 
technique, de formation, de 
suivi et de contrôle de 
régularité des actes. 
En accompagnement au 
processus de 
décentralisation, 
l’articulation des services 
déconcentrés aux communes 
sera renforcée et optimisée 
en termes d’appui-conseil 
technique, de formation, de 
suivi et de contrôle de 
régularité de la procédure de 
certification. 
 
The August LPF has 
replaced the control of 
documents by the 
control of procedures of 
certification by the 
deconcentrated state 
land service.  
 
> This is to allocate 
more supervisory 
responsibilities to the 
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deconcentrated state 
land service.  
Axe 4.4. Informatiser le système d’information foncière 
Axe 4.5. Renforcer les programmes de formation destinés aux acteurs concernés par le 
foncier 
Axe 4.6. Assurer un financement optimal des institutions de gestion foncière 
Orientation 5. S’engager sur la transparence et la redevabilité  
Axe 5.1. Lutter contre la corruption  
Axe 5.2. Garantir une gouvernance foncière inclusive 
Axe 5.3. Améliorer les services et partager les informations 
Axe 5.4. Instaurer un système de renforcement de la redevabilité 
Axe 5.5. Faciliter la résolution des litiges fonciers 
D. Stratégie de mise en œuvre  
1. Principes de mise en œuvre 
Processus multi-acteurs – 
De par sa transversalité et 
des enjeux de société qu’elle 
revêt, la politique foncière 
doit être débattue, conçue, 
mise en œuvre et suivie dans 
le cadre de démarches multi-
acteurs incluant les 
techniciens de 
l’administration, des 
collectivités décentralisées, 
les élus et acteurs politiques, 
les organisations 
socioprofessionnelles, les 
privés, la recherche, et 
surtout les représentants de la 
société civile. 
Processus multi-acteurs – 
De par sa transversalité et 
des enjeux de société qu’elle 
revêt, la politique foncière 
doit être débattue, conçue, 
mise en œuvre et suivie dans 
le cadre de démarches multi-
acteurs incluant les 
représentants de 
l’administration, des 
collectivités décentralisées, 
les élus et acteurs politiques, 
les organisations 
socioprofessionnelles, les 
privés, la recherche, les 
représentants de la société 
civile et surtout les 
techniciens de 
l’Administration foncière. 
 
The August LPF has 
replaced technicians of 
the administration by 
representatives. In 
addition, instead of 
specifically including 
CSOs in policy 
processes the LPF now 
talks about specifically 
including the 
technicians of the state 
land service. 
 
> This is to highlight the 
position of the state land 
service.  
2. Suivi et évaluation de la Politique Foncière 
Organisme d’Information 
et d’accompagnement – 
L’Observatoire du Foncier 
assurera l’appui au pilotage 
du Programme National 
Foncier, son évaluation et 
contribuera aux orientations 
de la politique foncière. Il 
mettra régulièrement en 
débat avec les parties 
prenantes les résultats de ces 
travaux et les réflexions 
produites, et fournira un 
conseil aux décideurs. 
Organisme d’Information 
et d’accompagnement – 
L’Observatoire du Foncier 
assurera l’appui au pilotage 
du Programme National 
Foncier, son évaluation et 
contribuera aux orientations 
de la politique foncière. Il 
mettra régulièrement en 
débat avec les parties 
prenantes les résultats de ces 
travaux et les réflexions 
produites, et fournira un 
conseil aux décideurs. Des 
représentants des services 
fonciers y seront affectés afin 
de les accompagner. 
The August LPF has 
added a sentence. It is to 
bring along 
representatives of the 
state land service to the 
Land Observatory to 
accompany their actions.  
 
> This is to allocate 
more supervisory 
responsibilities to the 
state land service. 
3. Le Programme National Foncier (PNF) 
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Un document unique - Le 
Programme National Foncier 
sera le document planifiant la 
mise en œuvre des 
orientations de la lettre de 
Politique foncière et de leurs 
axes d’intervention. Il sera 
élaboré par l’organisme de 
coordination en concertation 
avec les différents 
organismes d’exécutions. Il 
sera validé par l’organisme 
d’orientation. La mise en 
œuvre du programme sera 
assurée par les organismes 
d’exécution concernés. 
Un document unique - Le 
Programme National Foncier 
sera le document planifiant la 
mise en œuvre des 
orientations de la lettre de 
Politique foncière et de leurs 
axes d’intervention. Il sera 
élaboré par l’organisme de 
coordination en concertation 
avec les différents 
organismes d’exécutions 
incluant les directions 
techniques ainsi que les 
autres acteurs concernés. Il 
sera validé par l’organisme 
d’orientation. La mise en 
œuvre du programme sera 
assurée par les organismes 
d’exécution concernés.  
 
The August LPF has 
added a reference 
towards the technical 
directorates of the state 
land service and other 
concerned actors 
supposed to participate 
in the elaboration of the 
PNF.  
Organisme de 
Coordination du PNF – 
Une Cellule de Coordination 
de la mise en œuvre du PNF 
veillera à la mise en œuvre 
des cinq orientations de la 
politique foncière. Elle 
coordonnera les actions et 
acteurs par une planification 
concertée des interventions. 
Cette cellule sera constituée 
d’agents de la fonction 
publique affectés, et de 
consultants privés, dont les 
compétences et disciplines 
sont en adéquation avec les 
besoins du PNF. 
Organisme de 
Coordination du PNF – 
Une cellule de coordination 
de la mise en œuvre du PNF 
veillera à la coordination de 
la mise en œuvre des cinq 
orientations de la Politique 
foncière. Cette cellule sera 
constituée d’agents de la 
fonction publique issue 
notamment de 
l’Administration foncière et 
de consultants privés dont les 
compétences et disciplines 
sont en adéquation avec les 
besoins du PNF. 
 
The August LPF has 
removed a sentence 
making reference 
towards the coordination 
of actions and actors by 
the PNF through 
concerted planning. The 
LPF has replaced 
concerned civil servants 
by civil servant 
belonging to the state 
land service. These will 
be part of the 
Coordination unit of the 
PNF. 
 
> This means ensuring 
the presence of the state 
land service in the 
Coordination unit. 
Organismes d’exécutions 
du PNF – La mise en œuvre 
des orientations et axes 
d’intervention de la Lettre de 
Politique foncière, 
impliquera l’ensemble du 
gouvernement. La place et 
rôle de chaque ministère et 
départements ministériels 
seront précisés dans le 
document de PNF. Les 
acteurs de la société civile, le 
secteur privé et les 
Collectivités Territoriales 
Décentralisées seront 
 The August LPF has 
removed the paragraph 
referring to the 
implementation 
structures of the PNF. 
The paragraph provided 
responsibilities to the 
government as a whole, 
civil society, private 
sector and decentralised 
collectivities.  
 
> This is to restrain the 
wide inclusion of actors 
in the PNF. 
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également impliqués de 
manière significative dans 
l’exécution du programme. 
Sources: Repoblikan’i Madagasikara. (2015a and b) 
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Appendix 4. Institutional actors and their responsibilities in the land 
policy implementation as set in 2005 
 
Actors Responsibilities 
Line Ministries (in the 
beginning Ministry of 
Agriculture; now M2PATE)  
State land service 
Coordination unit 
Development of policy and legal frameworks 
Coordination of the implementation of the policy  
Data collection for monitoring purposes  
Awareness raising among regional authorities, 
deconcentrated state land service and local land offices 
Donors Financial support 
Project implementation in line with the policy 
Committee of orientation and 
follow-up 
Supervision and evaluation of the implementation of the 
policy 
Regional administration 
Regional coordination units  
 
State deconcentrated land 
service 
‘Bureaux spécialisés’ 
Awareness raising and information campaigns in 
municipalities 
Choice of municipalities for the creation of local land 
offices 
 
Establishment of local land occupancy status maps 
(PLOFs) and up-dating information on titles 
Technical support to land resource and information centre 
(CRIFs), municipalities and local land offices 
Exchange of information and data (on titles and 
certificates) with CRIFs and local land offices  
Conservation of the PLOFs 
Safeguard of data 
CRIF Exchange of information and data (on titles and 
certificates) with deconcentrated state land service and 
local land offices  
Edition of certificates (on behalf of paper offices) 
Digitalisation of information on PLOFs (on behalf of 
paper offices) 
Up-dating of PLOFs 
Conservation of the PLOFs 
Safeguard of data 
Municipal councils and 
administration 
Inter-municipal structures 
(OPCI) 
 
Choice of modalities of securing tenure between i) 
endowment, ii) cadastral operations, and iii) citizen 
cadastre  
 
Choice of the type of local land office to be created 
between i) standard (with competencies in ITC; 
safeguard of data in CRIF); ii) paper (non-digitalised 
offices; digitalisation and safeguard of data by CRIF); 
and iii) mobile (shared between several municipalities; 
digitalisation and/or safeguard of data by CRIF) 
 
Establishment of inter-municipal agreements for the 
management of CRIFs and operations of mobile offices 
 
Recruitment of employees of local land offices and 
CRIFs. Payment of salaries 
 
Election of members of local recognition commission 
(e.g. Ray Aman’drenys for each fokontany) 
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Signature of certificates (by mayors) 
Local land office 
 
Reception and customer service  
Awareness raising in the municipality and in fokontanys 
 
Implementation of certification processes (instruction of 
the demand of a certificate, publicity, local recognition, 
establishment of certificate) 
 
Exchange of information and data (on titles and 
certificates) with state deconcentrated land service and 
CRIFs  
 
Digitalisation of information, up-dating and conservation 
of the PLOF (for standard offices)  
 
Management of changes to certificates 
Inscription of rights and duties to certificates   
 
Book keeping and data management 
Safeguard of certificates 
Local recognition commission Recognition of appropriations and uses of land on the 
ground 
Consultation and interviews with stakeholders (applicant, 
neighbours, testimonies) 
Customers/ end beneficiaries Demand for certificates  
Participation in local recognition commission work 
Payment of fees 
Demand for up-dating of certificates 
Sources : Rochegude (2004), LPF 2005, MAEP (2006), Droy et al. (2006), Teyssier et al. 
(2006), interviews in 2016; Table adapted from Arial (2008) 
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Appendix 5. Implementation phases of local land offices 
 
Phases 
 
 
 
I –  
Preparatory 
phase  
Steps Actions 
1.1. –  
Regional diagnoses  
Inventory of legal status of land 
Inventory of local practices of securing 
tenure 
Identification of strengths, challenges and 
opportunities 
1.2. –  
Information sessions with 
regional and local actors  
Information of regional authorities 
Establishment of regional forum on land 
Information campaigns in municipalities 
1.3. – 
Choice of plans and 
modalities for securing 
tenure   
Analysis of local tenure situations 
Concertation on the plans to manage land 
tenure 
Choice of plans to manage land tenure  
Establishment of local land office 
Information of competent authorities on the 
choices adopted  
 
II –  
Establishment 
of local land 
offices  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. – 
Definition and allocation of 
responsibilities  
Establishment of contracts 
Taking care of intermunicipal arrangements  
 
2.2. – 
Definition of competencies 
of municipalities  
Definition of legal status of land and 
competencies of local land offices 
Establishment of local land occupancy status 
maps (PLOF) 
2.3. – 
Mobilisation of competencies   
Recruitment and training of employees of 
local land offices  
Constitution of local recognition 
commissions 
2.4. – 
Equipment of local land 
offices 
Equipment of land resource and information 
centre (CRIF)  
Equipment of local land offices (standard, 
paper and mobile) 
2.5. – 
Mobilisation of financial 
resources   
Consolidation of local land offices 
Definition of fees applied in local land 
offices  
Definition of modalities of financial 
management of local or intercommunal land 
offices  
 
 
 
 
III – 
Operations of 
local land 
offices 
3.1. – 
Implementation of 
certification processes  
Instruction of the demand of a certificate 
- Deposit of the demand 
- Creation of the document and opening of 
chemise parcellaire (reference document on 
the parcels) 
- Payment of administrative fees 
 
Publicity 
- Display of the demand of a certificate for 
the occupied parcel 
- Consideration of oppositions and 
complaints  
- Renew or replacement of the members of 
the local recognition commission 
- Programming of the work of local 
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recognition commissions 
- Convocation of the members of the local 
recognition commissions and information of 
assistants 
 
Recognition 
- Identification of parcels and ascertainment 
of occupations 
- Reception of oppositions 
- Resolving of disputes and mediation 
- Writing of minutes of meeting of the local 
recognition commission work 
 
Issuing of a certificate 
- Edition of the certificate 
- Validation of the certificate 
- Payment of the procedural fees and 
issuance of the certificate 
- Remission of the certificate in case of lost 
3.2. – 
Management of changes to 
certificates 
Change of right holder in case of selling, 
donation or heritage 
Analysis of certificates in case of partition or 
non-partition 
Delivery of the certificate to the new right 
holder 
3.3. – 
Inscription of rights and 
duties   
(Lease, sharecropping, mortgage) 
Deposit of contract to the local land office 
3.4. – 
Up-dating of PLOF 
Integration of new certificates and changes in 
the database 
Integration of new titles on recently made 
demands for registration and transformation 
of certificates  
Exchange of information between local land 
offices and deconcentrates state land service 
Double conservation of the PLOF (by local 
land offices and deconcentrated state land 
service) 
Safeguard of information  
3.5. – 
Information and training 
Regular communication with authorities and 
technical services 
Regular communication with users 
Regular training of deconcentrated state land 
service and municipalities 
Regular training of members of local 
recognition commissions 
3.6. – 
Property tax 
Disposition to be foreseen in partnership with 
competent ministries 
Source: MAEP (2006) 
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Appendix 6: Synthesis of new practices proposed in the context of the land policy implementation74  
 
 By whom Where When Objectives Practices of securing 
tenure 
Challenges 
Systematic 
inventory of parcels 
Matoy development 
project 
Pilot 
municipalities 
around 
Antsirabe 
On-
going 
Inventory of all parcels 
of an area together with 
local authorities and 
people. The objective is 
to generate a full 
overview of land 
occupation. This 
information is inserted 
in PLOF and used for 
the purposes of property 
taxation. Certification 
can follow. 
Grouped certification 
upon interest of tenure 
holders. Creation of 
consensus on land 
occupations. Direct 
resolution of conflicts 
and false claims. 
 
Additional 
responsibilities for 
local land offices. 
Management and up-
dating of PLOF. 
Technical and human 
resources. 
Parcel census Some civil society 
organisations 
National Exist at 
the level 
of ideas 
Inventory of all land 
uses and users in an area 
together with local 
authorities and people. 
The objective is to 
create a complete base 
map on land uses. This 
information is inserted 
in the PLOF and used to 
create clarity over 
Protection of tenure 
rights by making 
information on land uses 
visible and public. 
Financial, technical 
and human resources. 
Extensive ground 
work. Management 
and up-dating of 
information on 
changes in land use. 
National recognition 
of local maps. 
                                                 
74 The plans and piloted activities presented in the table are evolving quickly. The intention of the table is thus to provide an idea of on-going discussions and pilots rather than present definitive 
details. 
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existing land uses, to 
make information public 
and to generate a visual 
proof of land uses. The 
base maps can help 
public authorities and 
investors assess the 
presence of tenure right 
holders in certain areas. 
Inventory of state 
lands 
 
State land service in 
association with FAO 
and the World Bank 
State lands 
over the 
country. 
Piloting in a 
municipality of 
Ankazobe in 
Analamanga 
region under 
FAO funded 
project. 
Planned Inventory of state land 
with the objective to 
know what the state 
holds and where. The 
information can be 
further used, for 
instance, to elaborate 
tenure catalogues of 
available state land for 
the benefit of investors. 
Definition in space state 
holdings. Reinforcing 
appropriation of these 
holdings. 
Status of people 
occupying titled state 
land and procedures 
taken towards them. 
Unclarity over the 
definition of what is 
(non-)appropriated and 
(non-)used land – 
legally these enter 
either under state land 
or PPNT. Risks of 
extending state control 
over land that would 
legally fall under the 
PPNT. Financial, 
technical and human 
resources. Extensive 
ground work. 
Management and up-
dating of information. 
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Delineating PPNT International technical 
experts, civil society 
organisations 
PPNT over the 
country 
Exist at 
the level 
of ideas 
Identify in space areas 
that fall under the legal 
category of PPNT (lands 
that are appropriated and 
used) and protect these 
against external claims. 
The delineation would 
enhance spatial clarity 
on the different statuses 
of land and separate the 
operational areas of the 
local land offices 
responsible for PPNT 
and the state land 
service responsible for 
state land and unused 
lands. 
Protection of PPNT 
from external claims by 
defining the areas in 
space. 
Fixing the PPNT in 
space and not allowing 
expansion of land uses 
e.g. for agricultural 
purposes. Financial, 
technical and human 
resources. Extensive 
ground work. 
Management and up-
dating of information. 
Local land use 
plans (SACs - 
Schéma 
d’aménagement 
communal) 
Policy makers, state 
land service, technical 
experts, donors, civil 
society 
Piloted by GIZ 
in Boeny 
region. To be 
implemented 
in priority in 
municipalities 
that have a 
local land 
office. 
Pilots 
on-
going. 
Exist at 
the level 
of ideas. 
Separation of land uses 
in space (e.g. 
agricultural land, 
forested areas, water 
sheds, habitation, 
investment areas, etc.) 
and definition of their 
future scenarios. 
Feeding information in 
PLOF.  
The land use plans 
could serve as a tool for 
the delineation of the 
PPNT on the PLOF. 
Participation of local 
populations, risk of 
fixing uses in space, 
sophistication of the 
tools used, human and 
financial resources, 
capacities of local land 
office to manage and 
up-date plans. 
Agricultural 
investment zones 
(ZIAs) 
State land service, 
PNF, regions, World 
Bank 
Piloted in 
Vasiana in 
Vakinankaratra 
region 
Pilot on-
going. 
Intention 
Identification of 
available lands for the 
establishment of 
investments zones for 
Provide legally secure 
and clear lands for 
investors. 
Status of people 
occupying the lands 
and procedures taken 
towards them. 
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agriculture. Local land 
use plans and the 
inventory of state lands 
could be used to identify 
these areas. 
Participation of local 
populations in the 
definition of the 
investment areas. 
Benefits generated to 
local populations. 
Disagreements on 
whether decentralised 
or deconcentrated 
institutions should be 
responsible for the 
management of these 
areas. 
Source: Interviews with international, national and regional actors 
300 
 
Appendix 7. Observation of the work of two local recognition 
commissions 
 
One morning in 2016, we attended two sessions of local recognition commission work. 
We were invited by the employee of the local land office. In overall, the recognition of 
two properties of two different owners took around 2.5 hours. The processes were 
straightforward. They were about administratively confirming the properties rather than 
managing any tenure relations. The below observations provide insights on the process. 
 
The first parcel was located at the outskirts of Ankazomiriotra and some 300m from the NR 
34. It was a fallow land bordered by housing plots and by agricultural plots used to grow 
cassava.  
 
The owner was a man in his 40s living in the centre of Ankazomiriotra. In addition to him, 
the audience included the employee of the local land office, representative of the municipality, 
the chief of fokontany, two Ray Aman’drenys and one neighbour. The neighbour was the 
owner of the plot with cassava and had a title on the land. We were recorded as visitors in the 
minutes of the meeting.  
 
The local recognition process started by studying the aerial photograph to identify the location 
of the parcel to be recognised. The photo dated back to 2006 and the situation on the field 
might have changed since (e.g. in terms of walking tracks etc.). The employee of the local 
land office had sketched the parcels with titles and certificates on the photo. As a second step, 
people looked for the beacons of the titled parcels. Some new boundary markers were also 
placed on the ground as a reference. Sticks and stones were used for this. In addition, lines 
were drawn between the boundary markers using a simple meter. These lines were sketched 
on the photo and their measurements recorded on paper. These procedures were reproduced 
on each side of the parcel. As a third step, paper work was completed and inserted in the 
‘chemise parcellaire’ opened for the case. The paper work included up-dating the drawing on 
the aerial photograph, recording measurements (e.g. distance between boundary markers) and 
signing attendance records. These papers remain as records in the local land office and only 
the overall size, form of the parcel and its identification on the aerial photograph are 
reproduced to the final certificates.  
 
Everyone participated in the identification and measurement exercise. One of the Ray 
Amand’renys was responsible for using the meter, another one for cutting and placing wooden 
sticks. The municipal officer took measurements. The chief of fokontany was observing the 
process. The employee of the local land office was drawing sketches on the aerial photo and 
filling in information on administrative papers. The neighbour arrived towards the end of the 
process only to take note of the results.  
 
At the end, everyone (us included) had to sign the form of presence. When all paper work was 
completed, the process ended and the commission (without the owner and neighbour) went to 
see the other parcel to be recognised on the same day. 
 
The second parcel was located around one kilometre out of Ankazomiriotra. It is adjacent to 
the RN 34 and to some parcels used for agriculture. The parcel is partly on a slope and crossed 
by a small walking track.  
 
The owner was a female in her 30s. The neighbour was also a woman in her 30s/ 40s, and she 
came along with her two children. 
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The owner lives in the centre of Ankazomiriotra. She had recently bought the parcel and is 
planning it for animal husbandry that is not possible in the centre.  
 
The same procedure of recognition was conducted as with the first parcel. 
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Appendix 8. Synthesis of actors, interests and means of power used in 
the context of the Malagasy land policy 
 
Actors Interests Power 
Minister Harison Reform land administration 
 
Political lead of the land policy  
 
Ensure popularity among 
beneficiaries  
 
 
Power over state land 
service  
Power to establish 
political and 
institutional settings 
 
Visible form: 
opposing to the state 
land service and 
endorsing the 2005 
LPF  
Open space: 
receptive to new 
proposals 
Other Minister(s) and line 
Ministries 
 
Guarantee adherence of and 
popularity among state land service  
 
Visible form: 
endorsing the 
different versions of 
2015 LPFs 
Hidden form: 
influencing decision-
making behind the 
scenes, deciding who 
participates in 
decision-making 
State land service – lawyers 
and surveyors  
Maintain their legal and 
administrative responsibilities  
 
Ensure continuous revenue streams 
 
Sustain state control over land  
 
 
 
Power within the 
state land service 
 
Visible form: strikes, 
everyday opposition 
Hidden form: 
holding information  
Invisible form: 
influencing ideas and 
opinions against the 
certificates 
 
Invited space: control 
of list of attendees 
Closed space: 
Control over land 
administration 
Claimed space: 
strikes 
 
National and local 
levels: acting in 
national policy 
sphere; influencing 
what happens 
locally; intervening 
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in the control of land 
by municipalities. 
Technical drafting 
committees (2005 and 2015 
LPFs; and 2016 PNF) 
Propose a land policy for the 
approval of the Government 
 
Introduce their political, legal, 
institutional and technical point of 
views 
 
 
From invited to 
closed space due to 
conceptual 
differences. 
 
Visible form: setting 
up a committee 
Hidden form: 
preparing agendas 
and issues to be 
considered; taking 
final decision behind 
closed doors 
 
National and global 
levels: acting 
nationally, seeking 
support from 
international 
frameworks. 
Technical experts – 
international and national 
Promote legal and administrative 
innovations: recognition of legitimate 
tenure rights, decentralisation and 
certification.  
 
Align with international best 
practices 
 
Maintain one’s ideas on the top of 
the policy agenda 
 
 
Power within: self-
confidence towards 
the legal and 
administrative 
innovations 
 
Visible form: 
Demonising the state 
land service.  
Hidden form: taking 
decision behind 
closed doors on what 
to write in the 2005 
and 2015 LPF 
 
Closed space: few 
experts drafting the 
2005 and 2015 LPF  
Claimed space: Seek 
political and 
financial support for 
the dominant policy 
narrative 
Donors – financial and 
technical partners 
Provide financial support 
 
Ensure adherence to decentralisation 
and certification approaches 
 
Achieve tangible results (number of 
local land offices opened, number of 
certificates delivered, area covered 
by certificates).  
 
Power to direct 
actions and decide 
implementation 
areas. 
 
Power over state 
administration.  
 
Global, national and 
local levels: bringing 
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Align with international best practice in global funds and 
ideas; influencing 
national policy 
space; engaging 
municipalities 
CSOs Render statutory land administration 
more accessible to farmers 
 
Ensure the respect of the legitimate 
tenure rights of farmers 
 
 
Power with and 
within: synergies and 
force created through 
collaboration 
 
Claimed space: 
making requests for 
policy debate, 
claiming visibility 
for farmers 
 
Global, national and 
local levels: linking 
with international 
networks; engaging 
in national policy 
space; connecting 
with farmers and 
bringing experiences 
to national arena 
Coordination unit Coordinate the implementation of the 
policy between conflicting interests 
 
Maintain cordial relations 
 
Satisfy donor requirements 
Powerless: squeezed 
between different 
interests 
 
Global, national and 
local levels  
 
 
Mayors, municipal 
councils, inter-municipal 
structures, CRIFs and local 
land offices 
Satisfy national and donor 
requirements. Implement the policy 
as per orders from the capital  
 
Ensure adherence to legal and 
administrative requirements 
 
Provide information and services to 
farmers. Ensure popularity. Avoid 
conflicts and tensions 
Powerless: 
responding to 
national requests and 
local expectations; 
lack of financial and 
human resources 
 
Global, national and 
local levels: 
dependent of donor 
funding, distant 
linkages to national 
policy sphere, acting 
locally 
Chiefs of fokontany Act as interface between the local 
land offices and farmers.  
 
Facilitate demands for certificates 
Claimed space: 
Claiming a role for 
themselves 
Local recognition 
commission 
Recognise appropriations and uses of 
land 
 
Not to jeopardise one’s position.  
Power to influence 
final decisions 
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Avoid conflict. Maintain cordial 
relations.  
Hidden form: 
decisions taken 
behind the 
background 
Invited space: 
convening upon 
invitation 
Beneficiaries - farmers Acquire a statutory recognition for 
legitimate tenure rights 
 
Consolidate holdings 
Power to request a 
certificate. 
Power with self-
confidence 
Power within 
networks  
Power over non-
beneficiaries 
Sources: Rowlands (1995); Gaventa (2006) 
 
 
